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Abstract 
This thesis compares agricultural input subsidies and social cash transfers as alternative policy 
levers for addressing vulnerability to hunger in Malawi. Input subsidies stimulate yield growth 
in agriculture, and can improve the food security of food-deficit small farmers both directly and 
indirectly. Social cash transfers directly support the immediate consumption needs of 
populations at risk of missing minimum food entitlements. The two policies interact both as 
livelihood complements and as competitors for fiscal space. Research to date has provided little 
comparative evidence on such interactions and their effects. The thesis objective is to gain a 
deeper understanding than hitherto available of these policy options, which in Malawi are 
characterised by confusion concerning their roles in achieving a sustainable reduction in 
vulnerability and deprivation. 
 
In Malawi both policies were introduced in 2005/06, following five years of recurrent national 
food crises. The input subsidy programme (ISP) is a national programme targeting over 50 per 
cent of Malawi’s 3.2 million farm families every year. Social cash transfers, in contrast, are 
pilot schemes in seven of the 28 districts, and aim to cover the 10 per cent of households 
identified as ultra poor and labour constrained. The research involved the use of secondary data 
sources combined with a fieldwork in Mchinji district, which was the first pilot site for social 
cash transfers in 2006. 
 
The research demonstrates the difficulty in Malawi of constructing a policy environment that 
can enduringly reduce the proneness of the rural population to hunger and deprivation. The ISP 
appears to have more than doubled maize output according to official figures but caution is 
indicated regarding the true magnitude of output gains realised. For social cash transfers, 
evidence suggests positive food security and livelihood impacts but important caveats are 
identified. Overall, the thesis contributes to the growing awareness that one strategy on its own 
cannot be relied upon to achieve sustainable vulnerability reduction; a portfolio of instruments 
that address differing needs is advised, while carefully considering complementarities and trade-
offs between them. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis addresses the problem of vulnerability to hunger in low income African 
economies, through the medium of a case-study in Malawi. Specifically, the thesis is 
concerned with alternative policies for reducing vulnerability to hunger. Some policies 
approach the problem directly in the form of food or cash transfers to those groups in the 
population considered most at risk of failing to meet their minimum food and basic needs. 
Others act indirectly by seeking to improve the income generating capabilities of vulnerable 
people. Broadly, these alternatives divide between consumption and production-led efforts to 
improve people’s food security. However, such a distinction is only useful up to a point since 
an array of policy options address different needs in different ways, and operate over different 
timescales. 
Malawi represents an appropriate case-study country to examine these policy alternatives. It is 
well-known as one of the poorest countries in Africa with a per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of US$326 per annum in 2009 (World Bank 2010b) and ranks as one of the least 
developed countries in the world according to the human development index (HDI). Malawi’s 
position in the HDI is ranked 160th out of 182 countries in 2009 (UNDP 2009, pp.171-74), 
and this relative position has barely changed over the past twenty years.1 Malawi is also one 
of a set of poor countries in Africa that have been especially prone to episodes of food 
insecurity over the past two decades. Others in this group in eastern and southern Africa are 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland (Devereux 2006). 
A high prevalence of HIV infection, estimated at 11.9 per cent of the adult (15-49 year old) 
population in 2007 (UNAIDS 2008), has added to vulnerability in Malawi due to its adverse 
effects on morbidity, mortality, life expectancy and asset depletion by affected households. 
Life expectancy at birth in Malawi in 2008 was estimated at 53, just one year more than in 
1998 (World Bank 2010b). 
There are several other reasons why a study of vulnerability and its amelioration or reduction 
in Malawi offers the opportunity to take forward policy debate about reducing extreme hunger 
and vulnerability. Earlier studies in Malawi (e.g. Government of Malawi/United Nations 
1993, Devereux 1998, 1999) made valuable contributions to the broader understanding of 
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 In 1990, Malawi was ranked 117th out of 130 countries (UNDP 1990, pp.28-9). 
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vulnerability and to the coping strategies of families both in anticipating crises and in dealing 
with shocks once they had occurred. Malawi has an unusually high nutritional dependence on 
a single crop, maize, as the dietary staple food of the population, and most maize is produced 
in just one season each calendar year making seasonality a critical aspect of household 
vulnerability. Successive Malawi governments have exhibited a policy preference for 
subsidising agricultural inputs as the means to increase yields and incomes in agriculture, and 
since 2005, the country has had a large scale, countrywide, subsidy scheme in place called the 
agricultural input subsidy programme (ISP)2. In addition, since 2006, Malawi has 
implemented a pilot social cash transfer scheme aimed at the chronic extreme poor, which had 
expanded by March 2010 to cover 28.1 thousand households in seven districts (Government 
of Malawi 2010i). 
This chapter provides the setting and groundwork for the rest of the thesis. The second section 
states the research problem upon which the thesis intends to shed light, and the research 
questions addressed by the empirical work of the thesis. This section also provides a brief 
introduction to the methodology, which is elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 4. The third 
section provides a preliminary clarification of definitions used throughout the thesis regarding 
terms such as safety nets, social transfers, categorical transfers, and social protection. These 
topics are elaborated more fully in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The fourth section sets out some 
pertinent features of Malawi for the thesis as a whole, with a particular focus on rural poverty, 
maize production and the price seasonality problem in the Malawi maize market which is the 
major contributor to lean season vulnerability to hunger. Finally, the fifth section of this 
chapter provides a descriptive overview of the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Thesis objective, research questions and methods 
The objective of this thesis is to gain an in-depth understanding of policy options for reducing 
vulnerability to hunger in a poor, mainly rural, African country, represented by the example of 
Malawi. This objective is informed by the persistence of hunger and deprivation in Malawi, 
and by confusion at the policy level concerning the ability of different policy instruments to 
provide satisfactory and sustainable amelioration of such deprivation. For example, in the 
current era the Malawi government has chosen decisively to prioritize agricultural input 
subsidies as its flagship policy for tackling vulnerability. However, in the midst of the 
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 From 2010, this has been renamed the farm input subsidy programme (FISP)(Government of Malawi 
2010d). 
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estimated maize output gains which have been achieved by this policy, every single year 
sizeable humanitarian transfers of food or cash transfers are required in order to overcome 
‘missing food entitlements’ that are discovered in different locations across the country3. 
Moreover, other policies for tackling chronic vulnerability to hunger are being advocated or 
are already partially in place. The main, but not the only, one of these is a social cash transfer 
scheme designed to protect the minimum acceptable consumption level of families that are 
destitute for reasons of ultra poverty, and lacking able-bodied labour in the household. 
Ideas about tackling chronic extreme poverty have evolved rapidly in the past decade, mainly 
under the umbrella term ‘social protection’, the meaning of which this chapter considers in 
greater detail in due course. The emphasis of recent ideas has been to separate for policy 
purposes transient hunger and deprivation caused by adverse events such as drought or 
conflict from chronic deprivation that is present all the time, irrespective of unusual trends or 
events. It is thought that policy responses should differ between these categories, emergency 
action only being needed for large scale or widespread catastrophes such as droughts, while 
regular social transfers can meet the needs of those persistently unable to achieve acceptable 
levels of food consumption and nutrition (Gross and Webb 2006, Tibbo and Drimie 2006, 
Devereux et al. 2008). The phrase used to capture this idea is ‘predictable funding for 
predictable needs’ (Ellis et al. 2009, p.3), and calculations have been done to demonstrate the 
lower cost to governments and donors that could accrue by switching from an emergency 
driven to continuity oriented response to chronic deprivation.4  
This shift in emphasis towards routine social transfers is only part of a complicated emerging 
picture. The preference has also shifted in the same period from providing social transfers as 
food to providing them as cash. Food transfers tend to be associated with emergency 
operations, and have known disadvantages including high delivery cost and a propensity to 
undermine local food markets. Cash transfers, by contrast, are potentially cheap to deliver and 
can support local food markets (Farrington and Slater 2006). Cash transfers can, however, 
take a variety of different forms, so policy choices are also required as between, for example, 
providing a social pension or trying to target precisely only those most in need. The variety of 
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  These are reported in routine assessments by the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
(MVAC), and are also summarised in FEWSNET monthly reports on food security in Malawi: 
http://www.fews.net/pages/country.aspx?gb=mw  
4
  As reported by Ellis et al., (2009, p.59), in the preparatory work for the Hunger Safety Nets 
Programme (HSNP) in Kenya, it was estimated that the cost per person per year would fall from 
US$79 to US$55 with a switch from emergency food aid to an equivalent continuous cash transfer.  
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such options, their strengths and weaknesses, are examined in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
Here, it suffices to state that the thesis intends to focus mainly on the policy options 
represented by agricultural input subsidies, on the one hand, and poverty targeted social cash 
transfers, on the other. 
It is tempting to pose input subsidies and cash transfers as mutually exclusive alternatives for 
tackling vulnerability that should be set in contrast and opposition to each other. However, 
this is not the stance towards them that is taken in this thesis. These policies address the 
problem of reducing vulnerability to hunger in distinct ways, over different timescales, and 
reaching rather different rural social groups. Therefore, there is broad scope for them to 
operate as complementary policies, and if both of them were in place, they might have a 
mutually reinforcing beneficial effect. Nevertheless, there is one important dimension in 
which they do compete, and that is for scarce public resources. This latter competition may be 
decisive, since if available government expenditure is devoted exclusively to one of them, 
then this on its own may rule out the other. Specifically, in the Malawi case, the government 
has chosen since 2005 to use most, if not all, of its available ‘fiscal space’5 to fund the 
agricultural input subsidy scheme. This has effectively relegated social transfers to the 
sidelines of government efforts to reduce extreme poverty and hunger, since the various 
partial schemes operating on the social transfers side depend almost entirely on project 
funding by bilateral or multilateral aid donors. The trade-offs involving fiscal space in Malawi 
is examined in Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
These considerations lead to a set of research questions about vulnerability reduction policies 
in Malawi, which this thesis sets out to tackle in pursuit of its overall objective. These 
research questions are as follows: 
(1) What are the chief sources of vulnerability to hunger in Malawi, and how have debates 
about reducing poverty and vulnerability tended to be framed in the past? 
(2) What are the criteria that distinguish different vulnerable groups, and how are the 
needs of these groups in the short and long term met by different policy levers? 
                                                 
5
  Fiscal space’ refers to the room available to government in the short term to undertake discretionary 
expenditures, when fixed commitments (e.g. civil service establishment) have been met (Heller 2005). 
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(3) What is the history of input subsidies in Malawi, and how successful have they been in 
tackling vulnerability, especially in the most recent era? 
(4) What is the history of social cash transfers in Malawi, and what is the evidence to date 
on their effectiveness at improving the food security of the extreme poor? 
(5) What does empirical investigation at community and household levels show us about 
the effectiveness of input subsidies and cash transfers for achieving family food 
security in rural Malawi? 
(6) What are the budgetary trade-offs in Malawi regarding the costs, coverage and 
effectiveness of different potential components of a vulnerability reduction strategy? 
The research underlying this thesis deployed a variety of methods in order to address its 
objective and the above research questions, and these methods are set out in full in Chapter 4. 
Since the chosen research topic spans an array of sub-topics that are infrequently juxtaposed 
to each other, substantial reliance is placed on secondary data sources in order to construct the 
analysis of the thesis. For example, an examination of input subsidies and their efficacy 
requires data on fertilizer use, yields and output in maize, as well as price and food balance 
sheet data in order to interpret the validity of estimated output trends. Likewise, secondary 
sources and data sets yield pertinent information on the scope, coverage and costs of social 
transfer schemes; especially the Mchinji social cash transfer scheme which is the case-study 
selected for detailed treatment in the thesis. Household and community level empirical 
investigations were carried out in three communities in Mchinji district in order to examine, 
over an annual cycle, the ways input subsidies and cash transfers affected the livelihood 
circumstances of recipient families. In addition, the research involved a considerable number 
of interviews with key informants involved in policy formulation or implementation at 
central, district and more local levels; and in this context the principle of triangulation was 
applied in order to cross check the veracity of different views on the policies under 
consideration and their implementation. 
1.3 Vulnerability, input subsidies, social transfers and social protection 
This section sets out in a preliminary way the understandings adopted by this thesis 
concerning vulnerability, input subsidies and social transfers. These topics are covered in 
substantially greater detail in the literature review of Chapter 2. Of relevance, too, and also 
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touched upon here is the term ‘social protection’ over which quite a lot of confusion exists 
concerning its coverage and focus in the poverty reduction policy arena.  
Vulnerability is a term that evokes weakness and risk of falling prey to an adverse cause 
(Chambers 1989). Other terms for vulnerability are ‘susceptible to’ or ‘prone to’, interpreted 
in the same sense of not having the strength to withstand an adverse event or circumstance. In 
the food security and social transfer literature, vulnerability tends to refer almost entirely to 
vulnerability to hunger, and it is in this sense that it is used throughout this thesis. In other 
words, the thesis does not address other vulnerabilities to which individuals or families may 
be prone such as physical violence, or disempowerment or abuse. However, even when 
narrowed down to ‘vulnerability to hunger’, the term vulnerability requires further 
elucidation, especially to distinguish it from poverty (Swift 1989, Dercon 2002, Ellis 2003). 
While poverty refers to the failure to attain a minimum acceptable consumption level of food 
and basic needs, vulnerability refers to the risk of shocks occurring to people’s livelihoods, 
and their ability to deal with such shocks when they occur (Devereux 2002b). This definition 
of vulnerability has two clearly interlocking components. On the one hand, there is the ‘risk’ 
component. Other things being equal, the higher and the more diverse the risks confronted by 
families, the more vulnerable they are. On the other hand, there is the ‘ability to deal with 
shocks’ component. In general, the more assets people own (land, livestock, tools, 
implements, crops in store) and the stronger their sources of income (e.g. a regular cash 
wage), the less vulnerable they are. This is because they are able to overcome adverse events 
(such as the death of an income earning member of the family, or crop failure) from resources 
they have at their own disposal. 
People are highly vulnerable when they are prone to multiple shocks, their incomes are low 
and uncertain, and they own few assets. Rising vulnerability can occur as a cumulative 
process whereby incomplete recovery occurs from successive shocks, resulting in an erosion 
of assets. One of the functions of social transfers (the so-called ‘preventative’ function) is to 
prevent this asset erosion from taking place (Guhan 1994). Vulnerability is not directly 
measurable, nevertheless various proxy indicators of vulnerability have been found useful for 
policy purposes. One set of these are measurable assets such as food stores and livestock 
holdings that can be tracked over time. Another set is provided by coping strategies such as 
reducing the portion size of meals or skipping meals altogether (Maxwell 1996, Maxwell et 
al. 1999). 
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Poverty predisposes people to vulnerability, and in any given situation there will be a very 
considerable overlap between people who are poor and those who are vulnerable. This applies 
even more so to the ‘extreme poor’ or ‘ultra poor’, often defined as those unable to secure 
even the minimum nutritional requirements for a healthy existence (Halder and Mosley 2004). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage circumstances in which poor people live in relatively 
risk free environments, with stable social and economic institutions, and are therefore poor 
but not vulnerable. Indeed, it could be said that a key aim of social transfers is to reproduce 
such circumstances, such that people’s low income does not also expose them to a high risk of 
starvation or destitution. Conversely, people in high risk environments may be non-poor but 
vulnerable, for example, if they live on a flood plain, earthquake zone or face unusually 
variable and unpredictable climatic cycles (Wisner et al. 2004). 
In poor agrarian economies like Malawi, the performance of small farm agriculture has long 
been understood to play a central role in determining the scale of national poverty, and the 
pace at which it can be reduced through economic growth. This is because in such economies, 
the majority of the poor are rural, and their livelihoods are based in crop and livestock 
production. Growth in small farm agriculture is thought to have properties of labour intensity 
and employment creation that few, if any, other sectors could match (Christiaensen and 
Demery 2007); and therefore in the development literature stimulating small farm economic 
growth has tended to be placed as a priority objective on both growth and equity grounds  
(Johnston and Kilby 1975, Lipton 1977). In the 1990s, the potential of diversity of income 
sources for reducing risk and providing pathways to higher incomes in rural areas became a 
significant subsidiary theme (Bryceson and Jamal 1997, Reardon 1997, Ellis 1998, 2000), 
leading also to policy advocacy in relation to rural non-farm enterprise (Haggblade et al. 
2008). While a wide range of policies acting on farm input and output markets in different 
ways can potentially be deployed to promote increasing yields and higher output in 
agriculture, policy fashions have changed over the years concerning the amount of 
government interference in markets that is considered advisable. Subsidies to farm inputs, 
lowering their price to farmers, are one such set of instruments the credence of which in terms 
of their costs and effectiveness has varied over the years. 
While input subsidies can cover a range of inputs including fertilizer, seeds, fuel, credit and 
machinery, for most purposes in this thesis the reference is to fertilizer subsidies since these 
are by far the most important type of input subsidy encountered in Malawi, both nowadays 
  8 
and in the past. Fertilizer subsidies are not a welfare transfer. In economic terms they seek to 
overcome sub-optimal use of a key productive input caused by risk and market failure. Small 
farmers cannot afford the high outlay on full cost fertilizers because of the prevalence of 
climate shocks that lead to crop failure and ruin, and the absence of credit markets by which 
such an outlay can be financed. Fertilizer subsidies are supposed to accomplish a transitional, 
bridging, function (see Chapter 2). They stimulate fertilizer uptake resulting in higher yields, 
more marketed surplus, higher cash incomes, more money in circulation in rural areas, 
improving rural credit markets and so on. The past wisdom was that once these outcomes had 
been achieved, the subsidies should be gradually phased out, for otherwise they would 
represent a continued substantial drain on public finances, preventing support to other 
worthwhile social and economic goals from being undertaken. 
Fertilizer subsidies do not assist the poorest and most vulnerable rural households directly, 
although they can have beneficial indirect effects. In most contemporary instances of their 
application, subsidies apply to a limited quantity of fertilizer that is targeted to small farmers. 
However, land and labour are prerequisites for productive use of fertilizer, and therefore the 
landless and those lacking active labour are excluded. Moreover, because the overall quantity 
made available at the subsidised price is rationed, a parallel market is likely to arise that does 
the job of allocating the restricted quantity available at some price between the subsidised 
price and the full price. Studies of the distribution of subsidised fertilizers tend to discover 
that the majority of eventual beneficiaries are non-poor and better off rather than poor farmers 
(Minde et al. 2008). This is so even if some attempt is made to allocate coupons to poorer 
farmers, since the latter will, in many cases, sell their coupons because they are unable to 
afford even the subsidised price that the coupon represents. 
Nevertheless, poor and vulnerable people can gain from fertilizer subsidies indirectly in three 
recognised ways. First, poor farmers who are allocated vouchers and then sell them in effect 
get a cash transfer (but this is a very expensive way of providing such a cash transfer). 
Second, lower food prices as a result of higher supply improve the food security position of 
food deficit farmers and landless rural dwellers. Third, a vibrant agriculture increases demand 
for rural labour, creating additional jobs and potentially resulting in higher rural wages 
(Dorward and Chirwa 2011). From the viewpoint of this thesis, these indirect effects are not 
regarded as the primary reasons for having a fertilizer subsidy, and they do not provide cause 
for ignoring social transfers that may be able to address a broad range of vulnerabilities to 
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hunger (including in farming populations) more directly, more effectively, or less expensively 
than fertilizer subsidies. 
Social transfers refer to welfare payments or social security provided by the state to 
designated beneficiaries in order to ensure that they can meet their minimum food security 
and basic needs. Social transfers have a long history in the now developed countries as the 
means by which unacceptable levels of deprivation experienced by the weakest members of 
society are addressed (Tabor 2002). While social transfers can potentially be made available 
for a wide variety of adverse circumstances, the core principle of modern social welfare 
systems is that they should be made available to those members of society who for lifecycle 
or other reasons outside their control are unable to provide for themselves. The main social 
groups this principle encompasses are the old, young, chronically ill, and disabled. The related 
policies are pensions, child benefits, ill health payments, and disability grants. A feature 
shared by these groups is that they are ‘dependent’, so the social or moral issue is the sharing 
of the burden of their dependency between society as a whole and their families.6 
Until relatively recently, the provision of such social transfers in the poorest developing 
countries was considered a most unlikely occurrence, simply on the grounds that the 
governments of such countries would be most unlikely to afford them (Behrendt 2008). 
However, views change, and the contemporary position is more one of placing social transfers 
in the balance against other government priorities, so that the prospects of them being funded 
are at least properly considered. This rise in the prospective role of social transfers has been 
driven partly by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) agenda (social transfers provide 
additional instruments to lift people out of poverty, or to get children into school, or to 
improve gender outcomes) (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, Grosh et al. 2008), and partly by the 
switch in thinking mentioned earlier from crisis-driven emergency responses to the provision 
of predictable transfers. 
In addition, a rather different focus in terms of beneficiaries has marked the discussion in low 
income African countries. Instead of a focus on ‘dependent’ categories of the population, the 
focus has been on targeting the extreme poor, in countries where more than half the 
population are estimated to be poor according to household income and expenditure surveys. 
The particular social transfers under consideration have therefore been ‘poverty-targeted’ 
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  Of course many older people may not be ‘dependent’ until they become frail with age, but in wage 
labour based societies they nevertheless require pensions in order to purchase food and basic needs. 
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transfers, and this emphasis has been deliberate and related to the affordability issue. If 
suitable eligibility rules could be devised, then a ‘poverty-targeted’ transfer would reach far 
fewer beneficiaries than would be captured by a categorical transfer like pensions, and might 
be affordable while tackling the most severe of all vulnerability problems (i.e. those people 
not able to secure enough food even in normal circumstances). The term ‘social cash 
transfers’ (SCTs) tends in the recent literature to refer to transfers made to beneficiaries on the 
basis of selection criteria for extreme poverty (Devereux et al. 2005).7 This is to distinguish 
this approach from social transfers in general, and from ‘categorical’ transfers like old age 
pensions. 
While SCTs are of particular interest here because the thesis explores the comparison between 
input subsidies and SCTs as instruments for attacking vulnerability to hunger in Malawi, this 
account of different types of social transfer in the low income country context is incomplete. 
Another substantial category of social transfers are seasonal safety nets of the food-for-work 
or cash-for-work variety that limit financial exposure in rather a different way, by only 
coming into existence for periods of the year or in places where the problem of incipient 
hunger is most acute. In Malawi, seasonal safety nets have played a significant hunger 
prevention role in the past, although they are declining in credibility for a number of reasons 
that are elucidated in Chapter 2, and thence are giving way to the poverty targeting approach.  
The poverty targeting approach is itself the subject of critical discussion. In pilot schemes, it 
has been found that about 65 per cent of beneficiary households are headed by persons aged 
65 years or over (Schubert 2007b), resulting in pertinent questions about the effort and cost of 
beneficiary selection, when a social pension could do the job just as well with a fraction of the 
administrative complexity. Politics also importantly enters the picture, since poverty targeted 
transfers tend to have little electoral traction, while pensions once introduced are politically 
popular and, like input subsidies in Malawi, the defence of them by a government in power is 
found to be a powerful force for re-election in countries such as Lesotho that have 
implemented them (Pelham 2007, Hagen 2008, Likoti 2008). 
Social protection is quite a confusing term. It entered the development lexicon at some point 
in the 1990s, and was being widely used by academics and international aid agencies to 
describe an extended view of social transfers by the mid first decade of the 2000s. At one 
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 Social cash transfers are permanent schemes that transfer cash on a regular and reliable basis to 
eligible beneficiaries (Schubert 2005, p.8). 
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level it is merely new terminology for the older and more widely understood notions of 
‘social security’ or ‘welfare policies’. At another, it is a broader and more inclusive term, 
covering not just social transfers, but also the rights and entitlements to transfers that citizens 
should possess, and the promotion of improving livelihoods in addition to the protection of 
minimum levels of consumption. A full discussion of difficulties around the meaning of social 
protection is deferred to Chapter 2 of this thesis. In the meantime, a widely accepted 
contemporary definition is provided by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), and is stated 
as follows: 
‘Social protection describes all public and private initiatives that provide income 
or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood 
risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall 
objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable 
and marginalised groups’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004, p.9). 
 
 
This definition contains certain basic components with which this thesis would agree. The 
chief focus is on social transfers that directly improve the consumption level of designated 
beneficiaries. However, social inclusion is also an important aspect. Social protection seeks to 
ensure that the weakest members of society are able to participate fully in social and 
economic life. Social protection also typically includes employment protection, and health 
and safety, in formal sector places of work. 
The foregoing is intended only to give a taste of the key issues that preoccupy this thesis. At 
the centre is vulnerability to hunger which is an ever present dimension of social and 
economic life in Malawi (Rethman 2006), and one which has scarcely diminished over the 
more than four decades since independence in 1964. Indeed, until the recent burst of growth 
(partly attributed to the inputs subsidy) of the period 2006-10, vulnerability in Malawi was 
considered to be spreading and intensifying due to the frequency and scale of humanitarian 
actions required in the 1990s and early 2000s. Input subsidies represent the preferred Malawi 
government policy to overcome poverty and vulnerability, but their effects need 
differentiating between different types of vulnerable people, and the claims made for their 
success require critical scrutiny. Social cash transfers have also been advocated, and are being 
piloted on quite a large scale in Malawi. However, such transfers are themselves just one of 
an array of prospective social transfers that are preoccupying social policy debate in low 
income countries and their feasibility at scale remains largely unproven. 
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1.4 Linking poverty, vulnerability and the maize economy in Malawi 
Malawi has made slow economic progress since gaining independence from Britain in 1964. 
As shown in Table 1.1 gross domestic product (GDP) measured in constant US$ has 
increased fourfold in the forty years from the late 1960s to the late 2000s. Since population 
has risen 3.4-fold in the same period, gains in per capita GDP have been really quite small 
over such a long historical period, when much of the world experienced an extended (with 
short interruptions) economic boom. Specifically, GDP per capita rose by 24 per cent overall, 
going from US$120 to US$149. By comparison over this same historical period per capita 
income in South Asia grew by 207.9 per cent from US$207 to US$639, in India by 242.5 per 
cent from US$198 to in US$676 and in China by 1,723.8 per cent from US$101 in 1965 to 
US$1,842 (World Bank 2010b). 
Table 1.1 shows that there are significant sub-periods within the overall growth trend. Strong 
growth occurred in the first two decades post-independence which, as is discussed in Chapter 
3, resulted in part from policies that favoured estate over smallholder agriculture and in part 
from nascent manufacturing in branches of industry capable of succeeding in a small 
economy (such as beer brewing, local food canning, and others). There then followed a long 
period of relative stagnation, punctuated by short sub-periods of improvement (one of these 
was in the late 1990s). 
Table 1.1: Trends in major socio- economic indicators of Malawi, 1965-2009 
Period 
(Year) 
GDP 
(constant 2000 
US$ m.) 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(%) 
Population 
(million ) 
 
Population 
growth 
(%) 
1965-69 502.8 7.6 120.2 5.0 4.2 2.5 
1970-74 660.7 6.5 137.2 3.3 4.8 3.0 
1975-79 887.2 6.0 156.8 2.6 5.6 3.3 
1980-84 996.9 1.3 151.9 -1.5 6.7 2.9 
1985-89 1,135.4 2.1 139.7 -3.2 7.9 5.4 
1990-94 1,290.8 1.3 132.3 -0.6 8.8 1.8 
1995-99 1,593.9 7.0 148.1 4.1 9.8 2.8 
2000-04 1,689.1 0.8 134.7 -2.1 11.0 2.9 
2005-09 2,164.9 7.4 149.4 4.4 12.6 2.8 
Average 1,213.5 4.4 141.1 1.3 7.9 3.0 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008f); World Bank (2010b) 
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According to the World Bank data in Table 1.1, GDP per capita in the early 2000s was 14 per 
cent lower than the average figure for the late 1970s. Not too much should be read into these 
figures since several revisions in GDP methodology and numerous exchange rate changes will 
have occurred over this period. However, researchers (e.g. Kydd and Christiansen 1982, Sahn 
and Van Frausum 1994, Harrigan 2001, Conroy et al. 2006) who have kept track of the 
Malawi economy since its early post-independence period are widely agreed that the economy 
stagnated or declined in this middle period, and this sense of stalled progress also reveals 
itself in plenty of other data, such as in rural household surveys (e.g. Ellis et al. 2003), and in 
hunger crises of the 1990s and early 2000s (Devereux 2002a, International Federation 2006). 
In the latest period, growth seems to have picked up momentum; indeed for 2007, 2008, 2009 
and 2010 estimated overall real growth rates of 9.8, 7.7, 6.7 and 7.6 per cent respectively were 
recorded (Government of Malawi 2010g). 
The most recent full household income and expenditure survey in Malawi, referred to as the 
second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), was conducted in 2004-05. This yielded a 
poverty estimate of 52.4 per cent and an ultra-poverty estimate of 22.3 per cent (Government 
of Malawi 2005b). Later in the thesis regional and district level patterns of poverty and ultra-
poverty are examined. Subsequent partial surveys (welfare monitoring surveys) conducted in 
2007 and 2008 suggest a fall in poverty and ultra poverty since 2005, down to 40 per cent and 
15 per cent for these two measures respectively in 2008 (Government of Malawi 2009h). It is 
not known how firmly such results can be treated, and it will require another full survey to 
confirm the strength or otherwise of such trends. Based on the 2004-05 results, poverty in 
Malawi is overwhelmingly rural in character. Rural poverty was estimated at 56.3 per cent, 
urban poverty at 25.4 per cent, and the rural poor corresponded to 94.5 per cent of all poor 
people in Malawi. This thesis is concerned with rural poverty and vulnerability. For this 
reason, except in passing, it does not refer to policies appropriate to urban poverty and 
deprivation. 
Malawi is a fairly unequal country. Derived from the 2004-05 IHS2, the gini coefficient of 
income inequality was 0.39 overall, with an urban inequality coefficient of 0.48 (Ellis 2011). 
Table 1.2 provides data derived from the IHS2 on mean per capita expenditure by decile for 
rural areas, urban areas and the country as a whole. In rural areas, the bottom 60 per cent of 
the population has little separating them in terms of material standards of living. Indeed, when 
converted into US$ at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the survey, only US$1.8 per 
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capita per month separates each decile from the first up to the sixth decile (Ellis 2011).8 In 
rural areas, as depicted in Figure 1.1, small changes in inter-decile per capita consumption 
occur up to the sixth decile, with steeper disparities intensifying through the seventh to tenth 
decile. The comparative picture for urban areas displays greater inequality occurring 
throughout the distribution, with especially large differences at the high income end.9 
Table 1.2: Monthly Per Capita Expenditure by Income Decile (MK per month) 
Decile 
Rural Urban National 
Mean 
Inter-
Decile 
Change 
Mean 
Inter-
Decile 
Change 
Mean 
Inter-
Decile 
Change 
1 552 - 801 - 565 - 
2 776 224 1,200 399 801 237 
3 949 174 1,511 311 988 187 
4 1,123 174 1,851 340 1,174 186 
5 1,311 188 2,231 380 1,380 206 
6 1,529 218 2,746 515 1,619 240 
7 1,802 273 3,433 687 1,923 304 
8 2,175 373 4,398 965 2,363 440 
9 2,820 645 6,624 2,226 3,154 791 
10 5,097 2,277 16,147 9,523 6,902 3,747 
 Source: Ellis (2011) 
 
Figure 1.1: Malawi rural, urban and total income distributions, by decile 
 
 Source: Data contained in Table 1.2 
                                                 
8
  The exchange rate used by Ellis (2011) was MK108.9 to the US$. 
9
  Note that it is not unusual for the first inter-decile difference to be unexpectedly large in data sets of 
this kind. This is because more statistical variation in per capita expenditure occurs in the first decile, 
where implausibly low expenditure levels may be recorded even after data cleaning. 
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The IHS2 collected a considerable amount of data pertinent to understanding vulnerability to 
hunger in Malawi, and this data was analysed by several teams who published their findings 
in key documents (e.g. Devereux et al. 2006a, Government of Malawi/World Bank 2006, 
World Bank 2007a). One of these teams summarised their findings thus: 
. . . .many Malawians are more vulnerable today than in the past because hazards 
appear to have increased – rainfall and food production are erratic, HIV/AIDS is 
spreading, markets are weak and prices are volatile – and their ability to cope has 
declined – livelihoods are dangerously undiversified, repeated shocks have 
eroded assets and savings, informal networks are less willing or able to provide 
assistance (e.g. Devereux et al. 2006a, p.14). 
 
 
The IHS2 questionnaire asked respondents to state the frequency with which shocks occurred 
to them, and the types of shock that were most serious. Ninety-five per cent of respondents 
reported one or more shocks in the preceding 5 years. The most prevalent of these were large 
rises in food prices, low crop yields due to drought or floods, illness or accident of household 
members, and death of a family member. These represent a mixture of weather-related and 
personal risks and shocks that are pervasive for rural Malawians. Factors predisposing 
households to ultra poverty in these reports were found to be large household size, more 
young children, lack of active adult labour, lack of access to land and female household 
headship. The reports also emphasised the dynamic character of poverty and vulnerability, in 
particular that successive shocks could push formerly non-poor households into poverty.  
Maize has historically played a pivotal role in social and economic life in Malawi, and this 
remains the same to this day. It is the staple food of the population and fundamental to food 
security in Malawi. Its cultivation occupies roughly 60 per cent of the cultivated area in the 
small farm sector (Government of Malawi 2008a, p.44).10 It is variously estimated that maize 
contributes between 55 per cent (Jayne et al. 2008) and 72.8 per cent (FEWSNET 2007) of all 
calories consumed by the population of Malawi. Some 97 per cent of small farmers are 
thought to grow maize (Government of Malawi 2005b). Table 1.3 presents selected indicators 
of maize production while Figure 1.2 compares trends in per capita maize production and 
consumption requirements.  
                                                 
10
 Refers to 2007/08 crop season: maize occupied 1.6 million ha, and all crops 2.6 million ha. The latter 
figure excludes coffee, macadamia nuts and cashew, which are counted in number of trees in the 
MoAFS data. 
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Table 1.3: Historical maize output and requirements 1965 to 2009 
Period 
(Year) 
Maize 
area 
(million 
ha) 
Maize 
output 
(million 
tons) 
Maize 
yield 
(kg/ ha) 
Per 
capita 
output 
(kg) 
Per capita 
surplus 
/deficit 
(kg)* 
Per capita 
surplus 
/deficit 
 (%) 
1965-69 1.01  1.05 1,057 252.56 94.16 36.6 
1970-74 1.08  1.20 1,108 249.55 91.15 35.7 
1975-79 1.06  1.25 1,171 222.72 64.32 28.2 
1980-84 1.12  1.32 1,179 198.35 39.95 20.0 
1985-89 1.20  1.36 1,129 171.47 13.07 7.2 
1990-94 1.31  1.29 976 146.40 -12.00 -29.3 
1995-99 1.20  1.63 1,269 166.12 7.72 0.8 
2000-04 1.50  1.76 1,209 161.35 2.95 -1.2 
2005-09 1.54  2.66 1,790 209.52 51.12 14.9 
Average 1.23 1.50 1,210 197.56 39.16 12.5 
   
* Author calculations based on per capita maize requirement of 158.4 kg per year, 
explained in Chapter 4.  
 
Source: Derived from data compiled from Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009f, 
2010f) and FAO (2010). 
 
It can be seen that maize output increased steadily from 1.01 million tons in late 1960s to 1.36 
million tons in the late 1980s (5-year averages). Between 1990 and 1994, production declined 
to around 1.29 million tons per year owing to many factors, discussed in Chapter 3, the 
impacts of which was reflected in the lowest recorded maize yield in the history of maize 
production in Malawi (976 kg per ha). Production picked up again to 1.63 million tons in 
1995-99, much higher than during the earlier years and reaching an average of 2.66 million 
tons in the last five years of this decade (2005-2009). These averages of course mask great 
annual fluctuations in production, especially during the first five years of the 2000s when the 
yield varied between 1,099 kg per hectare in 2000/01 and 809 kg per hectare in 2004/05. 
The maize production figures in Table 1.3 which have been graphed in Figure 1.2 are also 
pertinent to the examination of domestic maize availability per capita over the years. In recent 
years, maize output has been between 2.6 and 3.6 million tons per year. With a population of 
around 13 million people, this has meant an apparent per capita maize surplus of 15 per cent 
or 51.1 kg per capita after annual consumption requirements (about 160 kg per person per 
year). At a national aggregate level, this is well in excess of annual domestic consumption, 
and should imply that the country is more than self-sufficient in its staple food. However, it is 
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probable that production data in recent years is not quite as it seems in official statistics, a 
consideration which is examined in more detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Figure 1.2: Trends in per capita maize output and requirements 1965-2009 
 
Source: data series underlying Table 1.3 
 
 
In contrast with output the cultivated maize area has continued to rise steadily from 1.01 
million hectares in the 1960s to 1.54 million hectares in the late 2000s. There have been 
specific years when the harvested maize area has been below 1 million hectares, indeed three 
individual seasons in the period of 40 or so years. The lowest maize areas were recorded in 
1966/67 (0.86 million ha), 1979/80 (0.97 million ha) and 1995/96 (0.88 million ha) due to 
drought in the first two cases, and more widespread agricultural collapse in the last instance. 
The generally rising trend in maize area diminishes the area available to other crops, and 
limits greater diversity of food crop output in Malawi (Mloza-Banda 2005). 
The overall maize output shown in Table 1.3 is a product of cultivated area and the yield level 
achieved. In the first twenty years, maize yields grew steadily from 1,057 kg per ha in 1965-
69 to 1,179 kg per hectare in 1980-84 before declining to the lowest 976 kg per ha in the 
1990-94 period. The average yield improved in the late 1990s, but fell back again in the early 
2000s, attributable to difficult weather conditions, and (arguably) a change in the subsidised 
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fertilizer regime (to be examined later in the thesis). In the later 2000s, substantial 
improvements in yields seem to have occurred, giving rise to an average yield of 1,790 kg per 
ha in the 2005/09 period. This represents a 48 per cent increase above former long run yield 
levels; however, as in previous years, considerable annual fluctuations in yields have 
continued to occur.  
Table 1.4: Historical maize areas and yield by variety, 1985 to 2009 
Period 
(Year) 
Maize Area (million ha) Maize yield ((Kg/ha) 
Local  Composite Hybrid Local  Composite  Hybrid 
1985-89* 1.14 0.02 0.06 1,033 1,531 2,743 
1990-94 1.09 0.01 0.21 725 1,123 2,238 
1995-99 0.86 0.02 0.37 864 1,267 2,221 
2000-04 0.80 0.23 0.42 770 1,366 1,952 
2005-09 0.54 0.53 0.45 1,372 1,769 2,526 
Average 0.86 0.18 0.32 946 1,401 2,300 
 * Refers to three years from 1986 to 1989, years data is available 
Source: data provided in Table 4.3 Chapter 4 
 
The rise in maize yields in recent years represents a combination of several different factors, 
amongst which relatively benign rainfall patterns, the ISP, and changes in the variety of maize 
cultivated have all made contributions. As shown in Table 1.4, Malawi has three broad types 
of maize varieties which are local, composite (open pollinated varieties or OPV in short) and 
hybrid maize11, with farmers in recent years apparently preferring the higher yielding hybrid 
maize (Dorward et al. 2008). Serious efforts to promote hybrid maize in Malawi gathered 
momentum in 1998/99 when the government distributed free hybrid seed to every farmer 
through a nation-wide starter pack input scheme. In the subsequent scheme (the targeted input 
programme) from 2000/01 to 2004/05, policy emphasis shifted to OPVs. Since 2005/06, the 
government has promoted both hybrid and OPVs under the input subsidy programme but, as 
discussed later in Chapter 5, constraints to farmer access to the seed still persist.  
As trends in Figure 1.3 show, the area devoted to local varieties has declined from 1.2 million 
ha in 1986 to only 400,000 ha in 2009. The areas under composite varieties remained very 
low throughout the 1990s but this has grown rapidly especially with the ISP from 2005/06 
and now corresponds to a third of the cultivated area (400,000 ha). Similarly, the maize area 
                                                 
11
 These three groups of maize varieties are also referred to as flint, semi-flint and dent maize varieties, 
reflecting the relative hardness of their starch. Hybrid maize gives higher yields but there are also 
arguments that OPVs are poor friendly since they can be recycled by farmers and can do better with 
limited fertilizer (Hardy 1998, Denning et al. 2009). 
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under hybrid maize remained low until the 1998/99 crop season, when their use jumped 
upwards in connection with the introduction of the nation-wide starter pack scheme, but then 
declined during the TIP era (2001-2005)12. As can be seen in Figure 1.3 the area under these 
three groups of varieties has converged over time, so that they now represent nearly equal 
shares in the total area under maize cultivation in Malawi. 
Figure 1.3: Trends in maize area by variety, 1985 to 2009 
 
Note: Year 1986 refers to production season 1986/87 and so on. 
Source: data series underlying Table 1.4 
 
In brief summary of these contextual economic aspects of the present study (a) Malawi has a 
generally weak record of per capita income growth, and has remained one of the poorest 
countries of the world since independence in 1964, however, economic performance in the 
period 2006-10 has improved markedly; (b) the most recent full integrated household survey 
(the 2004-05 IHS2) put poverty in Malawi at 52.4 per cent, and ultra-poverty at 22.3 per cent; 
partial subsequent surveys indicate a subsequent rapid decline in the poverty rate but this must 
                                                 
12
 Four factors have been implicated in the slow adoption of hybrid maize varieties in Malawi. These are 
the historical absence of a significant settler population, a previous government growth strategy 
through estates, lack of cash to purchase inputs, and farm families’ preference for local maize (Smale 
and Heisey 1997, Smale and Jayne 2009). 
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be regarded as provisional pending proper verification; (c) vulnerability to hunger in Malawi 
was observably intensifying throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but this process may have 
been reversed in the most recent era; 13 and (d) Malawi’s reliance on maize for food security at 
national and household levels has remained a constant feature for the entire past 40 years, and 
this continues to hold true in the most recent era. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This chapter sets out the objective of this thesis to take forward contemporary policy debates 
in Malawi regarding the most appropriate combination of policy instruments for overcoming 
vulnerability to hunger in the country. The distinction is made between production oriented 
instruments, exemplified by the agricultural input subsidy programme; and consumption 
oriented instruments, exemplified by the Mchinji social cash transfer scheme. The chapter 
provides a brief summary of evolving policy ideas in relation to poverty and vulnerability 
reduction, as well as an overview of key features of the Malawi economy. Research questions 
to be addressed by the thesis are set out. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, the background ideas that inform the thesis are 
explored in relation to the wider literature. The economic rationale and the historical 
experience of inputs subsidies are examined, including changing views about them up to the 
present time. In similar fashion, evolving ideas about social welfare policies, and the different 
forms that social transfers can take are summarised. Ambiguities that occur around the term 
social protection and its scope are discussed, and clarification for the purposes of the thesis is 
provided. Finally, the chapter shows how social protection, vulnerability and agriculture are 
interwoven at the conceptual level, as well as in the reality that the most vulnerable people in 
a country like Malawi are food deficit poor farmers. 
Chapter 3 provides essential information about Malawi that is important for the argument of 
the thesis. The chapter contains an agricultural policy history of Malawi, oriented especially 
to the role of fertilizer subsidies in Malawi agricultural policy over past decades. The chapter 
also provides a history of social transfers and social transfer policies in Malawi, including 
public works programmes associated with the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), and the 
adoption of a National Safety Net Policy. The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of 
                                                 
13
 The progression of vulnerability in Malawi at the turn of the 21st century is elaborated in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4 
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politics in Malawi, and the way decentralised public administration is organised in the 
country. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with research methods. The thesis comprises three sets of methods. 
The first involves making use of data collected by the Malawi government; the second 
involves village and household level research covering 90 households in Mchinji district; and 
the third involves key informant interviews with stakeholders, often with a view to 
triangulating the interpretation of policy options provided by different respondents with 
differing ideas. The chapter summarises the collection methods for various data series 
produced by the Malawi government that play important roles in the thesis. It also describes 
the community selection and sampling approach to fieldwork, and the organisation of key 
informant interviews. 
The agricultural input subsidy programme (ISP) is examined in Chapter 5. The chapter 
provides an overview of the programme, details of its organisation (and how this has evolved 
since the programme has been in operation), economic features of the programme (coverage, 
effect on fertilizer use, amount of subsidy in successive years, cost of delivery, findings of 
programme evaluations), and a consideration of the programmes strengths and weaknesses in 
terms both of its own criteria and the interests of this thesis in vulnerability reduction. The 
chapter contains an extended section on the likelihood that maize output levels since the ISP 
was introduced have been as high as officially recognised. Price behaviour in the maize 
market in 2007 and 2008 suggests that official maize output levels are infeasible in economic 
terms, and an exercise is conducted to assess how large this discrepancy has been. 
The Malawi social cash transfer scheme, also often referred to as the Mchinji scheme from the 
district in which it was first introduced is examined in Chapter 6. This chapter provides an 
overview of social cash transfers in Malawi, the details of how the Mchinji scheme was 
implemented, how this organisation has evolved, what evaluations have had to say about the 
scheme, and strengths and weaknesses that are identified from secondary sources. The chapter 
contains an extended section that critically examines the 10 per cent principle which has 
capped the number of beneficiaries in the Mchinji scheme. Spatial patterns of poverty and 
ultra-poverty are examined, and the income distribution implications of providing the Mchinji 
level of cash transfers are considered. 
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The ISP and the social cash transfer scheme in Malawi are independent programmes but 
operate side by side in some communities, including using community targeting to select 
beneficiaries. In Chapter 7, empirical investigation of a sample of 90 households is utilised to 
examine how these programmes interact at household and community level. The chapter 
looks specifically at three main dimensions: (a) organisation and beneficiary selection; (b) 
food security differences between cash transfer recipients and non-recipients; and (c) the 
impact of ISP coupon receipt on farmer input behaviour, comparing coupon recipients with 
non-recipients, and households that received both coupons and cash transfers. 
Chapter 8 draws the threads of the thesis together in a particular way. It examines how the 
vulnerability reduction attributes of input subsidies and social cash transfers differ from each 
other, and reveal different strengths and weaknesses. It also widens out the social transfer side 
of the picture to consider other transfers such as social pensions. The chapter examines the 
ability of the Malawi government to afford subsidies or transfers, given the structure of and 
balance of government income and expenditure. The historical and current budgetary cost of 
input subsidies is examined. An exercise is conducted to show how the same budgetary outlay 
could be allocated in different ways to provide a diverse portfolio of vulnerability reduction 
policies. 
Chapter 9 is the final chapter of the thesis. The chapter returns to the objective of the thesis, 
and reviews this in the light of what the thesis has discovered. It then proceeds to summarise 
how the thesis has tackled the six research questions set out in this chapter, and the findings 
that have emerged under each of those headings. Finally, the chapter seeks to put forward a 
balanced assessment of the implications of the findings of the thesis for future vulnerability 
reduction policy in Malawi.  
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Chapter 2: Input Subsidies, Social Protection and Vulnerability 
2.1 Input Subsidies 
This chapter synthesises the background ideas that inform the topic and research questions of 
the thesis. The chapter examines the economic rationale and past experience with input 
subsidies, as well as summarising the treatment of them in recent literature. This is followed 
by a parallel tour of emerging ideas about social transfers in low income sub-Saharan Africa. 
Finally, the chapter expands on the brief introduction to vulnerability provided in Chapter 1, 
and links vulnerability ideas to social protection and farm inputs. 
Input subsidies are one amongst an array of policy levers that are used by governments in 
order to achieve output or income goals in agriculture. Other such policies include output 
price stabilisation, controls over marketing, reducing the cost of credit, constructing irrigation 
systems, developing new technologies, and diffusing new ideas through agricultural extension 
systems. In the past, in countries like Malawi, governments became deeply engaged in 
manipulating the economic environment surrounding agriculture. Often a single government 
agency, such as the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) in 
Malawi would be delegated broad powers to implement such policies, and might be 
designated monopsony powers in the purchase of crops from farmers and monopoly powers 
in the delivery of fertilizers and seed. Often, too, for equity as well as stabilization reasons, a 
single pan-territorial and pan-seasonal producer price would be fixed for key strategic crops in 
advance of the agricultural season (Harrigan 2001, Djurfeldt et al. 2005). 
Input subsidies became a popular policy instrument in low income developing countries in the 
1960s. They are associated with the recognition that small-farm agriculture could be efficient 
(Schultz 1964, Hopper 1965), which in the mid- to late-1960s overturned previous ideas about 
the non-formal or ‘traditional’ economy acting as a source of labour to the modern sector of 
the economy, including estate or plantation agriculture (Lewis 1954, Figueroa 2004).14 This 
period also saw the advent of new, higher yielding, varieties of wheat and maize which began 
to be adopted rapidly in Latin America and Asia (Herdt and Capule 1983, Dalrymple 1986b, 
                                                 
14
 Figueroa (2004) points out that the Lewis ‘dual economy’ model was not about subordinating 
agriculture to industrial development, but was about moving labour from non-accumulating sectors to 
sectors offering the potential for accumulation and growth. These latter sectors could equally be 
agricultural as industrial. 
 
  24 
1986a). A new mainstream thinking emerged, in which small farmers would be encouraged to 
make a leap forward in production technology, by combining new varieties with appropriate 
levels of inputs, and (where possible) with sufficient control over water availability 
(irrigation) in order to ensure that high yields could be attained and sustained (Johnston and 
Kilby 1975). This was the so-called Green Revolution, also sometimes referred to as the seed-
fertilizer-water revolution (Blyn 1983, Lipton and Longhurst 1989). 
The basic economics of manipulating an input price like that of fertilizer is shown in Figure 
2.1 (Ellis 1993, pp.18-26). This shows in a stylised way the relationship between the output of 
a crop like maize or rice and differing levels of fertilizer use, holding other conditions of 
production constant. It is assumed that some level of output, denominated Y1 would occur in 
the absence of fertilizer. Thereafter, output increases as fertilizer use increases; however, at a 
characteristic diminishing rate with ever larger quantities of fertilizer (the law of diminishing 
marginal returns). Eventually, a maximum level of output occurs, shown as YMAX, beyond 
which no further output gains are made for increases in the fertilizer input. 
Figure 2.1: Influencing Fertilizer Use by Changing Its Price 
  
Source: based with changes on Ellis (1993, p.24). 
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If output, Y, is expressed in value terms (i.e. the physical output multiplied by the producer 
price, Py), and if we have a price for fertilizer (Px), then the economic optimum level of output 
and fertilizer use occurs at point A on the production function, when the familiar condition is 
satisfied that: 
 MVPx = Px (1) 
 
Here, MVPx is the marginal value product of fertilizer (i.e. the additional output value 
obtained by increasing fertilizer use by one unit), and Px is the price of fertilizer. If equation 
(1) were not satisfied, then either MVPx < Px and more is being paid out for fertilizer than is 
being obtained in extra output value; or MVPx > Px in which case a greater additional value of 
output could continue to be obtained by increasing the level of fertilizer use. By rearranging 
this expression, the optimum condition can also be stated as: 
 MVPx/Px = 1 (2) 
 
In other words, the ratio of the marginal value product of an input to its price should equal 
one. This allows for a conceptually simple test for whether any variable agricultural input is 
being used by farmers is close to its efficient level of use or not. If the marginal value product 
of such inputs can be estimated (by no means a straightforward task), then statistically 
significant departures of the stated ratio from 1 would be indicative of inefficient input use by 
that group of farmers. Since the marginal value product of increasing an input like fertilizer is 
the marginal physical product multiplied by the output price (i.e. MVPx = MPPx * Py), yet 
another useful way the optimum level of input use can be expressed is in the form: 
 MPPX = Px/Py (3) 
 
The marginal physical product of a variable input like fertilizer should equal the price of the 
input divided by the price of the output. For example if the price of fertilizer is MK500 per 
kg, and the price of maize is MK50 per kg, then optimum fertilizer use occurs when the 
additional output per unit of fertilizer use (the MPP) is 10 kg. This makes it possible to see 
what happens when the price of fertilizer is reduced, holding the price of maize constant. If 
the price of fertilizer were halved, for example, to MK250, then a new optimum level of input 
use would occur when the MPP is 5 kg rather than 10 kg. The lower marginal physical 
product occurs further up the production curve, say, at point B, where fertilizer use and output 
are both higher than they are at point A. Thus, for a given technology of production, lowering 
the price of fertilizer should result in higher fertilizer use and higher output. 
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This analysis is of course highly stylised and really does no more than show the predicted 
direction of change that is expected to occur if fertilizer prices are lowered. Taken on its own, 
this would almost certainly turn out to be an exceptionally expensive way of achieving 
relatively small gains in output. In the real world of the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
perceived problem was that most small farmers were not using fertilizers at all. This was 
partly thought to be associated with their unfamiliarity with cash inputs (coming from a 
subsistence oriented economy), and partly with their inability to shoulder the risk of cash 
outlays, in the event of subsequent crop failure (Lipton 1968, Binswanger and Sillers 1983). 
In effect, the task was to get farmers to move from point Y1 to point A in Figure 2.1, not from 
point A to point B, but it was considered that low fertilizer prices (due to the reduction in risk 
this would cause) might ‘jump start’ this process. It follows that even at this simple analytical 
level, input subsidies have been regarded by agricultural economists as transitional policies, 
only to be kept in place until the desired change in farmer input use were achieved, after 
which they should be withdrawn. 
There are, of course, other aspects of fertilizer purchase by farmers that are not captured in the 
picture presented so far (Johnston and Clark 1982, Ahmed 1987, Tomich et al. 1995). The 
reliable and timely supply of fertilizer at remote rural depots is another aspect that in the 
1960s and 1970s was considered a service that the private sector would not cover adequately, 
so the state often moved into fertilizer supply management to ensure the availability problem 
was addressed. Moreover, the purchase of fertilizer occurs in a period of year (the new 
cultivation season) when all but the best off small farmers lack cash. Therefore, the advance 
of credit to farmers and their uptake of fertilizer are inextricably linked. Many experiments 
occurred (and continue to occur) with the provision of credit to farmers to enable them to 
purchase fertilizer. In the past, this credit was often at subsidised interest rates. Many different 
institutional models have been trialled, such as providing credit and fertilizer from the same 
organisation that purchases crops from farmers, allowing recoupment of the credit by 
deduction of its cost from payments made to farmers for their output. This coordination of 
different markets (in this case, credit, fertilizer and output markets) is still today considered 
by some experts a valuable feature of the parastatal era in low income African countries, that 
deserves reconsidering in cases where the private sector fails to make the necessary 
connections (Kydd and Dorward 2004, Dorward et al. 2005, Poulton et al. 2006).  
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The adoption of new technology offers an even stronger justification for input subsidies than 
promoting greater input use with an existing technology. Using the same simple tools as for 
Figure 2.1, an improvement in technology appears as a shift upwards and rightwards of the 
total product curve (Figure 2.2). The improvement in technology means that higher output is 
achieved for all different levels of fertilizer input; moreover, the new crop variety may be 
more responsive to fertilizer than traditional varieties, and over a greater range of fertilizer 
use. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 by the steeper slope of the product curve, and a much 
higher level of input use before maximum output (YMAX) for a single variable input occurs. 
The economic optimum input use for a given input/output price ratio occurs at a higher rate of 
fertilizer use than under the former technology. The same ability to shift farmers’ position 
along the product curve by lowering the fertilizer price also, of course, applies. 
 
Figure 2.2: New Technology and Stimulating a Leap in Fertilizer Use 
  
Source: adapted from Ellis (1992, p.138) 
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level of fertilizer use to which they were accustomed with the previous technology. The 
purpose of the subsidy, as in the previous case but with hoped for considerably greater gains, 
is to overcome farmer reluctance to increase fertilizer use due to risk and credit constraints, 
and to bring use close to the optimum fertilizer requirements for the new higher yielding crop 
variety. As in the previous case, however, it is not considered that this artificially low cost of 
fertilizer should remain in place indefinitely. To do so is to invite farmers to use fertilizers at 
rates of application that go beyond the optimum rate indicated by the opportunity cost of 
fertilizers to society (the world price of fertilizers), therefore creating economic inefficiency. 
Moreover, at the higher yields made possible by the new technology, it is expected that 
farmers would be unlikely to reduce fertilizer application much if a phasing out of the subsidy 
occurs.15 
A further aspect of this logic that merits brief consideration is the potential of using the 
producer price rather than the fertilizer price as the means of stimulating a change in fertilizer 
use by small farmers (Quizon 1985, Sidhu and Sidhu 1985). An implication of the efficiency 
condition stated in equation (3) above is that the same stimulus to increased fertilizer use 
could in theory occur by raising the producer price, as by lowering the fertilizer price. 
However, this is by reference to an abstract microeconomic model. In practice, small poor 
farmers either do not engage in the market at all for their staple food crop, or, if they do so, it 
is only for a small proportion of their harvest needed to meet immediate cash needs. So an 
output price rise would be filtered through complicated trade-offs between subsistence and 
sale, weakening its theoretical impact on the motivation to use more fertilizer. In addition, 
producer price rises have broader unwanted effects on the consumer price of food that most 
governments would wish to avoid, so in this comparison a fertilizer subsidy is a superior 
policy instrument. This can also be shown using partial welfare analysis (producer and 
consumer surplus). An output price rise causes a net welfare loss, whereas a fertilizer subsidy 
under specified conditions regarding their effectiveness can be shown to produce a net welfare 
gain (Barker and Hayami 1976).16 
In the 1960s and 1970s, input subsidies produced variable outcomes, especially comparing the 
Asian and African experience. In Asia, such subsidies contributed to rising fertilizer use and 
                                                 
15
 This depends on farmer response to fertilizer price changes once they have got used to usage levels 
appropriate to the high yielding varieties which they are now cultivating. 
16
 In the Barker & Hayami (1976) analysis, producer prices are artificially raised by the government 
paying farmers higher prices than the world market price. 
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yield increases which in the case of rice jumped regionally from around 1 to 4 tons per ha. In 
India, fertilizer use increased from 0.8 million tons in 1965 to 7.7 million tons in 1983 (Desai 
1986, 1988). In Indonesia, fertilizer use increased from 0.2 million tons in 1970 to 4.5 million 
tons in 1986 (Hedley and Tabor 1989, Roche 1994). Nevertheless these experiences also 
illustrate the financial costs of keeping subsidies in place long after farmers have adopted new 
varieties and the appropriate levels of fertilizer to go with them. In the Indonesia case, the 
fertilizer subsidy on its own reached 25 per cent of all government expenditure by the early-
1980s (Booth 1989, Hedley and Tabor 1989). This was in a large, industrialising, oil 
exporting country with plentiful and rising sources of tax revenue. The problem overlooked in 
Indonesia was that a subsidy that seemed manageable for fertilizer sales, say, of 0.5 million 
tons, became quite infeasible when sales reached 4 million tons. This, of course, only applies 
if unlimited supplies to meet demand are made available at the subsidised price, a 
consideration that does not apply in the contemporary Malawi case. 
While in Asia input subsidies are seen as having contributed positively to the Green 
Revolution, and were in the end phased out or reduced with little subsequent loss in yields or 
output, in Africa such gains were difficult to discern by the early 1980s (World Bank 1981). 
Many factors can be identified that contributed with varying significance to the less positive 
experience in Africa (Mellor and Ahmed 1988). Improvements in maize varieties were slower 
and more fragmented than for rice and wheat in Asia. Likewise, irrigation (which ensures the 
availability of water to plants during the period of fertilizer applications) reaches only a 
fraction of the cultivated food crop area achieved in Asia. African governments had problems 
financing sufficient supplies of fertilizer (especially after the oil price crises of 1973 and 
1979), resulting in rationing at subsidised prices. Fertilizer delivered by parastatal agencies 
became widely associated with leakages (bags disappearing from trucks and warehouses), and 
with too little being delivered to farmers too late. By the mid-1980s with the change in policy 
sentiment towards market liberalisation underway, input subsidies in Africa became one of 
the priorities for removal under the structural adjustment programmes of the international 
financial institutions (Commander 1989, Shepherd 1989, Cornia and Helleiner 1994). 
Rationing is an important issue in relation to input subsidies that is pertinent in the Malawi 
case where deliberate rationing has formed the basis of various phases of input subsidy policy 
implementation. In general, if insufficient supply is available to meet demand at a subsidised 
price, then rationing will occur. If this rationing is unplanned, being caused perhaps by 
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inadequate ordering of supplies, insufficient finance, or poorly functioning delivery systems, 
then a rather anarchic scramble for access is likely to prevail. Rationing causes a parallel 
market to arise, which will price the input at somewhere between the subsidised price and the 
full market price for the restricted level of quantity available, depending on the strength of 
demand at different price levels, and on the severity of the shortfall in availability.17 
Unfortunately rationing encourages corruption in public sector supply chains (the temptation 
to make side sales out of store increases, the greater the disparity between the subsidised and 
parallel market price) (Trivedi 1988). This also inevitably means that it is the better off 
farmers who secure most of the restricted supplies, since only they can afford either the bribes 
required in order to receive an allocation at the subsidised price, or the parallel market price. 
Malawi has followed several different variants of planned rationing of subsidised fertilizer 
supplies since the re-introduction of input subsidies with the Starter Pack Scheme (SPS) in 
1998 (detailed in Chapters 3). Under Starter Pack, the rationing took the form of allocating all 
small farmers just enough fertilizer each to cover 0.1 ha of maize. This was a universal 
scheme, so equity in distribution was a key feature (Mann 1998, Blackie and Mann 2005b). 
Starter Pack was succeeded by a Targeted Input Programme (TIP) in which a similarly very 
small quantity of seeds and fertilizer were distributed to a restricted number of beneficiaries, 
designated as those poor but able to farm (Levy and Barahona 2002, Potter 2005). In both 
SPS and TIP it is likely that some recipients sold their allocations to better off neighbours 
who were prepared to offer an attractive price for them (Levy 2005a). Therefore some upward 
‘drift’ towards better off farmers is likely to have occurred. In the most recent agricultural 
Input Subsidy Programme (ISP), rationing occurs through a coupon system (Dorward et al. 
2008), and a discussion of its distributional features is deferred to Chapter 5. 
From the mid-1980s until the late 1990s, fertilizer subsidies became substantially less 
prevalent in agricultural policy implementation in Africa. This occurred variably and 
haphazardly across the continent with stronger resistance to external pressures occurring in 
some countries than in others (Seppala 1998, Jayne et al. 2002). The liberalisation period saw 
significant falls in the proportion of public expenditure devoted to agriculture, and a 
generalised erosion and fragmentation in public services to the sector. This was to be expected 
given the external pressures placed on governments by the international financial institutions 
                                                 
17
 If imports of full price fertilizer are unrestricted then the border price would form the upper limit of 
this price range. 
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(IFIs) to decontrol markets and dismantle or privatise service institutions. Many researchers 
have interpreted emerging food crises in the 1990s as originating in these effects of 
liberalisation (Gibbon 1992, Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996, Bryceson and Jamal 1997). In 
view of this enforced retrenchment it seems somewhat disingenuous that the international 
narrative in the 2000s became one of African governments’ failures to invest in agriculture. 
This has been reiterated in numerous strategic documents including the Millennium 
Commission strategy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (UN Millennium Project 
2005), the DFID policy paper on agriculture (DFID 2005), and the 2008 World Development 
Report on agriculture (World Bank 2007b). 
There seems little doubt that fertilizer use amongst smallholder farmers declined in the 
liberalisation period (Bryceson and Jamal 1997). Various experiments were tried to make 
privatised full cost fertilizer more accessible to small farmers, for example by selling in small 
quantities in rural kiosks. In the early 2000s, free or subsidised input packages began to be 
promoted by international NGOs in order to help farmers recover from drought or floods, or 
deal with chronic food insecurity. Zambia introduced a government-led Food Security Pack 
(comprising free fertilizer and seeds) in 2000, distributed through a local NGO called the 
Programme Against Malnutrition (Jayne et al. 2006a). The World Bank and others began to 
talk about ‘smart’ input subsidies, that would be used to kick-start recovery in countries with 
languishing agricultures, but which (as in the older arguments) would be withdrawn once a 
recovery was solidly underway (World Bank 2007b, Minde et al. 2008). 
Taking this idea further, Morris et al. (2007) set out ‘ ten commandments’ that should guide 
the implementation of market smart subsidies: (1) promote the factor or product as part of a 
wider strategy that includes complementary inputs and strengthening of markets; (2) favour 
market-based solutions that do not undermine incentives for private investment; (3) promote 
competition and cost reductions by reducing barriers to entry; (4) recognize that effective 
demand from farmers is critical for long-run sustainability; (5) insist on economic efficiency 
as the basis for the fertilizer promotion effort; (6) empower farmers to make the decisions 
about soil fertility management; (7) devise an exit strategy to limit the time period of public 
interventions; (8) pursue regional integration in order to benefit from economies of market 
size; (9) emphasize sustainability as a goal when designing interventions, and, (10) promote 
pro-poor growth, in recognition of the importance of equity considerations. These are all very 
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well but they imply perhaps an unrealistic coordination capability over multiple objectives, as 
well as neglect of the politics of subsidies. 
In brief summary of the present state of affairs, the use of subsidies to promote fertilizer use 
in low income country agriculture currently seems to have a semi-legitimised status amongst 
the IFIs and aid donors, captured by the notion of ‘market smart’ subsidies. This reflects an 
ambivalent view about their role, how far they should be encouraged, and how to prevent 
them from becoming too institutionalised. 
2.2 Social Transfers 
As touched upon briefly already in Chapter 1, social transfers occupy quite a different policy 
space from input subsidies. Social transfers are a branch of social policy, and are concerned 
with ensuring the minimum welfare of the weakest and most disadvantaged members of 
society, while input subsidies are an agricultural growth policy. The two policy spheres are 
therefore distinguished at a basic level by social transfers being focused on consumption, 
while input subsidies are focused on production. In recent development policy discussion in 
Africa, these distinctions have tended to be elided, causing considerable confusion for donors, 
advocacy organisations and governments. In particular, the advocacy of ‘social protection’ 
has tended to cast a wide net, drawing in a broad range of instances in which government in 
some way ‘subsidises’ the lives of its citizens, and input subsidies have tended to get caught 
in this net too. 
This section reaches its own conclusion about the advisability of conflating input subsidies 
and welfare payments, but in the meantime ground needs to be covered concerning a number 
of critical past and current features of social transfers. All societies must grapple with the 
human and ethical problem of those members of society who for one reason or another are 
unable to support themselves through their own efforts. In traditional societies, the extended 
family and the community were the site at which such social support occurred; however, in 
the modern world the state also carries obligations to ensure that none of its citizens are 
wilfully left to perish, and this is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations 1948). The developed industrial countries experienced their own past 
political struggles to achieve social transfers to disadvantaged or excluded social groups; 
however, the scope, coverage and generosity of such transfers remain debated issues, never 
fully resolved in any country. 
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Social transfers can be divided into various different categories, distinguished according to 
differences in their financing, coverage and nature of beneficiaries’ eligibility to receive them 
(Tabor 2002). A first such distinction is between transfers that do not rely on past 
contributions for their funding, from those that are mainly funded through contributions paid 
by their intended beneficiaries. Non-contributory transfers represent obligations taken on by 
the state to support different categories of people in need, without prior payments made by 
recipients. Such transfers tend to be referred to in the literature as ‘social assistance’ (Norton 
et al. 2001). An example would be disability grants paid to all registered disabled people, or 
an old age pension made to all citizens above a certain age without prior contributions. 
Botswana, for example, has a non-contributory social pension, introduced in 1996 (Casey and 
McKinnon 2009). 
Contributory transfers are transfers to which people become entitled due to having made prior 
payments into a scheme. Such transfers are referred to as ‘social insurance’, since they obey 
the insurance principle that payments or ‘premiums’ are paid in order to secure a payout when 
certain conditions occur. Contributory transfers are especially associated with employment 
and the formal economy. For example, occupational pension schemes (including civil service 
pension schemes) are contributory transfers of this type. It is obvious that in a country like 
Malawi, only a small proportion of the population are covered by contributory transfers, since 
the formal sector of the economy is small compared to the informal sector, including 
customary small farmers. Since most poor and vulnerable people in an economy like Malawi 
are not in the formal sector, most of the discussion about social transfers refers to non-
contributory transfers (ILO 2005, Samson 2009). Collectively, social assistance and social 
insurance taken together are termed ‘social security’. This is the established term for social 
transfers overall, superseded in the literature of the past decade by term ‘social protection’, to 
which discussion returns shortly (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, Grosh et al. 2008). 
A second important distinction regarding social transfers is whether their recipients are 
required to conform to any activities or obligations in order to receive the transfer. For 
example, in food-for-work schemes, it is a requirement of the receipt of a food transfer that 
physical work is performed in a designated public works project, such as repairing a rural 
road. In some countries, it is a requirement of receipt of benefits that children attend school or 
infants and young children turn up for regular checks at health clinics. Transfers that require 
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activities or obligations on the part of their beneficiaries are called ‘conditional transfers’. 
Those who require no such obligations are ‘unconditional transfers’. 
In contemporary developing countries, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are the norm for 
social assistance in the Latin American region. Indeed, two of the best known contemporary 
social protection programmes in developing countries are Bolsa Familia in Brazil and 
Oportunidades in Mexico, both of which are CCTs that impose quite strict obligations on their 
recipients in terms of school and clinic attendance (Fiszbein et al. 2009). In sub-Saharan 
Africa, the work condition is clearly present in food-for-work or cash-for-work schemes, but 
in other respects the balance of argument to date has tended to be in the direction of non-
conditionality for social transfers. The reason for this is that school and clinic provision in 
rural areas of poor African countries is not considered robust enough (in quantity and quality) 
for imposition of Latin American type conditions to be a worthwhile option (Schubert and 
Slater 2006). Nevertheless, Ghana has a poverty targeted social assistance scheme called 
Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), described in more detail shortly, which 
imposes such conditions on scheme beneficiaries (Samson 2009). 
A third factor that distinguishes different social transfer approaches is the way eligibility for 
receipt of payments is determined. This is called the targeting dimension. Targeting is a 
potentially costly component of the overall operation of delivering social transfers. For 
example, means-testing, which seeks to measure the income or wealth of individuals in order 
to decide whether they should receive transfers is particularly difficult to carry out in a non-
formal economy with no record of people’s earnings or savings. Means-testing is one amongst 
an array of devices for separating eligible from non-eligible potential recipients of a social 
transfer. One particular category of social transfers – those organised in the form of food-for-
work or cash-for-work – relies on the preparedness of individuals to turn up for manual labour 
at a wage rate (or food equivalent) below the market wage in order to select beneficiaries. 
These are ‘self-targeted’ social transfers, which avoid the administrative cost of beneficiary 
selection by individuals themselves deciding whether or not to participate (Coady et al. 2004). 
However, in conditions of unexpectedly widespread hunger, such as might occur in a country 
like Malawi due to a shortage of maize in the market and unusually high lean season prices, 
there may be more people turning up for food-for-work or cash-for-work schemes than the 
amount of work available. In this case, work must be rationed and other targeting methods 
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such as selection by community leaders, or by village welfare committees, are used to 
supplement self-selection (Chirwa 2007). 
Social transfers that do not require a targeting method (other than the basic designation of a 
type of beneficiary) are often referred to as ‘universal’ transfers. For example, social pensions 
where all people above a threshold age (such as 60 or 65) are entitled to receipt of the transfer 
are a universal benefit. However, in the recent literature, this use of the word ‘universal’ tends 
to be considered unsatisfactory since it perhaps wrongly conveys the idea that everyone in 
society is eligible for the benefit. For this reason, the term ‘categorical’ transfers is preferred, 
since the transfers are actually to a category of society such as older people or young children, 
or disabled people (Kakwani and Subbarao 2005, Ellis 2011). In southern Africa, there are 
several countries that have categorical social assistance programmes. For example, South 
Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia all have social pensions; while Namibia 
and South Africa also have child support grants. The pension in South Africa is means-tested 
(Casey and McKinnon 2009, Ellis et al. 2009, Klasen and Woolard 2009). 
As already introduced in Chapter 1, much of the discussion about social transfers in southern 
Africa in the 2000s, including in Malawi, has been about targeting them to the poorest and 
most vulnerable members of society. The specifics of the Malawi case are traced in Chapters 
3 and 6 of the thesis; however, some of the general issues that arise are worth exploring in a 
preliminary way here. The notion of providing social transfers to the extreme poor in sub- 
Saharan African countries seems to have arisen from several different directions. One such 
direction has undoubtedly been the desire of international agencies, bilateral donors and 
governments to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of halving 
countries’ poverty rates by 2015 (Barrientos and Hulme 2008, Grosh et al. 2008). In parts of 
the world (principally sub-Saharan Africa) where progress towards this goal was barely 
discernable in the early 2000s, all stakeholders have cast around for policy levers that might 
provoke some greater forward momentum to occur. Social transfers to the poorest represent 
one such, previously relatively unexplored, option. 
Another impetus towards poverty targeted transfers has already been outlined in Chapter 1, 
and this was the increasing reliance of certain countries in eastern and southern Africa on 
emergency food transfers, not just on an intermittent basis, but almost every year in the late-
1990s and early 2000s. It began to occur to those involved in implementing these emergency 
operations, as well as the donors funding them, that a significant proportion of such transfers 
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were to the same populations and social groups year-after-year, implying a chronic rather than 
temporary proneness to food security failure. It was then quite a short step to argue that 
chronically food insecure people should be supported by routine and predictable transfers 
rather than emergency operations. This thinking also coincided with a growing disaffection 
with the readiness with which donors funded, and countries were prepared to receive, food 
aid. While an earlier literature criticised food aid as a form of dumping of unwanted food 
surpluses by the US and Europe, as well as for its negative effect on local food markets 
(Maxwell and Singer 1979, Singer 1987), the more recent literature focuses on its costs and 
effectiveness at dealing with repeated and predictable food security crises (Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005). In particular, emergency food operations incur significant delays between the 
decision to go ahead and the arrival of the food in communities needing help, with the result 
that significant mortality especially amongst the physically weakest members of society 
occurs before the food arrives. In addition, the cost of delivering food from international 
markets (or storage warehouses) to remote rural areas in poor countries is very considerable, 
making food aid one of the most expensive ways of delivering a benefit (representing a 
particular level of calorie consumption) to recipient families (Dearden and Ackroyd 1989, 
Clay et al. 1998, Maxwell et al. 2008). 
Yet another factor provoking interest in poverty targeted transfers in the past ten to fifteen 
years has been the rise of families lacking able-bodied labour to generate sufficient 
livelihoods, or burdened with high ratio of dependents relative to the number of active adults 
in the household. The chief cause of such circumstances in southern Africa has been the 
growing prevalence of HIV infection, resulting eventually in AIDS-related illnesses and 
mortality, as well as a steep rise in the number of orphans in society. The HIV prevalence rate 
and other pertinent data for southern Africa, including in Malawi, is summarised in Table 2.1 
below. This reveals HIV infection rates in the adult population varying between 11.9 per cent 
in Malawi and 26.1 per cent in Swaziland, and orphan numbers reaching 4.2 million in the 
region as a whole by 2007 (UNAIDS 2008). 
The rising incidence of AIDS-related deaths in southern African countries by the early 2000s 
led to the proposition that this might be a crucial factor reducing the capability of populations 
to cope with external shocks. This proposition has been termed ‘new variant famine’ due to 
certain features that distinguish it from ‘old famines’, principally associated with the onset of 
droughts (de Waal and Whiteside 2003). The comparison is summarised in Table 2.2 below. 
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The starting point is risk management, and it is proposed that whereas drought risks are 
anticipated in the custom and design of farming systems in Africa, HIV/AIDS risks most 
decidedly are not so, because the risk is new in historical terms, and less than a generation has 
had the chance to learn from the experience of living with HIV/AIDS. 
Table 2.1: Major HIV indicators in selected countries in Southern Africa 
Country 
 
People living 
with HIV 
(‘000) 
HIV prevalence 
15-49 years 
(%) 
Life 
expectancy 
(Years) 
AIDS- 
orphans 
0-17 years 
(‘000) 
1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007 2007 
Lesotho 5.9 270 0.8 23.2 59.2 44.7 160 
Malawi 90 930 2.1 11.9 49.2 52.3 550 
Mozambique 94 1500 1.4 12.5 43.3 47.8 400 
South Africa 160 5700 0.8 18.1 61.4 51.4 1,400 
Swaziland 3.9 190 0.9 26.1 60.4 45.3 56 
Zambia 360 1100 8.9 15.2 51.1 44.5 600 
Zimbabwe 710 1300 14.2 15.3 60.8 43.1 1,000 
 
 Source: compiled from statistics contained in UNAIDS (2008), UNICEF (2010) 
 
 
Both old and new food security crises possess some coping strategies in common, but others 
differ markedly. In particular, adults consuming less food is a viable strategy if they are 
healthy but is not an option for adults made ill by AIDS; asset sales for coping leaves labour 
and its skills intact after a shock, while AIDS depletes labour and its skills; labour- intensive 
livelihood activities continue up to moment that hunger strikes in previous crises, but are 
increasingly neglected in AIDs households, reducing resilience. Once hunger seriously takes 
hold, additional differences can be observed. In previous food security crises, mortality occurs 
mainly amongst children and the elderly; the dependency ratio falls; and more men die than 
women. In AIDS crises, mortality mainly strikes working age adults, the dependency ratio 
rises, and more women die than men. Finally, agrarian livelihoods in the past recovered from 
droughts and other weather-induced crises, and social networks that were drawn upon in order 
to cope were rebuilt. However, the prevalence of AIDS may make agrarian livelihoods as 
currently structured unsustainable and social networks become overburdened by caring for 
orphans. 
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Table 2.2: The New Variant Famine Hypothesis 
‘Old Famines’ 
(or previous effects of shocks) 
‘New Variant Famine’ 
(or new effects of shocks) 
risk of drought is built into farming 
systems 
risk of HIV/AIDS is not built into 
farming systems 
food rationing as coping strategy 
widespread 
food rationing not possible for people ill 
as a result of AIDS 
asset sales for coping leaves labour and 
its skills intact 
the labour asset is depleted, and skills and 
knowledge lost 
labour-intensive operations continue 
before the crisis and can be resumed 
afterwards 
labour-intensive operations are neglected 
before the crisis, reducing resilience 
mortality mainly young and old mortality mainly economically active 
adults 
more men die than women more women die than men 
dependency ratio falls dependency ratio rises 
social networks can be rebuilt social networks overstretched by orphans 
agrarian livelihoods recover agrarian livelihoods are unsustainable 
Source: adapted from Ellis (2003) 
 
A detailed picture of the AIDS pandemic and its economy-wide impacts in Malawi in the 
early 2000s is provided in Conroy et al. (2006).  In this edited collection a particular argument 
about the impact of HIV/AIDS on agriculture and livelihoods is made by Whiteside and 
Conroy (Chapter 4) including an estimate that the pandemic adversely affects the lives of 85 
per cent of the population who draw their livelihoods from agriculture. In particular, labour 
scarcity resulting from the pandemic means that critical farm activities cannot be conducted 
on time and fully. Also, since seasonal food availability depends on availability of labour to 
undertake ganyu (casual labour) as a coping strategy, HIV/AIDS undermines this household 
capability and increases vulnerability. Vulnerability to hunger and AIDS in Malawi also 
presents gender dimensions as women resort to prostitution as a coping mechanism (Conroy 
2005). 
The discussion of the deleterious effects of HIV/AIDS on household demography and food 
security leads into consideration of the eligibility criteria for poverty targeted social transfers. 
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The impossibility in practice of means-testing very poor people in rural low income country 
settings has meant that aid agencies and government have tended to develop proxy criteria for 
the extreme poverty that they wish social transfers to address. These proxy criteria tend to 
focus on household demography; for example, the headship of the household (households 
headed by elderly, widows, orphans, or children); the number of orphans cared for by the 
household; and the dependency ratio of the household (number of dependents divided by 
active adults aged 18-64). In addition to demographic factors two additional indicators are 
common in poverty targeting. One of these is lack of land for farming, and a second is direct 
observation of food insecurity stress as shown by the family reducing meal size or only 
having one meal per day (Maxwell et al. 1999). 
Having developed proxy criteria for extreme poverty and deprivation, the question remains 
how best to conduct the selection of beneficiaries in communities (Ellis et al. 2009, Ch.3). 
Unfortunately, beneficiary selection is prone to ‘moral hazard’. For example, village leaders 
may fill up beneficiary lists with their own relatives (an occurrence termed ‘elite capture’), or 
households may modify their composition in order to fulfil the criteria that have been 
publicised (suddenly an unexpectedly high number of households turn up filled with orphans, 
or elderly widows etc.). In order to overcome elite capture, aid agencies have tended to 
gravitate towards community selection methods for targeting those most in need (Conning 
and Kevane 2002). This entails first creating a village or community welfare committee (if 
one does not already exist), then charging this committee with the task of drawing up a 
beneficiary list, according to a chosen set of criteria. Ideally, this list is then taken back to a 
general village meeting for verification. However, even with these checks and balances, 
transfers can create contrary behaviours in communities. For example, beneficiaries may be 
put in the position of having to ‘share’ their benefits with the committee members who put 
them on the list. The complexity, cost, and ambiguous outcomes of poverty targeting 
processes contribute to a set of arguments in favour of universal or categorical targeting, the 
additional costs incurred by complete coverage being considered preferable to the 
inaccuracies of attempts to narrow down unduly the number of beneficiaries (Coady et al. 
2004). 
The foregoing distinctions suggest a typology that groups social transfers according to some 
of the key features that they do or do not share. One such type comprises ‘safety nets’ (see 
below) that do not impose on government any future or long term obligations regarding their 
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provision, and which are mainly funded by donors or multilateral agencies like the World 
Bank. Another type is categorical transfers that involve routine monthly payments to their 
beneficiaries, and are usually legislated by the governments that provide them, and are 
therefore entitlements on the part of the citizens who qualify to receive them (pensions and 
child support payments are this type). A third type are poverty targeted transfers which 
hitherto have mainly comprised pilot programmes funded by donors, and where the chief 
difficulty as seen from the donor perspective is persuading governments to scale them up and 
institutionalise them as long term budgetary commitments. 
Amongst these social transfer types, not much has yet been said about the safety net approach. 
Safety nets made their appearance on the social policy stage in Africa in the mid- to late-
1980s as a response to predicted transient hardship created by structural adjustment and 
market liberalisation programmes. The World Bank became a leader in promoting safety nets, 
following the critical stance on adjustment taken by the 1987 UNICEF book Adjustment with 
a Human Face (Cornia et al. 1987). Following earlier debates in India about the difficulties of 
identifying those most adversely affected by economic and social change, the ‘self-targeted’ 
public works programme became the dominant model for this type of social protection 
(Subbarao 1997, 2003). In this model, individuals who turn up for food- or cash-for-work 
projects receive a wage which is below the market wage for that time and place, thus 
discouraging the participation of all but those genuinely unable to secure income from other 
sources. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, public works programmes were the most prevalent form of social 
protection in the 1990s, with the exception of a few countries of southern Africa. Public 
works programmes require planning and designing a social project (e.g. repairing or building 
a rural road), overseeing the quality of the work performed, and making decisions about 
eligibility if supply of labour seems likely to outstrip the workplaces available. Beneficiary 
selection in the latter case re-enters the picture either as a top down administrative decision, or 
through consultation with local key informants (e.g. village leaders), or through a 
participatory process of beneficiary selection. These different selection methods evolved 
sequentially during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Public works programmes have known flaws. They are expensive to set up and administer, 
and comparative cost studies show that they are amongst the most expensive ways of putting 
a dollar in the pocket of someone in need (upwards of US$1.40 to provide US$1.00 benefit, 
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as compared, for example, to US$1.05 to provide US$1.00 benefit for some social pension 
programmes) (Ellis et al. 2009, p.90). Their requirement for physical labour excludes access 
by those lacking able-bodied labour in the household, who are often those most desperately in 
need of social support. 
Nowadays, public works programmes remain a widespread solution to providing relief for 
rural families experiencing food and other deprivations in the lean season before the next 
grain harvest. Indeed, the largest public works programme in Africa is at the centre of the 
Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia which routinely provides cash- or 
food-for-work in the lean season to 7-8 million people (more on which below). In this form, 
safety nets have become quite sophisticated, taking on board newer ideas of ‘predictable 
funding for predictable needs’ (as outlined in Chapter 1), as well as seeking to bolt on 
additional components (e.g. agricultural support) in order to assist beneficiaries to ‘graduate’ 
in future years. 
Nevertheless, a critical distinguishing feature of safety nets is that they remain temporary 
structures, outside the main business of government, and not implying a future social security 
obligation on the part of the state. Confusingly, the World Bank has taken to calling safety 
nets ‘social protection’ while retaining a stance of avoiding institutionalising social security 
(see, for example, Grosh et al. 2008). Funding for social protection was a major component of 
the Global Food Crisis Response Programme (GFRP) set up by the UN in response to the 
food and financial crises of 2007-09 (McCord 2010). An examination of the US$1.2 billion 
spent from this fund up to April 2010 shows that by far the majority of disbursements were to 
temporary food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes (World Bank 2010a). 
Three contemporary social programmes in Africa illustrate the current state of play in social 
transfer thinking in the continent, although legislated entitlements like pensions are not part of 
these examples. The first described briefly here is the Productive Safety Nets Programme 
(PNSP) in Ethiopia (IDL Group 2007, Devereux et al. 2009). Food insecurity in Ethiopia is 
mainly chronic in nature. Around 7-8 million people (10 per cent of the population) require 
assistance every year irrespective of agricultural outcomes, and these numbers increase 
steeply in drought years. In the past no distinction was made between chronic and transitory 
hunger, and almost all transfers to those in need were met through annual emergency 
responses. The PNSP was established in 2005 with powerful impetus by the ‘donor group’ 
that had hitherto been responsible for funding emergency food aid (principally, World Bank, 
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EU and DFID). It addresses chronic hunger in a multi-year programme with an agreed 
forward budget over a five-year cycle (it is currently in 2010 at the start of its second cycle). 
Transfers to beneficiaries are for a maximum of six months in the lean season. Transfers may 
be in food or cash, or can be switched between cash or food mid-season (latterly, recipients 
have expressed a strong preference for food over cash following steep food price rises in 
2008-09). It has both a public works (conditional) transfer component and a direct support 
(unconditional) component, although the latter only applies to households lacking able-bodied 
labour (about 10-15 per cent of all recipient households). The core public works component is 
not self-targeted, beneficiaries being selected by community targeting. 
The PNSP is essentially a hybrid of the safety net and poverty targeted social transfer types 
delineated above. It is also, however, illustrative of another factor, not yet discussed, that 
worries African governments about social transfers. This is the concern that recipients will 
become ‘dependent’ on transfers, creating a long term and cumulative burden on the state. 
The worry about dependency leads to the notion that support to beneficiaries should be 
temporary, and they should ‘graduate’ from requiring transfers after an interval of time. In the 
PSNP there is an expectation that recipients should graduate after three years, with the help of 
complementary public investments in agricultural development. However, the conditions for 
graduation have proved difficult to pin down, and an unusually large caseload of households 
needing support in 2008-09 (10-11 million people) meant that hopes of graduating a 
significant proportion of the regular 7-8 million beneficiaries in that season failed to 
materialise. 
A second illustrative case study is provided by the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in 
Kenya, initiated in 2009 (Irungu et al. 2009, Devereux and White 2010). In the semi-arid 
northern districts of Kenya, about 1.5 million people are regarded as a predictable caseload 
requiring assistance every year. It was estimated in 2007 that a predictable cash transfer 
would cost donors or the government less per person assisted than food aid (US$55 against 
US$79)(Ellis et al. 2009, p.59). DFID decided to trial the funding of an unconditional cash 
transfer over a 10-year period, with a total budget of US$245 million. Transfers in the HSNP 
are regular, throughout the year, and will eventually be made to 60,000 households (300,000 
people) which is about 20 per cent of the estimated total number of people needing routine 
support. It is hoped that other donors and the Kenya government will come on board to 
expand the programme in the future. 
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The HSNP is a poverty targeted transfer, and although it is the largest of its kind it is 
essentially a cash transfer pilot, which is not institutionalised in the Kenya government. Its 
chief innovation has been the use of electronic technologies for the transfer of funds to 
beneficiaries, thus overcoming leakage and security problems that would inevitably 
accompany the physical delivery of cash to beneficiaries in remote (and in northern Kenya 
sometimes lawless) rural areas. In the HSNP, local shop and kiosk owners in the districts 
covered by the scheme are issued with point-of-sale devices connected by satellite 
communication to a bank called the Equity Bank in the capital, Nairobi. Beneficiaries are 
issued with a smartcard, charged up with their monthly allowance, and this is inserted in the 
point-of-sale device against a thumbprint and PIN number, for payout by the trader or kiosk 
owner who is designated as a pay point in the programme. The point-of-sale device 
automatically communicates the transaction to a special bank account opened in the trader’s 
name in the Equity Bank so the trader is then credited with the transfer plus a 2-3 per cent 
service charge (Vincent 2010). 
The third illustrative case study is the Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 
programme in Ghana, mentioned earlier in this section. The LEAP programme is also a 
poverty targeted transfer, aimed at the destitute or near destitute, with tightly specified proxy 
criteria for extreme poverty. However, unlike HSNP (and also PSNP), LEAP is funded by the 
Ghana government from its own resources, and has an agreed budget line in planned 
government expenditure. It is therefore semi-institutionalised in the sense discussed earlier of 
a government taking on the obligation of ensuring continuity of transfers into the future. 
However, it is not legislated as an entitlement in the same way as social pensions are in some 
southern African countries. LEAP is also a conditional cash transfer, reflecting perhaps the 
hiring of Brazilian consultants during the period when it was being devised. Conditions 
comprise birth registration of children, enrolment of family members on the National Health 
Insurance Scheme, not allowing child labour, and sending children to school. LEAP was 
launched in March 2008, with coverage of 15,000 households in 50 districts. By May 2009, 
LEAP had was benefiting about 26,200 households in 74 districts (out of 178 districts 
nationally). The Department of Social Welfare (DSW) in the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Welfare (MESW), which manages the programme, aims to reach 165,000 households 
in 138 districts by the end of 2012 (Government of Ghana 2007, Sultan and Schrofer 2008, 
UNICEF 2009). 
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These three programmes in different ways raise interesting points for the future of social 
transfers in sub-Saharan Africa, which also influence the development of ideas in this thesis. 
A critical issue is whether or not governments decide to take on social transfers as their own 
responsibility, and Ghana represents an unusual case of this happening, leaving on one side 
for the moment social pensions in some southern African countries listed earlier. A second 
issue is the amount of the transfer (either cash or food equivalent). This has varied in these 
examples from US$3.50 per month (Ethiopia), to US$5.4-10 per month (Ghana) and US$10 
per month (Kenya).18 A third issue is whether or under what conditions food or cash makes 
the best form of transfer to beneficiaries. This is returned to later in the thesis, but it can be 
noted briefly here that cash transfers require working food markets and stable food prices, for 
otherwise the value of the transfer is eroded by rising food prices. In Ethiopia, the preference 
of beneficiaries for food became overwhelming due to this reason in 2008-09. This also places 
doubt, of course, on the enthusiasm for cash that dominated policy discussion in the mid-
2000s (Farrington and Slater 2006). 
2.3 Social protection, vulnerability and agriculture 
In this chapter so far, the term social protection has only been used in passing, without placing 
too much weight on it as an umbrella term for social transfers and other services and 
regulations protecting the welfare of a country’s citizens. In this section, the term is given 
more substance, and in addition links are made between social protection and vulnerability, as 
well as with agriculture. 
It is not entirely clear when and where the term social protection originated, but there is no 
doubt that by 2005 it had become the dominant expression used to describe social welfare 
policies in developing countries. This has caused problems for governments as well as for 
welfare advocates. Governments tend to be familiar with older terms like social welfare or 
social security, and they often have departments of social welfare (or agencies with similar 
titles) located in a major ministry like the Ministry of Labour or Ministry of Health or 
Ministry of Community Services. For governments, the difficulty is not being certain where 
the reach of social protection begins and ends, and therefore what the likely costs and 
obligations would be if they were to espouse a social protection policy. For aid agencies and 
advocacy organisations, the broadness of the term has been something of a double-edged 
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 These figures refer to actual or planned payments in these programmes in the period 2008 or 2009, and 
may have changed subsequently. 
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sword: on the one hand they have been able to smuggle all sorts of progressive welfare ideas 
into policy debate under a social protection rubric; on the other hand this has made the term 
imprecise and unwieldy, and has created precisely the distrust on the part of government 
officials that they would have hoped to avoid. 
In Chapter 1, a widely accepted definition of social protection was provided. This focuses on 
transfers and on protecting the rights of marginalised people. In a well known article written 
in 1994, Guhan (1994) proposes that social protection has prevention, protection and 
promotion roles (the 3Ps). In this, prevention refers to preventing asset disposal by 
households when disaster strikes, so that they can recover their former livelihood resilience 
more quickly once the crisis has passed. Protection refers in a straightforward way to 
protecting the minimum consumption needs of poor and vulnerable people. This clearly needs 
to be timely, and is therefore best done as a planned intervention, rather than waiting until 
people are already in distress before acting. This is one way in which social protection is 
distinguished from emergency responses. Promotion refers to providing people with the 
means to strengthen and improve their livelihoods in the future. It is under the ‘promotion’ 
rubric that policies such as free input packages, or subsidised fertilizers, came in certain 
quarters to be regarded as social protection.  
Much of the difficulty about the scope of social protection seems to stem from confusion 
between protection as the outcome of a range of policies, and protection as a set of policy 
instruments. The inclination has been to treat all instruments that involve any sort of 
subsidised service or transfer from government under the ‘social protection’ rubric, even if 
such instruments fall under the competencies of many different government ministries. 
However, this mixes up ways of achieving a desired objective with the objective itself. Social 
protection as an outcome can be achieved by a range of policy interventions, not just social 
transfer instruments. For example, the social protection of someone chronically ill due to 
AIDS requires a food or cash transfer, yes, but also needs other services (medical supervision, 
anti-retroviral drugs, special diets, care in the home). Likewise the social protection of a small 
poor farmer may be contributed to by input subsidies, output price stabilisation and food 
security stocks, but these are all agricultural, not social welfare, policy instruments.19 
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 This paragraph benefitted from a discussion with my supervisor, Prof Frank Ellis, regarding the 
difficulties for this thesis of the broad scope used in much of the literature for the term social 
protection. 
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In this thesis, the basic definition of social protection provided by Devereux & Sabates-
Wheeler (2004) is accepted, but with the proviso that ends should not be confused with 
means, and because an instrument may ultimately improve the welfare of its recipients this 
does not necessarily make it a ‘social protection’ instrument. Hence, agricultural input 
subsidies are not treated as a social protection instrument in this thesis, even though the 
Malawi government has at times found it convenient to represent its ISP as social protection 
rather than agricultural policy to make the programme more palatable to social protection 
oriented donors (Government of Malawi 2008i). As a set of instruments, social protection 
includes social transfers (social assistance and social insurance), and possibly employment 
protection and health and safety in the workplace (although these may equally be called 
labour market policies). It may also include rights and entitlements to certain transfers (such 
as pension rights), where countries decide to legislate them. A substantial branch of the social 
protection literature is concerned with the rights arguments for adoption by governments of 
regular social transfers to the weakest members of society (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 
2007, Munro 2008). 
In the low income, mainly agrarian, economies of eastern and southern Africa, the majority of 
vulnerable people are small farmers or landless households living in farming communities 
(Jazairy et al. 1992, ACF 2008). This makes their social protection (as an outcome) especially 
difficult to achieve, because food deficit small farmers are a large proportion of all small 
farmers (around 60 per cent according to some estimates), the extent of functional 
landlessness is difficult to pin down, and these categories of the population are especially 
prone to moving into and out of poverty according to small variations in livelihood outturns 
from one year to the next. 
Starting in the mid 1980s, a literature (e.g. Campbell 1984) began to appear suggesting that 
traditional means by which poor families dealt with misfortune in poor, mainly rural, 
countries were severely eroded, creating considerable gaps in coverage (Morduch 1999, 
Jonathan and Manohar 2002). These traditional support systems were referred to as 
‘traditional coping’ or ‘informal insurance’, and it was considered that gaps in these pre-
existing institutions were becoming more prevalent over time. The term ‘coping’ in fact 
originates in the famine literature of the 1980s (e.g. Corbett 1988) and refers to the behaviours 
adopted by families when confronted by an adverse shock to their livelihoods, including 
obtaining community help, borrowing from relatives, selling movable assets (especially 
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livestock), temporarily migrating in search of wage work, eating non-customary and wild 
foods, and reducing the number of meals consumed per day (Devereux 1993). In later 
development of this concept, both ex ante and ex post types of coping were identified 
(Alwang et al. 2001). The former comprises building up assets (household) and nurturing 
reciprocal obligation (kin and community), while the latter involves running these down after 
the shock has occurred. 
It follows from these ideas that ‘informal insurance’ comprises two rather different processes. 
One is an individual household process of building savings, stores and other assets that help 
the family withstand unforeseen adverse events. The other is a social process of reciprocity in 
which there is cultural understanding that help given to a family in need today will be repaid 
in the future if the giver should run into difficult circumstances. The strength of purported 
social reciprocity was debated in earlier literatures on the peasant economy (Scott 1976, 
Popkin 1979). There is, of course, crossover and overlap between the individual and social 
spheres in regard to these processes. The household is an elastic concept in which extended 
kinship relations play a vital role, and these tend to permeate into the broader social sphere, 
especially in smaller and more tightly knit communities. 
Research in the 1990s pointed to important limitations of informal insurance, especially when 
entire communities are repeatedly placed under livelihood stress. There is no intrinsic reason 
that traditional coping should have equalising effects amongst community members. For 
household level coping, it is found that better off households are able to cope better with a 
crisis of equal magnitude than a poorer household. This is because the same level of asset 
erosion will comprise a smaller proportion of the total assets of a richer as compared to a 
poorer household. Moreover, most social reciprocity is strongly kin based rather than 
genuinely involving the ‘wider community’, again meaning that having wealthier relatives 
places the individual or household in a stronger position than having poorer relatives. With 
respect to repeated widespread shocks such as drought or floods that adversely affect all 
members of the community, these reduce the capabilities of community members to respond 
to the difficulties of others since they must scramble themselves to resuscitate their own 
livelihoods (Platteau 1991, Carter and Maluccio 2003, Fafchamps and Lund 2003). 
Thus another important entry point to contemporary discussions of social protection in Africa 
has been a perception that long term, socially embedded, ways that rural families have dealt 
with livelihood risks and shocks in the past have declined in effectiveness markedly over the 
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past two decades. At the household level, recurrent shocks deplete family assets, with 
incomplete recovery occurring between shocks so that the capability of households to 
withstand adverse circumstances is depleted over time. At the community level, recurrent 
widespread shocks (drought, floods, civil conflict) results in the weakening and eventual 
disappearance of reciprocal transfers. Research in countries like Malawi, Tanzania and 
Ethiopia shows that the frequency of shocks increased in the 1990s and early 2000s such that 
many rural households experienced a mixture of personal or large scale shocks every annual 
cycle (Dercon 2002, 2005). In southern Africa AIDS morbidity and mortality were a key 
factor at the household level, and recurrent adverse weather events (too little rain, too much 
rain) occurred in the ten-year period 1995 to 2005 (however, weather seems to have been 
more favourable in the most recent period). 
Seasonal price changes represent a particular difficulty for food deficit small farmers, and a 
substantive regular annual cause of heightened vulnerability to hunger is the extent to which 
food prices rise in the lean season before the next harvest. The importance of seasonality for 
vulnerability was established in a much earlier literature (Chambers et al. 1981). In West 
Africa, for example, there is a seasonal pattern of male migration to cities which serves the 
dual purpose of ‘removing mouths to feed’ from the resident household and securing cash 
income for food purchases (Toulmin 1992). In Ethiopia, proneness to hunger is highly 
seasonal, and the policy response in the form of the PNSP provides food or cash transfers just 
for the lean season. In Malawi, the majority of food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes 
have been seasonal in character (see Chapter 3). Price seasonality causes evident difficulties 
for regular cash transfer programmes, regarding the amount of the transfer (and its purchasing 
power over food at different price levels), or whether, alternatively, indexing of the amount of 
transfer to the food price should be considered. In experiences of cash transfers (including 
pensions) so far in African countries, price indexation has not been contemplated due to its 
administrative complexity. An exception was a short term intervention in Dowa district of 
Malawi in 2006 called the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer (DECT) scheme implemented by 
the NGO Concern Worldwide with funding from DFID, which indexed cash transfer amounts 
each month to the price of maize (Davies 2007, Devereux 2008). This worked moderately 
well, but beneficiaries were somewhat nonplussed when their benefit level fell for the last two 
months of the scheme due to a fall in the price of maize just before the next harvest. 
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The significance of seasonality, as well as the prevalence of food-deficit small farmers, links 
vulnerability and social protection very firmly to agriculture. This set of interactions has been 
examined recently at a conceptual level by several researchers (e.g. Holmes et al. 2007, 
Devereux 2009, Dorward et al. 2009). These authors distinguish the various ways agriculture 
and social transfers can contribute singly or jointly to the achievement of social protection as 
an outcome of different combinations of policies. Five different policy scenarios are 
distinguished, denominated as (1) social protection from agriculture (agricultural support 
policies of various kinds succeed in achieving livelihood security for nearly all rural families); 
(2) social protection independent of agriculture (social transfers of various kinds are directed 
at protecting the consumption of the most vulnerable); (3) social protection for agriculture 
(market-based crop insurance instruments); (4) social protection through agriculture (free 
input transfers to the most vulnerable to achieve their livelihood security); and (5) social 
protection with agriculture (agricultural input subsidies mainly benefitting non-poor farmers, 
but with beneficial side-effects for the most vulnerable including lower food prices, and 
labour hiring by better off farmers). 
These are useful distinctions, but they leave open the precise combination of policies that are 
likely to have the greatest traction on reducing vulnerability given the circumstances of a 
specific country. In any specific case, it becomes critical to know (a) just who in the rural 
economy benefits from an input subsidy of a given amount, delivered in a particular way; (b) 
just how strong are the indirect effects on those for whom the subsidy makes little direct 
difference to their food security (i.e. in terms of lowering or stabilising food prices, or 
creating more work at higher farm wages); (c) how the costs of creating these indirect effects 
compare with the costs of direct transfers to the same or closely overlapping social groups; 
and (d) the extent of vulnerable people missed out entirely by agricultural interventions (for 
example, the elderly, the disabled, households lacking able-bodied labour etc.). It is 
admittedly beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to resolve these unknowns entirely for 
Malawi. Yet progress can certainly be made on some of them, which is what the thesis hopes 
to achieve. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has examined past and contemporary ideas and experiences in the areas of 
agricultural input subsidies, social transfers, social protection and vulnerability, in order to get 
a grip on the key factors that need to be taken into account in assessing the policy approaches 
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taken in Malawi to tackle the recurring problem of vulnerability to hunger. The chapter is 
mainly pitched at a general level, not specific to the Malawi case study, since the latter 
constitutes the subject of the next chapter and the rest of the thesis. 
The economic logic and history of input subsidies in low income countries is traced. It is 
noted that the historical experience of input subsidies was quite different in Asia (where 
generally they are regarded in hindsight as having made a useful contribution to the Green 
Revolution) to Africa (where they were regarded as failed policies in the 1980s). More 
recently, their reputation as having a role in stimulating agricultural growth in Africa has been 
partially rehabilitated. This follows from a measure of success in the small-scale delivery of 
free input packages (mainly by NGOs) in African countries confronting severe food security 
problems, as well as apparent success achieved on the larger scale in a few countries which 
have re-introduced them as national policies, amongst which Malawi is the focus of much 
attention. This rehabilitation has been encouraged by the contemporary international focus on 
achieving yield gains in African agriculture, including NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the Alliance for a Green Revolution for 
Africa (AGRA) (NEPAD 2002, Sanchez et al. 2009, AGRA 2010).  
The history of social transfers in sub-Saharan Africa is also traced. The important distinction 
is made between social assistance (not requiring prior contributions) and social insurance 
(requiring contributions), with the latter being associated almost entirely with employment in 
the formal sector. Distinctions are also made between different categories of social transfer, 
with temporary safety nets (food-for-work, cash-for-work) being distinguished from poverty 
targeted transfers (continuous social cash transfers) and categorical transfers (such as pensions 
and child support grants). These types of social transfer have been funded in different ways 
and imply different obligations on the part of government, and entitlements on the part of 
their recipients. Safety nets and pilot cash transfers have been mainly funded by donors, but in 
the latter case there has been the intention that they would eventually be scaled up and 
adopted by governments (as indeed has occurred in Ghana). On the other hand social pensions 
represent cash transfers at scale that have been legislated by the governments that introduced 
them, and are a right or entitlement on the part of their recipients. 
Some difficulties around the definition of social protection are noted. There has tended to be 
an unhelpful elision between the means and ends of government policies aimed to improve 
the welfare and livelihood security of their citizens. Social protection as an outcome of 
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diverse policy instruments, including both those that work on production and those that work 
on consumption and wellbeing, is confused with social protection instruments that primarily 
comprise social transfers. The consequence has been that the social protection net is cast too 
wide, causing unnecessary confusion for governments. In this thesis, unless otherwise 
indicated, the term social protection is predominantly used to refer to social security; while 
input subsidies in agriculture are treated as an agricultural policy intended to achieve yield 
and output growth. 
Social protection and agricultural policies inevitably overlap when most vulnerable people in 
a country are small poor farmers or landless agricultural labour. The discussion about 
vulnerability and agriculture reveals the key question addressed by this thesis, which is the 
combination of policies that are likely to be most successful at reducing the scale of 
vulnerability to hunger in a country, and that therefore also overcome the country’s proneness 
towards recurrent food security crises. In the next chapter, the two main policy strands that 
run through this thesis (agricultural policies and social protection) are examined for the 
specific case study of Malawi. 
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Chapter 3: Malawi as a Case-Study Country 
3.1 Agricultural Policy History of Malawi 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on Malawi that is pertinent 
to the topic of vulnerability to hunger and how it might be tackled using different policy 
instruments. The chapter begins with an agricultural policy history of Malawi, centred mainly 
on maize sector because of the critical importance of maize in Malawi’s food production and 
nutrition, as established already in Chapter 1, as well as the role of the maize sector in either 
ameliorating or intensifying the vulnerability to hunger of food deficit farm families. The 
chapter also provides a social transfer policy history of Malawi, a brief account of the 
country’s political history and its administrative structure, and an examination of key 
additional features of vulnerability. 
The government vision for the economy in the first two decades after independence in 1964 
prioritised estate-led labour-intensive agricultural exports while perceiving smallholder 
agriculture as expected to play a dominant role in national food self-sufficiency (Blackie and 
Conroy 2006). As a result, agricultural policy often represented tensions between national 
food self-sufficiency and export promotion objectives, mediated by land tenure 
considerations. The outcome of this process was the emergence of a dual agricultural 
economy characterised by a predominantly smallholder subsistence sector on customary land 
and a tobacco dominated commercial estate sector on private (leasehold) land. Smallholder 
farmers were nevertheless allowed to grow some tradable crops such as fire-cured tobacco, 
cotton and groundnuts but these were sold only to a state marketing board, described in due 
course, which in turn exported them at large trading margins (Kydd and Christiansen 1982, 
Harrigan 2001).  
Marketing for smallholder inputs, outputs and food staples were the responsibility of the state 
owned Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC)20 which was set up 
in 1971. Markets were regulated through pan-territorial and pan-seasonal fixed prices, 
accompanied by delivery to farmers of subsidized fertilizers and credit. Localised private 
trading that had occurred in earlier years was effectively prohibited from 1971 onwards 
(Chilowa 1998). Producer prices were kept artificially low in order to keep the food price low 
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 From independence in 1964, marketing was undertaken by the Farmers Marketing Board which in 
1971 was converted into ADMARC, with extended powers and responsibilities. 
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and, for the export crops that smallholders were permitted to grow, also to generate financial 
surpluses. The financial surplus was generated from ADMARC paying small farmers low 
prices for export crops (fire-cured tobacco, cotton and groundnuts) and selling these crops at 
high export prices. The surpluses were then transferred to the estate sector through cross-
ownership holdings between ADMARC and Press Holdings, a national conglomerate owned 
by the President (Dr Kamuzu Banda) but operated as a private holding company with equity 
investments in almost all sectors of the economy. So apart from cross subsidising losses in its 
maize trading, as discussed in due course,  most of this profit was not reinvested in 
smallholder agriculture but was siphoned off to support the expansion and activities of 
tobacco growing estates owned by a privileged political class (Harrigan 2001, p.35). 
The government position on the smallholder economy involved public provision of a 
continuum of services under one umbrella: agricultural technologies, credit, extension, and, of 
course input, output and food marketing. These were organized through an agricultural credit- 
input-extension policy that aimed to promote hybrid maize and fertilizer, with an agricultural 
extension worker at community level acting as facilitator and mediator of the links between 
farmers and the various service providers. These services were organized in the context of the 
National Rural Development Programme (NRDP) established in the 1970s as a successor to 
the earlier integrated rural development project (IRDP) in the 1960s. While ADMARC was 
responsible for marketing functions, another state organization called the Smallholder 
Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA), established in the early 1970s as a department in 
the Ministry of Agriculture, managed the credit aspects which farmers accessed through 
farmer clubs. Once SACA approved a farmer club for agricultural credit, actual inputs were 
provided at ADMARC markets where also loan deductions were made during the crop sales 
period. This subsidised distribution arrangement could be regarded as quite successful in 
ensuring a high level of recoupment of input loans as well as in providing farmers with a 
predictable trading environment for inputs and outputs (Dorward et al. 2005, Poulton et al. 
2006).  
At the centre of the ‘NRDP arrangement’ was a unified national policy framework called the 
Statement of Development Policies (DEVPOL). The first policy from 1971 to 1980 
(DEVPOL 1) was aimed at accelerating agricultural and rural development as an engine of 
growth for the Malawi economy. The second policy from 1981 to 1996 (DEVPOL II) was 
aimed at private sector development and envisaged a reduced role for state-owned enterprises 
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such as ADMARC (Record 2007). Since 1996, Malawi has had no unified policy of the 
DEVPOL nature but has operated piecemeal policies and strategies, often on an ad hoc basis 
as cabinet directives, and sometimes reflecting donor demands and corresponding 
concessions. The effects of this is apparent in the lack of coordinated policy direction on the 
relationship between agricultural and other policies, including social protection (Dorward et 
al. 2008). 
The extension-technology-credit-marketing arrangement collapsed during the 1990-94 period 
owing to three major factors. First, agricultural credit was delinked from agricultural 
extension in response to changing international thinking. It was argued that the role of 
agricultural extension was to provide technical information and not to distribute inputs, 
administer credit, recover loans or collect data. Second, prior to the first 1994 multiparty 
general elections, political parties including the United Democratic Party (UDF) which 
eventually won the general election had campaigned on a promise of writing-off agricultural 
loan debt, creating a setting for ‘officially sanctioned loan defaults’.21 Third, Malawi suffered 
serious droughts in 1992 and 1994, leading anyway to widespread loan default and, 
eventually, to the collapse of SACA in 1994 (Zeller et al. 1998, Kherallah and Govindan 
1999, Sulaiman and Hall 2002). The full impacts of the collapse of the credit system and the 
increased cost of fertilizer, masked for several years through emergency input distribution 
programmes, emerged in 1996-97 when food became scarce despite good weather (Mann 
1998).  
Returning to the role of ADMARC, as alluded to earlier, at least until the end of the 1970s, 
ADMARC was a profitable marketing organization that was able to fund the losses incurred 
in maize trading through profits generated in other operations (Kydd and Christiansen 1982). 
In 1979, Malawi experienced a deepening economic crisis characterised by rising import 
prices, declining export prices and rising losses in estate and other state business interests. 
ADMARC nevertheless continued to implement the established price policy framework up to 
1987, but with increasing difficulty in remaining commercially viable. Malawi’s economic 
problems provoked international interventions through International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Standby Facilities and World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans (known as SAL I, II and III), 
implemented between 1981 and 1987. The first structural adjustment loan (SAL I) occurred in 
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 The Kamuzu Banda government had used draconian measures to ensure credit repayment, and as a 
result, had an impressive repayment record although a dreadful human rights one (Blackie and Conroy 
2006, note number 13, p.102). 
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1981, a second SAL was signed in early 1984, and a third SAL was agreed in late 1985 but 
occurred in two stages in 1986 and 1987 (Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989). 
In the first loan in 1981 (SAL I), the Bank insisted on realignment of smallholder crop prices 
with export parity, but the maize price was exempted. The government reluctantly acceded to 
increasing export crop prices, but also chose to raise the producer price of maize which 
continued to be pan-territorial and pan-seasonal, and set by the government in advance of the 
crop season. While the maize producer price was kept towards the top of the import-export 
parity price range, the consumer price was kept much lower such that ADMARC incurred 
large losses in its maize trading activities. Meanwhile export parity pricing for crops other 
than maize meant very small trading margins in other crops for ADMARC. Together with 
dwindling government funding, ADMARC became unable to cross-subsidise loss-making 
maize trading as it had done in the past. The corporation’s financial problems were 
exacerbated in 1981 when the government mandated ADMARC to take on the new 
responsibility of managing the country’s Strategic Grain Reserves. By the 1985/86 season, 
ADMARC had accumulated and continued to incur unsustainable trading losses (Christiansen 
and Stackhouse 1989, Chilowa 1998). 
In the second loan (SAL II) in 1984, the Bank insisted on gradual elimination of the fertilizer 
subsidy22 (Lele 1990, Harrigan 2003). In the third loan (SAL III) in 1985, the Bank insisted 
on market liberalisation, in particular for the government to divest ADMARC of its non-
marketing functions, and to allow private trading (Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989). At this 
point, the government had little room for negotiation given ADMARC’s huge financial 
problems but it was nevertheless sceptical about the effects on food security (Smith 1995). A 
number of policy reforms then ensued between 1985 and 1995: 
(a) repeal of the Agriculture (General Purposes) Act and the Agricultural Produce 
(Marketing) Regulation Act in 1987; 
(b) repeal of the Special Crops Act in 1990 in order to allow smallholder farmers to grow 
burley tobacco which had earlier been exclusively an estate crop; 
                                                 
22
 Uma Lele called this ‘ an ill-fated effort to eliminate the fertilizer subsidy’ on the part of the World 
Bank (Lele 1990, p.1211). 
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(c) passing of the Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Act in 1994 to revoke an earlier ban on 
the private export of crops, however, maize was excepted from this liberalisation with 
maize exports being restricted to a list of licensed traders; 
(d)  introduction of a broad liberalisation of all crop prices in 1995 to allow traders to buy and 
sell according to market forces with the exception of maize; 
(e) introduction of a producer maize price band for ADMARC and the passing of a Fertilizer, 
Farm, Feed and Seed Remedies Act, effectively removing all restrictions on private 
trading in farm inputs (Oygard et al. 2003). 
The reforms meant significant changes in ADMARC’s position in the markets, including 
restructuring and closing market outlets. For example, in the late 1980s, ADMARC had a 
market structure that comprised 3 regional offices, 12 divisional offices, 80 area offices, 217 
unit markets23 and 1,300 seasonal markets (Chirwa 2006). By 2001, the division and area 
offices were replaced by 14 district offices and 10 depots. While unit markets were increased 
to 343, seasonal markets were reduced to only 441. In 2002, the regional offices for centre 
and northern were merged (Chirwa et al. 2005). Nevertheless, ADMARC has remained a 
large player in the market, a position strengthened in recent years by its responsibility in 
distributing subsidised fertilizers (see below and Chapter 5). However, its share of crop 
purchases is substantially diminished compared to the 1980s. In the 2000s, different 
challenges have arisen for the proper role of ADMARC in the maize market, and in regard to 
price stabilisation. As shown in Chapter 5, the first years of the 2000s experienced high 
volatility in production outcomes and price instability. There were seasons when ADMARC 
set out to defend the producer price band, then abandoned the attempt when market prices 
soared out of the range. In other seasons, ADMARC joined the scramble for supplies, lifting 
its buying prices in line with market developments. For a period from 2008 to 2010, 
ADMARC was temporarily given monopoly control again over maize trade, in an effort to 
control spiralling prices in a year with an apparently good harvest according to official 
production figures. 
Turning more specifically to input subsidy history, the government during the period 1964-
1990 also managed subsidized pan-territorial and pan-seasonal input prices linked to the 
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 Unit markets had permanent structures able to operate through the year in urban or near urban centres 
while seasonal markets were made of temporary (grass-thatch) structures in village settings. 
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agricultural credit-input-extension policy described above. From 1971 ADMARC was the 
sole importer and distributor of fertilizers (Smith, 1995) but this changed in 1988 when the 
government under donor pressure set up the Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer Revolving Fund 
of Malawi (SFFRFM) to be responsible for the procurement of fertilizer, while ADMARC 
focussed on distribution (Oygard et al. 2003). By 1982, subsidies were costing 6 per cent of 
the government budget, and the World Bank insisted on a phased removal of the subsidy 
(Chirwa 2006); a process which the government started in 1984 but unilaterally abandoned in 
1987 due to food security concerns. Instead, the government increased the subsidy to 22 per 
cent, a little higher than it had been in the immediate pre-reform period (Chilowa 1998, 
Harrigan 2003). With funding from the European Commission (EC), the government also 
introduced a fertilizer buffer stock project that also constructed four regional warehouses for 
SFFRFM with a total capacity of 140,000 tons. This was also an ‘insurance’ against 
disruptions of fertilizer supplies due to civil war in Mozambique at that time (Smith 1995).  
In 1990, the government effectively resumed the fertilizer subsidy removal process when it 
signed an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC) with the World Bank. This removal 
occurred unevenly due to temporary subsidy measures reinstated in particular years, and 
complete removal did not occur until 1995/96. Sharp rises in fertilizer prices occurred in the 
1990s, not just due to subsidy removal, but also to successive devaluations of the kwacha.24 
Within the framework of ASAC, the Bank also insisted on opening up the fertilizer market to 
private operators. As a compromise, the government agreed to such liberalization while 
retaining ADMARC’s role as ‘seller of last resort’ (Smith 1995). In official terms, the 
fertilizer market was now liberalized (Chirwa 2006).  
In 1991/92, there was a drought that reduced national maize output by 58.7 per cent (from 1.6 
million tons in 1990/91 to 0.7 million tons in 1991/92). The immediate policy response was a 
Drought Recovery Inputs Programme (DRIP) that distributed free inputs for the 1992/93 crop 
season (Harrigan 2008). For the 1994/95 crop season, a Supplementary Inputs Project (SIP) 
was established with funding from UK ODA (soon to become DFID). This was succeeded by 
three seasons of complete subsidy removal from 1995/96 to 1997/98; however, the 
government was increasingly at odds with the World Bank about this policy stance, and 
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 ‘The Kwacha was devalued several times since 1994, increasing from about MK9 to the US$ in 1994 
to MK45 to the US$ in 1999. Effectively, the average price of a 50 Kg bag of NPK or urea increased 
from about MK100 in 1994/95 to MK800 to 900 Kwacha in 1998/99’ (Minot et al. 2000, p.4). 
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acquired allies in the donor community and amongst the large NGOs who were particularly 
concerned with deteriorating household level food security in the country.  
As already mentioned, politics took centre stage in the form of campaigns for the first multi-
party elections in 1994. Opposition political parties campaigned on the promise to forgive 
outstanding credit for input purchases and to reinstate lower fertilizer prices. For the 1998/99 
crop season, with another election coming up in May 1999, a major reversal in fertilizer 
policy occurred with the introduction by the government of a universal Starter Pack scheme at 
a cost of US$23.5 million, and an outreach of 2.3 million smallholders, funded by the 
government (US$14.5m), DFID (US$8.2m), the World Bank (US$1.7m), the European 
Community (US$0.7m) and Republic of China (US$0.5m) (Harrigan 2005, p.237). The 
Starter Pack ran for a second year in 1999/2000 as a universal scheme open to all small 
farmers and with an estimated uptake of 2.8 million farmers. Yields and output jumped by 
about 40 per cent over the preceding levels, assisted by good rainfall in those two seasons 
(Levy and Barahona 2002). The scheme demonstrated potential for increasing productivity 
but it was abandoned after two years owing to donor pressure25 in favour of a scaled-back 
version that came to be known as the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) implemented from 
2000/01 to 2004/05. TIP reflected the following changes to the starter pack: (1) the number of 
beneficiaries was reduced to 0.4 million farmers (later increasing to 1.5 million due to 
persistent hunger events); (2) the size of the input package was reduced to 0.08 hectares maize 
area (2 kg maize seed, 1 kg legume seed and 12 kgs fertilizer); and (3) the seed was changed 
from hybrid to OPV maize. Unlike the starter pack, TIP coincided with a series of major 
adverse weather events, mainly floods in 2000/01 and droughts in 2001/02 and 2003/04 
(Frankenberger et al. 2003, Government of Malawi 2004) but the fall in maize production and 
the ensuing hunger is largely attributed to the scaling down of the starter pack (Levy and 
Barahona 2002).  
For the 2005/06 crop season, and subsequently, the government made good on its 2004 
election promise of re-introducing a more comprehensive fertilizer subsidy, the agricultural 
input subsidy programme (ISP)). The ISP has provided 1.7 million (and upwards) farm 
households with subsidised fertilizers via a coupon distribution that provides beneficiaries 
with two 50 kg bags of fertilizer at greatly discounted prices. Due to rising world prices of 
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 An apparently quiescent World Bank up to that point suddenly reverted to a tougher stance, and put 
considerable pressure on other donors (principally DFID) to move away from universal coverage. 
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fertilizer, the subsidy rate grew steeply from an initial level of 64 per cent to an estimated 92 
per cent in 2008/09. This also increased the share of the subsidy in government revenue from 
5 per cent to 14 per cent. The 2008/09 figures reflected a price spike that occurred in world 
fertilizer prices in mid-2008. Nevertheless, this is a historically unprecedented level of 
fertilizer and other input subsidisation for Malawi. The subsidy is associated with (but not 
necessarily entirely responsible for) an apparent increase in production from an average 1.55 
million tons in 2000/01-2004/05 to 3.06 million tons in 2005/06-2009/10. Production 
outcomes in this latter period are explored further in Chapter 5 (section 5.5) of this thesis.  
Table 3.1: Agricultural input transfer programs in Malawi, 1998/99-2008/09 
Year Scheme Input package 
Cost 
(MK 
billion) 
FARM 
HHs 
(Mn) 
Maize 
Output 
(Mn MT) 
1998/99 Starter Pack  
Fert: 10 Kgs 23:21:0+4S, 5 Kgs Urea 
Seed: 2 Kg hybrid maize, 2 Kgs legume  1.1 2.3 2.2 
1999/00 Starter Pack  
Fert: 10 Kgs 23:21:0+4S, 5 Kgs Urea 
Seed: 2 Kg hybrid maize, 2 Kgs legume 1.2 2.8 2.3 
2000/01 TIP Fert: 5 Kgs fertilizer, 2 Kg  Seed: OPV maize, 1 Kgs legume  0.6 1.5 1.6 
2001/02 TIP Fert: 5 Kgs NPK, 5 Kgs Urea Seed: 2 Kg OPV maize, 1 Kgs legume 0.5 1.0 1.5 
2002/03 TIP Fert: 5 Kgs NPK, 5 Kgs Urea Seed: 2 Kg OPV maize, 1 Kgs legume 1.1 2.0 1.8 
2003/04 TIP (Winter) 
Fert: 5 Kgs Urea, 2 Kg 
Seed: OPV maize, 1 Kgs legume 0.2 0.4 1.6 
2004/05 TIP Fert: 12.5 Kgs NPK, 12.5 Kgs Urea Seed: 5 Kg OPV maize, 1 Kgs legume 4.2 2.0 1.2 
2005/06 ISP 
Fert: 50 kg 23:21:0+4S & 50 kg Urea for maize 
at MK950 or 50 kg D compound & 50 Kgs 
CAN for tobacco at MK1450 
Seed: MK400 per 3kg hybrid or OPV 
7.2 1.4 2.6 
2006/07 ISP 
Fert: 50 kg NPK & 50 kg Urea for maize or 50 
kg D compound & 50 Kgs CAN for tobacco at 
MK950 per bag; Seed: MK400 per 3kg  
12.7 1.8 3.2 
2007/08 ISP 
Fert: 50 kg NPK & 50 kg Urea for maize or 50 
kg D compound & 50 kgs CAN for tobacco at 
MK900 per bag; Seed: 2 kg hybrid up to 
MK900 or 4 Kg OPV maize (MK400) 
16.3 1.7 2.6 
2008/09 ISP 
Fert: 50 kg NPK & 50 kg Urea for maize or 50 
kg D compound & 50 kgs CAN for tobacco at 
MK800 per bag; Seed: 2 kg hybrid or 4 kg OPV 
at MK680 
39.8 1.7 3.6 
2009/10 ISP 
Fert: 50 kg NPK & 50 kg Urea for maize at 
MK500 per bag; Seed: 5 kg hybrid/10 kg OPV 
at MK1500  
25.0 1.6 3.2 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009f, 2010f, 2010d) 
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Table 3.1 provides a summary of the three successive input interventions that the government 
has implemented in this decade and considers to fall within ‘agricultural input programmes in 
Malawi’. The focus of this thesis in Chapter 5 is on the ISP but where necessary in the 
discussion, reference is made to the earlier schemes. Detailed descriptions, operations and 
outcomes of the Starter Pack and TIP can be found in the literature (e.g. Levy 2005b).  
The government has since March 2010 formulated a six year Medium Term Plan (2010/11-
2015/16) for the input subsidy programme, which has since been renamed the Farm Inputs 
Subsidy Programme (FISP). 26 Before then, issues around the input subsidies were managed 
on ad hoc basis mostly as cabinet directives and donor concessions. This ‘ambitious’ 
MK202.6 billion programme has three main components (1) Farmer Access to Farm Inputs 
(coupon system); (2) Farm Inputs Markets (agricultural credit) and (3) Farmer Access to 
Complementary Services (agricultural extension and other services). Every year, 8 million 
coupons will be distributed covering 160,000 metric tonnes of maize fertilizer (80,000 tonnes 
each Urea and NPK), 8,000-16,000 tonnes of maize seed and 3,200-8,000 tonnes of legume 
seed. It is envisaged that by 2015/16, over 3.5 million farm families will be reached 
(Government of Malawi 2010d). Table 3.2 presents the costs. 
Table 3.2: The Medium Term ISP Plan 2010/11-2015/16 (MK billion) 
Year Farm Inputs Input Credit Agric. Services Total 
2010/11 29.01 0.00 0.21 29.22 
2011/12 31.06 0.00 0.22 31.28 
2012/13 32.93 0.00 0.24 33.17 
2013/14 34.57 0.10 0.25 34.92 
2014/15 35.26 1.27 0.27 36.80 
2015/16 35.62 1.32 0.29 37.23 
Total 198.46 2.70 1.47 202.63 
 Note: official rate of exchange US$1.00 = MK140 
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2010d, pp.31 & 54) 
 
 
This rather condensed history of input-output-food market regulation and fertilizer-credit 
subsidy policy in Malawi provides an essential background to the policy options for 
                                                 
26
 The ISP has become Malawi’s flagship economic policy, but remains controversial on numerous 
grounds including its funding (ostensibly funded by the government, but nevertheless dependent on 
general budget support), targeting (who actually gets the coupons), secondary markets (in coupons and 
fertilizer), impact on food security at the household level, and accuracy of the maize output levels 
attributed to it. These aspects are examined in much greater detail in later chapters of this thesis. 
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overcoming vulnerability which are the focus of this thesis. Maize policy in Malawi is 
understandably highly political, and many decisions can only be understood in terms of 
electoral cycles, promises made by political parties and their leaders prior to gaining power, 
and the goal of securing political support from important sectors of the populace in the future. 
The Malawi government has had a continuous priority of securing maize self-sufficiency at 
national level, and at times this has coincided with the evolving concerns of donors regarding 
household level food security, thus resulting in some periods of agreement and in other 
periods of disagreement over objectives and the means to secure them. The periods of 
agreement notably during the starter pack scheme saw the World Bank contributing up to 29 
per cent of the programme resources and during the period of disagreement (TIP), the Bank 
did not contribute any financial resources (see Table 17.1 in Harrigan 2005, p.237). The 
policy switches that have occurred have reflected the often brief ascendancy of one side or the 
other in terms of leverage over the course of events, with more liberalisation and less 
subsidies occurring when the external agencies have been in the ascendant, and reversion to 
more regulation and more subsidies when the Malawi government has felt able to exercise 
more control. 
3.2  Social Transfer History in Malawi 
Policy ideas about formal social transfers emerged in Malawi in the early 1990s after a UN-
funded Situation Analysis of Poverty published in 1993 revealed widespread and pervasive 
poverty, manifested by multiple adverse indicators (Government of Malawi/United Nations 
1993). The analysis was conducted at the peak of the political transition which culminated in 
the first multiparty general elections in May 1994. During the campaign, the main opposition 
United Democratic Front (UDF) party had campaigned on a promise to reduce poverty. 
Immediately after the general election, the winning UDF-led government launched a Poverty 
Alleviation Programme (PAP) in August 1994. Between 1994 and 1995, the government set 
up a poverty alleviation framework and implementation structure, coordinated by a secretariat 
in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD). The government also 
organized a series of stakeholder workshops to discuss ideas around social funds that were 
emerging from the World Bank. This process eventually culminated in the establishment of 
the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) which the president launched in August 1996 as its 
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flagship poverty alleviation strategy (Bloom et al. 2005).27 Since 1996, MASAF has evolved 
in terms of scope and management, and three distinct phases can be identified: 
(1) The first phase (MASAF 1: 1995-1999) obtained funding of US$56 million and 
comprised two components; a Community Sub-Project (CSP) and a Public Works 
Programme (PWP). 
(2) The second phase (MASAF II: 1999-2003) became effective in 1998 and ran until 
2003 with further World Bank funding of US$66 million. MASAF II added a third 
component known as Social Sub-Projects or sponsored sub-projects (SSP). 
(3) The third phase (MASAF III: 2003-2015) became effective in November 2003 with a 
funding commitment of US$240 million, with further details as follows. 
The community sub-projects (CSP) component financed community-driven and managed 
infrastructure projects such as construction of school blocks, health centres and bridges. 
MASAF disbursed funds directly to the communities in three tranches, upon accounting of 
first tranches. The Sponsored Sub Projects (SSP) component addressed the needs of groups 
such as orphans, persons with disabilities, street children and people living with HIV/AIDS 
whose needs the design of MASAF I had inadvertently ignored. Most projects were income 
generating activities, early childhood development centres, food security and nutrition and 
vocational skills training. MASAF disbursed funds to Project Support Committees (PSCs) 
through a sponsoring agency (SA) that managed the resources on behalf of the communities. 
The sponsoring agencies were mostly NGOs with technical capacity in the selected project, 
and already working in the community.  
The focus of this section is particularly on public works programmes (PWPs) which comprise 
Malawi’s major social safety net. The first PWP was implemented during MASAF I as a cash 
transfer-based safety net pilot in response to income poverty and food insecurity that had been 
identified in the earlier poverty assessment, and had been followed up in a vulnerability 
assessment mapping (VAM) in 1996. In terms of budget allocation, PWPs accounted for 27 
per cent of the financial resources of MASAF I and 20.6 per cent of MASAF II. In the 
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 MASAF was a World Bank funded project the government publicised it as UDF’s commitment to 
reducing poverty in a similar way the government has publicised the ISP as the Democratic 
Development Party (DPP) commitment to reducing hunger. 
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decentralised structure, PWPs are nowadays implemented by district assemblies with MASAF 
as the principle funding agency (Bloom et al. 2005, Government of Malawi 2005a). 
The programme involves labour-intensive public works such as building or rehabilitating 
community roads, dams, forests and other environmental assets. The programme targets poor 
and vulnerable but economically active individuals who can provide labour. The targeting 
follows a three-tier system that involves (a) geographic targeting using VAM to identify 
communities within a district that are poorest and at risk of food insecurity; (b) community 
targeting using community committees to identify and select deserving individuals; and (c) 
self targeting in which the wage rate is set at 20 per cent below the government minimum 
wage to ensure that only genuinely needy individuals participate. During MASAF I and II, the 
cash transfer was pegged at MK43 for a four-hour task in a day. Following the 2001/02 
drought, MASAF’s PWP was redesigned as a conditional cash transfer (PWP-CCT) involving 
a fixed ten days of work at MK200 per day. It was implemented between October and 
December, prior to the onset of agricultural season. The unenforceable conditions were that 
beneficiaries would use the cash to buy agricultural inputs. Following another hunger in 
2004/05 that compelled the government to introduce the input subsidy programme, the 
government now holds the view that the PWP-CCT programme is implemented to provide 
cash with which to redeem coupons provided in the input subsidy programme. From MASAF 
operational guidelines, PWP funds would be released to districts when the subsidized farm 
inputs were available on the market; every participant would receive MK2400 for 12 days’ of 
4 hour work per day (Government of Malawi 2007d, p.4). The government expects 
participants to purchase at least one 50-kg bag of maize and one 50-kg bag of the subsidized 
fertilizer (Barnett et al. 2008, p.44). 
In addition to MASAF’s continuing PWP funded by the World Bank, the government has 
implemented other variants through MASAF and other institutions to address specific short-
term shocks. For example, following the 2001-02 drought, the World Bank provided an 
additional US$6 million through an Emergency Drought Recovery Project (EDRP) for relief 
related transfers through PWPs from 2002 to 2005. The Department for International 
Development (DFID) also provided US$12.2 million to implement PWPs in selected districts. 
The first phase called DFID 1 was implemented by MASAF in 2001-02. The second phase 
was implemented in 2002-04 through an international NGO (CARE) in a project called the 
Improving Livelihoods through Public Works Programme (ILTPWP). The government 
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provided MK113 million (US$1.26 million) to implement the Relief Cash for Work 
Programme (RCWP) in 2002-043. Another non-MASAF public works programme has been 
funded by the European Union (EU) since 2001 and is known as the Government of 
Malawi/European Union (GoM/EU) Income Generating Public Works Programme (IGPWP) 
(Chirwa 2007). 
The main phase of the IGPWP ran from 2001 to 2005 with the aim of reducing poverty and 
improving food security. It covered all districts and, like MASAF’s PWPs, focused on 
rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads, afforestation projects, and small-scale irrigation 
schemes. Unlike MASAF, the programme worked with local contractors who in turn recruited 
beneficiaries. The wage rate varied between contractors but was set at a minimum of MK64 
per 6-hour task. Between 2002 and 2004, the GoM/EU implemented a PWP Food Security 
Programme through five district assemblies in the central region targeting the ‘rural poor with 
surplus labour’. Local leaders identified and selected beneficiaries in consultation with district 
officials (leadership beneficiary selection). The wage rate was set at MK147 for a 5-hour task. 
In the 2005/06 hungry season, GoM/EU implemented a Special Programme for Relief and 
Investment in Needy Times (SPRINT) between November 2005 and March 2006 in 
communities that were identified through VAM to be badly hit by the food crisis. SPRINT 
beneficiaries were selected by community committees (community targeting) and were paid 
MK150 per day for an average period of 20 days. Since 2005, the main IGPWP has continued 
with the local contractor approach, but local leaders are involved in rationing beneficiaries. 
The wage rate in 2009 was MK150 for a 6-hr task (Chirwa 2007). 
The third major safety net public works programme is the nationwide Special Government 
Public Works Programme (SGPWP) managed by Ministry of Transport and Public Works 
since 2005, and funded by the government. It is implemented by the District Assemblies and 
covers all the districts in Malawi. District officials decide on the roads to be rehabilitated in 
district but the beneficiaries are identified and selected by local leaders through a rationing 
approach. The wage rate is set at MK200 per day for an 8 hour task (Devereux et al. 2006a, 
Chirwa 2007, Ntata 2010). Other PWPs in Malawi include those implemented by NGOs such 
as World Vision International, Catholic Relief Services, Malawi Red Cross, Save the 
Children, OXFAM and others (World Bank 2007a, p.31). Table 3.3 provides summary of 
some (and not all) of the major PWPs in Malawi in terms of timing, budgets and their sources. 
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Table 3.3: Major Public Works Programmes in Malawi, 1996-2008 
Institution Public Works Programme Period Budget 
(US$ million) 
Source of 
Funds 
 
MASAF 
MASAF II PWP 1999-2002 13.10 IDA 
EDRP 2002-2003 6.37 IDA 
DFID I 2001-2002 4.25 DFID 
ILTPWP 2002-2004 7.95 DFID 
RCWP 2002-2003 1.40 GoM 
PWP-CCT 2005-2006 12.10 IDA 
PWP-CCT 2007-2008 3.40 IDA 
GOM/EU Food Security Programme 2003-2006 84.90 EU 
Public Works Programme 2003-2006 34.90 EU 
Income Generating PWP 2003-2006 2.70 EU 
Ministry of 
Transport & 
Public Works 
Special Public Works 
Programme 
 
2003-2006 
 
3.30 
 
GoM 
Source: Government of Malawi (2003a, p.23, 2007d, p.10), Barnett, et al (2008, p.45), 
World Bank (2007a, p.33). 
 
Since 2005, there has been a shift in emphasis regarding social transfers in Malawi. This has 
involved a move away from seasonal PWPs towards cash transfers that are paid continuously 
(on a monthly basis) across the calendar year. The Mchinji social cash transfer scheme 
(Chapter 6 of this thesis) was designed in 2005 and implemented in 2006. The scheme 
replicates design features that were devised earlier for a social cash transfer pilot in Kalomo 
district in Zambia (Schubert 2003, 2006, Miller et al. 2010). As the first such scheme in the 
region, and given the burgeoning enthusiasm for cash transfers amongst bilateral donors and 
international NGOs in this period, the Kalomo scheme acquired almost celebrity status. In 
March 2006, the African Union held a conference on social protection attended by 13 African 
heads-of-state, in Livingstone in Zambia, the proceedings of which involved a visit to the 
nearby Kalomo scheme. This resulted in the Livingstone Call for Action in which the African 
Union pledged to encourage its member countries to adopt social cash transfer policies as part 
of their social protection strategies (African Union 2006). 
In addition to the Mchinji social cash transfer scheme, there were other, shorter term, 
unconditional cash transfer projects in Malawi in the 2000s. These include a component of 
Concern Universal’s safety nets scheme in Dedza district (Levy et al. 2002); an Oxfam social 
cash transfers scheme implemented in Thyolo district (Harvey and Savage 2006); and the 
Concern Worldwide cash transfer scheme in Dowa district in the 2005-06 season called the 
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Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer (DECT) scheme (Devereux et al. 2006b). These schemes did 
not involve routine social cash transfers of long duration, rather they were short-term 
responses to immediate deprivation, with limited timescales. Nevertheless, they provided 
considerable impetus to the search in Malawi for innovative ways to tackle chronic 
vulnerability, and to examine alternatives to the safety net PWP approach (Devereux 2008). 
Between 2006 and 2008, donors and NGOs helped the government to formulate a Social 
Protection Policy the goal of which is to reduce poverty and enable the poor to move out of 
poverty and vulnerability. It sets out four pillars, comprising (i) provision of welfare support 
to the most needy, (ii) protection of assets, (iii) livelihood promotion through productivity 
enhancement, and (iv) policy linkages and mainstreaming within government. In 2008, the 
Cabinet discussed the policy but did not approve it because the narrative used higher poverty 
rates (52 per cent from IHS2) when later welfare monitoring surveys revealed apparent 
decline to 40 per cent by 2007. The cabinet changed the name ‘social protection policy’ to 
‘Social Support Policy’ because the former implied dependency on the state (Chinsinga 2009, 
Government of Malawi 2009h, p.9). A second draft of January 2009 incorporated the 
directives (Government of Malawi 2009g) but, at the time of writing this thesis, the policy is 
yet to obtain official status because the Cabinet again failed to approve it in June 2010 
(Government of Malawi 2010i). The policy represents a broader and more predictable 
resource commitment from government and donors to respond to vulnerability (FANTA 
2007, p.22) but the formulation process is also faulted for lacking local participation since it 
was driven by donors and not government and also lacked political or grassroots input 
(Chinsinga 2007d). 
The policy builds on previous safety net strategies which can be traced to earlier initiatives in 
1999 when the World Bank led a process for the design of a National Safety Net Strategy 
(NSNS) (World Bank 1999). The NSNS recommendation was delivered to the government in 
2000 but no further action was taken at that time (World Bank 2007a). In 2002, fresh efforts 
were initiated to put in place a National Safety Nets Programme linked to the 2002-2005 
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) which provided for safety nets in order to 
improve the lives of the most vulnerable people (Government of Malawi 2002a). A third set 
of efforts emerged during the formulation of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS) covering the period 2006-2011 (Government of Malawi 2006a).  
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There have also been attempts to improve coordination of social transfer initiatives. Initially, 
safety nets were coordinated by the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) Unit in the then 
National Economic Council (NEC), and operated under a Presidential Council on Poverty 
Alleviation. The coordination then moved to a Safety Nets Unit in the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development when NEC was dissolved, and later to the Department of Poverty 
and Disaster Management Affairs (DPDMA) in the Office of the President and Cabinet. 
Currently, social protection is coordinated by a Social Protection Unit in the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development. It operates under a National Social Protection Steering 
Committee (NSSSC) comprising principal secretaries from the key ministries, and heads of 
donor agencies and civil society which is represented by the Council for Non Governmental 
Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA), a coordinating body for civil society organizations in 
Malawi (World Bank 2007a, Government of Malawi 2008i). However, the Social Protection 
Unit mandated to coordinate implementation of the Social Support Policy remains a one-man 
office (staffed by a Director) and the government continues to implement a variety of social 
transfers using parallel structures, some of them even located in the same ministry as the 
Social Protection Unit (e.g. Department of Disaster Preparedness and Management).  
3.3 Politics and Public Administration in Malawi 
The earlier summary of agricultural policy history in Malawi provides some insights into the 
significance of the country’s politics in determining the policies that are given priority by 
governments in power. Malawi has had just three heads of state since independence in 1964. 
Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda ruled from 1964 to 1994 (30 years). After a referendum in 1993 
and an election in May 1994, he was succeeded by Bakili Muluzi, leader of the UDF political 
party, who won two successive elections in 1994 and 1999. In 2004, the UDF regained power 
under the leadership of Bingu wa Mutharika, who due to the slenderness of his majority and 
political infighting between the major parties, proceeded to move his government and 
leadership into a new party, the Democratic Development Party (DPP) in 2005. Bingu has 
subsequently won a second electoral term, which runs from 2009 to 2014. 28  
                                                 
28
 President Mutharika is popular and is known locally by praise titles such as Mose wa lero or Ngwazi. 
The former means ‘today’s Moses’ and connotes Dr Mutharika delivering Malawians from hunger. 
Ngwazi means ‘conqueror’ or ‘saviour’, the title with which Dr Banda also was bestowed for having 
conquered colonialism. A university in China in 2010 conferred on the president an honorary 
professorship. His official salutations have now become His Excellency Ngwazi Professor Bingu wa 
Mutharika. 
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Dr Banda is regarded by most political science observers of Malawi to have entrenched what 
is called neo-patrimonialism in the way government in Malawi tends to function (see, for 
example, Cross and Kutengule 2001, Booth et al. 2006). Neo-patrimonialism is characterised 
by excessive patronage, allegiance, cronyism, and rent seeking (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 
Kydd 2009). Under neo-patrimonialism, politics is the art of private wealth generation for 
‘insiders’, and political control is achieved and sustained by using high office to ‘purchase’ 
loyalty and support. The alienation of land from the customary sector in the Banda era 
exemplifies neo-patrimonial behaviour. The MCP regime encouraged its senior members to 
engage in the transfer of land from customary to private tenure, mainly to produce burley 
tobacco for export. The scale of this land alienation was considerable. In the early 1970s there 
were some 229 estates covering 255,800 ha with an average size of some 1,000 ha each, 
representing the historic pattern of commercial settlement in forestry, tea, sugar, coffee, and 
tobacco. By the end of the Banda period in 1993, this had risen to 23,000 estates occupying 
1.2 million ha, with an average size of some 50 ha, largely consisting of a clientelist class of 
tobacco growers. By way of contrast, the same period saw a decline in plot size in the 
customary sector from 70 per cent of producers owning 2 ha or more in 1969 to less than 15 
per cent having more than 1 ha in 1995 (FAO/WFP 1995, Cross and Kutengule 2001). 
Politics in Malawi does not only obey neo-patrimonial features; it also exhibits political 
manoeuvring of more routine kinds such as keeping one step ahead of opposition politicians 
and groups, making decisions that are reactive to claims put forward in the country’s media, 
attempting to shift responsibility when things go wrong, and denying that an emerging 
problem exists (Booth et al. 2006). In relation to fertilizer policy (and its relative success or 
failure), several of these behaviours have been deployed at different points in time. Fertilizer 
subsidies are hugely popular amongst the country’s small farmers, and elections in Malawi 
are won or lost according to how convincingly the leaders of different political parties 
represent their intentions regarding the future amount and scale of the subsidy (Murwira 2009, 
Smiddy and Young 2009). However, if maize market behaviour indicates that the policy’s 
impacts may not have been quite as positive as claimed, then scapegoats are sought (typically, 
private maize traders if maize prices rise steeply), and the existence of a maize shortage may 
be ignored or downplayed.29 
                                                 
29
 This latter occurs quite often, but was observed at its most disingenuous in Malawi in 2002 when, 
confronted by mounting evidence of serious famine taking hold in some parts of the country, President 
Muluzi declared that no such problem existed (Devereux 2002a). 
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Malawi nowadays has a devolved public administration, following the decentralisation of 
local government to districts that occurred in 2001. The national decentralization policy 
introduced in 1998 provides for a unified system of local government with the aim of 
enhancing local participation, eliminating duplication in service delivery, and promoting 
transparency and accountability. In this context, districts, towns and cities are all denominated 
district assemblies (DAs)30. Figure 3.1 above provides an administrative map of Malawi 
showing district assemblies.  
The decentralized system comprises a hierarchy of committees constituted by elected or 
nominated representatives. There is the District Assembly (DA), the Area Development 
Committee (ADC) and the Village Development Committee (VDC). The DA is constituted by 
elected ward councillors, but also includes a prescribed number of members of parliament 
(MPs) and Traditional Authorities (TAs). The DA has the mandate to implement national 
policies and is also able to formulate district specific policies. The ADC covers a TA (area) 
and comprises representatives of all Village Development Committees (VDCs) under the 
jurisdiction of the TA. The ADC is responsible for identification and prioritization of 
community needs, supervising implementation, and mobilizing community input and 
resources. A VDC can be the same as, or larger than, a group village head (GVH) which in 
turn comprises several villages when village size is small. 
These committees are supported by technical committees comprising staff from government 
departments, NGOs and the private sector. A District Executive Committee (DEC) provides 
technical backstopping to the DA. It constitutes the District Commissioner (DC) as 
chairperson, the Director for Planning and Development as secretary, and heads of the local 
offices of line ministries, as well as NGO technical officers. At community level, the Area 
Executive Committee (AEC) supports the ADC and VDC in their roles. The AEC comprises 
field extension workers such as Community Development Assistants, Health Assistants, 
Agriculture field staff, and others (Government of Malawi 1998b, 2000a, 2001). But many 
government departments have their own parallel structures of service delivery that both 
departs from and overlaps this administrative and governance system. 
 
                                                 
30
 There are 28 rural districts, 4 cities (Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu in Mzimba and Zomba), and 6 town 
assemblies (Balaka, Luchenza, Karonga, Kasungu, Mangochi and Salima). The DA for Mzimba 
district is known as Mbelwa DA. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Malawi showing administrative districts of Malawi 
 
Source: Benson, et al., (2002, p.6) 
 
Note that as of 2002, there were 27 districts in 
Malawi. Neno was part of Mwanza district. 
Hence it is not shown here 
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Discussion on how the input subsidy programme and the Mchinji cash transfer scheme work 
is deferred to later chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) but it is relevant to note here that despite the 
presence of the unified local government structure, government departments, NGOs and 
projects often continue to use their own parallel implementation structures and systems. The 
case study of Mchinji district (Chapters 6 and 7) illustrates this point. The district has a 
‘district social protection committee’ and ‘community social protection committees’ 
responsible for implementation and management of social transfers. In theory, all social 
transfer activities should use these sub-committees for their implementation, but this does not 
happen in practice. The Mchinji social cash transfer programme is implemented by 
Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Women and Community services. At district 
level, the Ministry has two separate offices: a community development office and a social 
welfare office responsible for all social issues such as orphan and vulnerable children care and 
disabilities.31 The two offices converge at community level where a community development 
assistant (CDA), who typically covers a TA, coordinates activities of both offices. The social 
cash transfer programme is implemented by a separate district social cash transfer secretariat 
and community social cash transfer committees (CSCTCs) under VDCs. 
Likewise, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) implements the input subsidy 
programme through district assemblies but lacks consistency. Some activities are 
implemented through the DC while others are implemented through District Agriculture 
offices. At community level, some activities are implemented through extension workers, 
some through village heads and some through village input subsidy committees. An important 
feature of local authorities in Malawi is their apparent inability to consolidate local 
governance and development management. In fact, since 2004, the government has not held 
local elections to constitute the DAs. There are also increasing cases and speculations about 
tensions between different government departments, corruption, nepotism and 
mismanagement of public resources (especially agricultural input subsidy coupons), most 
probably emanating from confusion created by the failure to establish institutional boundaries 
in the decentralization (Hussein 2004, Patel et al. 2007, Tambulasi 2009a).  
At the centre of this lack of clarity about institutional responsibility are traditional leaders 
who comprise an informal but officially recognised administrative structure of traditional 
                                                 
31
 Note that although the district social welfare office handles issues of disabilities, at national level there 
is a separate Ministry of Persons with Disabilities. 
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leadership (the chieftaincy system). Traditional leaders serve multiple roles and command 
respect as custodians of legal, governance, security, administrative and development issues at 
the community level. This structure has existed from colonial times and was strengthened 
during the Banda era. The traditional leadership hierarchy comprises Traditional Authorities 
(TAs) and sub-Traditional Authorities (STAs), known by the title of chief, who are 
responsible for a catchment known as an Area. Below TAs and STAs are village heads 
responsible for villages. Villages are the smallest unit of the traditional authority system, a 
number of villages are brought together and have a group village head (GVH). A Chiefs Act 
passed during the colonial era provides the legislative framework for traditional authority. 
Although government holds the power to confirm or promote or reject a chief, traditional 
leadership is inherited. A chief is answerable to the president through the District 
Commissioner and draws a monthly honorarium. The traditional leadership system applies 
predominantly in rural areas. Although urban areas have ‘chiefs’, governments have up to 
now not recognized this arrangement, preferring to call them ‘block leaders’. Traditional 
leaders in Malawi are influential and they act as the focal point for the social, cultural, 
political, and economic aspects of rural life as well as the de facto system for local 
participation (Kutengule 2000, Chiweza 2005, Muriaas 2009). 
Evidence seems to suggest that traditional leaders in Malawi are more than in the past 
involved in corruption, nepotism and theft of resources. Indeed it has been proposed that after 
the police, traditional leaders (chiefs and village heads) are the most corrupt social group in 
Malawi (Kasunda 2008, Tambulasi 2009b, Chipalasa 2010a). As just one example of this in 
the context of this thesis, the number of registered villages has grown rapidly apparently with 
a view to increasing the access of chiefs and their citizens to the free cash, inputs and other 
resources in circulation (Chinsinga 2009). For example, in the social cash transfer project area 
in TA Mlomba in Machinga district, Seaman et al., (2008, pp.7-8) noted a 60 per cent 
increase in the number of villages listed by the Social Welfare Department compared to the 
national census map of 1998. Some villages had as few households as four. The subdivision 
of the villages appeared to have been partly due to disagreements within villages about 
engagement with aid projects, but mostly to do with increasing the potential of receiving 
social transfers from current programmes, especially social cash transfers. During the 
fieldwork for this research (described in Chapter 7), it was observed that villages in the case 
study sites were small and structured like hamlets (mudzi) or ‘clans’ of people related to each 
other either by blood or affiliation through marriages. In particular one VDC called Kangwere 
  73 
comprised one clan with Zulu as the common household name. The VDC called Mduwa 
represented 33 villages with 1146 households (i.e. 34 households per village). Some villages 
(Mdumpha, Jimu and Tachoka) had ten or less households. This background is important for 
understanding how social transfers actually work at district and community levels. 
3.4 Further notes on vulnerability in Malawi 
A definition of vulnerability was provided in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and the problem of 
growing vulnerability in low income eastern and southern African countries was discussed in 
Chapter 2. In addition some brief comments were made in Chapter 1 concerning the chief 
causes of vulnerability in Malawi. In this section, the thesis briefly extends this understanding 
of vulnerability in Malawi. First it reaffirms a context of persistent poverty and widening 
vulnerability through the 1990s and 2000s. Second it provides data on the poverty status of 
households, as emerged from the 2004-05 IHS2. Third it summarises the chief causes of 
vulnerability that have been identified by other researchers. Fourth, it comments on the 
relative participation of different proportions of the farm population as net buyers or sellers of 
maize. 
First, there is a broad consensus that from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s vulnerability to 
hunger in Malawi became more prevalent and more deeply entrenched than in former decades 
(Devereux 1998, 1999, Devereux et al. 2006a). This trend is implicit at one level in the lack 
of progress in poverty reduction in that period.  Rural poverty was found to be 65 per cent in a 
UN survey conducted in 1993 (Government of Malawi/United Nations 1993), 67 per cent in 
the first Integrated Household Survey (IHS1) conducted in 1997/98 (Government of Malawi 
1998a), and 60 per cent in the second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2)(Government of 
Malawi 2005e). Given the margins of error in these statistics, little if any progress in rural 
poverty reduction occurred over this 15-year period, with significant spillovers into the 
progression of vulnerability. 
The reasons widely put forward for this process are explored shortly (see the discussion about 
the chief causes of vulnerability); however additional trends are also relevant. As shown in 
earlier tables on maize production, maize output in the 1990s and early 2000s was uneven on 
a declining trend, culminating in the lowest output since 1993/94 occurring in 2004/05. At the 
same time, efforts to diversify Malawian food crop agriculture away from maize yielded slow 
and marginal results (Mataya et al. 1998). Crops such as cassava, potatoes, rice, sorghum and 
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millet which can be direct substitutes for maize in consumption are ‘location-specific’ crops. 
For example, rice and cassava do well in lakeshore and river areas, but rice in particular is not 
an option in most rainfed agriculture in Malawi. Likewise sorghum and millet do relatively 
well in the lower Shire valley, but cannot compete with maize in yields or returns in much of 
the rest of the Malawi. There is some truth, perhaps, in the broader observation about sub-
Saharan Africa made by Hardy (1998) that maize often dominates farming systems in Africa 
because it is the crop most suited to agro-ecological conditions and it provides the broadest 
range of benefits in storage and consumption for poor people. 
Alongside a disappointing agricultural trend, there are continuous pressures from rising 
population and diminishing farm size. The 2008 census revealed an overall rate of population 
growth of 31.5 per cent from the preceding census in 1998, and population in rural areas rose 
by 30.3 per cent over the intercensal interval, from 8.8 million to 11.5 million people 
(Government of Malawi 2008b). With no new land becoming available, this increased rural 
population has had to be accommodated within the existing area available for cultivation, with 
inevitable effects on farm size and the incidence of functional landlessness. At the same time, 
the opportunities for non-farm wage work in rural areas remained quite limited throughout 
that period, and it is observed that demand for ganyu tended to outstrip supply, lowering the 
real rural wage (Whiteside 2000, Devereux et al. 2008, p.34). 
Second, it is useful here to reprise briefly some key figures from the IHS2 household budget 
survey undertaken by the NSO in 2004/05, details of which are provided in Chapter 4, even 
though these figures are now five years old, and partial surveys (as discussed in Chapter 1) 
show a marked improvement in poverty indices in the intervening period. In 2004/05 roughly 
17 per cent of all households in Malawi (448 thousand households) were estimated to be 
ultra-poor.32 According to the IHS2 definition of ultra-poverty, these are households unable to 
meet even minimum annual calorie needs on the basis of their per capita expenditure level. Of 
this national figure, 428 thousand households (15.9 per cent of all the households) are rural 
and ultra-poor; in other words ultra-poverty is overwhelmingly rural in character. 
Furthermore, 174 thousand households are not just rural and ultra-poor but are labour 
constrained in the sense of having a dependency ratio of 3 or over or have chronic illness 
                                                 
32
 This is less than the ultra-poverty rate of 22.3 per cent that has already been cited as the figure for 
Malawi, and which refers to individuals, not households. Since poorer households are larger than 
better off households in Malawi, the proportion of households that are ultra poor is lower than the 
proportion of people who are ultra poor. 
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amongst adults in the household. These and related figures are summarised in Table 3.4 
below. While the ultra-poverty line should not be treated as too definitive (people move in 
and out of ultra-poverty depending especially on their maize harvests), these data are 
indicative of the scale of the vulnerability problem faced by Malawi in the recent past. 
Table 3.4: Distribution of Households by Poverty Category 2004-05 
Poverty Category National Rural Number % Number % 
Non poor 1,518,620 56.4 1,249,296 53.2 
Poor but not ultra-poor 726,718 27.0 672,228 28.6 
Ultra-poor, of which: 448,206 16.6 428,337 18.2 
Not labour constrained 266,392 9.9 253,995 10.8 
Labour constrained 181,814 6.8 174,342 7.4 
Total Households 2,693,544 100.0 2,349,861 100.0 
  
Source: drawing on Ellis and Marchetta (2009) 
 
Vulnerability to hunger in Malawi is associated with long term and short term factors, as well 
as cumulative effects on household resilience (Devereux 1999, Devereux et al. 2006a). The 
principal causes of vulnerability in Malawi identified in the literature are as follows: 
(a) a substantial proportion of small farm households (estimated at around 60 per cent) are 
net food buyers, always requiring recourse to the market to cover their ‘food gap’ even 
in good years; 
(b) a long run decline in available cultivated land per farm family (Jayne et al. 2003), 
accelerated in Malawi during the 1970s and 1980s by the land alienation policies of 
the Banda period; 
(c) unstable maize production outcomes from one year to the next, caused principally by 
varying weather conditions, but also associated in the past with low yielding 
traditional varieties, depleted soil fertility and varying access to fertilizer; 
(d) an associated high degree of maize price instability, both within years (seasonal price 
instability) and across years in terms of the degree of such instability; 
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(e) slow progress in the diversification of the rural economy, both in terms of reducing 
small farmer’s reliance on maize as the principal food crop, and in terms of the lack of 
non-farm activities in rural areas; 
(f) the adverse impacts at household level of the rise in HIV infection in the 1980s and 
1990s, and the associated chronic illnesses and mortality of AIDS in the late-1990s 
and 2000s (these impacts include asset erosion to pay for medical care and funeral 
costs, and depletion of available labour for productive activities) (Conroy et al. 2006); 
(g) decline in personal security in rural areas, especially evidenced by livestock theft, 
causing a fall in the use of livestock (especially goats and cattle) by small farmers as 
an asset buffer against future shocks (Ellis et al. 2003, Pelser et al. 2007). 
(h) the cumulative impact of all these risk and shock factors taken together, principally 
manifested by incomplete recovery from successive shocks reducing long term 
resilience and increasing the likelihood that households are unable to cope with 
adverse effects using their own resources. 
Examining points (a) to (d) further, small farm size, coupled with inequality in land access in 
customary areas and inability to access agricultural technologies and input, means that 
participation in maize markets is highly differentiated. According to Jayne et al. (2003), about 
half of marketed output in Malawi is supplied by just 2-3 per cent farmers, operating in the 
farm size range of 4-20 hectares. The remaining half of marketed supply originates from a 
second tier of roughly 20 per cent of households, selling in the range of 0.1 to 5 tons maize 
per household. As stated in point (a) above, a third category comprises buyers only of staple 
grains, corresponding to around 60 per cent of all rural households. A final category of 
farmers (15-20 per cent) carry out both selling and buying of maize, or are self-sufficient in 
food overall due to combining maize production with other starchy crops like cassava or 
sweet potatoes. The size of the third of these categories, the 60 per cent of farm households 
who are net buyers of staple grains, is a key factor in explaining vulnerability to hunger in 
Malawi. Such households are prone to widening ‘food entitlement’ gaps in years of poor 
harvests, as well as to the adverse purchasing power effects of seasonal maize price increases. 
The next chapters, especially chapter 5, examine these aspects in more detail including 
analysis of maize price trends, and the proportion of people identified as at risk of missing 
food entitlements, at a time when government has declared phenomenal maize surpluses. 
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3.5 Summary 
The intention of this chapter was to provide essential features of Malawi’s past policies, 
politics, administration, and maize economy that inform the later concerns of the thesis. The 
chapter begins with a synthesis of the agricultural policy history of Malawi, with a special 
focus on past input subsidy policies. It then explores the history of cash transfers in Malawi, 
mainly in the form of food- or cash-for-work schemes associated with public works 
programmes. The chapter summarises views found in the literature about the way politics 
works in Malawi, and sketches out the current structure of devolved public administration. 
Finally, the chapter extends previous points made about vulnerability in Malawi, addressing 
‘who are the rural vulnerable’ via an examination of the proportion of ultra-poor and ultra-
poor labour constrained rural households, and the proportion of all farmers that are net buyers 
of maize.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical Methods and Fieldwork in Malawi 
4.1 Methods Overview 
As stated in a preliminary way in Chapter 1, this thesis represents a mixture of methods in 
which use of secondary data sources, and their interpretation, is combined with a relatively 
small fieldwork component in one district. Specifically the thesis comprises three sets of 
methods. The first involves making use of data collected by the Malawi government; the 
second involves village and household level research covering 90 households in Mchinji 
district; and the third involves key informant interviews with stakeholders, often with a view 
to triangulating the interpretation of policy options provided by different respondents with 
differing ideas. 
The reason for placing a high reliance on secondary data sources in this thesis is that several 
of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 are best approached by interrogating existing 
data in a different way from the uses to which it is normally put, or by extending the analysis 
of data in new directions. The following list sets out the principal ways this is done in the 
thesis: 
(1) a significant proportion of vulnerability to hunger in Malawi is seasonal in nature, and 
is created by large and unpredictable seasonal changes in the price of maize, so that 
analysis of this price instability contributes to the overall understanding of 
vulnerability (Section 4.2.7 and Tables 4.10 and 4.14 below);  
(2) the vulnerability assessment analysis that is conducted in Malawi provides the spatial 
data upon which social transfers of food or cash are made in different parts of the 
country, down to the sub-district level (see below section 4.2.8); 
(3) a spatial disaggregation of poverty and ultra poverty conducted in Chapter 6 (section 
6.2), as part of strengthening understanding of social cash transfer policies, relies on 
extracting previously unpublished data from the 2004-05 IHS2; 
(4) institutional monitoring data, as well as evaluations, provide the core information from 
which to examine critically and interpret the two main programmes that are compared 
in this thesis, the ISP and the Mchinji social cash transfer scheme (Chapters 5 and 6 of 
the thesis); 
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(5) budget and expenditure data provide the background against which the affordability 
question of input subsidies and social transfers can be examined (Chapter 8). 
 
The next section of this chapter sets out the major methodologies that are used by the 
government of Malawi to generate the secondary data that is utilised in the thesis. This section 
is then followed in Section 4.3 by a description of the fieldwork sites and sample selection 
methods for the fieldwork component of the thesis. 
4.2 Malawi Government Data Collection Methods 
The collection, compilation, analysis and dissemination of official government statistics in 
Malawi is the mandate of the National Statistical Office (NSO) which was set up by the 
Statistics Act, Chap 27.01 of 1967 as the central office on statistics matters. But due to the 
diversity of statistics required for development planning and decision making processes, other 
ministries and departments also produce official statistics (Government of Malawi 2008h). 
The next sections describe major government methodologies.  
4.2.1 Integrated Household Survey 2004-05 
NSO conducts routine and ad-hoc socio-economic surveys, but the most influential survey in 
recent years is the second Integrated Household Survey conducted in 2004-05 (IHS2). The 
IHS2 yielded poverty profiles which have since become the fundamental source of statistics 
for the planning and delivery of social transfers in Malawi. IHS2 was a follow up to a first 
Integrated Household Survey in Malawi (IHS1) conducted in 1997-98 to provide an 
understanding of poverty issues in the country (Government of Malawi 2005e). 
Both surveys employed same household and community questionnaires, with additional 
questions in IHS2. Major variables from the household survey were: household characteristics 
and composition; education of all persons above the age of four years; health of all persons 
and maternal and pre-natal care issues for all recent mothers aged 12 to 49 years; time and 
labour use; security and safety; housing; consumption and expenditure on food and non-food 
items; ownership of assets; agriculture; income and sources; social safety nets transfers; 
access to credit; subjective assessment of wellbeing and shocks; child nutrition. Key variables 
from the community survey were: physical and demographic characteristics; access to 
services; economic activities; changes in the last five years, prices. In terms of sample size, 
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IHS2 comprised 11,280 households drawn from all the districts (Government of Malawi 
2005e). Table 4.1 summarises poverty data which emerged from the IHS2.  
Table 4.1: Distribution of rural poverty in Malawi, 2004-05 
Region/District Poor (%) Ultra-poor 
(%) 
Ultra Poor 
Labour Constrained* 
Malawi 52.4 22.3 9.6 
Urban 25.4 7.5 3.2 
Rural 55.9 24.3 10.5 
Northern Region: 56.3 25.9 7.9 
Chitipa 67.2 30.4 10.7 
Karonga 54.9 28.3 9.3 
Mzimba 50.6 22.7 5.8 
Nkhata Bay 63.0 30.3 10.6 
Rumphi 61.6 24.2 7.4 
Central Region: 46.7 16.2 7.8 
Dedza 54.6 20.9 7.9 
Dowa 36.6 4.8 2.9 
Kasungu 44.9 15.1 4.8 
Lilongwe  37.5 11.7 6.3 
Mchinji 59.6 30.4 13.4 
Nkhota Kota 48.0 11.4 4.8 
Ntcheu 51.6 21.1 13.7 
Ntchisi 47.3 12.2 8.8 
Salima 57.3 25.0 12.9 
Southern Region: 64.4 31.5 13.6 
Balaka 66.8 33.5 19.0 
Blantyre 46.5 16.0 9.5 
Chikwawa 65.8 31.9 11.0 
Chiradzulu 63.5 27.5 9.3 
Machinga 73.7 38.3 18.5 
Mangochi 60.7 29.3 13.3 
Mulanje 68.6 30.6 10.9 
Mwanza 55.6 19.7 6.3 
Nsanje 76.0 44.3 22.8 
Phalombe 61.9 26.9 15.5 
Thyolo 64.9 33.0 9.7 
Zomba 70.0 41.0 18.2 
Source: Government of Malawi (2005b, pp.142-145), * Ellis and 
Marchetta (2009, p.8).  
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4.2.2 Population Data 
The NSO also conducts population and housing censuses every ten years and makes 
population projections. Table 4.2 presents population figures which have been employed in 
Chapter 5 to estimate annual national maize requirements (Government of Malawi 2008f).  
Table 4.2: Malawi population data, 1991-2010 
Year Population Inter-censal 
growth rate (%) 
Corresponding 
Crop season 
1991  8,647,385   1990-91  
1992  8,820,427   1991-92  
1993  8,996,931   1992-93  
1994  9,176,968   1993-94  
1995  9,360,607   1994-95  
1996  9,547,920   1995-96  
1997  9,738,983   1996-97  
1998  9,933,868  3.4 1997-98  
1999  10,184,501   1998-99  
2000  10,441,457   1999-00  
2001  10,704,896   2000-01  
2002  10,974,982   2001-02  
2003  11,251,882   2002-03  
2004  11,535,768   2003-04  
2005  11,826,817   2004-05  
2006  12,125,209   2005-06  
2007  12,431,129   2006-07  
2008  13,066,320  2.8 2007-08  
2009  13,395,985   2008-09  
2010   13,733,967   2009-10  
Note: Italicised bold denotes actual census figures, otherwise NSO projections 
Source: Government of Malawi (Government of Malawi 2008f) 
 
4.2.3 The Crop Estimates Methodology 
Since the 1960s, the government has compiled and publicised official crop production 
statistics collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS). More 
organized efforts, however, emerged in 1990s when FAO helped the government to develop a 
formal crop estimates methodology which was officially adopted for the 1992/93 crop season.  
The National Rural Development Programme (NRDP) mentioned in Chapter 3 divides the 
country into eight agricultural zones known as Agricultural Development Divisions 
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(ADDs).33 An ADD, managed by a programme manager, covers two to seven zones called 
Rural Development Projects (RDPs) of which there are 31 in total. In the past, some RDPs cut 
across two districts but now all fall within a district following introduction of the national 
decentralization policy. An RDP is now typically called the District Agriculture Office, and is 
managed by a District Agriculture Development Officer (DADO). RDPs comprise 2-19 
Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) under the management of an Agricultural Extension 
Development Coordinators (AEDC) and there are about 150 of these across the country. An 
EPA is further divided into 2-15 zones called Sections managed by Agricultural Extension 
Development Officers (AEDOs). A Section covers a village or group of villages. The lowest 
unit in this system is a Block, from which a group of farm families is organized into farmer 
clubs as a unit of contact for the AEDOs (extension workers)(Government of Malawi 2008a). 
The crop estimate methodology uses the Blocks in order to select randomly sample farmer 
plots. The process involves dividing crops into major and minor crops according to cropped 
areas, the cut off point being 5 per cent. Major crops that occupy more than 5 per cent of the 
crop area in Malawi are maize, rice, groundnuts, tobacco, cotton, wheat, millets, sorghum, 
pulses (beans and peas) while minor crops that occupy less than 5 per cent of crop area are 
guar beans, cashew nuts, macadamia, sesame, sunflower, coffee, paprika, chillies, cassava and 
potatoes. For the major crops, 25 per cent of all blocks in an EPA are randomly selected 
followed by 20 per cent of farm families in each sampled block, so that the sample constitutes 
5 per cent of farm families in an EPA. The process is repeated for minor crops except that all 
farm families growing the crop in the sampled block are selected in order to give an estimated 
sample proportion of 25 per cent of the farmers who grow minor crops in an EPA. 
Three rounds of crop production estimates are conducted in a season: at the onset of the rains 
in November/December (first round); in February/March when the crop stands in the field 
(second round); and immediately after harvest in April/May (third round). The methodology 
applies predominantly to smallholder and rain-fed crops but is also extended to estate and off-
season (dimba or irrigated) crops. The first round involves sampling and measuring plot areas 
that have been prepared for planting. Together with inferences from crop yields realised in the 
immediate past season, a first forecast of production is deduced. The estimates are discussed 
and released in January/February. The second round involves verification of the crop areas 
                                                 
33
 The ADDs are Karonga and Mzuzu in the north; Kasungu, Lilongwe and Salima in the centre; and 
Blantyre, Machinga and Shire Valley in the south. 
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planted to different crops and estimates of the uptake of inputs as deduced from fertilizer sales 
in order to provide production estimates that are released in March/April. The third round 
involves measuring the plot area actually harvested, and weighing the output obtained from 
the sample plot. Government releases the results in June, before the start of the budget session 
of parliament. A fourth round is undertaken in August for winter crops, the results of which 
are released in September34. In summary, the methodology entails random selection of sample 
farms to be measured in each of the EPAs. It involves 5-10 per cent of farmers for the first 
and second round estimates, reducing to 1-2 per cent for the third round when the harvested 
crop is actually weighed (FAO/WFP 2005).  
Discussion (and ‘cleaning up’) of the results follows a six-tier ‘cascade’ model before final 
release. The first meeting is at EPA level chaired by the AEDC where AEDOs present the 
results from their sections, while EPA subject matter specialists (SMS) in crops, extension, 
irrigation, and others critique. The next meeting is at district level chaired by the DADO to 
discuss EPA results (district level SMSs critique). The third meeting is at ADD level chaired 
by the Programme Manager to discuss district (RDP) results. From there, regional meetings 
involving ADDs in that region are held in order to adopt a regional consensus. The fifth 
meeting is at Ministry level chaired by a senior ministry official to discuss the ADD results. 
The final meeting is a national meeting of the National Agricultural Production Estimate 
Committee (NAPEC)35 to approve and publicise official results. In most of these meetings, 
ADMARC and the Department of Meteorological Services also present perspectives related to 
their areas of competence to provide a broader perspective for the crop production estimate 
figures. The ‘cascade’ model permits departures from the strict outcomes of a quantitative 
procedure to creep into the estimates at each stage; in effect, it allows judgements on the 
veracity of the quantitative indicators to be made, and opens up the possibility for political 
considerations to enter these deliberations. In Chapter 5, the potential for such bias is 
considered in greater detail in relation to production figures in recent years. In the meantime 
                                                 
34
 The fourth estimates may not be reflected in the official statistics released in June. As a result, official 
crop production figures quoted in different government documents including those originating from 
the Ministry of Agriculture tend to vary depending on whether they include or exclude the winter 
maize estimate. 
35
  Chaired by Secretary for Agriculture, membership includes government departments (Economic 
Planning, Finance, department of Meteorological Services), state marketing institutions (ADMARC, 
SFRFM), private sector (grain association of Malawi, farmers union of Malawi), donors (FAO, WFP, 
DFID, EU, World Bank, USAID) and NGOs. 
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Table 4.3 below sets out the official maize production figures from 1986 to 2010 as published 
by MoAFS. 
Table 4.3: Maize Production Estimates for Malawi, 1986-2010 
Table 4.3a: All maize production 
Crop Season 
Production 
(tons) 
Area 
(Ha) 
Yield 
(Kg/Ha) 
1986-87 1,201,757  1,182,415  1,016  
1987-88  1,423,902  1,215,087  1,172  
1988-89  1,509,513  1,270,822  1,188  
1989-90  1,342,809  1,343,784  999  
1990-91  1,589,377  1,391,878  1,142  
1991-92  657,000  1,368,093  480  
1992-93  2,033,957  1,327,038  1,533  
1993-94  818,999  1,129,327  725  
1994-95  1,327,865  1,225,580  1,083  
1995-96  1,793,469  875,195  1,443  
1996-97  1,226,478  1,233,538  994  
1997-98  1,534,326  1,292,669  1,187  
1998-99  2,245,824  1,369,153  1,640  
1999-00  2,290,018  1,435,222  1,596  
2000-01  1,589,437  1,446,264  1,099  
2001-02  1,485,272  1,513,945  1,034  
2002-03  1,847,476  1,617,917  1,230  
2003-04  1,608,349  1,478,750  1,088  
2004-05  1,225,234  1,513,929  809  
2005-06  2,611,486  1,762,839  1,608  
2006-07  3,226,418  1,215,356  2,655  
2007-08  2,634,701  1,596,955  1,650  
2008-09  3,582,502  1,608,996  2,227  
2009-10  3,233,364  1,640,878  1,971  
Average  1,834,981  1,377,318  1,315  
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009f, 2010f). 
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Table 4.3b: Trends in maize production by variety 
Period 
(Year) 
Maize Area (million ha) Maize yield ((Kg/ha) 
Local  Composite Hybrid Local  Composite  Hybrid 
1986-87 1,131,540  13,780  37,095   953  1,635  2,706  
1987-88  1,137,499  18,698  58,890  1,094  1,199  2,667  
1988-89  1,159,985  25,072  85,765  1,052  1,760  2,855  
1989-90  1,184,036  24,725  135,023  813  1,400  2,555  
1990-91  1,193,642  18,878  179,358  872  1,417  2,908  
1991-92  1,137,894  13,347  216,852  324  1,403  1,307  
1992-93  996,757  3,873  326,408  1,036  1,623  3,050  
1993-94  920,920  778  207,629  580  772  1,369  
1994-95  859,143  2,303  364,134  767  1,043  1,829  
1995-96  856,417  17,469  331,313  1,009  1,474  2,726  
1996-97  914,518  20,275  298,745  730  1,044  1,801  
1997-98  912,751  24,997  354,921  818  1,202  2,134  
1998-99  767,056  45,441  509,613  997  1,572  2,613  
1999-00  798,636  107,902  528,684  994  1,693  2,485  
2000-01  906,405  207,333  332,526  743  1,361  1,905  
2001-02  831,988  232,626  372,445  669  1,245  1,717  
2002-03  767,012  277,823  457,056  758  1,366  1,939  
2003-04  720,890  334,184  423,676  684  1,163  1,714  
2004-05  768,605  372,703  372,621  518  888  1,331  
2005-06  654,176  545,553  424,301  877  1,802  2,486  
2006-07      164,73136  585,486  465,139  3,638  2,132  2,965  
2007-08  559,912  587,041  450,002  866  1,767  2,472  
2008-09  544,248  561,787  524,620  960  2,257  3,374  
2009-10  513,234  524,424  603,160  915  1,972  2,867  
Average  850,083  190,271  335,832  944  1,425  2,324  
Figures in red suggest the yield, especially for local maize in 2006/07, might have been 
over-estimated. 
Source: Organized from official crop production estimates data (Government of 
Malawi 2008a, 2009f, 2010f). 
 
 
4.2.4 The Maize Crop Monitoring and Yield Assessment Model 
In tandem with the national crop production estimate methodology, the Department of 
Meteorological Services in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs 
forecasts production based on rainfall and crop water requirements, illustrated in Table 4.4. 
                                                 
36
 This maize area figure is the official figure published by the government in MoAFS statistics 
(Government of Malawi 2008, Table 2.2, p.44), and also entered into the FAO maize production 
database for Malawi (FAO 2010). It is possible that the figure results from a typographical error, since 
it falls outside the likely range of an area decline given the surrounding maize area trend in preceding 
and succeeding years. Nevertheless, the figure is taken as given in this thesis, since it does not alter the 
findings and conclusions either in this or subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
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Table 4.5 presents historical rainfall data to help understand crop failure events described in 
Chapter 3, and maize production trends examined in Chapter 5. According to official 
documents, ‘normal’ rainfall in Malawi is around 950 mm per year (Government of Malawi 
2010a). 
Table 4.4: Crop water requirements in Malawi 
Crop Growing period (days) CWR (mm) 
Maize 90 – 140 500 -700 
Sorghum 90 – 140 450 -650 
Groundnuts 90 – 140 500 -700 
Beans 60 – 120 300 -500 
Source: Government of Malawi (2009c). 
 
 
Table 4.5: Average rainfall (mm) in Malawi 1985/6 to 2009/10 
Year Rainfall (mm) % of Normal* 
1989-90  1,081.3 14.0 
1990-91  981.4 3.5 
1991-92  736.1 -22.4 
1992-93  1,150.5 21.3 
1993-94  775.6 -18.2 
1994-95  807.4 -14.9 
1995-96  1,087.8 14.7 
1996-97  1,174.9 23.9 
1997-98  1,138.1 20.0 
1998-99  1,193.1 25.8 
1999-00  875.0 -7.7 
2000-01  1,290.1 36.0 
2001-02  1,049.2 10.6 
2002-03  1,084.5 14.3 
2003-04  859.9 -9.3 
2004-05  823.1 -13.2 
2005-06  1,087.0 14.6 
2006-07  1,083.0 14.2 
2007-08  1,049.0 10.6 
2008-09  975.3 2.8 
2009-10  903.7 -4.7 
Average* 1,009.8 6.5 
*Author calculations 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009a, 2010a) 
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The Department employs a Maize Crop Monitoring and Yield Assessment Model that 
involves two stages. The first stage of the model involves predicting yield (Y): 
Y = a + b (WRSI), where 
a = intercept constant 
b = coefficient of the relationship between historical yields and WRSI 
WRSI  =  Water Requirement Satisfaction Index (accounting for soil water 
holding capacity, rainfall efficiency, crop water requirement 
coefficients, season characteristics, etc). 
 
 
The second stage involves forecasting production (P): 
P = Y x A, where 
Y = predicted yield 
A = area planted to a specific crop (e.g. maize) 
 
This regression-model process is conducted for different districts because of geographical 
variations in rainfall mentioned above. The results are then consolidated and presented as 
ADD figures which are then consolidated into national figures. The crop productions forecasts 
are conducted following the timing pattern of the rounds of the crop production estimate 
methodology described above (first, second and third round crop production estimates). The 
model can be applied to different crops but the emphasis is on maize. The model also provides 
potential for discretionary adjustments of the results of the crop production estimate results, as 
discussed above. Table 4.6 illustrates how the model results compare with results of the crop 
production estimate methodology. 
The first part of Table 4.6 (refer to the rows) provides the results of the model forecast for 
final round maize production estimates in 2008/09 and 2009/10. The second part provides 
respective figures from the national crop production estimate methodology for those two 
years. The final part of the table shows differences in the figures between the model estimates 
and the crop production estimate methodology. Negative figures imply lower figures from the 
crop production estimate methodology compared to the model estimates and vice versa.  
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Table 4.6: Comparing Third round estimates from the Model and MoAFS estimates 
Maize type 2008/09 Final Maize Production 
Estimates 
2009/10 Final Maize Production Estimates 
WRSI 
(%) 
Yield 
(Kg/ha) 
Area 
(Ha) 
Production 
(Tons) 
WRSI 
(%) 
Yield 
(Kg/ha) 
Area 
(Ha) 
Production 
(Tons) 
Model est.:a         
Local & OPV  92 2,040  1,057,562  2,157,746   86   1,973  973,203  1,920,394  
Hybrid maize 94 3,330  476,760  1,587,420   89   2,434  559,165  1,360,835  
All maize 93 2,685  1,534,322 3,745,166  88   2,204  1,532,368  3,281,229  
MoAFS est.:b         
Local & OPV   1,609 1,106,035 1,790,617  1,444 1,037,658 1,504,097 
Hybrid maize  3,374 524,620 1,770,014  2,867 603,160 1,729,068 
All maize  2,491  1,630,655 3,560,631   2,155  1,640,818  3,233,165  
Differ (%):         
Local & OPV  -26.8 4.4 -20.5  -36.7 6.2 -27.7 
Hybrid maize  1.3 9.1 10.3  15.1 7.3 21.3 
All maize  -7.8 5.9 -5.2  -2.2 6.6 -1.5 
 
Source: a Government of Malawi (2009d) and b Data underlying Table 4.3 
 
 
4.2.5 The Food Balance sheet 
The government through Department of Nutrition in the Ministry of Agriculture prepares and 
publishes ‘Food Balance Sheets’. The NAPEC approves these as part of the crop production 
estimates statistics. The food balance sheets, which adopt an FAO format, include major 
energy foods (maize, rice, sorghum, millets and cassava) which vary in importance across 
districts37; however the emphasis is on maize which provides an indication of food surplus or 
shortage in the country.  
Table 4.7 illustrates the actual content and the arithmetic that goes into the preparation of the 
official food balance sheet; while Table 4.8 presents official maize food balance sheet 
positions in the last 11 years. On the supply side (food availability), in Table 4.7, the balance 
sheet includes estimated total quantities of energy foods produced, imports and stocks in 
stores (strategic grain reserves). From the total supply, the balance sheets deduct purchases 
into stock, exports, stocks required for livestock feed, seed, industrial and non-food use and 
wastage. On the consumption side, the balance sheets include all foods determined on the 
basis of per capita energy requirements, adjusted for demographic factors such as age and sex.  
                                                 
37
 For example, rice and cassava are major foods along the lake shore districts of Karonga, Nkhata Bay 
and Nkhota Kota, while sorghum and millets are major food staples in Lower Shire districts of 
Chikhwawa and Nsanje. 
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Table 4.7: Illustrating the official food balance sheet for Malawi 
Food Balance Sheet Item Maize Rice Sorghum /Millet Cassava 
Maize 
Equiv. 
A. Net production (a1-a2) 1,473.2  30.8  52.4  691.0  2,192.0  
A1. Gross production 1,733.1  49.7  58.3  767.8  2,546.7  
A2. Post-harvest losses 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B. Opening stocks (B1+B2+B3+B4) 29.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  29.1  
B1. On-farm stocks 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B2. Stocks in Strategic Grain Reserve 7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.0  
B3. Stocks in ADMARC stores 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B4. WFP (humanitarian aid) 22.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  22.1  
C. Domestic availability (A+B) 1,502.3  30.8  52.4  691.0  2,221.1  
D. Kilocalories/kg 3.5  3.3  3.4  3.2  0.0  
E. Requirements (E1+E2+E3) 2,030.1  97.2  53.9  313.6  2,466.6  
E1. Food Use 1,930.9  93.4  53.4  313.6  2,363.2  
E2. Seed Requirement 39.2  3.8  0.5  0.0  43.4  
E3. SGR Replenishment 60.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  60.0  
F. Domestic food balance (C-E) -527.8  -66.4  -1.4  377.4  -245.5  
G. Cross substitution 282.3  -64.1  -1.4  347.8  0.0  
H. Shortfall/surplus (F+G) -245.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -245.5  
I. Total imports 120.2  2.6  0.5  1.6  124.6  
I1. Commercial Imports 111.8  2.5  0.3  1.6  116.0  
I1-1. Imports Received: Official 35.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  35.6  
I1-2. Imports Received: Informal 76.2  2.5  0.3  1.6  80.4  
I2. Food Aid (Confirmed Pledges) 8.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  8.6  
I2-1. Prog/Emergency Food Aid recvd 8.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  8.6  
L. Committed exports (L1+L2+L3) 0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.4  
L1. Actual Exports 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
L2. Not Yet Exported 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
L3. Actual Exports (Informal) 0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.4  
M. Actual net imports (I-L) 119.5  1.9  0.5  1.6  123.2  
N. Projected net imports 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
O. Total food gap (maize) -245.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -245.5  
P. Actual food gap -126.0  1.9  0.5  1.6  -122.3  
Source: Government of Malawi (2005f) 
 
Table 4.8: Maize production and requirements, 1999-2008 
Year 
National 
Requirement 
(tonnes) 
Maize 
Production 
(tonnes) 
Surplus or deficit 
Tonnes 
 
% of 
Production 
1999-00 2,023,625  2,122,495  98,870  4.7 
2000-01 1,643,274  2,432,334  789,060  32.4 
2001-02 1,825,449  1,495,104  330,345  -22.1 
2002-03 2,035,643  1,351,549  -684,094  -50.6 
2003-04 2,016,052  1,966,024  -50,028  -2.5 
2004-05 2,039,291  1,502,259  -537,032  -35.7 
2005-06 2,183,506  2,620,513  437,007  16.7 
2006-07 2,255,049  3,444,655  1,189,606  34.5 
2007-08 2,352,668  2,790,546  437,878  15.7 
2008-09 2,458,123 3,767,408 1,309,285 34.8 
2009-10 2,485,049 3,208,847 723,798 22.6 
Average* 2,119,794 2,427,430 367,700 4.6 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008g, p.23, 2010e, p.16) 
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4.2.6 The Smallholder Fertilizer Consumption Data 
In the discussion on the crop production estimate methodology above, it has been mentioned 
that during the discussion of the results of the crop production estimates, ADMARC and other 
key fertilizer dealers are available to present estimates of smallholder fertilizer consumption 
based on tallies of farmer purchases of the input at major market outlets. Major fertilizers in 
Malawi relate to maize (e.g. Urea, NPK, 23:21:0:4S) and tobacco (e.g. CAN and 
Compounds). Table 4.9 provides a compilation of official data from 1991/92 to 2009/10.  
Table 4.9: Smallholder fertilizer consumption 1991/92-2009/10 
Year Maize Fert 
(Tons) 
Tobacco 
(Tons) 
Total Fert 
(Tons) 
Maize Fert 
share (%) 
Subsidy 
Sales (%) 
Private sector 
sales (%) 
1991-92  128,377  3,305  131,682  97.5    
1992-93  138,737  3,868  142,605  97.3    
1993-94  80,041  3,031  83,072  96.4    
1994-95  122,894  17,746  140,640  87.4    
1995-96  152,992  43,041  196,033  78.0    
1996-97  79,147  72,327  151,474  52.3    
1997-98  130,345  56,581  186,926  69.7  8 79 
1998-99  131,799  50,977  182,776  72.1  36 79 
1999-00  140,734  50,918  191,652  73.4  36 83 
2000-01  121,153  50,868  172,021  70.4  16 67 
2001-02  135,996  50,535  186,531  72.9  9 80 
2002-03  174,577  37,786  212,363  82.2  18 94 
2003-04  173,166  54,761  227,927  76.0  10 84 
2004-05  211,636  49,400  261,036  81.1  23 89 
2005-06  237,501  54,483  291,984  81.3  45 55 
2006-07  264,086  38,462  302,548  87.3  60 58 
2007-08*  203,694  12,859  216,553  94.1  100 23 
2008-09*  182,309  19,969  202,278  90.1  100 0 
2009-10*  161,074    161,074  100.0  100 0 
Average 156,329 37,273 191,641 82.1  43 72 
*Refers to ISP programme fertilizer, which in 2007/08 was the only source 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009f, 2010f), except subsidy and private sector 
sales up to 2006/07 are from Dorward, et al., (2008, p.11)  
 
4.2.7 Malawi Retail Market Prices 
In Malawi retail market prices are collected for crop and livestock products by the Agro-
Economic Survey Unit of Planning Division in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS). Systematic data collection started in 1988 under a World Bank funded Agriculture 
Marketing and Estate Development project. The price collection methodology has undergone 
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several subsequent refinements mainly with USAID funding, the most notable recent 
innovation being the introduction of mobile phones through which MoAFS enumerators 
transmit the data from the collection point (local market) to the processing point (Agro-
Economic Survey Unit).  
Table 4.10: Average maize retail prices 1988-10 (MK/kg) 
Year Maize 
1988 0.26 
1989 0.30 
1990 0.38 
1991 0.38 
1992 0.51 
1993 0.63 
1994 0.99 
1995 1.52 
1996 2.62 
1997 3.23 
1998 7.03 
1999 8.20 
2000 6.66 
2001 11.29 
2002 21.45 
2003 12.54 
2004 15.86 
2005 23.74 
2006 27.65 
2007 18.70 
2008 45.86 
2009 46.01 
2010* 37.31 
*refers to 9 months January-September 2010. 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008a, 2009b). 
 
Data collectors from the Ministry (Agro Economic Survey Unit staff) collect the price data on 
a weekly basis from 72 local markets across the country (2-7 markets per district). For each of 
the sample commodity items (the price collection started with maize in 1988 and included 
other items from 1989), the prices are collected three times a day (8-9 am, 11-12 pm and 3-4 
pm) once a week for four weeks which are then consolidated to generate monthly average 
prices for each market and commodity. The averages for all the 72 markets then give national 
average monthly prices for each commodity, while the monthly averages in turn provide 
average annual prices. The price data collection methodology exercise collects prices on a 
number of food commodities but only prices for maize, rice, cassava, groundnuts, beans, peas, 
and meats (beef, pork and goat meet) are released in official statistics (see Government of 
Malawi 2008a, pp.80-119). Table 4.10 gives national average annual prices from 1988 to 
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2010. Similar price series are available for each of Malawi’s 28 districts, on a weekly, 
monthly or annual basis. 
4.2.8 Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) Methods 
Following the 2001-02 food crisis and in response to deepening poverty and vulnerability that 
was highlighted in the first Integrated Household Survey in 1998, the government set up a 
Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) which is a consortium committee of 
government, NGO and donor agencies. Its secretariat is located in the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development and is funded by DFID (Government of Malawi 2005d).  
The starting point in 2005 was to divide the country into 18 livelihood zones (see Figure 4.1) 
which group locations in terms of livelihood activities, susceptibility to shocks and coping 
strategies. A livelihood zone boundary generally follows EPAs and not district boundaries. A 
livelihood zone comprises a district, number of districts or parts of districts. This was 
followed by development of livelihood profiles for the ‘livelihood zones’ to serve as baseline. 
Since 2005, routine vulnerability assessments are conducted four times a year to monitor the 
emerging food situation (April-June, and so on) (Government of Malawi 2005d). 
MVAC employs a data collection approach known as the Household Economy Approach 
(HEA)38 that entails a four-step data collection and analysis process. The first step, as 
mentioned earlier, is ‘livelihood zoning’ which involves deciding on main geographical 
groupings to which households in a particular locality belong. The major proxy indicators 
constituting the zoning criteria are options for obtaining food and income. The second step is 
‘wealth ranking’ of the population in a Livelihood Zone in terms of how different households 
compose their livelihoods (food, income and coping options). The baseline yielded three 
categories: poor, middle and better off which in general terms were differentiated by land 
sizes, livestock owned and levels of income. In broadest terms, districts in the central region 
of Malawi lack diversity in income (tobacco) and food (maize) compared to districts in 
livelihood zones in the southern or northern regions. The case study district of Mchinji in this 
thesis falls within MVAC Livelihood Zone No.3 (Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain) in the central 
region. The third step involves analysis of ‘livelihood access’ in a ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ year. 
It involves one of: (1) identifying sources of food and income and their relative importance to 
the household’s total food and income access, or (2) quantifying access to food and income 
                                                 
38
 Methodological details of the approach can be found in Seaman, et al., (2000). 
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and expenditure over a 12-month baseline period. The final step is ‘outcome analysis’ which 
involves examining implications of the effects of shocks such as price increases, or crop 
failure, on people’s future access to food and income. This results in consideration of the 
appropriate interventions and associated budgetary implications required to ameliorate the 
suffering population at risk of missing food entitlement (Government of Malawi 2005c).  
MVAC uses the term ‘missing food entitlement’ rather than ‘food deficit’ because the latter is 
usually associated with shortfall in production, from the national crop production estimates. 
This shortfall actually indicates how much food needs to be imported in order to meet local 
average consumption but there is no guarantee that people will be able to access that food. 
Missing food entitlement, on the other hand, is the sum of all the food that is missing at 
household level, after households have exhausted all the options they have for obtaining it. It 
represents the total missing calories from people’s intake or consumption, rather than from 
their production (Government of Malawi 2005c). Table 4.11 shows the outcomes of the 
MVAC vulnerability assessment in terms of population at risk of missing food entitlement 
and the cost of intervention in Malawi as at June and October 2010. Table 4.12 presents 
district ‘vulnerability’ rates in terms of population at risk of missing food entitlements in each 
quarter of the MVAC assessment calendar, every year. 
Table 4.11: Population at risk and missing food entitlements October 2010 
Affected 
district 
Initial Forecast: 
June 2010 
Revised Forecast: October 2010 
Population 
at Risk- 
October 
Missing Food Entitlements 
Population at 
Risk- June 
Maize Equivalent 
(MT) 
Maize Equivalent 
(MK’000) 
Balaka 64,553 23,362 1,313.1 52,261 
Blantyre 79,018 49,522 1,889.3 75,194 
Chikwawa 161,205 74,724 7,568.2 301,214 
Chiradzulu 60,235 19,280 1,034.8 41,185 
Karonga 6,844 0 0.0 0 
Machinga 21,649 20,120 904.8 36,011 
Mangochi 54,280 0 .00 0 
Mulanje 74,198 41,560 2,988.4 118,938 
Mwanza 12,861 9,042 513.3 20,429 
Neno 26,344 20,760 894.4 35,5597 
Nsanje 101,711 44,589 3,185.9 126,799 
Ntcheu 47,202 27,823 1,579.3 62,856 
Phalombe 54,201 29,214 2,222.4 88,452 
Thyolo 203,426 112,260 3,010.6 119,822 
Zomba 94,893 35,832 1,497.7 58,261 
Total 1,061,625 508,089 28,602 1,138,360 
Note: the average population at risk in June 2010 represents 15 of the 28 districts of Malawi or 7.7 
per cent of the Malawi population. 
Source: Government of Malawi (2010h) 
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Figure 4.1: Map of Malawi showing National Livelihood Zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2005c, p.8) 
Note the distribution of the districts in the ADDs and regions:  
Karonga ADD - Chitipa and Karonga districts in the North 
Mzuzu ADD - Likoma, Mzimba, Nkhata Bay and Rumphi in the North 
Kasungu ADD – Dowa, Kasungu, Mchinji and Ntchisi districts in the Centre  
Salima ADD – Nkhota Kota and Salima districts in the Centre  
Lilongwe ADD – Dedza, Lilongwe and Ntcheu districts in the Centre  
Machinga ADD – Balaka, Machinga, Mangochi and Zomba districts in the South 
Blantyre ADD – Blantyre, Chiradzulu, Mulanje, Mwanza, Phalombe and Thyolo in the South 
Shire Valley ADD - Chikwawa and Nsanje districts in the South  
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Table 4.12: Population at risk of missing food entitlements in rural Malawi 
District Apr-Jun 
(1st Quarter) 
Jul-Sept 
(2nd Quarter) 
Oct-Dec 
(3rd Quarter) 
Jan-Mar 
(4th Quarter) 
Malawi 10.7 20.9 35.5 39.8 
Northern Region:     
Chitipa 0.0 27.2 27.2 27.2 
Karonga 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.0 
Mzimba 0.0 2.9 30.3 30.3 
Nkhata Bay 0.0 na na na 
Rumphi 0.0 0.0 14.5 14.5 
Central Region:     
Dedza 2.6 8.6 22.9 30.4 
Dowa 0.0 12.1 16.1 16.1 
Kasungu 0.0 13.0 23.5 23.5 
Lilongwe  0.0 6.6 17.5 17.5 
Mchinji 0.0 13.6 18.2 18.2 
Nkhota Kota 0.0 15.8 29.2 45.9 
Ntcheu 6.0 27.0 68.0 73.3 
Ntchisi 0.0 18.2 34.8 34.8 
Salima 0.0 26.6 63.5 63.5 
Southern Region:     
Balaka 50.0 57.1 81.1 81.1 
Blantyre 36.2 52.0 52.0 77.1 
Chikwawa 79.6 79.6 79.6 79.6 
Chiradzulu 31.8 31.8 31.8 79.6 
Machinga 21.6 32.2 40.9 61.7 
Mangochi 0.0 6.0 35.4 35.4 
Mulanje 32.0 42.0 76.2 76.2 
Mwanza 15.7 15.7 76.3 76.3 
Neno 17.4 17.4 86.0 86.0 
Nsanje 58.8 81.1 81.1 81.1 
Phalombe 12.2 29.7 50.0 50.0 
Thyolo 0.0 38.5 71.2 71.2 
Zomba 17.7 33.5 50.0 50.0 
Note: Likoma is sometimes treated as part of Nkhata Bay district, and not shown here 
Source: World Bank (2007a, pp.11-12), drawing on MVAC data  
 
4.2.9 Basic Needs Basket Surveys 
The vulnerability assessment methodologies described so far are predominantly rural and 
conducted by the government. The only known regular ‘urban vulnerability monitoring’ at the 
time of writing this thesis is the Basic Needs Basket (BNB) survey conducted by Centre for 
Social Concern (CSC) of the Roman Catholic Church in Malawi. The BNB surveys are 
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conducted monthly, since 2006, in the four cities of Malawi (Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and 
Zomba) in order to monitor basic cost of living. The government has since taken the BNB 
surveys as major initiative of food security monitoring in the country and most recent BNB 
reports are now on the MoAFS website under the theme ‘social protection’39. Table 4.13 is 
provided to show only what enters into the cost of basic food items of the BNB surveys while 
Table 4.14 shows the average price of maize in the four urban areas from 2007 to 2010. 
Table 4.13: The cost of basic food items for in Lilongwe City for January 2008 
Description of the constant items Units Price/Unit Qty Cost (MK) 
Maize (50 Kg Bag) 50-kg bag 1,780 2.0 3,560.00 
Milling (Including Grinding) Tins 52 14.0 728.00 
Beans (0.8kg/day) 8 Days Kgs 198 6.4 1,267.20 
Usipa (250g/day) 4 days Kgs 856 1.0 856.00 
Dry Fish-Utaka (200g/day) 4 days Kgs 808 0.8 646.40 
Kapenta (200g/day) 4 days Kgs 823 0.8 658.40 
Beef (1 kg/day) 4 days Kgs 361 4.0 1,444.00 
Eggs (12/day) 4 days Number 18 48.0 864.00 
Rape (750g/day) for 30 days Kgs 63 22.5 1,417.50 
Tomato (0.5 kg/day) 30 days Kgs 131 15.0 1,965.00 
Onion (116g/day) 30 days Kgs 175 3.5 612.50 
Fresh Milk (250mls/day) 30 days 500 ml- packets 70 15.0 1,050.00 
Kasungu Cooking Oil (100mls/day)  427 3.0 1,281.00 
Bread (5 bkfsts/week) 20 days Loaves 97 20.0 1,940.00 
Sugar (2 kgs/week) Kgs 107 8.0 856.00 
Kitchen Salt Kgs 58 1.0 58.00 
Tea Leaves (Chisangalalo) 50g-pkts 19 20.0 380.00 
Cassava (2kgsx2bkfsts/wk) Kgs 50 16.0 800.00 
Sub-total    20,384.00 
 
 Source: Center for Social Concern, Lilongwe, Malawi. 2008 (as explained in the text) 
 
 
The BNB methodology assumes an average household of six members. The reporting 
comprises four components: (1) cost of basic food items (maize, relish and flavourings), (2) 
cost of essential non-food items (cooking and lighting – charcoal, paraffin, electricity, 
groceries, water bills and rent for a two bedroom house), (3) Some other additional costs 
(transport costs and child education expenses- fees, notebooks etc), and (4) Some comparative 
figures of wages especially average wages in the civil services for jobs that employ majority 
of workers – teachers, nurses, police, clerical officers and security and cleaners. The main 
                                                 
39
 Available at http://www.moafsmw.org (MoAFS) or http://www.cfscmalawi.org/bnb_pub.html (CSC) 
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BNB is drawn from component (1) and (2) while component (4) gives an indication of how 
employment based incomes are able to cover cost of living (i.e. 4-1+2+3). This rapid data 
collection exercise involves collection of prices from markets and retailers selected at random 
and do not have a fixed sample markets or sample size. It is meant to be fairly simple and 
rapid survey 7 to 10 markets and retail outlets as well as selected households. 
Table 4.14: Maize prices in the four cities of Malawi 2007-2010 
Year Month Blantyre Lilongwe Mzuzu Zomba Average National 
2007  Oct  27.84  21.84  40.50  21.50  27.92  20.76 
 Nov  30.00  24.00  37.76  22.50  28.57  24.11 
 Dec  34.50  32.00  51.00  23.76  35.32  28.67 
2008 Jan  35.16  35.60  60.00  29.00  39.94  33.60 
 Feb  50.00  45.40  60.00  28.00  45.85  39.69 
 Mar  55.00  62.84  86.66  25.40  57.48  43.53 
 Apr  38.14  41.26  41.00  25.40  36.45  35.41 
 May  36.50  40.40  49.00  34.00  39.98  32.85 
 Jun  51.66  49.00  53.00  30.50  46.04  37.91 
 Jul  69.16  57.20  63.00  57.00  61.59  42.99 
 Aug  70.00  61.44  78.66  55.00  66.28  55.52 
 Sep  60.84  55.20  63.34  53.80  58.30  53.38 
 Oct  63.34  59.60  60.80  54.40  59.54  54.33 
 Nov  68.34  69.00  64.26  58.80  65.10  57.81 
 Dec  76.84  67.00  63.26  58.80  66.48  63.35 
2009  Jan  58.66  74.50  72.00  58.66  71.29  69.22 
 Feb  80.00  81.12  78.00  58.14  74.32  70.57 
 Mar  80.00  80.00  65.00  59.58  72.90  65.27 
 Apr  45.84  35.70  42.80  26.66  37.75  45.36 
 May  37.00  33.26  39.40  48.58  39.56  34.19 
Jun  40.00  36.88  38.60  34.72  37.55  32.98 
 Jul  42.50  40.00  38.60  31.46  38.14  35.57 
 Aug  42.50  39.00  36.60  33.50  37.90  37.29 
 Sep  50.00  43.00  42.00  40.00  43.75  38.74 
 Oct  50.00  41.00  41.40  44.00  44.10  39.98 
 Nov  50.00  41.76  38.26  40.00  42.51  41.21 
 Dec  50.00  44.50  38.78  39.56  43.21  41.74 
2010  Jan  50.00  45.72  49.60  45.50  47.71  45.29 
 Feb  51.66  44.28  51.40  49.20  49.14  46.47 
 Mar  45.00  41.28  39.20  51.14  44.16  43.75 
 Apr  50.00  31.26  39.20  31.14  37.90  37.57 
 May  35.84  24.76  37.80  20.72  29.78  30.51 
 Jun  37.50  27.72  46.40  25.32  34.24  29.81 
Source: as explained in the text. 
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The trends presented in Table 4.14 are meant to illustrate the impact of maize price changes as 
measured in the urban areas of Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Zomba from October 2007 to 
June 2010. This is so because the sharp rise in maize retail prices experienced across two 
successive lean seasons in 2008 and 2009, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5, first emerged in 
Blantyre where ADMARC started rationing maize. This was before the rationing was 
extended to other parts of the country, and the government eventually imposed nationwide 
restrictions on private trading on maize, including setting maximum prices (Government of 
Malawi 2008g). Figure 4.2 compares the trends in the urban areas and the average national 
prices collected by MoAFS as discussed earlier (Table 4.10). 
Figure 4.2: Trends in urban maize prices in Malawi 2007-2010  
 
National prices refer to maize prices presented in Table 4.9 
 
Source: as explained in the text. 
 
4.3 Fieldwork Component of the Research 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Original data was collected in three communities in Mchinji district where the two social 
transfer programmes have operated side by side since 2006. A sample household survey using 
structured questionnaires was conducted to collect quantitative data on proxy livelihood 
indicators such as demography, assets, labour and food production and consumption. A 
baseline survey was conducted in January 2008 to establish cropping patterns and the 
household food situation, and a follow up survey in September 2008 captured crop production 
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and sales. In between, two tracking surveys in March and May 2008 were conducted using a 
sub-sample of the main survey in order to capture what happened to households during the 
season. In addition, focus group discussions were conducted in October 2008 to identify 
various aspects of livelihoods and social transfers from a wider perspective of the rural 
community. And as part of on-going fieldwork, consultations and key informant interviews 
were also conducted at national, district and community levels to solicit the views of policy 
makers, researchers and stakeholders on many aspects such as policy, programme 
implementation and impacts. The survey questionnaires are provided in an Annex to this 
thesis, after the Reference list. 
4.3.2 Choice of Mchinji District 
Chapter 3 discussed that social cash transfers have operated in Malawi in selected seven 
districts, while the input subsidy programme is national covering all 28 districts of Malawi. 
Among the seven districts implementing the social cash transfers in the 2007/08 season, only 
Mchinji district had been the site of both schemes in the three years preceding the fieldwork, 
thereby potentially permitting comparative analysis of their impacts on a relatively longer 
term than any other district.  
Mchinji is one of the nine districts in central Malawi. It borders with Kasungu district to the 
north, Lilongwe district to the east, Zambia to the west and Mozambique to the south. The 
district headquarters (locally called Boma) is located about 110 km from the capital Lilongwe 
and 10 km from the Zambia border at Mwami. In 2008, the district population was 456,558. 
There were 97,209 households with an average household size of 4.7 (Government of Malawi 
2008b). However, in the same year, Ministry of Agriculture estimated farm families at 
141,347 (Government of Malawi 2008a). In 2002, about 40 per cent of the farm families were 
female headed (Government of Malawi 2002b). In the 2007/08 season, Mchinji had nine TAs, 
namely Mlonyeni, Mkanda, Dambe, Mavwere, Zulu, Dambe, Kapondo, Mduwa and Nyoka. 
This was an increase since 2002 when there were six TAs and 61 VDCs. At that time, the 
government had not yet declared Kapondo, Simphasi and Nyoka as TAs (Government of 
Malawi 2002b). Agriculturally, the district falls within the Kasungu ADD and has six 
Extension Planning Areas (EPAs), namely, Mkanda, Kalulu, Mikundi, Chioshya, Mlonyeni 
and Msitu. These administrative structures have already been described in Chapter 3. Table 
4.15 presents selected statistics in relation to these structures. A further discussion of 
livelihood aspects of the district is provided in Chapter 7.  
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Table 4.15: Selected Mchinji district statistics 
EPA TA covered Avge 
land 
(ha) 
Agricultural 
structures 
Traditional and 
decentralization 
Farm families 
Section Block Village VDC Total % FHH 
Mkanda Mkanda 2.8 11 88 83 15 16,731 34 
Kalulu Dambe & Kapondo 3.3 7 56 80 10 11,930 27 
Mikundi Mduwa & Nyoka 1.1 10 80 80 6 17,209 35 
Chioshya Simphasi & Zulu 2.6 10 80 76 13 22,925 40 
Mlonyeni Mlonyeni 1.8 9 72 77 7 12,679 32 
Msitu Mavwere 1.8 9 72 100 10 18,894 50 
Mchinji  2.2 56 448 496 61 141,347 38 
Note: Bolded italics refer to social cash transfer project sites in the district 
Source: Government of Malawi (2002b, 2008b) 
 
 
In terms of livelihood zoning, the district is located within the Kasungu-Lilongwe Livelihood 
Zone, which is Malawi’s best zone agriculturally with the potential for production of a wide 
range of smallholder crops. Mchinji has potential for a wide range of crops and other 
agricultural enterprises. Major crops are maize, groundnuts, burley tobacco, cassava, sweet 
potatoes and beans (Phaseolus, ground beans and soya beans). There is also substantial 
livestock production: cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, rabbits, chickens and guinea fowl. Irrigated 
farming is also practiced but on a limited scale. The district also has many tobacco estates, 
potentially offering alternative livelihood sources (Government of Malawi 2002b). The 
district has a high maize production potential. As shown in Figure 4.3, yields in the district 
have increased steadily in the last ten years while area planted to maize has generally 
remained almost the same. This contrasts with the national picture that suggests some steady 
increase in area planted to maize but uneven progress on yields. But the district is also 
potentially vulnerable. Unlike in other districts where people can also rely on rice, cassava, 
millets and sorghum, there is limited food diversity in Mchinji (Government of Malawi 
2005c, 2008d). Mchinji is among seven districts in Malawi40 with high child malnutrition 
(FANTA 2007) and has high rates of ultra-poverty although it is ranked among the middle ten 
districts in Malawi in terms of poverty ranking (Government of Malawi 2005b). Mchinji is 
not regarded as a hotspot district in terms of the risk of missing food entitlements (see Table 
4.12). A further discussion of livelihood aspects of the district is provided in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis. 
                                                 
40
 The districts are Dedza, Machinga, Mchinji, Mwanza, Ntcheu, Ntchisi, and Zomba 
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Figure 4.3: Comparing Mchinji and national maize productivity 1996-2008 
(a) Maize production (tons) 
 
 
(b) Maize hectarage (Ha) 
 
(c) Maize yield (Kg/ha) 
 
Note: 1997 refers to 1996-07 crop season and so on 
 
Source: Data underlying Table 4.3  
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4.3.3 Selection of study communities 
The fieldwork was conducted in three communities implementing the Mchinji Social Cash 
Transfer scheme. A community in Malawi typically refers to a village or group of villages. 
Villages are part of an informal but officially recognised administrative structure of the 
traditional leadership (chieftaincy system), as already described in Chapter 3. Because they 
organize and influence people’s social, cultural, political, economic aspects, villages are 
important research entities (Kutengule 2000, p.58). Despite these structures, the two social 
transfer programmes that are the focus of this thesis use Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) in order to target beneficiaries. Chapter 3 has described the VDCs as part of the 
national decentralization policy introduced in the 1990s to promote local governance and 
development management and were framed around traditional leadership structure. As of 
October 2007 during which period the study sites were being selected, the Mchinji social cash 
transfer scheme was operational in 29 VDCs in four TAs (Dambe, Kapondo, Mduwa and 
Nyoka) and covered about 2,500 beneficiary households which increased to 2,800 by April 
2008.  
The study was conducted in Mduwa VDC, Chiti VDC and Kangwere VDC which together 
had a total of 2,639 households (1,146 Mduwa, 861 Chiti and 632 Kangwere) and a total of 
256 cash transfer beneficiary households (110 Mduwa, 82 Chiti and 64 Kangwere). The 
selection of the study sites was made in consultation with the district social cash transfer 
office. Three factors were considered in the actual selection of study communities: (1) the 
distribution of the study sites across TAs in order to capture a wider community perspective; 
(2) selection of study sites located as far away from ‘urban centres’ or main roads as possible 
in order to capture ‘typical’ agricultural dimensions. The three study sites were located at least 
twenty kilometres from the district headquarters (boma) and at least ten kilometres away from 
main the Lilongwe-Mchinji road. However, there is a main tarmac road which connects 
Kasungu and Mchinji districts and forms the boundary between TA Mduwa and TA Nyoka; 
and (3) avoidance of VDCs where other studies (Miller and others) were being conducted 
from March 2007 to May 2008 as part of ongoing evaluations of the Mchinji Scheme. 
Table 4.16 provides the distribution of VDCs, households and the beneficiaries. The selected 
study sites are highlighted in bold italics. Figure 4.4 is map of Mchinji district to show the 
location of the study sites. 
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Table 4.16: Distribution of Mchinji pilot scheme beneficiaries 
Traditional 
Authority(TA) 
Village Development 
Committee (VDC) 
Number of 
Households 
SCT beneficiaries 
FHH MHH Total 
 
Dambe  
 
 
 
  
  
  
Chalunda  1,187   64  41  105  
Chilowa  387  19  12  31  
Chimwala  793  41  30  71  
Dambe 1,004  59  41  100  
Kakunga 1,917  79  42  121  
Kambuwe 310  18  10  28  
Khwere 174   13  4  17  
Mphanda 1,081   57  51  108  
Mtopola 1,081   49  29   78  
Nthema 1,124   69   39  108  
Panye  784  42  35  77  
Kapondo 
  
  
  
  
Chankhanga 1,354  83  52  135  
Chapakama 351  19  15  34  
Chiwoko 393  32  7  39  
Chiti 861  56  26  82  
Kalulu  1,162  62  44  106  
Mduwa 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Chimongo  980  72  23  95  
Mduwa 1,146  67  43  110  
Mkangala  1,018  75  25  100  
Mtunga  375  24  14  38  
Mzama  922  50  33  83  
Nduwa 1,255  77  38  115  
Thomasi 1,160  81  35  116  
Nyoka 
 
 
 
 
 
Kachamba 683  46  18  64  
Kangwere 632  41  23  64  
Mkunda 1,340  77  36  113  
Ndooka 1,221  74  34  108  
Nyoka 898  63  23  86  
Sivima 1,176  76  34  110  
  Total 26,769  1,585  857  2,442  
 Note: Italicised, bold refer to the selected study VDCs. 
  
Source: Mchinji District Social cash Transfer Office, October 2007 
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Figure 4.4: Map of Mchinji showing the location of the case study communities 
 
Source: Adapted from Government of Malawi (2002b:19) 
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4.3.4 Sampling 
Sampling is required in order to draw valid inferences about the population from which the 
sample is drawn. The basic assumption in research is that the sample being studied is 
representative of a larger population of interest from which the unit of inquiry is sampled 
(Lenth 2001). In livelihoods research, a household is recommended as the basic unit of 
inquiry (Ellis 2000, Seaman et al. 2000). A household can be described as a social unit that 
comprises a person or group of persons generally bound by ties of kinship who live together 
under a single roof or within a single compound and who share the same household head and 
eat from the same pot (Casley and Kumar 1988, p.6). Variants of this description also exist. 
For example, Kutengule (2000, pp.59-60) discusses the household in rural livelihoods of 
Malawi and terms it ‘banja’. Banja includes spouses (parents), their children, other kin and 
even workers who live with them since all these groups are regarded as ‘children’ in Malawi 
kinship systems. Nevertheless, the membership and terminology of household in Malawi are 
matters of practice in different socio-cultural contexts. It can be known by many terms such as 
banja (the family of) or khomo (the home of) or nyumba (the house of) and it may not 
necessarily comprise parents as heads since orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC) are 
increasingly known to head households. It is not uncommon now to find households being 
categorized as ‘male headed’, ‘female headed’, ‘elderly headed’ or ‘child headed’, as the 
Mchinji scheme has shown.  
Different approaches can be used to select valid samples but in practice, sample size may not 
be the main issue. The goal is to design a study that captures parameters and dimensions of 
interest. The sample can be too small for statistical generalization but yet still be valid enough 
for constructing useful stories. Flexible research designs are therefore recommended as 
yielding better research results (Sandelowski 2000, Lenth 2001). Nevertheless, for most 
practical purposes, a ‘30-10 rule’ is recommended. The ‘30-10 rule’ requires the sample size 
to be a minimum of 30 units or 10 per cent of population of interest, whichever is greater and 
where a complete population of interest is known (Grinnell 2001). Different approaches also 
exist in the literature on sample selection. However, stratified purposeful sampling is 
recommended in situations where a complete sampling frame might not be available and 
sample sizes are likely to be too small for generalization (Bartlett et al. 2001, Grinnell 2001, 
Lenth 2001). All the theoretical issues considered, the final sample for this research 
comprised 90 households for the main household survey, from which a sub-sample of 30 
households was drawn for the tracking survey. 
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At the time of sampling in October 2007, input subsidy (coupon) beneficiaries were not 
known because identification and registration was in progress. For this reason, the sample was 
drawn from three ‘beneficiary household strata’ that had emerged from the selection of 
beneficiary households for the Mchinji Social Transfer Scheme. The first group comprised 
cash beneficiary households that in official terms represented the poorest 10 per cent of the 
population (eligible beneficiaries). The second group comprised households that were 
registered by community social cash transfer committees (CSCTCs) but rejected by district 
social cash transfer committee (DSCTC) on the basis of not meeting minimum eligibility 
criteria (eligible non-beneficiaries). The third group comprised households that were not 
registered because they were considered to be non-poor (ineligible non-beneficiaries). The 
original plan was to distribute the pre-determined 90 sample households equally into these 
three household categories but this was not possible because of inadequate numbers of 
eligible non-beneficiaries. For this reason, the final distribution was 30 eligible cash 
beneficiaries, 26 eligible non-beneficiaries and 34 ineligible non-beneficiaries. However, the 
predetermined sample size of 90 households was distributed equally among the three study 
VDCs (30 Mduwa, 30 Chiti and 30 Kangwere). The plan was for each VDC to have equal 
distribution of the three cash beneficiary categories but this was not possible for Chiti and 
Kangwere because of low numbers of eligible non-beneficiaries. 
The district social cash transfer office provided a list of households showing eligible cash 
beneficiaries and eligible non-beneficiaries by VDC, zone, village and gender.41 The first step 
therefore involved taking the list of households to each VDC for discussion and confirmation 
with respective CSCTCs at specially organized meeting for the research. Together, the three 
VDCs had 256 eligible cash beneficiaries (110 Mduwa, 82 Chiti and 64 Kangwere) and 38 
eligible non-beneficiaries (22 Mduwa, 7 Chiti and 9 Kangwere). 
The second step involved actual selection of samples from the eligible cash beneficiaries and 
eligible non-beneficiaries. A research assistant randomly picked households until the required 
sample size was achieved, balancing zone, village and gender in the process. However, for 
Chiti and Kangwere, all eligible non-beneficiaries were selected since they were less than ten 
each. 
                                                 
41
 For cash payment purposes, the Mchinji Scheme divides VDCs into zones comprising a number of 
villages. The zones were: (1) Mduwa VDC – Mduwa, Tcholonjo and Jemusi; (2) Chiti VDC – 
Bwemba and Chiti; (3) Kangwere VDC – Kangwere, Mzangawo and Nyamazya. 
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The third step involved the selection of the ineligible non-beneficiaries. To allow village level 
comparisons, a decision was made that where possible, all the three cash beneficiary 
categories should be sampled from same villages. So, a list of villages was compiled to show 
where the sampled eligible cash beneficiary and eligible non-beneficiaries households came 
from. Then all ineligible non-beneficiary households in the village were listed by gender. On 
average, there were about twenty households in this category. Then a research assistant 
randomly picked households to complete the 30 sample for a VDC, while balancing the 
representation of zone, village and gender. The final sample size was 34 ineligible 
beneficiaries (10 Mduwa, 13 Chiti and 11 Kangwere). Table 4.17 shows the distribution by 
zone of the number of villages represented in the sample with the help of chairpersons of 
CSCTCs. 
Table 4.17: Distribution of zones in the study VDCs and sample survey 
VDC Zone 
No of 
Villages 
Vges in 
survey 
Cash 
HHs 
Sample 
HHs 
FGD 
participants 
Mduwa 
 
Mduwa 19 4 66 14 9 
Jemusi 2   2 27 6  
Tcholonjo 12   3 15 10  
Chiti 
 
Bwemba 4   4 45 14  
Chiti 3   3 38 16 7 
Kangwere 
 
Kangwere 1   1 26 13 8 
Mzangawo 3   2 16 10  
Nyamazya 3   1 22 7  
 
Note: CSCTC consultations here refer to those held on the day of PRA discussions 
to triangulate the responses. Otherwise, full CSCTCs were consulted as a committee 
at the start of the fieldwork and as individuals throughout the fieldwork to seek their 
views on a number of issues.  
Source: Mchinji Field Surveys 2007-08 
 
The distribution of the social cash transfer scheme and the input subsidy programme in the 
final working sample emerged from the 90 households as: 8 cash beneficiary households 
(cash), 47 coupon beneficiary households (coupon), 22 households that were beneficiaries of 
both schemes (both) and 13 households that were non-beneficiaries of either scheme (none).  
From the main sample of 90 households described above, a sub-sample of 30 households (10 
Mduwa, 10 Chiti and 10 Kangwere) was selected for the tracking survey. The selection 
involved balancing the three beneficiary strata described above, zone, village and gender. 
From the sub sample of 30 households, the distribution of the two schemes emerged as 
follows: 3 ‘cash’, 17 ‘coupon’, 8 ‘both’ and 2 ‘none’.
followed to select the sample. 
Figure 4.5
 
Colour codes:  
Green – Social cash transfer 
Yellow – Coupon recipients
Blue – Recipients of both cash transfers and coupons
 
 
Note: Figures in brackets refer to total households in that category/at that level
 
Source: Field sampling, 2007
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 Figure 4.5 depicts the stages that were 
 
: The stages and outcomes in the sample selection
recipients 
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4.3.5 Focus group discussions 
To facilitate payment of social cash grants, each VDC is divided into zones, each comprising 
15-120 beneficiary households. The zones constituted neighbouring villages and also served 
as central place for VDC project meetings. It has also been discussed earlier that the villages 
were organized like hamlets that comprised related individuals or individuals who knew each 
other fairly well. For this reason, the focus group discussions were held at zone level since 
that was the highest level that the participants were deemed fairly able to know and discuss 
every household in the villages. The discussions were conducted in Kadimba Village in 
Mduwa VDC, Chiti Zone and Kangwere zone. 42 
At least three days prior to the focus group discussions, chairpersons of CSCTCs helped to 
organize 7-10 participants drawn across villages represented in that zone to constitute the 
focus group discussions. In addition, separate discussions were organized with members of 
CSCTCs to generate different perspectives with which to compare results of the PRA 
discussions. It is important to note here that CSCTC which is constituted at VDC level 
comprised representatives from villages represented in that VDC. Based on what was 
discussed during the PRA discussions, as discussed further in Chapter 6, a VDC meeting 
attended by households from all villages in that VDC is held to elect CSCTC members. While 
popular vote counts, deliberate efforts are made to ensure representation from wider villages. 
That is why the official guidelines stipulate CSCTC membership of 12 individuals but in the 
three study sites, membership ranged from 11 to 14 members (11 members in Kangwere and 
14 members in Mduwa and Chiti VDCs). 
It is also important to note here that the CSCTCs were not independent entities but part of a 
‘community system of committees’. Again, based on what was discussed and observed during 
the field work, there were also input subsidy committees that were formed and worked with 
village heads to register coupon beneficiaries for input subsidy programme. Most members of 
CSCTCs were also members of the input subsidy committees. Thus, it was practically 
difficult to separate committees for the social cash transfer programme from those of the input 
subsidy programme. And by the structure of the villages and reporting requirements for the 
                                                 
42
 Former TA Mduwa had passed away, such that it was not possible to organize discussions at zone 
level. Special arrangements were made to conduct the PRA in Kadimba village since it was relatively 
far away from the TA headquarters. 
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committees, the committee activities were not entirely free of the influence of the village 
heads and ‘relational’ aspects. 
During the actual focus group discussions, the research team met with the participants at a 
central place where they normally met for CSCTC or village meetings. The researcher 
facilitated the discussions using a checklist of questions while two RAs took notes. The RAs 
were oriented to the PRA guides and facilitation and note-taking techniques before the 
exercise. Immediately following each focus group discussions, separate discussions were held 
with members of CSCTCs to generate a different perspective with which to compare results 
of the focus group discussions. All discussions took place 3-5 hours in the morning and the 
afternoons involved research team meetings to consolidate and summarise major findings. 
Table 4.17 above has provided the distribution of focus group discussion participants. 
4.3.6 Key Informant Interviews 
The researcher also conducted a number of key informant interviews at national, district and 
community levels as part of ongoing fieldwork activity. At national level, those interviewed 
included senior government officials in key ministry (Finance, Economic Planning- Social 
Protection Unit and MVAC, Agriculture, Local Government, Transport and Public works, 
Ministry of Gender- Social cash Transfer Unit, MASAF), donor agencies (DFID, UNICEF, 
WFP), NGOs (Concern Worldwide, Centre for Social Concern, CISANET, IPRISE and 
FEWSNET) and Centre for Social Research (that was conducting evaluation of the Mchinji 
Scheme with Boston University). At district level, interviews were held with Director of 
Planning, DADO, District Social Welfare officer and key staff. At community level, key 
informant interviews were conducted with agriculture field staff and village heads. It is 
stressed here that most of these were informal consultations to get deeper understanding of 
policy views, programme implementation processes and apparent outcomes and impacts on 
poverty and vulnerability reduction. Some consultations continued by email and telephone 
after the researcher had returned to the UK in order to get updates on ISP and social cash 
transfer programmes.  
4.4 Data transformations and analysis and epistemological issues 
4.4.1 Data analysis 
After each round of household survey, the questionnaires were processed and entered in 
SPSS. It is important at this point to stress the restricted character of the empirical fieldwork 
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research. In order to support the secondary data of this thesis, earlier described, the researcher 
conducted a limited fieldwork exercise to gain a more definite feel for critical strengths and 
weaknesses of the two programmes under discussion in this thesis. The researcher had no 
resources to carry out a full-scale livelihoods and vulnerability analysis of a large sample of 
households. For this reason, this thesis is mainly concerned with simple statistical methods for 
describing observed food security effects of the two schemes under consideration in this 
thesis. To test for differences in means, One-way Analysis of Variance (One way ANOVA) 
comparing at least three sample groups or Independent-Samples T-Test comparing two groups 
have been employed on the data. To test for differences in proportions between groups, 
Mann-Whitney U test (for 2 independent samples) and Kruskal-Wallis H Test (for k 
independent samples) have been conducted. In addition, simple regression (y=α+βt) is applied 
to the different productivity time series (secondary) data in order to test for the existence of a 
positive or negative trend. Simple correlation analysis using Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficient is also conducted to test for linear positive or negative relationships 
between two variables. These are most appropriate tests to yield the evidence sought in this 
research (Colman and Pulford 2006). 
A number of transformations have been conducted to the original data in order to permit 
comparisons between households. To allow comparisons of labour availability, ages of 
household members were converted into adult labour equivalent using conversion factors in 
Table 4.18. From the literature all persons above the age of 7 years provide productive labour 
in one way or the other, especially on family farms in Africa (Johnson 1982, p.205). In doing 
this calculation, there is no implication that ‘child labour’ is desirable. To the extent that the 
labour contribution of persons aged below 19 years is considered child labour is a matter of 
government policy, which currently lacks a proper framework. 43 The government has so far 
not outlawed or criminalized the participation of young people either on family farms or in 
ganyu in neighbouring farms. The attention to date has focussed on child labour in 
commercial tobacco and tea estates because of a previous history of using children as cheap 
labour (Eldring 2003, Otanez et al. 2006). In fact, the ISP as a main vulnerability reduction 
policy initiative in Malawi targets (amongst other categories) households where the head 
                                                 
43
 The Malawi Constitution provides for the protection of children from economic exploitation. The 
Employment Act of 2000 prohibits the employment of persons below the age of 14 but allows the 
employment of persons aged 14-18 years as long as it does not harm child development (Eldring, 
2003, p.12) labour (Eldring 2003, p.12). Government economic reports (e.g. by NSO) describe 
economically active age group in Malawi to be 15-64 years. 
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cannot provide active labour but there are dependents, including children, who can (Mwale 
2009). In the Medium Term Plan for the Farm Inputs Subsidy Programme covering the period 
2011-16, there is a stated policy provision to reach resource poor households headed by 
children and orphans, in the same way as special consideration is to be given to households 
headed by the elderly, HIV positive persons, females, disabled persons, or household heads 
caring for the elderly, chronically ill or disabled persons (Government of Malawi 2010d, 
p.16). During the fieldwork, children as young as five years were reported to have participated 
in family farms and even in ganyu but for the purpose of this thesis, labour input of 
individuals aged below the age of 7 years is considered to be zero.  
Table 4.18: Labour conversion factors (adult units equivalents) 
Age (Years) Female Male Average* 
Below 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 -14 0.4 0.4 0.4 
15-64 0.8 1.0 0.9 
65 and above 0.0 0.5 0.5 
 * author calculations to remove gender bias 
 Source: Johnson (1982, p.205) 
 
The fieldwork also monitored availability of food (maize) stocks at every survey round. The 
stocks were collected in both grain and ufa (maize flour) in units reported by the households 
and applicable to most rural Malawi. To permit comparisons to be made between households 
in the sample, the quantities were ‘standardized’ into kilogrammes using conversion factors 
developed by NSO and widely used as official measures for Malawi (see Table 4.19).  
Table 4.19: Maize conversion factors for Malawi 
Measure of maize Kilograms 
50 kg bag 46.7 
90 kg bag 84.0 
Pail (small) 8.7 
Pail (large) 20.0 
No. 10 plate 0.2 
No. 12 plate 0.8 
Basket (dengu) shelled 34.6 
Basket (dengu) unshelled 13.3 
Oxcart (unshelled) 32.3 
Oxcart (shelled) 350.0 
 Source: Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey by NSO, July 2007 
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The ufa was reported in the form of ufa woyela (refined meal), mgaiwa (whole meal) or 
mixed. To permit comparative analysis of households, the ufa was converted into maize grain 
equivalents using factors derived by leading researchers on food security and nutrition in 
eastern and southern Africa (Jayne et al. 1996). These were consistent with conversion factors 
earlier provided by nutritionists in the Department of Home Economics and Human Nutrition 
at Bunda College of Agriculture of the University of Malawi44. According to Jayne, et al., 
(1996, p.5), the extraction rate for mgaiwa is 96-99 per cent while the rate for ufa woyera is 
65 per cent. To account for situations where the ufa in the sample was mixed, an average rate 
was derived for this thesis as follows: the average of extraction rate for ufa woyera plus the 
average extraction rate for mgaiwa ((60 + (96+99)÷2) ÷2). This gave a working rate of 78.8 
per cent with which the ufa was converted back into maize equivalents. In any case, less than 
10 per cent of the sample households reported food in ufa form at every survey visit. 
To permit comparisons of the duration (days) the stocks would take to deplete, the stocks 
were ‘standardized’ into household maize calorie equivalents by applying a conversion factor 
(see Table 4.20) derived from two separate studies conducted on Malawi. In 1992, FAO 
estimated that 468.8 grams of maize in Malawi provided 1,422 calories equal to 3,033.3 
calories for each kilogram of maize (FAO 1992, Table 24). In 2010, Ecker and Qaim (2010, 
p.5) estimated that 381.7 grams of maize provided 1,332 calories equal to 3,489.7 calories for 
each kilogram of maize. 45 These two sources provide an average figure of 3,261.5 calories for 
each kilogram of maize, and this is the figure utilised for nutritional conversions in the rest of 
the thesis. 
The household maize calorie requirements were computed by applying conversion factors that 
were provided by the government in the 1998 Profile of Poverty in Malawi that drew on IHS-
1 (see Government of Malawi 2000b, p.109). The factors are adjusted for age, sex and scale 
of activity a person performs but the author derived age-based averages to remove ‘gender 
biases’. On the basis of these conversion factors, the average per capita maize requirement is 
0.43 kg per day or 158.4 kgs per year. To estimate number of days the food stocks would take 
                                                 
44
 Mr Kingsley Masamba, Lecturer in Food Science at Bunda College, provided an extraction rate of 90 
per cent for Mgaiwa and 60 per cent for ufa woyera as conversion factors used by Department of 
Home Economics and Human Nutrition at the College.  
45
 Mr Neil Orchardson (Technical Advisor for Food Security and Nutrition) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security informed the researcher in October 2010 that the Ministry has since 
adopted this as the ‘official’ conversion factor.  
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to deplete, total household maize calorie requirements per day were derived by summing up 
daily maize calorie requirements of different individuals in the household. This was then used 
as a denominator with which to divide the total maize calorie equivalents: 
Days food would last = Available food stocks (maize calorie equivalents) 
Daily household maize calorie requirement 
 
Table 4.20: Per capita calorie and equivalent maize requirements (kgs) 
Age 
(Years 
 
Mchinji sample 
Equiv group (yrs) 
 
Daily calorie 
requirement 
 
Daily maize 
calorie 
Daily maize 
requirements 
(kgs) 
Annual maize 
requirements 
(kgs) 46 
<1 0-0.9 820 597.0 0.18  65.7  
1-2 1-1.9 1,150 837.2 0.26  94.9  
2-3 2-2.9 1,350 982.8  0.30  109.5  
3-5 3-4.9 1,550 1,128.4  0.35  127.8  
5-7 5-6.9 1,800 1,310.4  0.40  146.0  
7-10 7-9.9 1,950 1,419.6  0.44  160.6  
10-12 10-11.9 2,075 1,510.6  0.46  167.9  
12-14 12-13.9 2,250 1,638.0  0.50  182.5  
14-16 14-15.9 2,400 1,747.2  0.54 197.1  
16-18 16-17.9 2,500 1,820.0  0.56  204.4  
18-30 18-29.9 2,600 1,892.8  0.58  211.7  
30-60 30-59.9 2,567 1,868.5  0.57  208.1  
60+ 60+ 2,225 1,619.8  0.50  182.5  
 Average 1,941 1,413.3  0.43  158.4  
Source: as explained in the main text above. 
 
4.4.2 Epistemological position in this thesis 
Research in the field of social sciences entails purposive and rigorous investigation that aims 
to generate new knowledge (Sarantakos 2005, p.4) based on facts that are not just given but 
also produced (Mukherjee and Wuyts 1998, p.243). Different research works adopt different 
epistemological stances regarding views on ‘generation of new knowledge’ but this research 
adopts view that allows for the comparison of different ideas on a relative basis (Proctor 
1998b). This epistemological position can be referred to as critical realist strands of thought 
which approaches issues of knowledge as constituting both realism and practical activity; that 
reality exists but it has to be interpreted within a given context by interpreting the observed 
interactions between powers, institutions, actors or forces. In the field of social sciences, the 
                                                 
46
 As a rule of thumb, the government encourages Malawians to keep two and a half 50-kg bag of maize 
per person per year. But working figures vary considerably. In the BNB surveys described in earlier 
sections of this Chapter, the methodology has adopted a working maize requirement of two 50-kg bags 
per month for a family of six persons, translating into 200 kgs per person per year. The average of the 
two sources yields 162.5 kgs per person per year, which is very close to 158.4 kgs derived for this 
study – a difference of 4.1 kgs may be acceptable for all practical purposes. 
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purpose is to uncover deeper issues around causes, patterns, outcomes and effects around 
themes of research interest; the interaction between ‘powers’ in issues around poverty and 
vulnerability and their most recent policy responses emphasizing social transfers/agriculture 
in the case of this thesis. This interpretive process involves aspects of subjectivity as set of 
empirical methods are explained and elaborated. The results of such analytical process in this 
thesis can provide the basis for ‘policy’ change. In this research, examples that have received 
critical analysis include power relations (e.g. role of private sector in ISP), ethical (e.g. 
leakages of coupons or social transfers), economic (e.g. cost effectiveness of social transfers) 
or political (e.g. politics of social transfer targeting and reporting of the outcomes that have 
created unexplained gaps with reality on the ground (Bhaskar 1989, Proctor 1998a, Carter and 
New 2004). This study combines social sciences including economics (e.g. optimal use of 
resources such as inputs) and politics (how political factors can override evidence-based 
policy making) with agriculture (e.g. maize production), geography and environment. These 
disciplines fall into either or both of the two main paradigms of positivist or post-positivist 
perspectives on knowledge generation. Importantly for this study, a number of different 
fieldwork methods were found appropriate, and a combined qualitative and quantitative 
approach was followed (Booth et al. 1998, Ellis 2000, Kanbur 2003). 
The field work was conducted with the assistances of six research assistants (RAs) who 
helped with field data collection variably at different periods but three worked on more or less 
‘permanent basis’ while the other three were brought in periodically to confirm the data 
collected. The original plan was to recruit research assistants resident in each of the three 
study VDCs. It was apparent from initial consultations that the CSCTCs did not favour the 
idea because it would kill the spirit of volunteerism since members of the CSCTCs were not 
receiving any formal remuneration for their time, resources and services.47 On the basis of 
these reservations, two assistants were recruited from communities neighbouring VDCs not 
participating in the study. Agricultural staff at district and Mikundi EPA helped in the 
identification and recruitment process. One RA was recruited from the district headquarters 
(Mchinji Boma) and worked with the researcher throughout the study from initial sample and 
community selection to data entry. All the three RAs commuted to the study sites on daily 
basis using bicycles. 
                                                 
47
 It is discussed in Chapter 6 that members of the CSCTCs are not volunteers in strictest sense because 
they draw a monthly allowance, now at MK1500 per month in addition to daily allowances every time 
they participate in project activities, mostly outside their communities.  
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A central place known as Matutu, a trading centre which forms a boundary between TAs 
Kapondo, Nyoka and Mduwa, was identified as a meeting place for the research team. Matutu 
also has some houses for agricultural extension workers from Mikundi EPA, one of whom 
volunteered venue for training and meetings throughout the fieldwork. Prior to the fieldwork 
data collection, one week training was provided to the RAs to orient them to the research 
objectives and design, data collection methodologies to be employed and ethical issues in 
research (sensitivity, confidentiality etc). Part of the training included a pre-test of the 
baseline questionnaire in nearby villages. The pre-test experiences were used to refine the 
questionnaires and to map out field logistics before fully-fledged baseline survey. 
The three RAs implemented the baseline survey (90 households), first tracking survey (30 
households) and final survey (90 households) through interviews with heads of households or 
their proxies. Each household survey phase took two weeks maximum and each household 
tracking phase was completed within one week. In addition to community level consultations, 
the researcher supervised and monitored the data collection by the RAs. But to ensure quality 
work, the payment of the RAs was tagged to each properly completed, checked and approved 
questionnaire. In the second tracking survey, however, the RAs responsible for Mduwa and 
Chiti were replaced with two new RAs (one from Lilongwe and another from Mchinji Boma; 
and a third was recruited from Bunda to specifically help with focus group discussions) in 
order to independently verify some issues. The new RAs were oriented to the study and 
questionnaire. The approach also changed - the research team (3 RAs & the researcher) 
moved together, completing the survey in one community before moving to the next 
community. Each study site took one full day to administer 10 questionnaires. All the 
household level interviews were conducted at respondent’s house/home using a structured 
questionnaire. Immediately after completion of each round of household survey, the 
questionnaires were coded and entered in SPSS. One RA did the data entry with regular help 
from the researcher. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed methodologies that are relevant to the construction and analysis of 
this thesis. These methodologies divide into two main categories: those associated with 
Malawi government statistics, and those associated with the author’s own fieldwork in 
Mchinji district. It is considered important to set out the basis of various government 
statistical series or surveys, since the provenance of these affects both questions of data 
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accuracy and the information that is available for food insecurity policy decision making. In 
particular, the targeting methods used in the Mchinji social cash transfer scheme have 
depended on a particular interpretation of data contained in the IHS2 conducted in 2004-05. 
The chief measure of success of the ISP are the output gains estimated according to the 
methodology set out in section 4.2.2 above, which, as discussed in that section, allows 
discretionary discussion of data to occur at particular points in the methodology. All the 
methods discussed in Section 4.2 above in one way or another have a bearing on data and its 
policy interpretation in this thesis. 
The second half of the chapter describes the methodology that applies to the fieldwork study 
conducted in Mchinji district. The section describes how major data transformations that have 
been conducted to the original data to allow comparisons between households. The restricted 
scale of the fieldwork is also discussed; because the purpose was to support secondary data 
sources described in Section 4.2. The importance of taking epistemological issues into great 
depth when conducting empirical research is recognised but not a binding factor in this thesis; 
although ‘fair’ consideration has been taken in that direction.  
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Chapter 5: Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have established that agricultural input subsidies have consistently been 
seen by successive governments as the principal policy initiative for tackling poverty and 
vulnerability in rural Malawi. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the most recent 
input subsidy programme (ISP) works on the ground and its outcomes. The chapter begins 
with a background to the ISP, including the factors that influenced the government decision to 
introduce agricultural input subsidies in 2005/06 and to continue them at scale in successive 
years. The chapter then provides a description of the organization, implementation and 
management of the programme as these have evolved since the programme started. The third 
section examines economic aspects of the programme, including coverage, fertilizer use, 
delivery costs, and cost effectiveness. The fourth section considers strengths and weaknesses 
of the programme that have been identified in various different studies of its functioning. 
Finally, the chapter critically examines the output claims of the subsidy, utilising maize 
balance sheet and price data to draw inferences about likely maize production levels in 
Malawi in recent years. 
The input subsidy programme (ISP) was introduced for the 2005/06 cropping season, and 
therefore the logistics for its implementation were put in place during mid-2005 so that 
coupons for subsidised input purchase were distributed by the planting season in 2005, and 
fertilizer was available in warehouses for coupons to be redeemed. The introduction of the 
ISP immediately followed a poor production year in 2004/05, leading to widespread hunger in 
the following 2005/06 lean season. As summarised also in Chapter 3, the ISP followed on 
from two previous schemes, the Starter Pack input scheme (SPS) which operated in the 
1998/99 and 1999/00 seasons; and the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) that operated at 
varying different levels of coverage from the 2000/01 to 2004/05 seasons. 
The background to these predecessor schemes is relevant to this chapter. In particular, SPS 
was introduced in response to a cumulative deterioration in food security in Malawi that had 
evolved during the 1990s. The reasons identified in the literature for this deterioration include 
adverse side effects of market liberalisation and collapse of public service (1990-94), adverse 
weather conditions especially droughts (1991/92-1994/95) and floods (1996/97), an influx of 
Mozambican refugees (1987-1994), the negative effects on production of growing AIDS-
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related illness and mortality, declining soil fertility, and high market price of fertilizers 
(Conroy et al. 2006). 
A five year programme of work by a national maize productivity task force presented its 
findings in 1998 (Mann 1998, 2008). This identified a cost-effective package of maize and 
fertilizer technology for small farmers with little cash to buy agricultural inputs. The package 
provided the correct inputs for just 0.1 ha of maize, but was considered effective, with good 
rains, if it was (a) accessible by all small farmers, (b) accessed on time before the onset of the 
season, (c) based on high productivity and reliable technology (of hybrid seed) with 
economically efficient doses of fertilizers and (d) supported by a strong mass campaign and a 
focussed extension effort (Mann 1998, Blackie and Mann 2005a, Mann 2008). The design of 
SPS incorporated these recommendations. It provided every farm family an input package 
comprising hybrid maize seed (2 kgs), legume seed (2 kgs), basal fertilizer (10 kgs 
23:21:0+4S) and top dressing fertilizers (5 kgs Urea) adequate for 0.1 hectare of maize. 
While SPS seemed to demonstrate good potential for raising maize yields and output in 
Malawi, it was halted after two years due to disagreements between donors regarding its 
advisability. Specifically, the World Bank opposed a universal scheme, and DFID which had 
provided technical support and funded SPS eventually gave way to the Bank’s position. SPS 
was replaced by a scaled-back version that came to be known as the Targeted Input 
Programme (TIP), implemented from the 2000/01 season. TIP incorporated the following 
changes to the starter pack: (a) the number of beneficiaries was reduced to 0.4 million farmers 
(later increasing to 1.5 million farmers, due to recurring hunger events); (b) the size of the 
input package was reduced to 0.08 hectares maize area (2 kg maize seed, 1 kg legume seed 
and 12 kgs fertilizer); and (c) the seed was changed from hybrid to OPV maize. Unlike the 
starter pack, TIP coincided with a series of adverse weather events, mainly floods in 2000/01 
and droughts in 2001/02 and 2003/04 (Frankenberger et al. 2003, MVAC 2004), but the fall 
in maize production and ensuing hunger tended to be attributed in government circles to the 
scaling down of the starter pack (Levy and Barahona 2002). 
The 2004/05 crop season produced the lowest maize output in a decade. It coincided with the 
new government of Dr Bingu wa Mutharika, elected in May 2004, who had campaigned on 
scaling up input subsidies to end hunger in Malawi (Denning et al. 2009). In 2005, the 
government moved to comply with its campaign promises and introduced the ISP in defiance 
of majority donor views, a decision that has since been described in some quarters as ‘ending 
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famine simply by ignoring the experts’ (Dugger 2007). The programme has since 2005/06 
provided every year 1.3-1.7 million farm families with 2-10 kilograms of maize seed and 100 
kilograms of fertilizer adequate for 0.4 hectares of maize area. At the Africa Summit of the 
World Economic Forum in Cape Town, South Africa on 4 June 2008 the president reaffirmed 
his commitment to providing input subsidies at this scale: 
“Enough is enough. I am not going to go on my knees to beg for food. Let us 
grow the food ourselves. And indeed we have” (Mutharika 2008) 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of the history of agricultural policies in Malawi, 
fertilizer subsidies have long represented a focus of contestation between government and 
donors (and also, at times, between different groupings of donors). For economic reasons set 
out in Chapter 2, the World Bank, IMF and USAID have generally been antagonistic towards 
the reintroduction of subsidies in Malawi, after a long battle in the 1980s and early 1990s to 
persuade the government to remove them. However, the World Bank softened this stance for 
an interval in the late 1990s, allowing the Starter Pack scheme to go ahead, only to retreat into 
its default position two years later. Currently, donor views fall between outright disapproval 
(USAID), sceptical but guarded approval (World Bank’s ‘smart subsidies’, EU, DFID), and 
near unreserved approval (most UN agencies, Nordic governments and international NGOs). 
The government on the other hand sees the ISP as reclaiming its policy space (Chinsinga 
2007b, 2007c). 
Even disapproving donors (USAID) have eventually shown a degree of interest in ensuring 
that the ISP achieves the most desirable outcomes and is properly monitored with regard to its 
efficiency and effectiveness. The World Bank and USAID have funded evaluations of the 
programme. In the most recent MK39 billion programme in 2009/10, major donors 
contributed resources as follows: DFID (£3.8 million pledged but £2 million provided), EU 
(€3 million in pledges), Norwegian Government (NK 15 million pledged but not provided, 
awaiting production of government audit for 2007/08 funds), Irish Aid (€3.2 million) 
(Government of Malawi 2010c). It is important to note that while the government has an 
apparent goal to widen the scope of the ISP to include smallholder cash crops such as tobacco, 
cotton, tea and coffee, the position of the quiescent donors is that the programme should be 
limited to food crops (maize and legumes) and poor farmers (DFID 2010).  Given this stance, 
the 2009/10 ISP was restricted to maize only and, as the findings of the fieldwork in the 
tobacco-dominated Mchinji district reveals (Chapter 7) households that receive coupons 
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display a preference towards the utilization of the fertilizer on maize. External experts who 
have examined or evaluation successive input programmes in Malawi (e.g. Dorward et al. 
2008) tend to come down in favour of a small universal subsidy for all farmers in Malawi (i.e. 
similar to Starter Pack) rather than a large subsidy targeted (probably ineffectually) towards 
poorer farmers.  
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 provides a summary of these three successive input subsidy 
interventions. Of special note is their varying coverage. SPS was designed as a universal 
programme to reach all small cultivators in Malawi, and in 1999/00 is thought to have reached 
2.8 million farm families. Good levels of maize harvest were achieved in both these seasons, 
at 2.2 and 2.3 million tons respectively; however, it is recognised by commentators that 
fortuitously good weather in these seasons contributed to these outcomes (Levy and Barahona 
2002). TIP varied in coverage, and also in the composition of the input package provided. As 
already noted poor weather resulted in a succession of low harvests in the TIP period, 
culminating in the disastrous 2004/05 season when only 1.2 million tons was harvested. The 
TIP data indicates the difficulty of deducing the effectiveness of input subsidies, given the 
overwhelming importance of weather events in rainfed maize production. Thus TIP coverage 
both in terms of number of farmers and size of pack was quite generous in 2004/05 (see Table 
3.1 n Chapter 3), but did not prevent a low harvest and serious hunger from happening. SPS 
and TIP performance has been examined in detail in a number of sources (e.g. Levy 2005b, 
Harrigan 2008).  
The ISP varied in coverage in successive seasons between 2005/06 and 2009/10. It set out to 
reach 1.7 million farmers (roughly 60 per cent of all small farmers) in 2006/07, while in the 
other years it sought near universal coverage. Official output levels during these five seasons 
of ISP implementation have varied between 2.6 and 3.6 million tons (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 
4); however, there are serious concerns about the accuracy of these figures which have been 
expressed by several leading researchers on maize markets in eastern and southern Africa 
(e.g. Jayne et al. 2008), and this is critical for the eventual evaluation of the ISP’s success in 
averting hunger and vulnerability in Malawi, as described in section 5.5 below. Table 5.1 
provides summary of basic data of the ISP from 2005/06 to 2009/10.  
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Table 5.1: Basic Data on the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 2005/06-2009/10 
Crop 
season 
HHs 
Reached 
Subsidya 
Fertilizer 
Sales 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Price 
Coupon 
Market 
Value 
Approx 
Subsidy 
Rate 
Total 
Cost  
Total 
Cost 
 no. tons MK/50kg MK/50kg % MK bn US$ m 
2005-06 1,370,060 131,388 985b 2,735 64 7,200  61.0 
2006-07 1,772,280 174,688 950 3,430 72 12,729  90.9 
2007-08 1,700,000 216,553 900 4,199 79 16,346  116.8 
2008-09 1,700,000 206,541 800 9,800 92 39,848 284.6 
2009-10 1,600,000 161,074 500 5,750 91 25,000c 178.6 
a  Maize seed sales were 4000 tons per year from 2006/07 to 2008/09, increasing to 8000 tons 
in 2009/10 
b In 2005-06 subsidised maize fertilizer was sold at MK950 and tobacco at MK1450 per 50kg 
bag, this figure represents a weighted average. The planned quantities 2006/07-2008/09 were 
170,000 tons of fertilizer but 2.7-27.4 per cent above the planned quantities was actually sold 
through ISP. 
c  2009/10 cost is the budgeted cost 
 
Source: updated from Dorward and Chirwa (2011), drawing on data underlying Table 3.1  
 
 
5.2 Programme Organisation 
The ISP is a fertilizer and maize seed subsidy program covering the entire country. It is 
funded by the Government of Malawi, with varying resource inputs and logistical support 
from donors in different years, especially DFID, NORAD, UNDP and the European Union. It 
is implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with several other institutional 
actors, principally two semi-autonomous public bodies that had played important earlier roles 
in fertilizer distribution as described in Chapter 3, ADMARC and the Smallholder Farmers 
Fertilizers Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM). The participation of the private sector in 
delivering ISP has varied from year to year (Dorward et al. 2008, Government of Malawi 
2008c, 2009e, 2010c). Figure 5.1 illustrates the institutional arrangements that have been 
responsible for the delivery of the ISP since it was started. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Implementation arrangements for the Input Subsidy Programme 
 
 
 
Source: Masanganise (2009)
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The ISP is a complex programme involving many activities and stakeholders. Some tasks are 
implemented in sequence and others in parallel, operating at different scales (from centre 
down to the village level). The major areas of activity nevertheless interact (e.g. fertilizer 
available must match coupon allocation). These can be summarised as (a) selection of 
beneficiaries (targeting), (b) coupon allocation and distribution, (c) fertilizer procurement and 
distribution, (d) coupon redemption by recipient farmers and (e) invoicing and 
reimbursements of suppliers. Within and between these activities, some tasks are 
implemented in sequence while others run parallel to each other. A stand-alone, leanly staffed 
Logistics Unit within MoAFS coordinates the implementation process in which the following 
are key players and their roles: 
(1) MoAFS senior management and an ISP Secretariat who decide on the work plan of 
coupon and fertilizer distributions in a season, and who are responsible for controlling 
the costs of ISP implementation; 
(2) specific donors who have provided logistical assistance (for example, DFID assisted 
with fertilizer distribution to warehouses in some years) as well as technical expertise, 
and financial contributions to assist with programme costs; 
(3) District Assemblies, ADDs and traditional authorities (TAs) which are responsible for 
beneficiary selection, registration and the distribution of vouchers; 
(4) ADMARC and SFFRFM and, variably, the private sector contracted to provide 
services of input procurement, warehousing, transportation, packaging and delivery, 
printing and publicity.  
The implementation of these activities, as summarised in Table 5.2, has evolved over the 
years. The ISP is a coupon-based input subsidy scheme. Eligible small farmers receive two 
coupons (vouchers), one for 50kg basal dressing and one for 50kg top dressing fertilizer, 
entitling the holder to redeem the fertilizer at a prescribed subsidised price per bag. The main 
emphasis of the programme is on maize but coupons were also issued to tobacco farmers (and 
in 2008/09 to a limited number of tea and coffee farmers) but this has been stopped since 
2009/10. The organisation of beneficiary selection has varied in different years, but has 
tended to move from reliance on traditional leaders (TAs) or VDCs to more open community 
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verification of suggested beneficiary lists. While there is no principle that the same 
households will be registered in successive years, in practice, repeat selection is the norm.  
Table 5.2: Summary of programme design and implementation 2005- 2010 
Year Scope of 
subsidised inputs 
Coupon distribution 
system 
Coupon redemption 
system 
Other system 
innovations 
2005-06 
Maize & tobacco 
fertilizers; 
Maize seed (OPV) 
District allocation 
by maize areas, 
distribution by TAs 
Only through 
SFFRFM & 
ADMARC 
 
2006-07 
Maize & tobacco 
fertilizers; 
Maize seed (hybrid 
& OPV) 
District allocation 
by maize areas, 
distribution varied, 
through DAs, TAs, 
VDCs, MoAFS 
Fertilizers also at 
private retailers; 
Flexible maize seed 
vouchers at range of 
seed retailers 
Coupons specific to 
fertilizer type. 
Fertilizer buys back 
system. Involvement 
of Logistics Unit 
2007-08 
Maize & tobacco 
fertilizers 
Maize seed (hybrid 
& OPV); Legume 
seed (limited);  
Cotton seed & 
chemicals 
District allocation to 
farm HHs & areas, 
DA selected 
beneficiaries, 
vouchers distributed 
through MoAFS and 
VDCs 
Fertilizers also at 
private retailers; 
Flexible maize & 
legume seed vouchers 
at range of seed 
retailers; 
Cotton inputs through 
ADDs 
Reduced copies of 
coupons. 
Remote EPA 
premium. 
Fertilizer buy back 
system 
2008-09 
Maize, tobacco, 
tea & coffee 
fertilizers; 
Maize seed (hybrid 
& OPV); legume 
seed, cotton seed 
& chemicals, 
maize storage 
chemicals 
District allocation to 
farm HHs & areas; 
Farm HH register; 
Open meetings for 
allocation & 
disbursement  
Fertilizers only at 
ADMARC & 
SFFRFM; 
Flexible seed 
vouchers at range of 
seed retailers; 
Cotton inputs through 
ADDs 
Extra coupon 
security features & 
market monitoring. 
No remote EPA 
premium. 
ADMARC 
computers for 
voucher processing 
2009-10* 
Maize fertilizers 
and seed (hybrid & 
OPV) only; 
Flexible seed 
vouchers 
discontinued 
Only DADOs 
working with local 
community leaders 
allowed to select 
beneficiaries and 
distribute vouchers 
Only ADMARC & 
SFFRFM allowed to 
sell the fertilizers;  
Only seed companies 
allowed to redeem 
seed vouchers 
Seed quantities 
increased to 5kgs 
hybrid & 10 Kg 
OPV 
*2009/10 is author’s update drawing on Govt of Malawi (2010c) 
Source: updated from Dorward and Chirwa (2011, p.6) 
 
 
 
The ISP has in principle followed a similar set of eligibility criteria for beneficiary selection 
since it began in 2005. A beneficiary household should be poor, and meet some combination 
of the following criteria: (a) a Malawian who owns a piece of land; (b) a household with low 
income; (c) a guardian looking after persons such as disabled, chronically ill or orphans; (d) 
hard working in farming; (e) an adopter of specified agricultural technologies (conservation 
agriculture); (f) a resident of the village; (g) a member of a designated vulnerable group, for 
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example, child headed households, female headed households, elderly households with active 
labour (Mwale 2009). Only one person per deserving household (typically the head of 
household or in the name of the household head) is supposed to be registered to receive two 
coupons but, as substantiated with empirical evidence later in this chapter, this is not always 
the case. 
In practice, actual selection of beneficiaries may be observed to depart from these principles 
in a variety of ways. For example, studies done on the 2006/07 ISP revealed varying practice 
on the part of village leaders or local committees in different places, including: (a) all eligible, 
including non-farmers resident in towns with family in the village; (b) ownership of a piece of 
land; (c) demonstrated ability to pay the subsidized price; (d) participation in community 
development projects; (e) participation in cash-for-work schemes, with the cash then allocated 
to input purchase; (f) adherence to a maize cultivation method known locally as sasakawa or 
‘conservation farming’48; (g) first-come, first-served; and (h) none of the above: non-
transparent allocations in which leaders, police, chiefs, friends and relatives received the bulk 
of coupon allocations (Ellis 2007, p.3, Kadzandira 2007).  
The ISP implementation process begins with a stakeholders’ meeting involving government, 
donors and selected private sector representatives who meet early in the year to decide on 
scope of the next season’s ISP in terms of coverage, distribution and management logistics, 
and timelines of major activities. For the 2007/08 ISP, for example, the meeting was held in 
March 2007 and agreed that: 
(1) selected farmers throughout the country would receive vouchers that could be 
exchanged for fertiliser and seed; 
(2) the programme would comprise 170,000 metric tonnes of fertiliser to be sold at a 
farmer’s contribution of MK 900 per 50 kg bag and a maximum of MK 90 for seed 
voucher; 
                                                 
48
 A maize cropping practice that involves planting single seeds on a grid pattern, with fertilizer targeted 
precisely to each ‘planting station’. It is being promoted by government as a recommended practice for 
boasting productivity. 
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(3) a bonus (MK100-200) to be paid for fertilizer voucher redeemed in selected remote 
EPAs, in order to encourage private sector involvement in input distribution in more 
remote rural areas; 
(4) the district allocation of coupons to be finalised by mid June 2007; 
(5) the selection of beneficiaries by districts to be completed by mid August 2007; 
(6) preparation of distribution registers to commence mid July and complete September 
2007; 
(7) voucher distribution to start mid August and complete late October 2007; 
(8) redemption of coupons to be conducted in November-December in order to ensure 
adequacy and timeliness of input supplies, consistent with the sowing and growing 
season between late October and January. 
Once the programme size and modalities have been agreed, MoAFS then allocates district 
quotas through a process that uses a distribution matrix that first allocates maize fertilizer and 
seed proportional to past area grown to maize in that district. Subsequent adjustments are 
done to reflect utilizations (redeemed vouchers) in previous years. The second step is to 
allocate the quantity of district vouchers between EPAs. A similar process is conducted for 
tobacco and cotton only for areas where these crops are grown49. MoAFS then distributes the 
coupons are to districts and TAs, where they are further distributed between villages (by the 
VDC) and to recipients by village leaders, following the selection process discussed above.  
Up to 2008/09, the programme made available four fertilizer types; two each for maize and 
tobacco but, in practice, a coupon holder could redeem any of the four types. In 2009/10, only 
maize fertilizers were planned to be distributed but some beneficiaries ended up with tobacco 
fertilizers due to shortage of maize fertilizers on the market; however, it is not clear whether 
or not this was used on maize or tobacco. Until 2008/09, programme management at district 
level was the responsibility of district commissioners (DCs) who worked in collaboration with 
District Executive Committees (DECs) acting through Area Development Committees 
(ADCs) and VDCs to select beneficiaries while District Development Agricultural Officers 
                                                 
49
 From 2009/10, as shown in Table 5.2 above, the government has ‘decided’ to remove the other crops 
and support maize production only.  
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(DADOs) distributed the coupons through the VDCs. In 2009/10, only the DADOs working 
with the local community leaders selected the beneficiaries and distributed the coupons or 
vouchers (Government of Malawi 2008c, 2009e, 2010c). 
The format of coupons has evolved in order to overcome concerns about their efficacy 
reported or observed in successive seasons. In 2005/06, the printed coupons were fairly 
simple, and the same basic design applied to all the different types of fertilizer available for 
different purposes by different categories of farmers. This meant that coupons could easily be 
reassigned by their holders, for example, between tobacco and maize fertilizers, and, equally, 
could ‘go astray’ into different districts from those to which they had been allocated. In 
2006/07, the design was made more sophisticated, each coupon comprising a booklet in 
triplicate bearing a unique serial number including a district identifier, and different colour 
coupons for different inputs. In this instance, redemption required matching up the correct 
colour coupon against the type of fertilizer purchased, and copies of the coupon and sales 
invoice being held after the transaction by both the seller and the buyer. In 2007/08 and 
2008/09, the government produced four types of vouchers: combined maize fertilizer and seed 
vouchers; tobacco fertilizer vouchers; maize seed vouchers only; and flexible seed vouchers 
that could be exchanged for maize, legume or cotton seed. In 2009/10, only maize fertiliser 
vouchers were printed. Each beneficiary was given two vouchers - one was for a 50- kg bag 
of NPK (base fertiliser) and the other for a 50-kg bag of Urea (top dressing). The same 
beneficiaries also received a maize seed voucher that could be exchanged for a maize seed 
package (5 kgs hybrid or 10 kgs OPV). The same selected farmers also received a legume 
seed voucher that could be exchanged for a pack containing any one of the following: beans, 
cow peas, pigeon peas, groundnuts or soya. In other words, flexible seed vouchers were 
discontinued for the 2009/10 programme (Government of Malawi 2008c, 2009e, 2010c). 
However, until 2008/09, a potential consequence of having a multiplicity of coupon types was 
to make their distribution between recipients arbitrary. For example, some beneficiaries might 
receive one seed voucher for maize only or flexi seed; others might receive vouchers that 
allowed them to redeem two bags of maize fertilizer and a maize seed pack (one voucher for 
basal fertiliser, one voucher for top dressing and another voucher for maize seed); and others 
might receive vouchers to redeem two bags of tobacco fertilizer (one voucher for basal 
fertiliser and one voucher for top dressing fertiliser). In Mchinji district, beneficiaries in 
2007/08 in most communities in the case study areas (see Chapter 7 below) were offered a 
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choice between maize fertilizer and tobacco fertilizer but not both, although cases were 
reported during the fieldwork where some households had managed to acquire different 
coupons from those which they had initially been allocated. 
Every coupon bears the name of the district where the coupon is redeemable, the type of 
fertilizer (e.g. NPK), and the name, village and TA of the holder. Figure 5.2 provides an 
example of a coupon to allow the holder in Mangochi district to redeem one bag of NPK 
fertilizer. Before the other crops were removed, the coupon required the input seller to tick 
whether the redeemer was a maize/tobacco/cotton grower (on the sample coupon is written 
chimanga/fodya/thonje, with the bracketed instructions asking the seller to tick the crop for 
which the coupon has been redeemed). At redemption point, every coupon is supposed to be 
signed by chairman, secretary and committee member of VDC after confirming the identity of 
the holder. This process does not work on the ground as it is too cumbersome, and in any case 
officials tend to behave in ways that reflect their own interests in the process, not just 
administrative compliance.  
Figure 5.2: Sample of a fertilizer coupon for the 2007/08 programme 
 
 
Source: Masanganise (2009) 
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Moving now to the physical fertilizer logistics of the ISP, procurement entails suppliers being 
awarded government contracts to import agreed quantities of fertilizer (or supplying the same 
from their residual stocks). The initial fertilizer deliveries are made to three SFFRFM regional 
depots located in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. From these depots, outward distribution 
occurs to ADMARC storage and sales facilities at district and EPA levels by contracted local 
transporters. Procurement and distribution of fertilizer has evolved over the years. In 2005/06, 
fertilizer procurement was mainly by SFFRFM and both fertilizer and seed were exclusively 
delivered to outlets by ADMARC and SFFRFM. The role of private sector input suppliers 
was restricted to a share of the total importation required. In 2006/07, partly under donor 
pressure, the role of the private sector was widened, especially for procurement, and the 
private sector was made responsible for seed distribution, while ADMARC and SFFRFM 
continued to be mainly responsible for fertilizer distribution. This resulted in a 50 per cent 
increase in private sector participation (Ellis 2007, p.5). In 2007/08, nine private suppliers 
were awarded contracts to procure and deliver 80 per cent of the programme fertilizers 
(Government of Malawi 2008c, p.8).  
In 2008/09 and 2009/10, the government excluded private traders altogether ostensibly 
because one private supplier had failed to perform in the 2007/08 programme, delivering only 
5 per cent of the awarded fertilizer quantity. This had caused the government to pay an 
additional US$2.5 million for replacement fertilizer. The private sector (agro-dealers) was 
nevertheless allowed to continue to trade in seed which in the 2009/10 programme was 
awarded to a restricted list of private seed companies. However, a Final Report on the 
Implementation of Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Programme 2007/09 (Government of Malawi 
2008c) revealed that the late procurement experienced in 2007/08 was in fact due to delays by 
the government in awarding contracts. Delays in procurement and outward distribution to 
warehouses are widely reported, with some farmers not being able to exchange their coupons 
until January when crops are already in mid-growth. In the 2008/09 programme, for example, 
sales for the subsidised inputs commenced in the first week of November 2008 and ceased in 
the second week of February 2009 (Government of Malawi 2010c).  
Table 5.3 presents the unit cost (US$ per ton) of delivering the fertilizers from regional 
SFFRFM warehouses districts (Mzuzu for districts in the north, Lilongwe for districts in the 
centre and Blantyre for districts in the south) to just over 800 ADMARC/SFFRFM selling 
points throughout the country. The average in the three seasons (2007/08-2009/10) was about 
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US$40 for each ton of fertilizer, and this ranged from US$18.45/ton for Chiradzulu to 
US$108.44 for Chitipa.  
Table 5.3: Cost of delivering fertiliser to districts (US$/ton) 
District 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 Average 
Chitipa 90.71 117.89 116.72 108.44 
Karonga 43.28 45.73 58.47 49.16 
Likoma 60.83 na na 60.83 
Mzimba 32.77 42.27 42.04 39.03 
Nkhata Bay  16.98 26.46 24.05 22.50 
Rumphi 23.66 23.86 27.40 24.97 
Dedza 34.31 30.28 25.99 30.19 
Dowa 16.79 21.40 19.09 19.09 
Kasungu 34.25 39.21 37.57 37.01 
Lilongwe  14.93 18.33 21.00 18.09 
Mchinji 30.25 35.90 30.61 32.25 
Nkhota Kota 49.56 61.94 60.31 57.27 
Ntcheu 52.95 51.98 55.19 53.37 
Ntchisi 24.65 29.52 28.78 27.65 
Salima 26.70 27.06 27.20 26.99 
Balaka 29.26 35.11 37.21 33.86 
Blantyre  na 17.36 23.77 20.57 
Chikwawa 25.35 29.76 30.24 28.45 
Chiradzulu 15.20 18.03 22.11 18.45 
Machinga 48.77 59.35 42.98 50.37 
Mangochi 59.59 76.73 61.72 66.01 
Mulanje 22.60 35.05 29.01 28.89 
Mwanza 19.92 34.04 29.48 27.81 
Neno 21.51 36.17 30.27 29.32 
Nsanje 40.66 50.88 45.72 45.75 
Phalombe 31.15 48.57 33.86 37.86 
Thyolo 17.35 28.93 28.57 24.95 
Zomba 18.51 31.35 26.22 25.36 
Regional Averages: 
Northern 44.71 51.24 53.74 50.82 
Central  31.60 35.07 33.97 33.55 
Southern  29.16 38.56 33.94 33.66 
National averages 33.43 39.75 37.61 37.30 
 
Source: compiled from Final ISP Implementation Reports prepared by 
Logistics Unit (Government of Malawi 2008c, 2009e, 2010c) 
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Once the coupons are distributed and inputs delivered to sales outlets, a coupon redemption 
process begins. To redeem the coupons, holders are required to present them (plus) along with 
the required cash payment (the subsidised price) to authorised input dealers selected by the 
government. In 2005/05, only ADMARC and SFFRFM were designated authorised dealers. 
In 2006/07 and 2007/08, the programme also allowed selected private fertilizer dealers to 
redeem the vouchers but the market was restricted to ADMARC and SFFRFM and a few big 
private suppliers who had been awarded fertilizer procurement contracts discussed above. The 
bulk of coupon redemption was done through ADMARC and SFFRFM market outlets. In fact 
80 per cent of fertilizer sales in 2007/08 were conducted through ADMARC and SFFRFM 
markets while, as discussed earlier, 80 per cent of the fertilizer procurement had been 
undertaken by the private sector. In 2008/09 and 2009/10, only ADMARC and SFFRFM were 
allowed to trade in programme fertilizer as discussed above (Government of Malawi 2008c, 
2009e, 2010c). 
As shown in Table 5.1 above, the subsidised purchase price of the fertilizers has varied 
between maize and tobacco and over the years. In 2005/06, the price of tobacco fertilizers was 
higher than for maize, at MK1450 (US$10.36) per bag, while in 2006/07 the single price of 
MK950 (US$6.79) per bag was used across all fertilizers. This was also the case in 
subsequent years when an across the board price of MK900 (US$6.43) per bag was applied in 
2007/08, MK800 (US$5.72) in 2008/09 and MK500 (US$3.57) in 2009/10. 
In addition, seed coupons are issued permitting purchase at a prescribed price per pack of 
seed. Unlike fertilizer coupon redemption, seed market outlets in 2007/08 were unrestricted 
and included agricultural retail dealers, general wholesalers, SFFRFM, and ADMARC. 
However, this was changed in 2008/09 and 2009/10 when the government allowed only eight 
recognised seed breeders to redeem vouchers in exchange for seed (which in 2009/10 
programme was packaged as follows: 5 kg hybrid maize, 10 kg OPV, 1.5 kg bean seed 1.5 kg 
groundnut seed, 1.2 kg each for Soya bean seed, Pigeon peas and Cow peas). In 2005/06, the 
maize seed coupons were set at MK400 per 3 kg pack of seed (hybrid or OPV). In 2007/08, 
two price arrangements prevailed. A seed coupon set at a value of MK400 was adequate to 
redeem 4 kgs of OPV seed. For hybrid seed, a coupon beneficiary was required to make a 
cash top up to redeem a 2 kg seed and this price varied from trader to trader, reaching MK900 
in most areas. In 2008/09, however, seed vouchers for both hybrid and OPV carried a value of 
MK680 and no cash top up by the beneficiary was required. In 2009/10, the maize seed 
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vouchers carried a redemption value of MK1,500 when exchanged for seed but the seed 
companies had the option to request a maximum of MK100 from the farmers on top of the 
maize seed voucher in exchange for the seed packet (Government of Malawi 2008c, 2009e, 
2010c).  
Table 5.4: Redemption rates for maize (hybrid and OPV) seed coupons 2007/08-2009/10 
District 
Number of seed maize vouchers distributed Proportion of vouchers redeemed (%) 
2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 Average 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 Average 
Chitipa  38,141  25,869  30,383  31,464  0.9 127.2 75.0 59.4 
Karonga  24,005  22,291  26,285  24,194  2.4 125.8 94.1 73.5 
Likoma 709  680  683  691  7.8 96.9 5.9 36.4 
Mzimba 164,573  96,840  107,727  123,047  0.3 129.9 88.2 60.0 
Nkhata Bay  24,078  22,566  23,956  23,533  1.4 70.1 95.8 55.4 
Rumphi  34,785  30,650  29,465  31,633  0.6 85.2 89.8 55.6 
Dedza  99,635  66,800  67,386  77,940  3.4 122.3 101.4 65.6 
Dowa 93,030  70,910  72,722  78,887  3.7 108.1 101.5 65.0 
Kasungu 104,580  82,528  90,345  92,484  3.6 90.7 95.2 59.3 
Lilongwe  260,492  124,429  161,211  182,044  1.3 101.4 102.0 53.8 
Mchinji 121,948  63,200  70,131  85,093  2.9 105.2 99.0 54.7 
Nkhota Kota 35,968  28,454  31,437  31,953  10.1 109.2 92.5 66.5 
Ntcheu 95,564  68,270  73,000  78,945  3.6 84.0 93.0 54.4 
Ntchisi  50,609  30,900  40,465  40,658  6.7 107.4 98.6 62.7 
Salima 39,129  36,180  36,800  37,370  9.1 102.1 87.3 64.8 
Balaka 9,187  40,911 53,285  47,794  37.8 110.7 101.9 82.4 
Blantyre  82,140  83,741  94,233  86,705  52.8 104.9 83.0 80.5 
Chikwawa  18,532  11,184  18,895  16,204  27.6 105.1 2.4 35.6 
Chiradzulu 61,782  55,559  52,964  56,768  55.1 108.9 98.2 86.0 
Machinga 81,783  63,455  64,819  70,019  26.8 98.4 103.0 71.9 
Mangochi 94,976  71,178  75,825  80,660  23.5 89.1 97.2 65.9 
Mulanje 76,054  73,153  76,533  75,247  28.6 107.7 49.4 61.3 
Mwanza 19,385  21,832  15,600  18,939  39.0 99.4 97.4 78.2 
Neno 21,593  16,918  17,573  18,695  45.5 77.5 96.8 71.2 
Nsanje 12,153  11,060  14,702  12,638  36.3 106.2 0.1 42.6 
Phalombe 49,345  71,704  60,379  60,476  28.8 99.8 66.5 69.4 
Thyolo 93,932  118,022  101,685  104,546  38.9 115.3 85.7 82.8 
Zomba  91,685  74,497  91,511  85,898  68.8 111.8 94.6 90.4 
Regional Avge:  
Northern  47,715  33,149  36,417  39,094  2.2 105.8 74.8 56.7 
Central  100,106  63,519  71,500  78,375  4.9 103.4 96.7 60.8 
Southern  57,888  54,863  56,770  56,507  39.2 102.7 75.1 70.7 
National Avge 69,278  52,992  57,143  59,804  20.3 103.6 82.0 64.5 
 
Source: compiled from Final ISP Implementation Reports prepared by Logistics Unit 
(Government of Malawi 2008c, 2009e, 2010c) 
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Table 5.4 presents data to show the number of maize seed vouchers that were distributed and 
actually redeemed in 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10. It can be seen that the unlike fertilizer 
vouchers which are all redeemed, there has been a generally poor redemption of maize seed 
vouchers especially in 2007/08 which recorded an average national redemption rate of 20.3 
per cent most probably because of the pricing mentioned above. When the top up cash 
requirement was removed in 2008/09, the average national redemption rate even surpassed 
seed vouchers that were officially distributed through the Logistics Unit but this progress fell 
back to a national average of 64.5 per cent in 2009/10 when the cash top up requirement of up 
to MK100 was introduced. Further analysis for the 2007/08 seed redemption shows that the 
plural treatment in the seed vouchers redemption prices potentially affected use of hybrid seed 
since the cash top up of up to MK900 for a 2 kg pack of hybrid seed demanded by traders in 
that year (2007/08) could redeem a 50 kg bag of fertilizer at MK900 per bag. 
The final stage of ISP organisation is redemption of invoices and payment of suppliers. The 
redemption process described above involves a coupon holder surrendering the vouchers, 
together with the prescribed cash payment for each voucher, to the supplier in exchange for 
the 50 kg bag of fertilizer or packet of seed. The redeemed coupons and associated paper 
work are then submitted back to the Logistics Unit to facilitate reimbursement of the 
difference (local market cost of the input less the amount paid by the coupon holder). This 
process does not necessarily work well, resulting in variations in claims. In the 2007/08 
programme, for example, claimed values for reimbursement by suppliers varied widely across 
districts and types of fertiliser. Claimed values for maize fertilizer vouchers ranged from 
MK3,160 in Blantyre in the southern region to MK3,485 in Chitipa in the northern region. 
The claimed value for a maize fertilizer coupon was relatively higher than for tobacco 
fertilizer vouchers which ranged from MK2,635 in Rumphi in the northern region to 
MK2,815 in Mangochi in the southern region (Government of Malawi 2008c).  
5.3 Economics of the Programme 
As already stated, the Malawi ISP has national coverage and sets out to reach small farmers in 
the remotest corners of the country reaching 1.4 to 1.7 million farm families every year. Since 
there are an estimated 3.1 million farm families (Government of Malawi 2008a:10), coverage 
in the 2007/08 programme, for example, was around 55 per cent. Reaching this level of 
coverage has huge budgetary implications, the discussion of which is deferred to Chapter 8. It 
suffices here to observe that the programme consumes over 50 per cent of the national 
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agriculture sector budget. In the MK210 billion 2008/2009 national budget, for example, 
MK20 billion (about 60 per cent of the Ministry of Agriculture budget) was allocated to the 
ISP. However, due to an unforeseen price spiral in international fertilizer prices in 2008, the 
final cost was MK39 billion, representing 19 per cent of total government expenditure (see 
Chapter 8 for more on these magnitudes). The budgeted subsidy was almost as much as the 
allocations to Malawi’s two biggest ministries after Agriculture, the Ministry of Education 
(2008/09 budget MK24 billion) and Ministry of Health (2008/09 budget MK23 billion) 
(Nation Reporter 2009), and actual expenditure exceeded these figures by almost 100 per cent 
in that financial year (Government of Malawi 2010d). 
The decreasing cost to farmers of subsidised fertilizer in successive years was summarised in 
Table 5.1 above. The fertilizer subsidy rate (i.e. the proportion of full market cost paid by the 
state) has increased steadily since the ISP started. The subsidized price for a 50 kg-bag of 
maize fertilizer was MK950 in 2005/06-2006/07 when the local market price was MK2,735. It 
reduced to MK900 in 2007/08 when the local market price was around MK4,200; and further 
still to MK800 in 2008/09 when the commercial price locally rose to MK9,800. 50 In 2009/10, 
the subsidised price reduced further to MK500. In 2005/06, the MK950 voucher represented a 
subsidy of roughly 75 per cent on the full cost price of a 50 kg bag of fertilizer. In 2008/09, 
this rose to 90 per cent due to a sharp rise in prices in world markets, as well as domestic 
political competition for subsidy largesse in the run up to the May 2009 general elections 
(Chinsinga and O’Brien 2008, Dorward and Chirwa 2009).  
Table 5.5 compares the subsidised prices with local commercial prices for the same fertilizer. 
The last column shows by how much the commercial price is greater than the subsidised 
price; for example, in 2005/06 the commercial price was 3 times the subsidised price, whereas 
by 2008/09 this had become 12 times. Even with a subsequent rapid decline in international 
fertilizer prices, the full market price is predicted to remain at around 10-11 times the 
subsidised price in 2009/10 and 2010/11. In other words, Malawi is currently operating an 
apparent 90 per cent fertilizer subsidy policy. 
                                                 
50
 In 2008/09 commercial fertilizer prices reached high levels due to a sharp rise in world prices: 
MK7200 for CAN, MK9940 for Urea and MK11010 for 23:21:0+4S, MK11360 for D-Compound and 
MK13580 for S-Compound. In 2009/10, these prices fell to almost half the previous years: MK4330 
for CAN, MK5330 for Urea, MK5180 for 23:21:0+4S, MK6600 for D-Compound and MK7810 for S-
compound. 
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Table 5.5: Comparing commercial and subsidised price of fertilizer 2005/06-2010/11 
Year 
Price per 50 kg bag (MK) Price per kg (MK) Price 
difference 
(times) Subsidised Commercial Subsidised Commercial 
2005/06 950 2,735 19 55 2.9 
2006/07 950 3,430 19 69 3.6 
2007/08 900 4,199 18 84 4.7 
2008/09 800 9,800 16 196 12.2 
2009/10 500 5,750 10 115 11.5 
2010/11 500 5,350 10 107 10.7 
Source: Elaboration of data in Table 5.1 
 
 
Key factors in trying to describe the economic efficiency of a programme like the ISP are the 
productivity of the fertilizer delivered, in terms of output per kg of fertilizer applied; and the 
cost efficiency of delivering a benefit of a certain value to the recipients of that benefit. For 
example, if a subsidy worth MK3000 per bag is provided to recipients, it makes a great deal 
of difference in terms of the efficient use of government resources if this subsidy costs 
MK2000 per bag or MK200 per bag to deliver. In the former case, the total cost to 
government is MK5000 per bag, and the efficiency ratio of the transfer is 1.67 (5000÷3000); 
whereas in the latter case, the total cost to government is MK3200, and the efficiency ratio of 
the transfer is 1.07 (3200÷3000). Here, the fertilizer productivity aspect is considered first, 
followed by the cost efficiency of providing the subsidy. 
Table 5.6 provides time series data on maize output, cultivated area, yields, fertilizer use and 
output per kg of fertilizer for the period 1991/92 to 2008/09 in Malawi. The data are official 
MoAFS figures for the production, area and maize fertilizer time-series described in Chapter 
4; while the various ratios are calculated from those figures. On the production side, the 
figures in Table 5.6 reaffirm trends that have already been discussed elsewhere in the thesis, 
namely the considerable variability in maize production and harvested area, the low average 
harvests in the 2001-2005 period, and the apparent jump in output occurring after the 
introduction of the ISP in 2005/06. The estimate of total maize fertilizer applications must be 
treated as approximate. While data on imports and distributions of different fertilizers are 
strong enough (see Table 4.7 in Chapter 4), the precise decisions made by farmers regarding 
the crops on which they use fertilizers is not susceptible to accurate measurement at scale. 
Nevertheless, maize fertilizer use without doubt jumps substantially from 2005/06; from an 
average of 163.3 thousand tons in the five years preceding the ISP to an average of 209.7 
thousand tons under the ISP. The difference here of 46.4 thousand tons demonstrates a factor 
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also highlighted by Dorward et al. (2008), that the total quantity of subsidised fertilizer (going 
up from 130 to 180 thousand tons in 2005/06 and 2006/07) is not the same as the net gain in 
fertilizer use created by the ISP. The ISP causes a substitution between subsidised and fuller 
cost supplies, so that the net gain in fertilizer use compared to the previous period is around 
40 per cent. 
Table 5.6: Maize-Fertilizer Productivity Relationships in Malawi 1991/92-2008/09 
Crop 
Season 
Production 
(tons) 
Area 
(ha) 
Maize 
Fertilizer 
(tons) 
Yield 
(kg/ha) 
Appln 
Rate 
(kg/ha) 
Average 
Product 
(kg mz/kg 
fert) 
1991-92  657,000  1,368,093  128,377 480.2  93.8 5.1 
1992-93  2,033,957  1,327,038  138,737 1,532.7  104.5 14.7 
1993-94  818,999  1,129,327  80,041 725.2  70.9 10.2 
1994-95  1,327,865  1,225,580  122,894 1,083.5  100.3 10.8 
1995-96  1,793,469  875,195  152,992 2,049.2  174.8 11.7 
1996-97  1,226,478  1,233,538  79,147 994.3  64.2 15.5 
1997-98  1,534,326  1,292,669  130,345 1,186.9  100.8 11.8 
1998-99  2,245,824  1,369,153  131,799 1,640.3  96.3 17.0 
1999-00  2,290,018  1,435,222  140,734 1,595.6  98.1 16.3 
2000-01  1,589,437  1,446,264  121,153 1,099.0  83.8 13.1 
2001-02  1,485,272  1,513,945  135,996 981.1  89.8 10.9 
2002-03  1,847,476  1,617,917  174,577 1,141.9  107.9 10.6 
2003-04  1,608,349  1,478,750  173,166 1,087.6  117.1 9.3 
2004-05  1,225,234  1,513,929  211,636 809.3  139.8 5.8 
2005-06  2,611,486  1,762,839  237,501 1,481.4  134.7 11.0 
2006-07  3,226,418  1,215,356  264,086 2,654.7  217.3 12.2 
2007-08  2,634,701  1,596,955  203,694 1,649.8  127.6 12.9 
2008-09  3,582,502  1,608,996  182,309 2,226.5  113.3 19.7 
2009-10  3,233,364  1,640,878  161,074 1,970.5  98.2 20.1 
Average 1,945,904 1,402,718 156,329 1,388.9 112.3 12.6 
Note: Maize fertilizer included both subsidized (large part) and commercial 
 
Source: Data contained in Table 4.3 and Table 4.8 in Chapter 4 
 
 
The figures in Table 5.6 show the difficulty in unambiguously assigning production and yield 
levels to fertilizer use, utilising Malawi official statistics. This is without taking into account 
possible exaggerations in recent production levels discussed in Section 5.5 below. Yields have 
been high in the ISP period, relative to the long term average, but so too they were high in 
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1992-93, 1998/99 and 1999/00. Applying a simple linear regression to the yield trend 
provides a significant trend at the 0.05 level of confidence (the t-statistic for the β coefficient 
is 51.5, p=.022)51. The trend shows yields rising at 51.5 kg/ha per year. It can easily be seen 
why the Starter Pack scheme (SPS) is regarded in Malawi maize history as a successful 
policy, since yields in the two years of SPS were as high as in two of the first three years of 
ISP. Even in the officially best ever season of 2006/07, average yields (given the pattern of 
cultivation between varieties provided in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1) do not 
approach the target yields that MoAFS regards as possible with a high input/high output 
smallholder production regime. According to MoAFS estimates it should be possible for 
smallholder maize in Malawi to attain 3,000 kg per ha for local maize, 5,000 kg per ha for 
OPV maize and 10,000 kg per ha for hybrid maize (Government of Malawi 2007c, p.41, 
2010d, p.53). 
The last two columns of Table 5.6 show the average application rate of fertilizer on maize 
(total fertilizer/total area) and the average product of fertilizer (total output/total fertilizer). 
The application rate provides an ambiguous time series. This is because official maize area is 
actually estimated harvested area, and in a drought year area harvested can be substantially 
less than the area originally sown to maize. The average application rate is 112.3 kg fertilizer 
per hectare. A time-series regression on application rates does not show any significant 
upward trend over the period (the t-statistic for the β coefficient is 2.4 and p=.110). The trend 
shows fertilizer application rate rising by a mere 2.4 kg/ha per year (from 93.8 kg/ha in 
1009/91) over the twenty year period from 1990 to 2010. 
The average product of fertilizer (final column of Table 5.6) provides yet another different 
view of productivity trends in maize over the past twenty years. The productivity of fertilizer 
in rainfed maize is of course highly dependent on weather events and especially on the pattern 
of rainfall in the sowing and cultivation period. It also depends on the correct timing of 
fertilizer applications, since applications too late in the growing season (due to late delivery of 
supplies) have less positive effects on final yield than the correct applications in the mid-
growth period. The average product of maize fertilizer in Malawi seems to vary with no 
discernable trend, and this is confirmed by the simple regression against time which finds no 
                                                 
51
 In this and subsequent paragraphs the simple regression y=α+βt is applied to the different productivity 
time series, where y is the productivity indicator, t is time, α is a constant, and β is the change 
coefficient. The test for the existence of a positive or negative trend is H0: β is not significantly 
different from zero. 
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statistically significant trend (the t-statistic of the β coefficient is .236, with p=.164). When 
taken in conjunction with the other findings here, time series data on maize-fertilizer 
productivity relationships do not firmly demonstrate rising efficiency in maize production 
over the past twenty years, even in the presence of the final five years in the time series when 
the ISP was in full implementation.  
The second, and rather different, aspect of efficiency in relation to the fertilizer subsidy is the 
cost efficiency of delivering the subsidy to its beneficiaries. The idea of cost efficiency has 
already been suggested above: a given level of subsidy incurs costs in its delivery to recipients 
and the size of these costs relative to the subsidy itself is an indicator of the ‘value for money’ 
that the government achieves in making such as subsidy available to a designated group of its 
citizens. It is immediately evident that cost efficiency is different from cost-benefit analysis. 
The latter seeks to assess the financial or economic returns to an investment by attaching 
monetary values to current and future streams of costs and benefits and bringing the two into 
comparison. Cost efficiency has the more limited scope of specifying an objective and then 
examining the costs incurred in achieving it. In the current context, the objective is providing 
1.7 million farmers (2005/06 to 2009/10 target) with a subsidy on the market value of their 
farm inputs, and the costs incurred are all those activities listed in the preceding section of this 
chapter to do with selecting beneficiaries, issuing coupons, moving fertilizer to distribution 
points and redeeming coupons for fertilizer sales.  
Cost efficiency is a common tool for comparing performance in the delivery of social welfare 
benefits to people. It is less common for an intervention like an input subsidy which has 
evident production objectives, and which is therefore susceptible in principle to cost-benefit 
analysis in which the cost of provision (including the subsidy itself) can be compared to the 
output gains realised (see discussion in Dorward et al. 2008). However, cost-benefit analysis 
may be difficult to calibrate in practice due to the effect of ‘other variables’ (such as rainfall), 
and lagged effects on soil fertility and good cultivation practices. Cost efficiency, on the other 
hand, is relatively tractable since the transfer (the amount of subsidy) can be calculated from 
the difference between the purchase price and the coupon price of the inputs, and the costs of 
delivery should be available from the agencies responsible for issuing coupons, distributing 
fertilizer, and managing the programme. Cost efficiency can be expressed in two different 
ways. If it costs US$2 in administrative and delivery costs to provide US$10 per month 
subsidy, then the ratio of the subsidy (US$10) to total outgoings (US$12) provides a cost-
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efficiency ratio of 0.83 (this is sometimes called the ‘alpha ratio’). Alternatively, the 
reciprocal of the alpha ratio (1.20) tells us the total budget required to deliver US$1 worth of 
subsidy to beneficiaries (Ellis et al. 2009, p.86). 
In relation to the ISP, Dorward et al. (2008) provide data on both the size of the subsidy and 
the costs of provision for the fertilizer component of the 2006/07 programme. The unit cost of 
fertilizer procurement by government into store was US$434 per ton (MK3,038 per 50kg 
bag), and the fertilizer coupon price as we have seen was MK950 per bag. Therefore the 
subsidy was MK2,088, or a subsidy rate of 69 per cent of the into-store procurement cost. The 
grand total cost of fertilizer delivery was MK11.9 billion, equivalent MK3,439 per bag (given 
a delivery quantity of 173,000 tons). Deducting the average price paid by farmers as 
contribution towards this, the net delivery cost was MK2,489 per bag (MK3,439 minus 
MK950 bag). Therefore MK2,489 (US$17.8) was required to deliver MK2,088 (US$14.9) 
subsidy value, a ratio of US$1.19 needed to deliver US$1.00 transfer value (Ellis 2007). This 
estimate is low to the extent that it ignores (which it does) the draw down on existing 
administrative capacity (in MoAFS, ADMARC, and the DAs) in order to deliver the input 
subsidy. 
Table 5.7 provides data obtained by the author from the Logistics Unit regarding the delivery 
costs of the 2007/08 programme. This estimates total costs of MK16.4 billion, of which 
MK10.9 billion are stated as government outlays on fertilizer contracts, leaving MK5.5 billion 
as delivery costs. In 2007/08, 216,553 tons of subsidised fertilizer were sold (see Table 4.7 in 
Chapter 4) equivalent to 4.3 million bags, giving a delivery cost of MK1,280 per bag. 
According to the data in Table 5.5, the market value of fertilizer was MK4,199 per bag, and 
the subsidy was MK3,299. The recoupment of MK900 per bag (the price paid by farmers) 
needs to be deducted from the delivery cost to obtain a net cost. The outcome is MK3,679 to 
deliver a MK3,299 subsidy, a cost-efficiency ratio of 1.12. This seems remarkably efficient; 
however, figures in various different sources, referring to different aspects of the 2007/08 
scheme, do not necessarily dovetail with each other. For example, the MK4,199 per bag 
estimated as the market value of fertilizer in 2007/08 (Table 5.5) would mean a government 
procurement cost of MK18.2 billion rather than the MK16.3 billion stated in Table 5.7. There 
are wide margins of error in many of the figures associated with the subsidy scheme, and the 
only area where a degree of confidence eventually occurs relates to the eventual charge made 
by the ISP against the government budget, which in 2007/08 was recorded as MK16.3. 
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Table 5.7: Costs of implementing the 2007/08 ISP programme 
Cost Categories Cost (MK m.) % Total Cost 
Programme Costs    
Seed voucher redemption 641.3 3.9 
Flexible voucher redemption  264.2 1.6 
Cotton chemical voucher redemption  33.0 0.2 
Fertilizer Voucher redemption 3,434.1 21.0 
Government Fertilizer contracts 10,864.7 66.4 
Transport costs to and within unit markets 801.3 4.9 
Recovery costs from unit markets 38.1 0.2 
Known Voucher printing costs 12.9 0.1 
Known SFFRFM operational costs 195.9 1.2 
Logistics costs met through Government  26.3 0.2 
Re-bagging costs (SFFRFM) 1.9 0.0 
Total Programme Costs 16,313.6 99.6 
   
Operational Costs 
 
0.0 
Logistics Unit HQ 28.5 0.2 
LU SFFRFM depot staffing 3.9 0.0 
Beneficiary registration  3.4 0.0 
Voucher control staff 10.0 0.1 
Monitoring ADMARC/SFFRFM sales 13.3 0.1 
Total Operational Costs 59.1 0.4 
Overall Total Costs 16,372.7 100.0 
Note: percentages are author calculations. 
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008c) 
 
5.4 Insights into the true functioning of the ISP 
The treatment of the ISP so far given in this chapter has tended, with a few exceptions, to 
describe the programme according to the principles of its design in different years, and to 
examine resulting productivity relationships in terms of official time series data available 
from MoAFS. There is broad agreement amongst those that have evaluated or otherwise 
studied the ISP that the decisiveness of its introduction by the government in 2005, its 
ambition in terms of scale, and its implementation in terms of ensuring that coupons are 
allocated and fertilizer is available for purchase, are significant achievements which deserve 
due recognition. It also seemed at first that the outcomes of the ISP were unambiguously 
positive. The jump in official production from 1.2 million tons in 2004/05 to 2.6 million tons 
in 2005/06 was without precedent in the previous maize history of Malawi. Moreover, the 
impact of this increase in output could be visibly observed in maize price behaviour from May 
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2006 to December 2007 (Table 5.8 and Figure 5.3). The nominal price of maize declined from 
a peak of MK51 in February 2006 to a low of MK18 in June 2006 following a good harvest of 
the 2005/06 crop in April-May 2006. Due to the huge volume of maize available in markets 
following the 2006 harvest, the normal rise in prices in the following lean season was 
unusually muted, peaking at MK22 in December 2006. With another apparently record 
harvest in prospect in 2006/07, the maize price descended to a low of MK14 in May 2007. 
Table 5.8: Nominal and Real Maize Prices 2006-2010 (MK/kg) 
Month 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nom. Real* Nom. Real* Nom. Real* Nom. Real* Nom. Real* 
Jan 41.68 18.20 21.18 8.50 33.6 12.47 69.22 23.50 45.29 14.26 
Feb 50.67 22.44 19.22 7.89 39.69 15.09 70.57 23.28 46.47 14.17 
Mar 45.95 21.06 18.21 7.75 43.53 17.08 65.27 21.63 43.75 13.38 
Apr 27.46 12.68 16.03 6.89 35.41 14.00 45.36 15.41 37.57 11.81 
May 19.07 9.00 14.26 6.28 32.85 13.26 34.19 11.96 30.51 9.90 
Jun 18.31 8.19 14.61 6.11 37.91 14.49 32.98 11.93 29.81 10.03 
Jul 18.76 8.35 15.63 6.49 42.99 16.30 35.57 13.02 29.7 10.13 
Aug 19.30 8.36 16.86 6.80 55.52 20.43 37.29 13.96 30.77 10.74 
Sep 20.39 8.62 18.04 7.09 53.38 19.08 38.74 13.78 30.95 10.29 
Oct 21.32 8.58 20.76 7.76 54.33 18.45 39.98 14.13   
Nov 22.28 8.70 24.11 8.72 57.81 19.07 41.21 14.15   
Dec 22.45 8.82 28.67 10.41 63.35 21.00 41.74 13.87   
  *real prices are nominal prices deflated by the CPI (2000=100) 
Source: data underlying Table 4.10 in Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Trend in Nominal Maize Prices in Malawi 2006-2010  
 
Source: Data contained in Table 5.8 
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A consideration of what subsequently happened to domestic maize prices and implications for 
the verity of harvest outcomes is deferred to the next section. Here the concern is to try to put 
together a more realistic picture of how the ISP has operated in practice than can be conveyed 
by its design features and well-publicised intentions. It is worth visualising a real situation: 
the rural economy of Malawi awash with fertilizer coupons (3-4 million coupons) that have 
represented an ever greater discount to the cost of full price supplies in successive years; the 
possibility open to virtually everyone dealing with the allocation of coupons or the 
distribution of fertilizer to realise personal gains by trading in some area of the margin 
between the subsidised and full price; the significance of coupon allocation for reward and 
allegiance in a neo-patrimonial political environment (Chapter 3); the exercise of power and 
control at local levels in determining who should receive coupons and who should not. Much 
of this picture is difficult to pin down empirically; however, small and large studies have been 
done by local researchers, certain types of data are available from programme operations and 
can be interpreted, some datasets have been collected specifically in relation to monitoring 
programme performance. In the rest of this section, insights into the true functioning of the 
ISP are derived from secondary sources and data sets, in relation to the following aspects: (a) 
distribution of coupons across districts; (b) beneficiary selection and allocation of coupons; 
and (c) use of coupons to acquire fertilizer. 
5.4.1 Distribution of coupons across districts 
The distribution of coupons to a stated number of households across districts in the ISP is 
freely available data, published by the Logistics Unit. In Table 5.9, this data is compared to 
the total number of farming households in each district for the TIP and ISP. This table also 
provides district level data on share of harvested maize area in the 2007/08 season, poverty 
rate as shown by district level IHS2 data, and the proportion of district households estimated 
to be at risk of missing food entitlements in the January to March period according to a World 
Bank study undertaken in 2007.  
A first point to note from this table is that the proportion of households allocated coupons in 
each district varies considerably across districts in all seasons (Table 5.9). For example, in 
2007/08, only 21 per cent of households in Nsanje district received coupons while in some 
districts the number of households designated to receive coupons exceeded the total number 
of farming households in the district (Mzimba, Rumphi). Second, there is considerable 
consistency in this variable allocation by district; for example, Dedza, Nkhota Kota, Nsanje 
  144 
and Chikwawa are consistently the lowest recipients of coupons, while Chitipa, Rumphi, 
Phalombe and Thyolo are consistently amongst the highest recipients. Third, there seems to 
be no relationship between this variation in relative coupon allocation and other indicators 
that might suggest a district should be favoured for coupons such as maize area (share of 
district maize area in total national maize area), poverty rate or vulnerability to hunger. 
Table 5.9: Comparing distribution TIP and ISP beneficiaries 2000/01-2009/10 (%) 
District/ 
Region 
TIP beneficiarya ISP Beneficiaryb Mz 
Areab 
Poor 
popa 
At risk 
popc 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avge  2006 2007 2009 Avge  
Chitipa 24 30 51 30 34 111 98 52 87 1.7 67 27 
Karonga 57 63 61 63 61 19 50 41 37 1.4 55 7 
Mzimba 30 38 33 38 35 92 102 41 78 8.3 51 30 
NkhataBay 20 22 26 22 23 15 36 41 31 0.9 63 na 
Rumphi 19 29 38 29 29 96 114 50 87 0.9 62 15 
Dedza 26 31 40 31 32 32 45 30 36 6.3 55 30 
Dowa 33 42 48 42 41 61 79 30 57 4.6 37 16 
Kasungu 32 42 40 42 39 67 99 27 64 5.8 45 24 
Lilongwe 22 29 35 29 29 82 90 34 69 11.1 38 18 
Mchinji 41 43 42 43 42 72 85 42 66 5.5 60 18 
Nkhotakota 36 35 36 35 35 20 42 37 33 1.2 48 46 
Ntcheu 45 52 50 52 50 65 64 48 59 6.3 52 73 
Ntchisi 41 46 50 46 46 80 91 34 68 2.3 47 35 
Salima 49 59 50 59 55 45 67 39 50 2.5 57 64 
Balaka 46 55 64 55 55 32 53 49 45 3.9 67 81 
Blantyre 32 37 37 37 36 57 66 56 60 2.9 47 77 
Chikwawa 47 60 58 60 56 6 23 15 15 2.3 66 80 
Chiradzulu 54 38 42 38 43 51 56 52 53 2.0 64 80 
Machinga 38 47 56 47 47 52 54 34 47 3.4 74 62 
Mangochi 46 48 54 48 49 30 41 28 33 7.1 61 35 
Mulanje 34 48 46 48 44 49 69 42 53 3.7 69 76 
Mwanza 69 67 62 67 66 49 73 56 59 1.2 56 76 
Neno  
  
41 56 54 50 1.5  86 
Nsanje 57 64 68 64 63 5 21 20 15 0.8 76 81 
Phalombe 33 42 44 42 41 65 70 62 66 2.7 62 50 
Thyolo 5 11 55 11 20 66 99 53 73 3.4 65 71 
Zomba 38 46 48 46 45 43 49 42 45 6.0 70 62 
Average 37 43 47 43 43 52 66 41 53 3.7 52 40 
Northern 30 37 39 37 36 67 80 45 64 13.2 56 31 
Central 32 39 42 39 38 58 74 36 56 45.6 47 36 
Southern 40 46 53 46 46 42 56 43 47 40.9 64 71 
Note: 
(1)  2001 refers to 2000-01 season, and so on. 
(2) Likoma district is not shown. Like Neno which in the past was part of Mwanza district, Likoma was 
part of Nkhata Bay district until as recent as 2002. 
Source: aGovernment of Malawi (2005b, p.102) & b(2008c, 2009e, 2010c); cTable 4.11. 
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Figure 5.4: District Distribution of TIP and ISP 
 
Note: TIP was implemented under UDF (Muluzi) government while ISP is under DPP (Mutharika). 
 
Source: Data contained in Table 5.9 
 
Table 5.10: Correlation matrix of ISP distribution and selected indicators 
 Maize area 
2007/08 
(%) 
2007/08 
Benefic. 
 (%) 
2008/09 
Benefic. 
 (%) 
2009/10 
Benefic. 
(%) 
Poor 
(%) 
 
At risk  
(%) 
 
Maize area 
2007/08  
(%) 
Pearson Cor. 1 .306 .250 -.237 -403* 
-.344 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .120 .209 .233 .041 .086 
N 27 27 27 27 26 26 
 2007/08 
Benefic.  
(%) 
Pearson Cor. 
.306 1 .925** .413* -.294 
-.437* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .120  .000 .032 .145 .026 
N 27 27 27 27 26 26 
2008/09 
Benefic. 
(%) 
 
Pearson Cor. 
.250 .925** 1 .380 -.385 
-.483* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .209 .000  .051 .052 .012 
N 27 27 27 27 26 26 
2009/10 
Benefic.  
(%) 
 
Pearson Cor. 
-.237 .413* .380 1 .066 
.211 
Sig. (2-tailed) .233 .032 .051  .747 .302 
N 27 27 27 27 26 26 
Poor 
(%) 
Pearson Cor. 
-.403* -.294 -.385 .066 1 .505* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .041 .145 .052 .747  .010 
N 26 26 26 26 26 25 
At risk  
(%) 
 
Pearson Cor. 
-.344 -.437* -.483* .211 .505* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .086 .026 .012 .302 .010  
N 26 26 26 26 25 26 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Data in Table 5.9 
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Several researchers have detected political undertones in these variations in relative coupon 
allocation (Chinsinga and O’Brien 2008, Murwira 2009, Smiddy and Young 2009). It seems 
that districts which are known strongholds of the ruling DPP tend to be allocated consistently 
high relative quantities of coupons (Mulanje, Thyolo and Phalombe), while districts which in 
Malawi are well-known as supporting opposition parties at elections tend to be allocated low 
relative quantities (Dedza, Nkhata Bay, Nsanje, Chikwawa, Mangochi, Nkhota Kota). In 
general, the distribution in ISP is a direct opposite of the distribution of TIP which apparently 
favoured UDF strongholds (Figure 5.4). Moreover, the allocation matrix that places 
substantial weight on past allocations means that once these biases have been built-in they 
then persist in subsequent years. Simple correlation analysis (Table 5.10) shows that relative 
allocations of the ISP have remained similar in paired years of implementation. It also shows 
that the relative allocations are poorly correlated with the indicators on last three columns of 
Table 5.9. 
5.4.2 Beneficiary selection and allocation of coupons 
Moving from the central allocation to districts to within-district allocation, several researchers 
have found evidence of widespread malpractice in beneficiary selection and assignment of 
coupons to households (Kadzandira 2007, Mgemezulu 2008) Available evidence regarding 
the 2006-07 allocation was summarised by (Ellis 2007) as follows: 
(a) at sub-district level and down to community level, the handling of coupon allocations 
has been highly variable, with, in the worst instances, fraudulent loss of coupons to 
officials, politicians, policemen, chiefs and headmen; 
(b) fraudulent practices have included splitting coupon booklets, giving villagers invalid 
single copies of coupons, using blocks of coupons to acquire fertilizer then sold on to 
farmers above the subsidised price, and many others; 
(c) these instances resulted in widely varying access by ordinary farmers to coupons, and 
to physical fertilizer, in different parts of the country, across and within districts. 
There are openly reported instances of fraudulent behaviour that nonetheless fail to provoke 
official outrage or censure or punishment, in effect allowing such behaviour to become 
institutionalised over time. For example, in 2007/08 allegations were made that cabinet 
ministers had at different times stolen quantities of between 50 and 400 thousand coupons, 
  147 
but these allegations were never investigated (Nyirongo and Sonani 2007, Kashoti 2008). In 
the same season, delivery drivers were implicated in the theft of 500 tons of physical 
fertilizer, but were never prosecuted on the instruction of the government (Government of 
Malawi 2008c).52 In the 2008/09 distribution of coupons, politicians were alleged to have 
shared some 150 thousand coupons between them without any subsequent follow-up 
(ADMIN 2009a). Many other examples, of varying gravity, could be cited since such 
instances are frequent news items throughout the coupon allocation period every year. 
However, further than these fragmentary pieces of evidence or allegation, the more serious 
proposition has been advanced that the ISP is systematically permeated by institutionalised 
coupon syndicates comprising (a) politicians, including ministers, using political influence to 
obtain large blocks of coupons for sale; (b) government officials obtaining substantial 
quantities of coupons for sale; (c) traditional leaders on their own or as conduits for broader 
syndicates selling instead of distributing coupons, (d) workers at coupon printers stealing 
large quantities of coupons, (e) criminal groups printing and selling fake coupons or using 
fake coupons to buy fertilizer for resale (Tambulasi 2009b, pp.23-27). Irregularities in the 
management of the programme could help to explain weak accounting of subsidy resources, 
and reluctance of the government to produce transparent accounts of funds allocated to the 
programme. For example, the government at the time of writing the thesis had not yet 
produced accounts for the 2007/08 distribution, causing the Norwegian government in 2010 
to reconsider their financial support to the programme. The government dismissed a request 
by the Norwegians for an audit report, stating the Norwegian government did not fund the ISP 
(Chipalasa 2010b). 
Irregularities in coupon management are revealed empirically in the Agricultural Input 
Subsidy Survey (AISS) conducted by Michigan State University as part of the monitoring of 
the 2006/07 ISP programme53. The survey comprised a statistically valid sample of 3,298 
households, matched to the sample frame of the IHS2. Bearing in mind that selected 
recipients should be entitled to at least two coupons (maize) and a maximum of four coupons 
(a further two for tobacco), the distribution of recipients by number of coupons produces 
                                                 
52
 This was enough to have provided 5,000 beneficiary households with fertilizer at two 50 kg bags each. 
The full market value of this quantity was about MK100 million (US$0.72 million) in 2007/08. 
 
53
 The dataset for the AISS was made available to the author by Michigan State University, and the data 
presented here was derived from the survey by the author.  
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interesting findings (Table 5.11)54. Forty-five per cent of the households in the sample 
received zero coupons; 25 per cent only one coupon; a further 25 per cent two coupons (the 
correct number for maize only or tobacco only recipients); and 6 per cent 3 or more coupons, 
including 1 per cent (41 households) who received 5 or more coupons. In addition there 
appears to be a land ownership bias in this coupon distribution indicating that larger land 
owners systematically acquire more coupons. Thus the proportion of coupon holders owning 
less than 0.5 ha descends from 30 per cent to 16-17 per cent as coupon allocation rises; 
whereas, inversely, the proportion owning more than 1 ha rising from 34 per cent to 73 per 
cent as coupon allocation rises. Mean land ownership rises from 1.1 ha (1 coupon holder) to 
4.0 ha (holders of 5 or more coupons). 
Table 5.11: Characteristics of households that acquired coupons in 2006/07 
Characteristics All HHs 
No. of coupons acquired 
0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
Distribution of HHs by coupons:        
Number of HHs (n) 3,298 1,487 808 817 64 81 41 
Proportion of HHs (%) 100 45 25 25 2 3 1 
        
HH land ownership (%):        
No land  4 7 1 2 0 3 0 
Less than 0.5 ha 27 30 29 23 16 16 17 
0.5 to 1.0 ha 29 30 28 28 28 22 10 
More than 1.0 ha  41 34 43 47 56 59 73 
        
Average Land (ha) 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 4.0 
        
IHS2 poverty ranking (%):        
Ultra-poor 18 19 19 18 13 13 11 
Poor 30 30 30 30 22 32 29 
Non-poor 52 51 51 52 65 55 61 
Not IHS2 sample 10 10 10 10 16 12 7 
 
Source: Author analysis of July 2007 AISS data 
 
 
5.4.3 Use of coupons 
Acquiring a large number of coupons does not necessarily imply that those coupons are used 
by their holders to purchase fertilizer. The coupons may be sold, allowing their recipients to 
realise a cash income from being allocated them. In the same survey it was found that while 
                                                 
54
 From 2009/10, the programme now targets maize only such that a beneficiary should be entitled to a 
maximum of two coupons. 
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subsidised fertilizer purchases rose in line with the number of coupons obtained, the quantity 
of additional fertilizer purchased departed increasingly from the quantity that could have been 
obtained for the given number of coupons. Moreover, zero allocation coupon holders 
nevertheless reported purchasing coupon fertilizer (Table 5.12). The average quantity of 
fertilizer rose from 61 kg to 119 kg across the range of incremental coupon holders (from zero 
to 5+); however, had these coupon holders (who acquired more than five coupons) used their 
coupons to purchase the exact amount to which they were entitled, the minimum quantity of 
fertilizer would be 1750 kgs, translating into 500 kg of fertilizer equivalents of unredeemed 
coupons. In effect, higher coupon holders progressively used less of their coupons to purchase 
fertilizer, implying that they must have sold them in a coupon ‘parallel market’.55 
Table 5.12: Fertilizer quantities acquired by number of coupons in 2006/07 
Category All HHs No. of coupons acquired P-
value 0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
Number of observations (n) 3298 1487 808 817 64 81 41  
         
Subsidy fert acquired (kg)         
Mean  70 61 63 90 65 102 119 .226 
Std Deviation 312 367 189 318 70 278 211  
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Maximum 7,500 7,500 5,000 5,000 350 2,500 1,250  
         
Acquired less expected (kg)         
Mean  20 61a 13ab (10)ab (85)b (98)b (299)c .000 
Std Deviation 317 367 189 318 70 278 322  
Minimum (1,750) 0 (50) (100) (150) (200) (1,750)  
Maximum 7,500 7,500 4,950 4,900 200 2,300 200  
Figures denoted by different letters are significant at 0.05. 
Note:  
(a) Subsidy fertilizer acquired refers to quantities of fertilizer that were acquired regardless of whether one had 
acquired coupons or not. 
 
(b) ‘Acquired less expected’ refers to quantities that were acquired when they should not or were not acquired 
when they should be, given the number of coupons acquired. For example, non-coupon holders ended up 
acquiring an average of 61 kg of fertilizer. Holders of one coupon where expected to acquire 50 kgs but 
actually acquired 63 kgs, an additional 13 kgs. Figures in brackets are negative, suggesting quantity of 
fertilizer (kg) which were expected given the number of coupons but not acquired. For example, a holder 
of 4 coupons was expected to acquire 200 kgs but actually acquired 102 kgs, a shortfall of 98 kgs.  
Source: Author analysis of 2007 AISS data 
 
                                                 
55
 No doubt some of them were freely given to family or friends, but on a large scale it is safest to 
assume that there is a coupon market that reallocates coupons between those that do not need them, or 
cannot afford the subsidised price for the fertilizer, and those that are seeking to purchase additional 
fertilizer. 
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The existence of multiple governance issues surrounding the ISP does not necessarily mean 
that the subsidy is ineffective in achieving improved food security overall in Malawi. It must 
be supposed that most of the subsidised fertilizer ends up on farmers’ fields, even if the 
farmers that utilise the fertilizer are not the same as those who were designated to receive 
coupons.56 In effect, an administrative allocation system for distributing vouchers becomes a 
market allocation system as a consequence of leakages from the administrative template and 
coupon recipients voluntarily relinquishing them in exchange for cash. The most probable 
outcome of this process is that fertilizer ends further up the rural wealth distribution than was 
intended in the plans, and this is not unusual in the history of subsidised fertilizers in Africa 
(Chapter 2 above). From a production viewpoint, the net effect could be positive if richer 
farmers are able to make better use of complementary inputs than poorer farmers, resulting in 
higher maize yields overall. There is even some indirect evidence of this occurring, with 
increased demand for labour in rural areas causing a rise in rural wages (Dorward and Chirwa 
2009).  
However, production effects are only part of the picture, and the vision of the subsidy put 
forward by Tambulasi (2009b) is a serious issue with its implication that the subsidy may be 
entrenching institutionalised unlawful behaviour throughout the political and administrative 
structure of rural Malawi. If this were the case, then it would also mean that the subsidy will 
be exceptionally difficult for any future government of Malawi to reduce or discontinue due 
to the pervasive vested interests with which it has become associated. It is not an objective of 
this thesis to pursue this line of thinking any further, especially as many of the arguments tend 
to be speculative and difficult to verify factually. However, what is important for this thesis is 
the degree to which the ISP provides a genuine advance in Malawi’s struggle to reduce the 
exposure of its poorer citizens to recurrent lack of sufficient food and inadequate nutrition. 
For this the output effects of the ISP are critical, since they determine, first, whether the 
annual food gaps of food-deficit farmers have narrowed since the ISP was introduced; and, 
second, whether market price volatility in the lean season has diminished, therefore better 
enabling food-deficit households to purchase food in that period. It is to these questions that 
this chapter now turns. 
                                                 
56
 The consideration that would undermine this supposition is significant leakage of subsidised fertilizers 
into neighbouring countries. On this there is anecdotal evidence, but as far as this author is aware no 
systematic study has been undertaken to reveal the extent of such leakage in any of the areas where 
cross-border informal trade is commonplace. 
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5.5 Reconsideration of the Output Effects of the ISP 
The foregoing discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the ISP as a vulnerability reduction 
strategy in Malawi refers to the significance on the strengths side of the size of production gains 
achieved by the policy. This section proposes to probe these production gains more deeply, 
bearing in mind that several leading authorities on food markets in eastern and southern Africa 
consider the official figures to be implausibly high, particularly in view of maize price 
behaviour in 2007 and 2008 (Jayne et al. 2008, Tschirley and Jayne 2010). If output gains are as 
suggested in official figures then several positive benefits should ensue: market supply will 
increase due to yield gains experienced by maize surplus farmers; food deficit farmers should 
see their annual ‘food gaps’ decrease for the same reason; the seasonal maize price rise should 
be on the low side of the long term average (which is pulled up by extreme price episodes); and 
rural wages should rise as more labour is demanded in farming and related activities.  
As already verified at the beginning of the preceding section, the initial claims of ISP success 
seem amply justified by market responses. Production jumped from 1.2 to 2.6 million tons from 
2004/05 to 2005/06, and the market price declined in nominal terms from MK50.67 per kg to 
MK18.76 between February and July 2006. Due to high expectations of an even more 
spectacular harvest in 2007, nominal prices reached a historic low in May 2007 of MK14.26 
(price data in this paragraph refer to Table 5.8 above). The proof of a harvest of a particular 
magnitude lies, of course, in price behaviour in the months following the harvest rather than the 
predicted harvest level before the event. In the case of the 2006/07 harvest, prices began to rise 
surprisingly soon after the harvest, gathering momentum through the end of the year to 
temporarily peak at a nominal level of MK43.53 in the January-March 2008 lean season, before 
then resuming an upward trend that reached MK70.57 in February 2009. 
Table 5.13 and Figure 5.5 below show this price behaviour in annual terms in historical 
perspective. For this purpose, the CPI was rebased to calendar year 1996, so that real prices 
(nominal prices deflated by the CPI) are denominated in 1996 terms. In addition to showing the 
nominal and real annual retail maize price trend, the graph also shows the average real maize 
price for the period 2001-10 (up to Sept 2010). The data and graph are illuminating. In general, 
real maize prices rose over the decade of the 2000s. In addition, and standing out very clearly in 
Figure 5.5 real maize prices rose to unprecedented high levels in the period 2007 to 2009 before 
beginning to decline towards the long run average later in 2009 and in 2010. 
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Table 5.13: Nominal and Real Maize Prices in Malawi, 2001-10 
Year Nominal  MK/kg 
Real* 
MK/kg 
2001 12.29 23.85 
2002 20.25 33.18 
2003 13.33 19.42 
2004 15.73 20.37 
2005 21.81 24.03 
2006 27.30 27.57 
2007 18.97 17.48 
2008 45.86 38.69 
2009 46.01 36.75 
2010 37.31 28.31 
Average 25.89 26.97 
  * deflated by the CPI rebased to 1996=100 
 Source: price data contained in Table 4.16 in Chapter 4 
 
Figure 5.5: Nominal and Real Maize Prices 2001-10 
 
Source: Table 5.14 above 
 
It is tempting to find a cause for this price behaviour other than questioning domestic 
production figures. The 2007-08 international spike in the price of grains is the explanation 
most readily to hand, and has been deployed by the Malawi government as an explanation. 
However, the international food price crisis was not synchronised even closely with Malawi 
price events (world prices were declining steeply as the Malawi maize price was rising through 
2008), and previous analysis has shown that in countries like Malawi and Zambia with 
significant barriers (both geographical and administrative) to external maize trade, domestic 
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maize prices tend to be decoupled from world prices and reflect far more the balance of supply 
and demand in the domestic market (Jayne et al. 2006b). 
To gauge fully the strangeness of the 2007-09 real price rise in Malawi, the estimated maize 
surplus generated by the officially record harvests of this period can be examined in the 
comparative context of preceding years. Table 5.14 and Figure 5.6 show maize surpluses and 
deficits from 1991 to 2010 calculated from official production figures and a consumption trend 
derived from average maize consumption per capita discussed in Chapter 4. This follows 
population growth with a constant maize requirement per capita of 158.4 kg (see Table 4.18 
above).57 The previous instability of the Malawi maize market is apparent, as also is the 
prevalence of market deficits in the 2000s, culminating in the very poor harvest of 2004/05. 
Overall, up to 2004/05, there had been nine deficit and six surplus years since 1990/91. This 
then gives way in startling fashion to a succession of huge surpluses from 2005/06. As observed 
in a previous chapter, whereas average production from 1990/91 to 2004/05 was 1.55 million 
tons, from 2005/06 to 2009/10 it was 3.06 million tons. In this later period, estimated maize 
surpluses in the domestic market were 1 million tons per year on average, or cumulatively 5 
million tons since the ISP started. Another reason put forward for the steeply rising prices 
experienced in 2008 was a 400,000 ton export sale to Zimbabwe from the 2006/07 harvest; 
however, this should have been easily accommodated in the context of the 3.2 million ton 
harvest proclaimed for the 2006/07 season. 
The maize balance sheet figures of Table 5.15 below, coupled with annual price change data, 
permit some, admittedly fairly crude, estimates of the likely magnitude of underlying changes in 
maize harvests that price trends in 2007-09 were indicating. Here, the relevant price change is 
for 12-month periods from May of one year to April of the following year, capturing the 
seasonal cycle of maize prices in successive years. The price rises or falls from one maize year 
to the next can be treated as responses to surpluses or deficits coming into existence at the 
preceding harvest. In other words, the May 2007-April 2008 average price reflects the outturn 
in the 2007 harvest season; and the price change from 2006/07 to 2007/08 reflects the degree to 
which 2006/07 production (harvested in May 2007) meets consumption requirements through 
the 2007/08 crop season. 
                                                 
57
 For this purpose it does not matter if the assumption of a constant consumption per capita is rather 
unrealistic. The magnitudes of surplus or deficit are generally so large compared to an assumed 
relatively stable consumption trend that more refined annual consumption estimates would make 
negligible difference to what is portrayed. 
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Table 5.14: Maize Balance Sheet 2000-10 
Year Production (Tons) 
Consumption 
Needs (Tons) 
Surplus or 
Deficit (Tons) 
Surp/Deficit 
(% Production) 
1991 1,589,377 1,369,746 219,631 13.8 
1992 657,000 1,397,156 -740,156 -112.7 
1993 2,033,957 1,425,114 608,843 29.9 
1994 818,999 1,453,632 -634,633 -77.5 
1995 1,327,865 1,482,720 -154,855 -11.7 
1996 1,793,469 1,512,391 281,078 15.7 
1997 1,226,478 1,542,655 -316,177 -25.8 
1998 1,534,326 1,573,525 -39,199 -2.6 
1999 2,245,824 1,613,225 632,599 28.2 
2000 2,290,018 1,653,927 636,091 27.8 
2001 1,589,437 1,695,656 -106,219 -6.7 
2002 1,485,272 1,738,437 -253,165 -17.0 
2003 1,847,476 1,782,298 65,178 3.5 
2004 1,608,349 1,827,266 -218,917 -13.6 
2005 1,225,234 1,873,368 -648,134 -52.9 
2006 2,611,486 1,920,633 690,853 26.5 
2007 3,226,418 1,969,091 1,257,327 39.0 
2008 2,634,701 2,069,705 564,996 21.4 
2009 3,582,502 2,121,924 1,460,578 40.8 
2010 3,233,364 2,175,460 1,057,904 32.7 
Average 1,928,078 1,709,896 218,181 -2.1 
Note: Maize Price and consumption in 1991, for example, is associated with 
1990-91 production and so on. Negative figures denote maize deficits. 
Source: As explained in the text above 
 
Figure 5.6: Calculated Maize Surpluses and Deficits 1991-2010 
 
Source: Data contained in Table 5.14 
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A modest simulation exercise is conducted in Table 5.15 below. In this price changes are related 
to consumption needs via a provisional assumption that the elasticity of consumption with 
respect to price changes is 0.5.58 This means, for example, that a 50 per cent price rise would be 
indicative of a 25 per cent fall in availability relative to the consumption needs figure. This 
gives rise (in the fourth column) to a calculated surplus or deficit (from price changes and the 
consumption trend), and thence to a calculated production level (fifth column) which is 
compared (in the sixth column) with official production estimates. 
Table 5.15: Simulation of Production Levels Based on Price Movements 
Notes:  
(1) calculated as described in the text assuming an elasticity of consumption with respect to 
price of -0.5 
 (2) both calculated and official production refer to the preceding season relative to the 
consumption season i.e. 2009/10 consumption is related to the 2008/09 production 
year, the harvest for which occurred in Apr-Jun 2009 
 
Source: Table 5.14 above; author’s calculations based on average real maize price data. 
 
 
Surprisingly, this rather blunt approach works quite well for years when production estimates 
may have been fairly accurate; thus, for 2005/06 a 62 per cent price rise indicates an output in 
the preceding harvest of 1.3 million tons (official production 1.2 million tons), and for 2006/07 
a 39 decline in price gives rise to an estimated output of 2.4 million tons (almost the same as the 
official figure of 2.6 million tons). However, for 2007/08 to 2009/10 this procedure yields 
figures that diverge sharply from official production. Taking into account an export figure of 
400 thousand tons taking place during 2007-08, calculated harvests indicate a drop in output in 
                                                 
58
 The elasticity of demand with respect to price for staple foods in low income countries varies 
according to substitution possibilities and income, such that low substitutability (applying to maize in 
Malawi) results in low price elasticity (range 0.2 to 0.5) while low income can work in the opposite 
direction if substitute foods are acceptable and available (Pinstrup-Andersen 1985). The figure of 0.5 
here is a trial figure used for illustrative purposes. 
Crop 
Year 
Consumption 
Needs 
(tons) 
Real 
Price 
Change 
% 
Calculated 
Surplus/Deficit 
(tons) (1) 
Calculated 
Production 
(tons)(2) 
Official 
Production 
(tons)(2) 
2004/05 1,873,368  
    2005/06 1,920,633  61.7 -592,515   1,328,118  1,225,234 
2006/07 1,969,091  -39.0 383,973   2,353,064  2,611,486 
2007/08 2,069,705  0.0 0   2,069,705  3,226,418 
2008/09 2,121,924  126.7 -1,344,239   1,177,685  2,634,701 
2009/10 2,175,460  -29.0 315,442   2,490,902  3,582,502 
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2007 as compared to 2006, and a further drop in 2008. The size of the gap between estimated 
and declared harvests is certainly much too large; nevertheless, its direction points to significant 
overestimates of production in the period 2006/07 to 2008/09. 
Table 5.15 should be interpreted perhaps more as an indicator of plausible directions of change 
in production than as firm predictions. It suggests that the only ISP year for which a degree of 
confidence can be attached to official maize harvest figures is 2005/06 (harvest occurring in 
May 2006). It is this year, of course, which led to justifiable (at the time) claims for the success 
of the programme, and resulted in donors softening their initial antagonism to it. Real price 
changes in 2007-09 (as shown in Table 5.8) demonstrate, if nothing else, that the direction of 
change in harvests must have been downward rather than upward in the 2007 and 2008 
harvests, and even if these drops in production were minimal (say a fall of 200,000 tons in each 
of those years), this would still mean a gap of 400-600 thousand tons a year to the official 
figures in those years (see also Jayne et al. 2008, Jayne and Tschirley 2009).  
There are, of course other factors that may have contributed to the steeply rising maize prices in 
2007-09; although in the view of this thesis these are not sufficiently powerful to overturn the 
likelihood of production overestimates in the 2007 and 2008 harvests. One such factor is 
hoarding of grain after harvest by private traders; another is cross-border exports of maize; and 
a third is the timing of the government’s total ban on private maize trade. Relevant to all these 
arguments is the consideration that traded maize in Malawi is a small fraction of total 
production, which can cause small changes in availability to result in big price changes. 
Nevertheless, detailed quantitative economic analysis has demonstrated that private maize trade 
in Malawi is competitive and efficient (Myers 2008), implying that hoarding can only occur if 
all traders concur that an impending shortage will drive up future prices. Moreover, cross-
border informal trade (monitored by FEWSNET) displays negligible exports and high net 
imports of informal maize in both those seasons (FEWSNET 2009).59 The timing of the ban on 
private trade may indeed be relevant, but only in the context of an underlying shortage already 
causing strong upward pressures on prices. 
The foregoing conclusion receives support from an entirely different direction. Quite 
independently of the various MoAFS area, production and yield estimates for maize and other 
                                                 
59
 FEWSNET data shows cross-border maize imports of 79,581 and 57,582 tons in 2006/07 and 2007/08 
respectively. Meanwhile estimated informal exports in the same years were 3,721 and 7,115 tons 
(FEWSNET 2009). 
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crops, the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) undertakes annual surveys of 
livelihood zones across Malawi in order to obtain estimates of the location and size of rural 
populations at risk of ‘missing food entitlements’, and therefore potentially requiring remedial 
action in the next lean season. These figures are produced in June each year, and take account of 
harvest data reported by households within their Household Economy Approach (HEA) 
methodology (discussed in Chapter 4 above). The key data is summarised in Table 5.16 below.  
Table 5.16: Areas of tension between MVAC figures and maize production estimates 
MVAC 
Report 
Maize estimates Population at risk of 
missing food 
entitlements 
Maize equivalents 
requirement 
Affected districts 
(out of total 28 districts: 
13 South, 9 Centre, 6 
North) 
Crop 
Season 
Surplus  
(%)a 
NO %b Tons % c 
May-05 2004-05 -35.7 4,224,400  35.7 269,400 17.9 All districts 
Jun-06 2005-06  16.7 833,000  6.9 57,300 2.2 16 districts (8S, 5C, 3N) 
Jun-07 2006-07  34.5 519,200 4.2 ‘Watch’ 8 districts (5S, 1 C, 2 N) 
Jun-08 2007-08  15.7 1,490,146  11.4 56,459 2.0 17 districts (13S, 2 C, 1N) 
Jun-09 2008-09  34.8 147,492  1.1 6,678 0.2 3 in south 
Jun-10 2009-10  22.6 1,061,625  7.7 45,366 1.4 15 districts (13S, 1C, 1N) 
Notes:  
 (a) Official government position (see Table 4.9) 
 (b) Author calculations based on population estimates in Table 4.2 (chapter 4) 
 (c) Author calculations based on official figures in Table 4.9 (chapter 4) 
 
Source: Compiled from MVAC Reports described in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Taking 2004/05 as a starting point, MVAC findings in May 2005 were entirely compatible with 
a very poor harvest. A total of 4.2 million people across all districts are identified as at risk of 
hunger in the following lean season. In June 2006, this figure drops dramatically, and drops 
again in June 2007 (probably reflecting, as do other data, a continued maize surplus overhang 
from the very successful 2006 harvest). However in June 2008, MVAC estimates are thrown 
into reverse, with a rise to 1.5 million people across 17 districts predicted to have insufficient 
food entitlements. This coincides with the steep price rises noted for 2008, and the government 
suppressed the MVAC report and delayed its publication due to the unwelcome predictions that 
it put forward. The June 2009 report curiously shows an almost negligible hunger problem, but 
the June 2010 report again suggests a deficit of maize in the market and serious risk to over one 
million people in 15 districts (out of 28 districts). Overall, MVAC findings do not support a 
picture of the Malawi maize economy that is so awash with maize as a result of successive 
record harvests that hunger is banished for all but the least fortunate in Malawi rural society. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter describes and assesses the success of the input subsidy programme (ISP) that has 
been implemented in Malawi since the 2005/06 agricultural season. This is the flagship 
government policy for reducing rural vulnerability in contemporary Malawi, and it builds on a 
long history of farm input subsidies in post-independence Malawi history. The ISP is highly 
charged politically in all its aspects. It is popular with the mainly rural electorate, and there is 
a trend to increase the rate of subsidy in successive years. A plan is already in place to extend 
its implementation to at least the crop year 2015/16. 
The Malawi government represents the ISP to the outside world as wresting the policy 
initiative from the donors and international financial institutions, and achieving food security 
through a truly national approach (Chinsinga 2007a). The incumbent President Dr Bingu wa 
Mutharika has received several awards for the publicised achievements of the policy: the 
International Award for Food Security by Food and Agriculture Natural Resources and Policy 
Network (FANRPN) in 2008; the Agricola Medal by the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) in 2008; and the Drivers of Change Award by the Southern Africa Trust in October 
2009 (Jayne and Tschirley 2009). The latest such recognition is an honorary professorship of 
Economics by the East China Normal University in 2010. 
The chapter describes the massive logistics of distributing 130,000 tons and more of fertilizer to 
between 1.4 and 1.7 million farmers, using a coupon system. These logistics involve 
determining the geographical distribution of coupons, allocating these coupons to farmers at the 
local level, moving fertilizer from border entry points to depots throughout the country, 
redeeming coupons for fertilizer at sales outlets at the subsidised price, and returning receipts 
from sales to the central government. This operation is conducted every year mainly by public 
sector bodies, with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security at the apex, and private sector 
agents have been permitted variable roles, under contract, in different years. The ambition and 
scale of the programme has been admirable, and it is widely agreed that the scheduling and 
timeliness of coupon and fertilizer distribution has in general been well done. 
Nevertheless there are documented aspects of the programme which give rise to a degree of 
doubt about its true effectiveness in achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty and 
vulnerability in Malawi. The allocation of coupons between districts seems possibly to reflect 
political as much as agricultural or economic criteria; there is widespread reportage of coupon 
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misappropriation, including by senior politicians and civil servants; and field studies have 
shown extensive misallocation at the small scale in local areas involving village leaders, district 
councillors, local civil servants and the police. There is evidence from field studies conducted 
by local researchers to show that a secondary market in coupons exists, and this market tends to 
redistribute subsidised fertilizer from poorer to better off farmers. This is to be expected with a 
subsidy that has reached around 90 per cent of the full cost price of commercial fertilizer in 
recent years, and there is the additional possibility not yet verified that there may be substantial 
leakage of fertilizers into adjacent countries (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia). 
From the viewpoint of this thesis, it is the output claims of the ISP that are critical. If the ISP 
fails to prevent food deficit rural households from experiencing nutritional deprivation in the 
lean season every year, then its claims to have brought Malawi into an era of food security for 
all become legitimately questionable. In fact, the period from August 2007 to March 2009 saw 
the most severe seasonal price spike in Malawi history, unusually maintained across two 
successive lean seasons. The chapter uses simple economic deduction to show that the output 
claims for the 2006/07 and 2009/10 maize harvests cannot have been anything like as high as 
are claimed by official maize production figures. The exact degree of such exaggeration is of 
course difficult to pin down. This author is not the first to suggest these discrepancies; however, 
the attempt made in the chapter to get some purchase on their approximate size has not been 
done by other researchers. There are two implications for the thesis that arise from the findings 
of this chapter: one is that the ISP has not turned out to be as efficacious for achieving national 
level food security as it is claimed to have done; and another is that whatever its effects on total 
maize production, it may still leave a substantial proportion of the poorest rural citizens exposed 
to missing food entitlements in the lean season every year The next chapter examines an 
alternative approach to achieving food security of the poorest members of rural society, 
represented by poverty targeted social cash transfers.  
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Chapter 6: Social Cash Transfers in Malawi 
6.1 Origins of social cash transfers in Malawi 
In September 2006, Malawi started a pilot social cash transfer (SCT) scheme in Mchinji 
district. It was motivated strongly by an external consultant to UNICEF Malawi, Dr Bernd 
Schubert, who had formerly been responsible for the design of a social cash transfer pilot in 
Zambia, the Kalomo social cash transfer scheme. The Kalomo scheme had been set up in 
November 2003 as a social welfare intervention for households mostly headed by the elderly, 
widows, children, chronically ill persons, and the disabled, most of which were affected by 
HIV/AIDS.60 These groups were deemed to be ultra-poor, labour constrained and with higher 
than average dependency ratios, and unable to provide for basic needs such as food, health 
and education (Schubert 2003). In the programming of the Kalomo and similar social cash 
transfer pilots in countries such as Malawi, these groups were described as the ‘non-viable’ or 
‘incapacitated’ poor. The Kalomo pilot scheme was a touchstone at an African Union social 
protection conference that Zambia hosted in the town of Livingstone in March 2006.61 The 
conference recognised positive impacts of regular cash transfers on the lives of poor people. 
This led to a ‘Livingstone Call for Action’ to introduce and institutionalize social cash 
transfers as major components of national social protection policies and programmes (African 
Union 2006). Several countries have since introduced or scaled up different variants of social 
cash transfers, including Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Malawi (Schubert 2007a).  
Since 2004, the UNICEF office in Malawi has advocated the mainstreaming of social cash 
transfers into national development policies and budgets. In 2006, it organised a study tour for 
government officials to learn about social cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Brazil. It 
also supported a consultancy for the Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs 
to design and test a pilot social cash transfer scheme. It provided initial funding for the project 
preparation phase, and start up funds amounting to US$872,534 that covered the period 
January 2006 to December 2007, until funding was sought, and eventually obtained, from the 
                                                 
60
 The recommendation for a social cash transfer pilot in Zambia was first made in a GTZ study, Social 
Welfare Interventions for AIDS Affected Households, for the Ministry of Community Development 
and Social Welfare in March 2001. By August 2003, GTZ helped the Social Safety Net Project in the 
Ministry to design a pilot social cash transfer scheme which was first implemented in two agricultural 
blocks of Kalomo District. The scheme was launched in 2004 and by December that year, it had been 
rolled out to over one thousand households. The Kalomo scheme became the first of its kind in eastern 
and southern Africa (Schubert 2003) 
61
 The participating governments at the conference were Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) that assists countries to 
respond effectively to a high incidence of HIV/AIDS. In June 2006, Mchinji district in central 
Malawi was selected for the pilot social cash transfer scheme. The objectives of the pilot 
scheme were to: (a) reduce poverty, hunger and starvation in all households living in the pilot 
area that are ultra poor and at the same time labour constrained; (b) increase school enrolment 
and attendance of children living in target group households; and (c) generate information on 
the feasibility, costs and benefits, and on the positive and negative impact of social cash 
transfers as a component of a possible future national social protection programme (Schubert 
and Huijbregts 2006, p.9, Miller et al. 2008b, p.11). 
From the outset and in line with the ‘Kalomo principles’, the pilot social cash transfer 
programme in Malawi decided to target what were called the ‘ultra poor labour constrained’ 
households. As mentioned earlier, other expressions used in the early documentation of the 
scheme to describe this social group were the ‘incapacitated poor’ or the ‘non-viable poor’. 
The targeting of the social cash transfers follows a ‘one in ten’ basic model deduced by Dr 
Schubert and colleagues, in this chapter referred to as the ‘Schubert targeting rule’, at the time 
of devising the original Kalomo scheme in Zambia. The thinking asserts that the ‘ultra poor 
labour constrained’ correspond to roughly ten per cent of all households in countries like 
Malawi and Zambia. The starting point for identifying this group in Malawi was to use the 
IHS2 (described in Chapter 4) to divide all households into four different categories: (1) poor, 
low dependency households; (2) poor, high dependency households, (3) ultra-poor but low 
dependency households, and (4) ultra- poor, high dependency households.  
Figure 6.1: Identifying 10 per cent of Malawi households in need of social cash transfers 
 
 Source: Schubert and Huijbregts (2006, p.19) 
 
A B
DC
600,000 150,000
250,000300,000
Low dep. ratio
"viable poor"
capacitated
High dep. ratio
"non-viable poor"
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Dependency
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Absolute Poverty
52%
Ultra Poverty
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  162 
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of poor households in Malawi as calculated by Schubert and 
Huijbregts (2006), based on IHS2. In this 600,000 poor households are classified as above the 
ultra poverty line, and with a low dependency ratio (quadrant A); 150,000 poor households 
are above the ultra poverty with a high dependency ratio (quadrant B); 300,000 households 
are classified as ultra-poor but low dependency (quadrant C); and 250,000 households are 
classified as high dependency, ultra- poor households (quadrant D). These categories add up 
to 1.3 million households, which is 52 per cent of a figure of 2.5 million used for total 
households in Malawi.  
A targeting method and criteria were developed from this starting position for the practical 
selection of beneficiaries in the pilot SCT scheme. They consisted of two sets of proxy 
indicators: (a) ultra poor households were defined as those below the national ultra poverty 
line of MK16,165 per capita per year (US$115 per year) in 2005, in the lowest expenditure 
quintile, consuming only one meal per day on most days, and owning no valuable assets; and 
(b) labour constrained households were defined as those headed by elderly or children with no 
adults between the ages of 19 to 64 that were fit for work; they had dependency ratios that 
higher than three (if possible to calculate) or might comprise households with no 
economically active adults. Chronically sick or disabled adults (19-64 age group) were 
counted as dependents thereby pushing up the dependency ratio (Schubert 2007a, pp.18-22).  
The Schubert 10 per cent principle was applied in Malawi to the Mchinji pilot SCT, and also 
in its later expansion to other districts, to be detailed later in this chapter. It is worth bearing in 
mind that such a rule is not just about trying to reach an impoverished social group with 
precise demographic and economic characteristics that can be readily identified. It is also a 
way of ‘capping’ the budgetary outlay on welfare payments in a poor country, where 
otherwise support to the very poor might seem a rather open-ended proposition. If a 
maximum of 10 per cent of a country’s households are going to be potentially eligible for 
such transfers then the ceiling budgetary exposure of such a scheme is known, and appropriate 
allocations either by a government, or by some combination of government and donors, can 
be made.  
This chapter proceeds, first, by describing in detail the Mchinji pilot social cash transfer: its 
organisation, selection processes and coverage (section 6.2). It then moves on to summarising 
the results of a detailed evaluation of the Mchinji scheme conducted in 2007-08 (section 6.3). 
The expansion of the scheme to additional districts, and its potential roll-out nationally in the 
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future, are then discussed (section 6.4). Finally, the chapter looks at strengths and weaknesses 
of social cash transfers in Malawi, especially as revealed by the working of the Mchinji pilot, 
but also taking into account lessons of the scaling up that has occurred so far (section 6.5). 
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of its main findings. 
6.2 The Mchinji pilot scheme 
6.2.1 The design 
The pilot Mchinji scheme was designed in April 2006 and started with 2,500 beneficiary 
households in four of the nine Traditional Authorities (TAs) in the district. In June 2006, the 
first payments were made to 400 households before the scheme was officially launched in 
September 2006 (Miller et al. 2008b). In the design of the original pilot, the first stage was to 
select a district to implement the programme. The criteria used for selecting Mchinji as the 
district are not clear from the documentation, but based on what was discussed with 
government officials during the fieldwork in 2007/08, the criteria was said to include the 
poverty rate in the district, the prevalence of HIV and orphans, the regional (political) 
balance, accessibility during the rainy season, and the capacity of the district to implement the 
scheme.  
In the programming of social cash transfers in Malawi, district capacity refers broadly to staff 
numbers, skills and resources such as vehicles, office space and computers (Schubert 2006). It 
has been argued in Chapter 3 that district assemblies in Malawi exhibit a generally weak 
capacity for development management; and the social cash transfer districts are not 
exceptions to this problem. In the Mchinji scheme, capacity weaknesses have included 
inability to maintain up-to-date and organized beneficiary records, irregularities in financial 
accounting and weak monitoring and reporting on progress. Capacity weaknesses persist also 
because line ministries do not provide the required technical oversight, for example, in areas 
of monitoring, evaluation and reporting. Even when the districts submit required reports, the 
responsible ministries (Ministry of Gender and community Services and Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development) do not provide feedback (Miller et al. 2008b). It has 
been argued that these capacity constraints in running cost-effective and reliable social cash 
transfer schemes are not unique to Malawi, and affect all social cash transfer schemes in 
Africa (Schubert and Slater 2006, p.575).  
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Table 6.1: Distribution of population, poverty and vulnerability by district 
District/ 
Region 
Population 
 
Poverty and vulnerability (%) 2007/08 Maize (%) 
Poor 
 
Ultra 
poor 
Ultra/ 
lab. 
const. 
At risk Orphans Area 
share 
Surplus/
deficit 
Chitipa 179,072 54.9 28.3 9.3 27 9.3 1.7 50.7 
Karonga 272,789 54.9 28.3 9.3 7 13.3 1.4 -5.5 
Likoma 10,445      
 
  
Mzimba 724,873 50.6 22.7 5.8 30 11 8.3 38.4 
NkhataBay 213,779 63.0 30.3 10.6 na 11.9 0.9 -17.1 
Rumphi 169,112 61.6 24.2 7.4 15 10.1 0.9 13.4 
Dedza 623,789 54.6 20.9 7.9 30 11.1 6.3 14.5 
Dowa 556,678 36.6 4.8 2.9 16 10.2 4.6 23.8 
Kasungu 616,085 44.9 15.1 4.8 24 9.4 5.8 39.0 
Lilongwe 1,228,143 37.5 11.7 6.3 18 8.1 11.1 27.3 
Mchinji 456,558 59.6 30.4 13.4 18 9.7 5.5 54.2 
Nkhotakota 301,868 48.0 11.4 4.8 46 12.2 1.2 -159.2 
Ntcheu 474,464 51.6 21.1 13.7 73 14.8 6.3 39.6 
Ntchisi 224,098 47.3 12.2 8.8 35 7.6 2.3 55.1 
Salima 340,327 57.3 25.0 12.9 64 10.5 2.5 1.1 
Balaka 316,748 66.8 33.5 19.0 81 16.8 3.9 8.3 
Blantyre 338,047 46.5 16.0 9.5 77 16.8 2.9 28.7 
Chikwawa 438,895 65.8 31.9 11.0 80 14.7 2.3 -94.2 
Chiradzulu 290,946 63.5 27.5 9.3 80 18.8 2.0 -35.6 
Machinga 488,996 73.7 38.3 18.5 62 11.7 3.4 -61.4 
Mangochi 803,602 60.7 29.3 13.3 35 14.3 7.1 2.2 
Mulanje 525,429 68.6 30.6 10.9 76 17.8 3.7 -12.4 
Mwanza 94,476 55.6 19.7 6.3 76 17.5 1.2 43.0 
Neno  108,897    86 na 1.5 36.4 
Nsanje 238,089 76.0 44.3 22.8 81 17.6 0.8 -166.4 
Phalombe 313,227 61.9 26.9 15.5 50 15.5 2.7 18.8 
Thyolo 587,455 64.9 33.0 9.7 71 10.5 3.4 1.3 
Zomba 583,167 70.0 41.0 18.2 62 16.8 6.0 23.5 
National 1,3066,320 52.4 22.3 9.6 40 12.4 100* 21.4* 
North (%)  13.0 56.3 25.9 7.9 31 7.9 13.2* 16.0* 
Centre (%) 42.0 46.7 16.2 7.8 36 7.8 45.6* 10.6* 
South (%) 45.0 64.4 31.5 13.6 71 13.6 40.9* -16.0* 
The bolded italics are the seven pilot social cash transfer sites in Malawi as of June 2010 
*The figures may not add up to or tally with national figures provided in Section 4.2 of 
Chapter 4 due to discrepancies in the official data.  
Source: Data in or underlying various Tables in Section 4.2 (Chapter 4) and author 
calculations 
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As demonstrated in Table 6.1 above, Mchinji district is not in fact amongst the poorest or 
most deprived districts in Malawi. Indeed, its poverty rate in the 2004-05 IHS2 was estimated 
at 59.6 per cent which places it exactly in the middle of Malawi’s districts, ordered by the 
poverty criterion. Half of Malawi’s districts had poverty rates over 60 per cent in 2004-05, 
and three had poverty rates over 70 per cent (Zomba, Machinga and Nsanje). Similar 
considerations apply to rates of ultra poverty and the ‘ultra-poor labour constrained’. The 
population of Mchinji considered ‘at risk’ of food insecurity in 2005 according to an MVAC 
assessment compiled by the World Bank (2007a) was 18 per cent, placing Mchinji as the 5th 
most secure district; while many other districts were assessed to have ‘at risk’ rates of 70 or 
80 per cent. With respect to the proportion of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in the 
population, Mchinji is also only the 5th highest, with an OVC of 9.7 per cent, whereas 8 
districts have estimated OVC rates of over 15 per cent (Government of Malawi 2006b, p.253). 
Finally, Mchinji is a strong maize surplus district overall, whereas many other districts have 
low predicted maize surpluses or serious maize deficits. It would seem that proximity to the 
capital Lilongwe, relative strength in district administration, and political factors were 
probably the decisive factors resulting in the choice of Mchinji for Malawi’s first poverty-
targeted social cash transfer scheme. 
From the outset, the Mchinji pilot SCT scheme adopted a variable rather than fixed approach 
to the level of cash transfers provided to beneficiary households. This was a departure 
compared to Kalomo where households were given the same level of transfer irrespective of 
household size or demographic structure. In Mchinji, the level of transfer varied according to 
household size, and extra payments were made for the confirmed school attendance of school-
age children (6-18 years old). The monthly cash transfer grant to a beneficiary household was 
designed as shown in Table 6.2 below. The cash transfer rises from MK600 per month for a 
one-person household to a maximum of MK1,800 per month for four or more persons in the 
household. In addition a school bonus is paid for each child attending school of MK200 per 
month for primary school pupils and MK400 per month for secondary school pupils. The cash 
levels have not been adjusted since the scheme was introduced in 2006 when a MK600 grant 
was equal to US$4.00 (Schubert 2007a, pp.18-22) at that time, in line with a national poverty 
line of MK 44.30 (US$0.5) per person per day.62 A six-person household with two secondary 
and one primary school children would obtain a transfer of MK2,400 (US$17) per month. In 
                                                 
62
 The exchange rate used for these calculations was MK140 to US$1, a rate which prevailed for several 
years in the middle and second half of the 2000s. 
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2008, the average level of transfer in the Mchinji scheme was MK2,000 (US$14) per month 
(Government of Malawi 2008e). 
Table 6.2: Levels of monthly cash grants to a household in the Mchinji SCT 
Household size (Persons) Monthly cash grant (MK/month) 
Main transfer  
One 600 
Two 1,000 
Three 1,400 
Four or more 1,800 
  
School bonus (per child)   
Primary school  200 
Secondary school 400 
 
Source: Schubert (2007a, pp.18-22) 
 
 
 
The implementation and management arrangement for the Mchinji scheme involves 
committees that work successively from national to district and to community levels. Key 
actors are the Ministry of Gender and Community Services as ‘owner’ of the scheme; the 
National AIDS Commission (NAC) as fund managing agency; UNICEF as a technical 
support agency; the District Assembly as implementing agency and Community Social Cash 
Transfer Committees as facilitators of community activities. This structure is also replicated 
in additional districts subsequently added to the SCT programme. In the subsequent 
description of organisation given here, most characteristics apply to all districts included in 
the SCT programme; however, specific examples typically refer to Mchinji district where the 
author’s fieldwork was conducted. 
The overall responsibility of the programme lies within the Department of Social Welfare in 
the Ministry of Gender and Community Services. A separate Social Cash Transfer Unit within 
the department and headed by a programme manager is responsible for daily management and 
coordination of the Malawi social cash transfer programme, and also serves as a social cash 
transfer secretariat for Malawi. Up to 2010, the SCT activities have been managed on a 
project basis but there are now plans to manage the scaled-up activities (2011-2015) as part of 
ongoing activities of the ministry (Government of Malawi 2010i). 
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Once in the district, a district secretariat headed by the District Commissioner (DC) has 
overall responsibility. The team varies from district to district but comprises between four and 
13 members, the most influential of whom are the DC, director of finance, director of district 
planning and development and district social welfare officer. The daily management and 
coordination of the programme activities is done by a District Social Cash Transfer unit which 
is responsible to the District Social Welfare Officer. The unit comprises a maximum of four 
staff from the Department Of Social Welfare and is headed by a desk officer. Chapter 3 has 
discussed district committees established within the framework of the Malawi national 
decentralization policy of 1998 to promote local participation in governance and development 
management. Heads of district level government departments are members of the District 
Executive Committee (DEC) headed by a district director of planning and reporting to the DC 
as the head of district assembly. With respect to the social cash transfer programme, the DEC 
has a subcommittee, the District Social Cash Transfer Committee (DSCTC) which is 
responsible for appraising and approving the list of potential scheme beneficiaries.  
Once in a community, the coordination of the programme is carried out by community social 
cash transfer committees (CSCTCs), which are sub-committees of village development 
committee (VDCs). Chapter 4 has discussed that the social cash transfer scheme treats village 
development committees (VDCs) as the relevant local domain for targeting purposes. 
Typically, a VDC in Mchinji has 400 households (Miller et al. 2008b, p.19) but officials state 
that the SCT programme has maintained 800-1,400 households per VDC to discourage the 
mushrooming of villages that Malawi has experienced in the last ten years (Government of 
Malawi 2010i) most probably to benefit from the proliferation of uncoordinated transfer 
programmes in the country, especially the ISP (Chinsinga 2009).  
In official guidelines for the election of CSCTCs, communities are required to choose 12 
CSCTC members (6 men and 6 women) who are trustworthy, energetic, able to read, write or 
speak in English, and willing to work on voluntary basis, and should not be village heads. The 
typical committee comprised a chairperson and vice-chairperson, secretary and vice-secretary, 
treasurer and 7 committee members; but there are many variations in practice as communities 
seek representation of their interests. There is little doubt that some individuals manoeuvre to 
become CSCTC members in order to benefit from the incentives provided by the scheme (see 
below). Village heads cannot be elected to the committees but, in reality, have been observed 
to serve as CSCTC members, or have influenced election of some individuals into CSCTCs. 
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There are speculations, difficult to verify, that district officials and members of CSCTCs 
influence the selection process in order to position themselves to access resources associated 
with the scheme (Miller et al. 2008c, p. 37). 
Since September 2007, a ‘volunteer allowance’ has been built into the operation of the 
Mchinji and other district SCTs in Malawi. This followed complaints from volunteers that the 
time they gave up to selecting beneficiaries and delivering the cash transfer was entirely 
unrewarded. CSCTC members receive bicycles, t-shirts and a monthly allowance. The latter 
began in September 2007 at a level of MK500 per month, later becoming MK835 per month 
in April 2008 and (in Mchinji) MK1,250 per month in May 2010. MK835 per day is also paid 
when CSCTC members attend ‘external meetings’ or workshops outside or within their VDC, 
unless the meetings are organized by themselves (Government of Malawi 2010i). It was 
apparent during the fieldwork that some members of the CSCTCs, especially chairpersons, 
had effectively become ‘employees’ of the programme because they were observed to be 
attending to SCT affairs on a daily basis morning to evening, thereby drawing the MK835 
daily (in some days when they attended district workshops), and raising some doubt about the 
voluntarism of their posts. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the implementation arrangement of the Malawi social cash transfer 
programme as observed during the fieldwork 2007/08. It can be noted in passing here that a 
draft National Social Support (‘social protection’) Policy that is coordinated by a social 
protection unit in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development provides for 
establishment of Social Protection Steering Committee (SPSC), and Social Protection 
Technical Committee (SPTC) at national level, district social protection committee (DSPC) as 
sub-committee of DEC at district level and community social protection committees (CSPCs) 
as sub-committees of VDCs at community level. Ideally, all existing transfer committees 
(including social cash transfer committees and input subsidy committees) would become sub-
committees of these respective overall social protection committees. To date, however, these 
social protection committees are still a concept because the government has not yet approved 
the National Social Support Policy. Only the national level committees (SPSC and SPTC) are 
functional. In most official documents, the social cash transfer committees and social 
protection committees are used interchangeably, causing some confusion in any discussion of 
the emerging administrative structure. 
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Figure 6.2: Institutional arrangement for Malawi Social Cash Transfers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author illustration based on what was observed during fieldwork, 2007/08 
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6.2.2 The targeting process 
The targeting process in SCT involves three major sequential stages, namely, selection of 
districts, selection of communities and selection of beneficiaries. A summary of these stages 
is provided in Figure 6.3. In this sequence, the village development committee (VDC) is the 
relevant local domain for targeting purposes. The criteria by which VDCs within a district are 
not clear, but ministry and district officials that were consulted during the fieldwork claimed 
that the VDCs in Mchinji were selected because of poverty levels and road accessibility 
during rainy season. 63 
The official guidelines describe the steps to be followed the first time the programme is newly 
introduced in a district, in terms of identifying, selecting and registering beneficiaries. The 
first step requires the district to prepare a list of all villages and households from which 
project sites are to be selected. The second step involves orientation and training of a core 
district team to be involved in the implementation and management of the programme. The 
third step is to facilitate formation and training of community social cash transfer committees 
(CSCTCs) (Government of Malawi 2007b). Once communities have been identified, the 
actual registration of the beneficiary households is conducted by the CSCTCs. Chapter 7 
discusses what was observed during the field work in 2007/08 in Mchinji district regarding 
the process to select the membership of CSCTCs.  
Once the CSCTCs are formed and trained, they are ready to select beneficiaries, using pre-
designed forms to fill in details of potential beneficiary households. The registration forms 
(Form 1) that CSCTCs complete at village level and counter-signed by head of household ask 
for (1) listing of household members, (2) relationship with household head, (3) ages and date 
of birth, (4) gender (M/F), (5) fit/unfit to work, (6) if unfit for work, reasons, (7) whether a 
child is an orphan who lost one or both parents, (8) whether in school (9) name of school and 
class. There are also narrative questions seeking detailed explanation of socio-economic 
situation of the household such as: (1) why the household requires social welfare 
interventions; (2) sources of livelihood of this household (3) types of assets owned (4) other 
programmes the household benefit (5) whether the household has been affected by a chronic 
disease especially AIDS and how.  
                                                 
63
 The accessibility issue also emerged during discussions on which VDCs should be selected for this 
research.  
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Figure 6.3: Stages in the targeting and approval process 
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The village level lists of potential beneficiaries (Form 1s) are then discussed at CSCTC 
meetings attended by extension workers and village heads and observed by district officials. 
All names approved at the VDC level during the CSCTCs ranking meetings are then written 
down on a form (Form 2) in order of their ranking, with the neediest being number one 
priority deserving the social cash transfers. Form 2 has ten columns, nine of which are 
required to be completed by VDC (1) rank, (2) name of household head (3) age of household 
head; (4) gender of household head, (5) number of household members, (6) number of 
household members fit to work, (7) number of children under the age of 19, (8) number in 
primary school, (9) number in secondary school. Column 10 is reserved for district Social 
Cash Transfer Committee to indicate decision (approved/rejected) and the recommended 
amount of cash transfer for the approved household. Before Form 2 is submitted to the 
district, a community meeting is held to discuss the ranking.  
The VDC list (Form 2) is then submitted to district for approval by DSCTC at a meeting 
attended by members of CSCTCs to argue for the recommended households. Rejected names 
are transferred onto Form 3 (Application Forms Rejected by DSCTC and Reasons for 
Rejection) which has three columns (1) rank given by CSCTC, (2) name of head of 
Household and (3) specific reasons for rejecting application and recommendations for follow 
up. Approved names are transferred onto Form 4 (Payment Order for Beneficiaries of the 
Social Cash Transfer Scheme) in which the DSCTC requests the district director of finance to 
pay the beneficiaries the monthly cash grants. Form 4 (listing approved names at VDC level) 
has four columns (1) number - on the list and not household number; (2) name of beneficiary 
and a deputy- in the event the main beneficiary is not able to receive the payment; (3) 
beneficiary card number; (4) name of village and (5) transfer amount (MK). The director of 
finance then transfers the names onto Form 5 (Payment Form to be signed by beneficiaries). It 
has six columns – (1) number of household; (2) name of beneficiary and a deputy; (3) Identity 
Card number; (4) received –MK, (5) signature – fingerprint and (6) date. Forms 1-5 are the 
most ‘important’ ones but the programme has also three other forms; Form 6 
(Recommendation for exclusion of some beneficiaries from the scheme), Form 7 (Information 
from a CSCTCs on changes in the structure of a beneficiary household) and Form 8 
(Information from a CSCTCs on the change of a representative).  
The ways CSCTCs translate official guidelines into practice is inevitably somewhat 
subjective. Table 6.3 presents the output of the CSCTCs vetting process at one of the VDCs in 
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Mchinji to illustrate the actual beneficiary ranking process. It can be seen that household 
ranked number one was assessed on the basis of lack of support for school children and 
prevalence of orphans; while an elderly headed household with no known active labour was 
ranked number six but it is hard to determine how needy one household was from the other. 
Nevertheless, official district statistics reveal that most beneficiaries of the programme are 
households headed by females, the elderly and children. This does not on its own mean that 
beneficiary households are worse off than non-beneficiary households. 
Table 6.3: Community ranking of households 
Name of 
household head 
Age Household 
size 
Number 
fit to 
work 
Social economic 
status 
Rank 
Luwiza Kang’ombe 48 5 0 The head is a TB patient 
and is caring for orphans 
2 
Mzamose Vaisoni 78 2 0 No decent house and no 
fit member to work 
5 
Talasizio Liberito 46 9 2 They are caring for many 
members 
4 
Maliyase Simioni 90 1 0 No fit member to work 6 
Liviness Chavela 27 10 1 School children lack 
help; caring for orphans 
1 
Sabina Filipo 33 5 1 Caring for an elderly 
person and orphans 
3 
Source: Miller et al (2008b, p.49) 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 compares characteristics of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the Mchinji 
scheme from data collected and reported in the Mchinji evaluation by Miller et al. (2008). 
This reveals that cash beneficiary households were significantly larger than non-beneficiary 
households, and also a slightly greater number of the cash beneficiary households cared for 
orphans. On the other hand, more non-beneficiary households than beneficiary households 
were headed by the elderly. Otherwise, there is little evidence to suggest that cash beneficiary 
households comprised more vulnerable persons compared to non-beneficiary households. If 
anything, cash beneficiary households comprised a higher proportion of persons below the 
age of 65 years, especially 19-64, while the non-beneficiary households had a comparatively 
higher proportion of members above the age of 65 years. There is no significant difference in 
the proportions of children below the age of 18 years, including orphans in the two groups.  
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Table 6.4: Characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in Mchinji 
Demographic characteristics of households Cash 
(N1) 
Noncash 
(N2) 
Evidence 
 
Characteristics of households (N1 = 374; N2 = 392)  
Household size 4.5 3.5 *** 
HHs caring for orphans (%) 53.2 43.3 * 
HHs caring for chronically ill 20.1 24.7 
HHs where at one member living with HIV/AIDS (%) 6.2 3.8 
HHs where members on ARVs (N1 = 19, N2 =15) (%) 82.6 66.7 
HHs keeping persons carers died of HIV/AIDS (%) 8.3 7.9 
Children below age of 18 years (N1 =1056; N2 = 770)  
Orphan lost mother (%) 9.7 11.2 
Orphan lost father (%) 27.3 28.6 
Orphan lost both parents (%) 22.3 20.5 
Any orphanhood (%) 59.2 60.3 
Non orphan (%) 40.5 39.5 
Distribution of all persons (N1 = 1693; N2 = 1367)a  
Aged 18 years and less (%) 62.4 56.5 
Aged 19-64 years (%) 18.0 16.0 *** 
Aged 65 years and above 12.9 21.5 * 
 
Female adults (%) 63.2 67.4 
Distribution of heads of households (N1 = 367; N2 = 387)  
Aged Less than 24 years 1.4 1.8 
Aged 25-64 years 48.9 35.1 ** 
Aged 65 years and above 49.7 63.1 ** 
Mean age in years 63.2 67.4 *** 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
a Author’s estimation based on original results in Miller et al. cited below 
 
Source: compiled from Mchinji evaluation results (Miller et al. 2008a) 
 
These results in Table 6.4 can be contrasted with the official data, shown in Table 6.10, which 
suggests, for example, that 60.6 per cent of the beneficiary households in Mchinji were 
headed by the elderly. During the author’s fieldwork in Mchinji in 2007/08, an elderly person 
in the district records for the case study communities were not actually persons above the age 
of 65 but individuals who ‘looked like they were elderly’ and were most likely above the age 
of 55 or 60. Similarly, households that were classified as headed by children were not in 
strictest sense headed by persons below the age of 18 years, but included those up to the age 
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of 25 years (many of whom were still in school). These age-related anomalies occur mostly 
due to inconsistencies in the policy and legal framework in Malawi64. 
6.2.3 Programme funding and related financial aspects 
As discussed earlier, the Global Fund has hitherto been the major funder of SCTs in Malawi, 
through the National AIDS Commission (NAC). Once the funds are with NAC, they are 
transferred to district accounts following agreed schedules. Subsequent transfers depend on 
accounting of previous disbursements, and submission of reports. NAC is a major grant 
manager to various district programme and activities related to HIV/AIDS and the SCTs are 
only one of many grants the Commission handles. Failure by a district to account for funds 
relating to one programme or activity means that all other programmes that are funded 
through NAC are affected. In fact NAC has so far been rarely implicated in cases where 
beneficiaries have failed to receive their grants, and more serious problems have been 
encountered in the resource flow from the Global Fund (Miller et al. 2008b).  
It is worth recognising that implementation of an SCT represents a step change in the size of 
financial resources being handled at district level (with important potential implications for 
security and governance). In Mchinji district in 2008, for example, the SCT budget was 
MK6.1 million (US$43,000) per month for the 2,800 beneficiary households (MK5.7 million 
actual cash transfers and MK0.5 million, or 7.2 per cent, operational costs). This MK6.1 
million represented an annual budget of MK73.2 million in 2008, which was higher than the 
2007/08 budget allocated to all other district level line departments except health. In 
particular, the monthly SCT budget dwarfed the Mchinji district budget allocation of the 
Ministry of Gender which has the overseeing role of the scheme (see Table 6.5).65 
                                                 
64
 Broadly, policy in Malawi describes persons aged below 18 years as children, persons aged 15 to 25 
years as youth and persons aged 65 years and above as the elderly. In principle, children, the elderly 
and most youth in school or training are dependents. In reality, however, some children head 
households because of orphanhood and other child vulnerabilities (OVCs). Legal age for marriage in 
Malawi is 18 years but under-age marriages are common and not illegal. However, policy generally 
recognises child headed households as those headed by OVCs and ‘youth’ who are still in education 
but not those in ‘child/ early marriages’. The elderly are assumed to have ‘retired’ from productive 
economic engagements. In the past, most elderly people depended on children for care and livelihoods. 
Now, majority have become carers and providers, especially for OVCs and the chronically ill. In the 
study communities and in official district social cash transfer records, an elderly person was any 
person over the age of 60 years while households headed by the youth (though not in school) were also 
treated as child headed households (Government of Malawi 1995, 2003b). 
65
 The monthly SCT budget for Mchinji had increased to MK20.84 million for 9,100 beneficiary 
households by June 2010 (see Table 6.9), implying an annual budget of MK250 million.  
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Table 6.5: Approved Mchinji district budget in the 2007/08 National Budget 
District sector Allocation (MK) Allocation (%) 
Agriculture 17,538,771  5.9 
Education  12,156,460  4.1 
Health  231,377,856  77.6 
General Resource Fund 14,331,269  4.8 
Constituency Development Fund 18,000,000  6.0 
Housing 926,941  0.3 
Trade 1,100,000  0.4 
Water 862,085  0.3 
Gender 1,800,861  0.6 
Total Assembly Allocation 298,094,243  100.0 
 Source: Government of Malawi (2007a) 
 
6.3 Emerging field experiences on the operations and outcomes of the scheme 
This section draws on an evaluation of the Mchinji scheme conducted from March 2007 to 
May 2008 by Boston University (Drs Candace Miller and Kathryn Reichert) and the Centre 
for Social Research of the University of Malawi (Mr Maxton Tsoka) with funding from the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID) and UNICEF. The evaluation had three 
distinct phases covering targeting, operations and impact. A number of findings and 
recommendations emerged from the evaluation, and the focus here is on aspects considered 
most relevant for this thesis. 
6.3.1 Uses of the cash grants 
Social cash transfers are unconditional grants, and this is regarded as a key positive feature of 
them by human rights advocates (Freeland, 2007). In the April 2008 household survey 
conducted for the Mchinji evaluation, 374 beneficiary households were asked how they spent 
the cash grants that they had received in March 2008. Table 6.6 reproduces the data provided 
by the evaluation but extends this in an attempt to estimate overall expenditure proportions 
that are suggested for the different types of expenditure listed. The evaluation report lists 
expenditure categories followed by the proportion of households reporting expenditure on that 
category, and the average spent per household. This data has been used to infer the total 
expenditure across all households on that category, and the share of that category in overall 
expenditure of the cash transfers. This is evidently a somewhat rough and ready exercise, but 
it is broad orders of magnitude which are of interest. 
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Table 6.6: Major uses of the March 2008 cash grants in the Mchinji scheme 
Major items on which 
households spent their 
March 2008 cash grants 
Miller (n = 374 HHs) Author calculations (n = 1004) 
HHs 
(%) 
Amt spent 
(MK) 
Obs. 
(n) 
Total spend 
(MK) Share (%) 
Food 92.5 903 346 312,393 49.3 
Household items 54.7 486 205 99,425 15.7 
Saving 39.8 596 149 88,716 14.0 
School/education 27.8 470 104 48,867 7.7 
Healthcare: medications 24.6 296 92 27,233 4.3 
Livestock 6.5 590 24 14,343 2.3 
Labour 6.2 470 23 10,898 1.7 
Agricultural inputs 5.2 515 19 10,016 1.6 
Business or IGA 3.5 569 13 7,448 1.2 
Transport  3.2 369 12 4,416 0.7 
Housing 2.9 673 11 7,299 1.2 
Beer & tobacco 1.1 45 4 185 0.03 
Lending 0.5 950 2 1,777 0.3 
Total 1004 633,016 100.0 
 Source: (Miller et al. 2008a, 40); author’s own calculations. 
 
In interpreting the data in Table 6.6, the timing of the evaluation survey is critical. March has 
a special place in Malawi’s food security calendar, since it is the month immediately before 
the next harvest. In March, all previous food stocks tend to be depleted, and vulnerable 
households are ‘clinging on’ until the maize harvest begins in or towards the end of the month 
of April. March is not a month when expenditure would be made on agricultural inputs. These 
circumstances are reflected in the table. The largest single item of expenditure from transfers 
was food, and 92.5 per cent of recipient households reported spending part of their transfers 
on food (it is perhaps surprising that this figure is not 100 per cent, but there are always 
anomalies in socio-economic data of this kind). It is calculated that just under half (49.3 per 
cent) of the total transfer amount was spent on food by beneficiary households in that month. 
Later, in Chapter 7, the author’s own fieldwork discovers a figure about half that proportion 
(i.e. around 25 per cent), but that is based on repeat visits every 3 months, rather than a one 
month spot check. 
In general, Table 6.6 displays prudent use of cash transfers by beneficiaries, with some 
interesting aspects. After food, other household basic needs and saving are the next two most 
important categories, the latter apparently indicating that despite the extreme poverty of cash 
transfer recipients a significant proportion of them (40 per cent) felt able to put cash to one 
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side for future use rather than spend it on immediate necessities. An important consideration 
here which is returned to with some force in Chapter 7 is that after a year or more of 
operation, cash transfer recipients are, in effect, no longer the poorest of the poor since they 
have had a steady cash income throughout the period of their enrolment on the scheme (see 
also discussion of SCT weaknesses in Section 6.5 below). Education is the fourth most 
important category of expenditure, but nevertheless represents quite a small proportion of the 
total at around 8 per cent. This is interesting given that a significant proportion of 
beneficiaries are given school bonuses as part of their transfer, and the indication is perhaps 
that these bonuses are treated just as part of the household cash flow, and not necessarily seen 
as money that should be spent on children’s educational needs.  
6.3.2 Programme outcomes on poverty and vulnerability reduction 
The Mchinji evaluation allows the outcomes and impacts of the SCT to be assessed according 
to three themes: (a) poverty reduction impacts (incomes, assets, ganyu participation, child 
education and health); (b) food security and nutrition impacts (meal frequency, amounts of 
food and nutritional status of children); and (c) agricultural impacts (access to inputs, 
production and sales income). In the following paragraphs, these are examined in turn. 
One aim of social cash transfers is to protect the consumption of extremely poor people and, 
possibly, lift households out of ultra-poverty. The beneficiary selection criteria try to ensure 
that recipient households are those possessing the lowest income and assets. Table 6.7 
provides data from the evaluation that compares beneficiary and non-beneficiary households 
over a period of one year. The table contains findings from the Mchinji evaluation, 
supplemented by the author’s further analysis of changes that might have occurred between 
the two groups. All the indicators presented in Table 6.7 showed significant differences 
between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in both periods at p=0.001; only 
ownership of hoes in September 2007 were different at p=0.05. According to Miller et al., 
(2008a) the asset status of cash beneficiary households had improved greatly; indeed, the only 
asset cash beneficiary households might have owned before the scheme were sickles, the rest 
had been accumulated because of the scheme.  
Analysis of the evaluation results show that the scheme has had impacts on income and asset 
ownership but the degree of success may not be quite as portrayed in the evaluation report. 
Income indicators have changed significantly, but examination of changes in proportions of 
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households owning different assets reveals, overall, only a 2 per cent point difference between 
cash and non-cash beneficiary households (15.7 per cent average for cash beneficiaries and 
13.8 per cent average for non-beneficiaries). The evaluation results also do not indicate the 
baseline situation at the start of the Mchinji scheme in June 2006. In any case, the earlier 
discussion has discussed that the schemes are not particularly operating in deprived areas or 
targeted at very destitute households as many tend to believe.  
Table 6.7: Comparing changes in incomes and ownership of assets 
Asset description Mchinji evaluation Author analysis 
of changes (%) Sept 2007 April 2008 
 Cash Noncash Cash Noncash Cash Noncash 
Number of observations 387 401 
 
 387 401 
Proxy income indicators     
Agric incomes (MK/year) 2000 2000 4000 2000 100.0 0.0 
Food expenditures (MK/mth) 460 645 3310 369 619.6 -42.8 
Asset ownership (% HHs)      
Bicycle 13.4 1.6 13.0 2.6 -3.0 62.5 
Chickens 63.4 10.1 71.0 10.3 12.0 2.0 
Goats 45.2 1.6 52.7 1.3 16.6 -18.8 
Pigs 17.5 0.0 15.2 0.3 -13.1 30.0 
Metal plates 91.0 56.0 64.1 96.5 -29.6 72.3 
Hoes 92.0 84.0 95.2 81.8 3.5 -2.6 
Metal pots 91.2 72.7 97.3 90.0 6.7 23.8 
Pounding mortar 52.0 31.0 59.6 35.4 14.6 14.2 
Axes 32.5 28.5 51.9 19.0 59.7 -33.3 
Pails, buckets 90.0 59.0 92.6 62.6 2.9 6.1 
Sickles 26.0 17.0 56.9 17.0 118.8 0.0 
Mats 95.7 72.5 95.5 79.2 -0.2 9.2 
Overall average  
  
 15.7 13.8 
 
Source: Miller et al. (2008a, pp.39-42) and author calculations 
 
 
Social cash transfers in Malawi have demonstrated improved food security in terms of food 
expenditures, fewer missed meals, fewer days without adequate food, and greater food 
diversity. For example, between March 2007 and April 2008, beneficiary households had 1.2 
days of ‘inadequate’ food in a month compared to 5.2 days for non-beneficiaries. And 44 per 
cent of beneficiary households were reported taking three meals compared to only 8 per cent 
of the non-beneficiary households. In March/April 2008, 88 per cent of beneficiary 
households compared to only 57 per cent of non-beneficiary households had food stocks in 
store. For those with food in store, stocks for 81 per cent of the non-beneficiaries compared to 
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68 per cent of beneficiary households would not last four weeks (Miller et al. 2008a). Table 
6.8 summarises these food security impacts from the Mchinji evaluation. 
Table 6.8: Food security and nutrition impact indicators in the Mchinji scheme 
Food security indicator 
 
Cash 
(n=374) 
Noncash 
(n=392) 
Evidence 
 
Number of meals taken day before survey visit:  
No meals 0.5 4.3 * 
One meal 6.4 43.6 *** 
Two meals 47.9 44.4 
Three meals 44.4 7.7 *** 
Four meals 0.8 0.0 
Food types taken during one week period:  
Cereals/grains 100.0 99.5 
Roots/Tubers 58.3 32.9 *** 
Pulses 92.0 51.3 *** 
Vegetables 100.0 99.5  
Meat/Fish 82.1 18.6 *** 
Dairy (Eggs/Milk) 44.9 4.6 *** 
Fruit 82.1 49.0 *** 
Sugar 75.7 29.6 *** 
Cooking Oil 73.3 9.7 *** 
Salt 96.8 93.6 * 
Average number of food types (max-10) 8.1 4.9 *** 
Meals with meat, fish or chicken (days/week) 2.1 0.3 *** 
Time March/April 2008 food stocks would deplete:  
Less than 1 week 22.2 48.2 *** 
1-4 weeks 32.9 45.6 ** 
1-2 months 13.7 13.5 
3-6 months 12.5 5.4 ** 
6 months 5.8 0.0 ** 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Source: Miller et al. (2008a, pp.35-38) 
 
From the point of view of this thesis, the lack of difference in households taking two meals 
per day requires special discussion. This research tracked households in three VDCs in the 
Mchinji project site from January to September 2008, including observing the food situation 
and conducting key informant interviews. The number of meals (ideally three meals per day) 
and diversity of foods are important vulnerability and food security indicators (Dorward et al. 
2008), but the fieldwork for this research established that most households typically ate two 
meals (lunch and supper) of nsima (maize meal) with vegetables or legumes. Formal breakfast 
was rare because people were busy with farm work and other activities. Nevertheless, some 
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households missed meals because of lack of food while relatively better off households had 
three meals, including meat-based meals and formal breakfast of tea with bread on a more 
regular basis. The pattern of meals in Table 6.7 depicts this. The large differences in the 
duration food stocks lasted may also require elaboration. It is possible that calculations did 
not account for differences in household calorie requirements, a consideration which this 
thesis reconsiders in Chapter 7. 
The Mchinji evaluation also demonstrates the potential of an SCT to improve household and 
child health. Fewer sicknesses among adults and children, and greater demand for healthcare 
for children and adults and higher healthcare expenditures were reported. For example, 73 per 
cent of cash beneficiary households and only 7 per cent of non-beneficiary households 
reported improved health status over a one year period between March 2007 and April 2008. 
In particular, nutritional status of under-five children had improved significantly (Miller et al. 
2008a, p.23-29). The graphs in Figures 6.4 (a-c) all suggest the better position of beneficiary 
households compared to non-beneficiary households, although the prevalence of child 
malnutrition in both households is apparently high.  
Figure 6.4: Nutritional status of children in Mchinji Scheme in April 2008  
 
Figure 6.4a: Wasting (weight for height)  
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Figure 6.4b: Stunting (height for age) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4c: Underweight (weight for age) 
 
 
Source: Data in Table 21 of Miller et al. (2008a, p.29) 
 
 
The evaluation also presented evidence supporting increased demand for child education, 
reflected in resulting in higher school enrolment, fewer absences and higher expenditure on 
child education. The evaluation recorded a monthly school expenditure difference of MK333 
per child or MK1,049 per household between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. 
Between March 2007 and March/April 2008, 8.3 per cent of children in cash beneficiary 
households enrolled in school for first time compared to 3.4 per cent of children in non-
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beneficiary households. By March/April 2008, 96 per cent of children in beneficiary 
households compared to 84 per cent of children in non-beneficiary households were in school. 
In March 2007, there were no significant differences in the number of days children were 
absent from school (2.8 days for children in cash beneficiary households against 3.2 days for 
children in non-beneficiary households) but by March/April 2008, children in cash 
beneficiary households were absent 1.3 fewer days than their counterparts in non-beneficiary 
households; at 1.1 days for children in cash beneficiary households against 2.4 days for 
children in non-beneficiary households (Miller et al. 2008a, p.30). Similar improvements in 
school attendance in beneficiary households due to cash transfers were recorded in a related 
cash transfer scheme in Zomba in southern Malawi (Baird et al. 2009). But as observed earlier 
(Table 6.6), the actual levels of expenditures are low given the school bonus incentive that the 
scheme provides. 
6.3.3 Conclusions of the Mchinji evaluation findings 
The evidence from the evaluation of the Mchinji scheme summarised above suggests that 
social cash transfers have a very considerable positive impact on the lives of the beneficiary 
households, both in the short term through immediate food needs and in the longer term 
through livelihoods investments (e.g. farm inputs and productive assets). The evaluation 
depended on an interval examination of a set of beneficiary and non-beneficiary involving 
surveys done in March 2007 and March-April 2008. It is probable that by March 2007, early 
recipients of cash transfers had already reaped considerable benefits from participation in the 
scheme, resulting in the data shown in Table 6.7 whereby the income and asset status of 
beneficiaries was already considerably above that of non-recipients of the cash transfer. In 
Chapter 7, this overall finding is affirmed by the author’s own fieldwork research, with the 
startling result that by 2008, cash transfer beneficiary households were ahead of non-
beneficiaries in just about all indicators of livelihood security. However, the Mchinji 
evaluation also raised some questions about scheme operation, including the accuracy of 
initial targeting, and these are taken up in Section 6.5 below. 
6.4 Social cash transfer roll-out and future intentions 
It is not entirely clear when the Malawi government decided to scale-up from the Mchinji 
pilot SCT scheme to cover more districts; however this happened at some stage between June 
2007 and November 2008. The scheme was extended nationally to six additional districts: 
Chitipa and Likoma in the northern region; Salima in the central region, and Machinga, 
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Mangochi and Phalombe in the southern region (Schubert 2007a, 2009). By March 2010, the 
programme covered a total of 28,000 beneficiary households, representing 11.2 per cent of 
those originally identified (by Schubert) as the ultra-poor labour constrained in Malawi. Table 
6.9 shows the start dates of the district schemes and the number of beneficiaries in June 2010. 
Table 6.10 summarises characteristics of the beneficiary households while Figure 6.5 shows 
the geographical location of these pilot districts. 
Table 6.9: Distribution of SCT, beneficiaries and monthly budgets 
Name of 
SCT 
District 
Programme Statistics, June 2010 District Statistics, June 2008 
Start date HHs No. Persons No. 
HH 
size* 
Monthly 
cash grants 
(MK) 
Monthly 
grant per 
HH (MK) 
Operational 
cost (%) 
Mchinji Sept 2006 9,140 35,182 3.8 18,280,000 2,000 14.0 
Likoma June 2007 183 773 4.2 366,000 2,000 30.0 
Machinga Sept 2007 4,229 18,579 4.4 8,458,000 2,000 21.0 
Salima Nov 2007 2,379 9,065 3.8 4,758,000 2,000 25.0 
Mangochi June 2008 4,859 20,260 4.2 9,718,000 2,000 25.0 
Chitipa Sept 2008 4,208 10,602 2.5 8,416,000 2,000 24.0 
Phalombe Sept 2008 3,140 12,073 3.8 6,280,000 2,000 26.0 
National  28,138 106,534 3.8 56,276,000 2,000 23.6 
 Note: * Author calculation 
 
Government of Malawi (2010i) 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.10: Distribution of SCT households and persons as of June 2010 
Project 
district 
Headship of beneficiary HHs  Persons in beneficiary households 
Total 
(n) 
Elderly 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
Child 
(%) 
Total 
(n) 
Children 
(%) 
Orphans 
(%) 
Elderly 
(%) 
Disabled 
(%) 
Mchinji 9,140 60.6 64.7 1.2 35,182 62.1 57.0 19.7 2.6 
Likoma 183 71.0 77.6 0.0 773 50.6 47.7 21.0 6.5 
Machinga 4,229 57.4 73.5 1.5 18,579 70.1 48.7 15.9 1.4 
Salima 2,379 43.5 62.5 0.8 9,065 50.9 43.0 16.7 1.5 
Mangochi 4,859 64.9 75.5 1.3 20,260 71.5 50.7 17.0 1.7 
Chitipa 4,208 52.0 46.5 0.3 10,602 56.7 32.3 23.4 2.8 
Phalombe 3,140 45.5 54.3 1.8 12,073 62.0 31.9 14.7 1.4 
Total 28,138 56.5 63.9 1.1 106,534 63.7 47.8 18.1 2.0 
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2010i) 
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Figure 6.5: Map of Malawi showing social cash transfer districts 
 
Note: Blue colour denotes Lake Malawi and Likoma is an island on Lake Malawi 
 
Source: Author editing of a map of Malawi showing SCT sites, accessed on 10/07/2009 
from: www.socialcashtransfers-malawi.org.  
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As shown in Table 6.9, the budgetary cost of scaled up coverage in June 2010 was MK69.6 
million per month, comprising MK56.3 million for transfer payments to 28,138 households, at 
an estimated average payment of MK2,000 per month, and MK13.3 million for administrative 
costs (23.6 per cent above the transfer value). The latter includes volunteer’s allowances, but 
does not include staff salaries and other remunerations met directly by the line ministries 
involved. A key emerging issue from the district budgets (MK) and operational costs (%) 
shown in Table 6.9 is the rising administrative cost of delivering the cash transfer programme. 
It is recalled that in April 2008 when the Mchinji scheme had 2,800 beneficiary households, 
the operational cost was 7.2 per cent in a monthly budget of MK6.1 million (US$43,000) 
which comprised MK5.7 million for actual cash grant transfers to the households and about 
MK0.5 million for operational costs (Government of Malawi 2008e). This low operational 
cost was one of the success highlights of the programme identified in the evaluation of the 
Mchinji scheme. The jump by roughly three times in the proportional cost of delivering 
transfers is perhaps an indicator of what happens when a pilot project moves from tight 
monitoring and control by a sponsoring agency (UNICEF in the case of the Mchinji scheme) 
to general implementation by the apparatus of decentralised government. 
While the Malawi government’s future stance on social cash transfers remains rather 
ambiguous (as manifested by the failure to date to adopt the Social Support Policy), 
nevertheless there is at least one document in circulation that envisages roll out to all ultra-
poor households by 2015, representing the poorest ten per cent of the population (Chinsinga 
2009, Schubert 2009). This suggests a phased expansion beginning initially with moving from 
the current seven districts to ten districts by the end of 2011, and thereafter rolling out an 
additional 6 districts every year until all 28 districts are covered with projected beneficiary 
numbers at 295,768 households. If this occurs, it is estimated that a budget in excess of 
US$55 million or 1.4 per cent of GDP would be required every year of the six years, as shown 
in Table 6.11. Apart from the potential funders listed in Table 6.11, some donors have 
expressed interest or will be approached to finance specific operational costs of the planned 
scaled-up programme: operational costs of US$22 million (European Union, Global Fund), 
capacity development costs of US$5.5 million (Irish Aid, Australian Aid, UNICEF), 
information management systems costs of US$2 million (World Bank), delivery mechanism 
costs of US$6.6 million (DFID) and monitoring and evaluation costs of US$4 million 
(USAID) (Chinsinga 2009, pp.22-23). 
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Table 6.11: Roll-out plan for the Malawi SCT programme, 2010/11-2014/15 
Financial 
year 
Number 
of 
districts 
Total 
HHs 
Cost of cash 
grants US$) 
Fund sources and contributions 
Government EU (10th EDF) Global Fund 
2009/10 7 87,032 17,406,440 - - - 
2010/11 10 105,096 22,914,110 - - 15,000,000 
2011/12 16 146,411 33,072,010 5,072,010 18,000,000 10,000,000 
2012/13 22 205,177  48,437,950 7,937,950 26,000,000 14,500,000 
2013/14 28 295,768 59,153,660 9,553,660 31,900,000 17,700,000 
2014/15 28 295,768 59,153,660 9,553,660 31,900,000 17,700,000 
Total   295,768 222,731,390 32,117,280  107,800,000 74,900,000  
Source: Chinsinga (2009, p.22) 
 
 
As noted earlier, the major programme funding to date has been from the Global Fund, the 
funding from which came to an end in 2009; however, resources allocated to the social cash 
transfer programme from the Global Fund contribution ended in October 2010. The Malawi 
Government in the 2010/11 budget allocated MK50 million for the SCT programme.66 The 
German Government has also provided US$20 million for three years from 2010, and Irish 
AID has shown some interest to fund the programme (Government of Malawi 2010i). It is 
therefore most unclear whether predictable long term funding for the current and subsequent 
expansion can in reality be secured. Already, following the end of the Global Fund 
Commitment, payments to existing recipients have been scaled back, and some months have 
been missed. Malawi’s multi-million dollar (US$560million) funding proposal (covering 
2011-16) to the Global Fund was rejected in 2010 for the second time (an earlier version was 
rejected in 2009) apparently for being considered too ambitious.67 Surprisingly, the latter 
proposal does not contain the proposed US$74.9 social cash transfer budget shown in Table 
6.11 (Global Fund 2010). 
It is evident that the budget for the roll-out plan depicted in Table 6.11 does not constitute a 
funding commitment on the part of the government, despite the document from which it is 
taken supposedly having some official authenticity. Four years after the government approved 
the pilot social cash transfer scheme and, thereafter, set in motion a scaling up process, it has 
                                                 
66
 This would barely cover the funding of SCT in Mchinji district for one year, and contrasts with over 
MK20 billion allocated to ISP in the 2009/10 budget. 
67
 In fact, proposals for big countries such as South Africa with high rates of HIV prevalence had budgets 
US$200 million lower than Malawi’s. The proposals and Fund’s decisions can be accessed at: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/fundingdecisions/approved/ 
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not made budgetary allocations to ensure predictable future funding for the programme. The 
best the government has so far approved in the national budget is funding for staff and 
operations as part of on-going recurrent budgets to line ministries and district assemblies. In 
the 2009/10 budget, the government approved and spent MK24.3 billion on social protection 
(whatever that entailed) but this was reduced by 95 per cent to only MK1.4 billion in the 
2010/11 national budget. In contrast, the ISP which cost MK39 billion in 2008/09 was 
allocated MK25 billion in 2009/10 and MK19.8 billion in 2010/11 national budget 
(Government of Malawi 2010b, pp.28-29).  
6.5 Emerging strengths and weaknesses of social cash transfers in Malawi 
The results of the independent external evaluation of the Mchinji pilot scheme summarised 
above demonstrate significant differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
households that point to better positions of beneficiary households in household and child 
well being, including better incomes, food security, school attendance and general health. 
Although the degree of these improvements relative to the circumstances of beneficiary 
households before scheme inception is difficult to pin down definitively, the evidence is 
sufficiently robust to provide powerful arguments to those who are in favour of scaling up the 
existing coverage to national level. The evaluation also noted strengths in its implementation 
efficiency, in terms of beneficiary targeting and cost effectiveness, these being comparable or 
even surpassing similar schemes in the USA, India and Latin America (Mexico or Brazil). In 
terms of targeting, designers of the programme set performance targets of 10 per cent 
inclusion error and 20 per cent exclusion error. Although the final outcomes were 22 per cent 
inclusion error and 38 per cent exclusion error, these errors were still lower or within the 
known range of ‘international’ errors (Miller et al. 2008c). Internationally, inclusion errors 
have been found to vary widely from 28 per cent in Ecuador to 99 per cent in Cambodia 
(Fiszbein et al. 2009, p.74). 
In addition an apparently notable achievement of the Malawi social cash transfer programme 
at the time of the evaluation in 2007-08 was in terms of the costs of delivering the social cash 
grant. The administrative costs of the Mchinji pilot were below 14 per cent of total benefit 
payments, compared to a target of 15 per cent or more in other countries or in other schemes 
in Malawi (for example, the ISP, discussed in Chapter 5). The evaluation found that 
irregularities in the accounting system of the Mchinji programme was in the scale of 0.3 per 
cent of total programme expenditures compared to countries where irregularities (fraud, error, 
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corruption) account for 32 per cent of programme expenditures in India or in the USA where 
overpayments (fraud) accounts for 4 per cent of programme costs (Miller et al. 2008b).  
The Malawi SCT also, however, reveals certain weaknesses of this approach to tackling 
vulnerability, and it is important to bring these to the surface since these help to weigh in the 
balance the arguments for and against different ways of reducing the incidence of chronic 
vulnerability to hunger in the country. Some of these weaknesses are general to the cash 
transfer approach, while others may be more to do with the practical implementation of cash 
transfers in Malawi. The weaknesses examined in this section include: 
(1) the problem of small economic and social difference, meaning that a cash transfer 
unduly favours one particular set of the rural poor, essentially placing them in a 
privileged position compared to other almost equally deprived ultra poor people; 
(2) the problem of the fixed proportional cap on beneficiary numbers, from national to 
district, sub-district and community levels (the ‘ten per cent’ rule), relative to varying 
ultra poverty levels in different locations; 
(3) the problem of targeting errors within existing design, i.e. how to avoid ‘elite capture’ 
and other problems in the selection of beneficiaries; 
(4) the problem of rising operational costs with scaling up, already shown by the costs 
associated with expansion to other districts in Malawi, and caused by incentive 
problems in the amount of time that has to be devoted to running a scaled up 
programme; 
(5) the problem of the real value of cash transfers when they remain the same in nominal 
value despite seasonal or long term changes in the prices of staple foods and basic 
needs (and exemplified by the rising price of maize in Malawi in 2007 and 2008) 
6.5.1 Income distribution effects of a cash transfer 
Taking each of these in turn, the first is concerned with the income distribution implications 
of a cash transfer, taking place in circumstances where over 50 per cent of the rural population 
are classified as poor, and where very small differences in per capita consumption distinguish 
successive consumption deciles up to about the sixth decile. This problem was already raised 
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in a preliminary way in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and Figure 1.1 shows the shallow slope of the 
lower 60 per cent rural income distribution. In fact, as discussed in Ellis (2011), for rural 
Malawi on average just MK195.60 (US$ 1.80 at US$1.00 = MK108.9, according to Ellis) per 
month separates the per capita consumption running from the first to the sixth consumption 
decile. In this context, a cash transfer of MK600 going up to MK1,800 (and more with school 
bonuses) inevitably alters the rural income distribution in favour of beneficiaries over non-
beneficiaries. The degree to which it does this depends on household size and demography, as 
well as the quantity of school bonuses received.  
Figure 6.6: Income Distribution Implications of Varying Levels of Cash Transfers 
  
Source: based with permission on Ellis (2011) 
 
The problem of income distribution is illustrated graphically by Ellis (2011) as shown in 
Figure 6.6, where different amounts of cash transfer per person are shown to propel their 
recipients up the income distribution. Ellis describes this problem as one of ‘leapfrogging’ 
beneficiaries up the income distribution. It is important not to mistake the argument that is 
being made here. It is inevitable of course that any welfare transfer to a poor person is going 
to improve their income position relative to other people in society (holding everything else 
the same). In economic terms, this would not be a reason not to make the transfer. In societies 
where the poorest and most underprivileged have consumption levels that are deeply below 
the majority of the population who are in work and enjoying sufficient lifestyles, the effect of 
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a welfare transfer is typically just to bring the poorest up to the ‘floor’ experienced by other 
people. However, in a country like Malawi these circumstances do not apply; the majority of 
rural people are very, very poor and therefore a welfare transfer has the potential literally to 
propel the recipients into a lifestyle position that is above that enjoyed by a substantial 
proportion of their fellow citizens. 
In the Malawi case, this problem can be demonstrated by reference to the actual effects of the 
cash transfers in the Mchinji pilot scheme, relative to the average per capita consumption in 
the bottom five deciles as shown by IHS2 (see Table 6.12). For example, the mean per capita 
consumption in the first decile is MK726 and for a one-person household the per capita 
transfer is MK600, giving a total per capita income with the transfer of MK1,326 per month. 
This essentially elevates that person to somewhere between the third and fourth deciles of the 
existing income distribution.68 Other similar jumps in income status can be inferred by the 
table. It is also worth bearing in mind that receipt of steady cash income places its recipient 
(in Malawi rural terms) in quite different circumstances with respect to livelihood risk. 
Whereas in general all livelihood components are subject to risk (crop failure, weak markets, 
failure to find ganyu etc.), a cash transfer all but eliminates this level of risk for its recipients. 
There is also a cumulative effect, in part set in motion by this significant reduction in risk: 
recipients can invest in agricultural inputs and assets in the knowledge that their basic food 
security is still secured by the cash transfer. 
Table 6.12: Illustrating ‘leap-frogging’ effects of social cash transfers in Malawi 
IHS2 
Income 
deciles 
Per capita 
income per 
month (MK) 69 
Decile plus cash transfer grant per person per month 
1 person HH 2 person HH 3 person HH 4 person HH 
600 500 467 450 
1 726 1,326 1,226 1,193 1,176 
2 1,020 1,620 1,520 1,487 1,470 
3 1,249 1,849 1,749 1,716 1,699 
4 1,478 2,078 1,978 1,945 1,928 
5 1,724     
  
Source: drawing on data in Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 
                                                 
68
 In Ellis (2011) these effects are examined more rigorously by tracing exactly the shifts in households’ 
position in the rural income distribution that would occur if the Mchinji level of transfers were rolled 
out nationally. 
69
 IHS2 decile means in Table 1.2 but (in Table 6.12) adjusted for inflation of 31.5 per cent between 
2004-05 and 2006-07 to reflect cost of living changes during the first year of implementation of the 
Mchinji social cash transfer scheme. 
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6.5.2 The fixed proportional cap on beneficiary numbers 
Earlier in this chapter, a question mark was placed concerning the accuracy of the calculation 
whereby Schubert and Huijbregts (2006) derived their 10 per cent household proportion that 
would act as the uniform cut off point for beneficiary numbers in the design of a Malawi 
social cash transfer. It is recalled that the IHS2 has an individual poverty rate at 52 per cent 
equivalent to a household poverty rate of 44 per cent (this is because poorer people tend to 
have larger households). Yet the calculation of the 10 per cent proportion of households 
occurs in a context of 52 per cent of population being poor (Figure 6.1 above). In fact, a re-
run of the ‘ultra-poor labour constrained’ numbers in IHS2 verifies this mistake since the 
criteria for defining this category of the population yields a proportion of 6.75 per cent of 
Malawi households that can be classified as ultra-poor labour constrained, containing 9.64 per 
cent of the Malawi population (Ellis and Marchetta 2009). 
The accuracy of the 10 per cent proportion is, however, perhaps not the main issue. More 
important is whether a uniform cap on beneficiary numbers (at whatever fixed proportion) can 
accurately represent locational variations in poverty and extreme poverty. Table 4.1 in 
Chapter 4 has provided comparative data, by region and district, for three different 
proportional measures of poverty in Malawi: poverty, ultra poverty, and ultra poor labour 
constrained. There is significant variation in the incidence of poverty (and vulnerability, see 
Table 6.1) in different places across the country. This variation becomes more pronounced at 
lower levels of geographical aggregation, as well as by moving from the poor, to the ultra 
poor and the ‘ultra poor labour constrained’ poverty proportions. For example, ultra-poverty 
varies between 16.2 per cent and 31.5 per cent at the regional level between rural Central and 
rural Southern; while at the district level it varies between 4.8 per cent (Dowa) and 44.3 per 
cent (Nsanje). Meanwhile, the ‘ultra poor labour constrained’ varies between 2.9 per cent 
(Dowa) and 22.8 per cent (Nsanje). 
The data provided earlier in the last column of Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 are poverty ratios 
conventionally expressed using individual weights; in other words they are proportions of the 
population that are classified as poor or ultra poor or ‘ultra poor labour constrained’. As 
discussed earlier, household shares differ from population shares, because average household 
size differs across the income ranges. Figure 6.7 provides a graphical illustration of how the 
share of ‘ultra poor labour constrained’ households varies across rural districts in Malawi. It 
also shows which districts are above the countrywide average proportion of 6.75 per cent, and 
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which districts are below this proportion. On a household basis, the lowest and highest 
proportions are 1.9 per cent (Dowa) and 15.4 per cent (Nsanje). Allowing for a band of one 
percentage point either side of the 6.75 per cent benchmark (i.e. 5.75 to 7.75 per cent), there 
are 10 districts with ultra poor labour constrained ratios above this band, and 8 districts below 
the band, out of the 26 rural districts in total. In other words, at district level, the imposition of 
a guideline proportion of households based on the national average would result in inaccurate 
beneficiary selection in 70 per cent of Malawi’s districts. 
Figure 6.7: Proportion of Ultra poor Labour Constrained Households by District 
  
Source: Ellis and Marchetta (2009, p.10). 
 
 
Figure 6.7 also illustrates the impact of adopting a 10 per cent household eligibility guideline 
as has been the practice so far in SCTs in Malawi. A 10 per cent guideline would reach the 
great majority of potential cash transfer beneficiaries that fulfil the ultra-poor labour 
constrained criteria. However, it excludes some proportion of eligible households in four 
districts, and includes many not quite so severely deprived households in other districts. In 
short, because of wide variation across districts (and probably also within districts) in the 
incidence of severe deprivation, a guideline proportion established for the country as a whole 
results in inaccurate targeting, with a high prevalence of local inclusion or exclusion errors 
relative to the underlying scale of the deprivation problem in different places. The evaluation 
of the Mchinji social cash transfer pilot was critical of setting a fixed guideline for these 
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reasons (Miller et al. 2008c), and Dr Schubert as the chief originator of the approach seems to 
have conceded that the proportion should perhaps be flexible across districts (Schubert 2009).  
6.5.3 Targeting errors within existing design 
A major challenge confronted by any poverty targeted cash transfer is achieving accuracy in 
the identification of intended beneficiaries (Ellis et al. 2009, Ch.3, Miller et al. 2010). Ideas 
about how to do this effectively have evolved over the past ten years, and much has been 
learnt from the implementation of pilot schemes. Initially, there was a tendency to rely on key 
informants in communities to identify the most deprived households, but then it was found 
that the key informants (typically leaders or chiefs) had a tendency to fill beneficiary lists with 
their own relatives and friends (an eventuality referred to as ‘elite capture’). The effort then 
switched to community-based targeting, usually involving the setting up of a representative 
community welfare committee (the Community Social Cash Transfer Committees described 
above for Mchinji district is just this type of committee). This does not avoid elite capture or 
other diversionary outcomes altogether, since leaders may still influence the composition and 
decision making of such committees and committee members may themselves make side 
deals with would-be beneficiaries in order to put them on the list. It could be said with some 
justification that targeting accuracy is a serious potential flaw in the very notion of poverty 
targeting, in low income country settings such as Malawi where means-testing is not a 
realistic option (Miller et al. 2008c, Miller et al. 2010).70 
The evaluation discussed in Section 6.3 above expressed some doubts about targeting 
accuracy in the Mchinji scheme. In Table 6.13 data provided by the evaluation is used either 
directly (dependency ratio) or indirectly (ultra poverty rates) to examine how cash beneficiary 
households compare to non-cash beneficiary households. With respect to dependency ratio, 
the evaluation found that a dependency ratio greater than three (a critical criterion for the 
selection of beneficiaries) applied to 66.6 per cent of the beneficiary sample, as against 26 per 
cent of the non-beneficiary sample. These proportions sum together what is stated in the table 
as incalculable dependency ratio (where there is no able-bodied adult in the household, and 
therefore no denominator in the dependency ratio calculation) and a dependency ratio greater 
than three. This shows certainly that the dependency ratio criterion had an important influence 
                                                 
70
 This also helps explain the preference of the World Bank for self-targeted public works programmes, 
as well as the arguments of other social protection protagonists in favour of categorical targeting (such 
as social pensions) where a single unambiguous criterion determines eligibility. 
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on beneficiary selection, but nevertheless also reveals that a third of beneficiaries did not 
conform to that selection criterion. 
Table 6.13: Comparing ultra-poverty and labour constrained HHs in Mchinji Scheme (%) 
Programme targeting criteria All HHs 
(n=639) 
Cash 
(n=84)  
Noncash 
(n=555)  
Evidence 
Household size 5.1  4.6  5.2  * 
DR with broad illness/disability 19-64 (% HH):     
DR incalculable – no worker 16.2  46.4  10.0 *** 
DR greater than 3.0  10.7  20.2 16.0  
Ultra poverty (% HH):     
All ultra-poor households  33.2 26.6 34.2  
Ultra poor but not labour constrained HHs 22.4 9.8 24.3  
Ultra poor and labour constrained HHs 10.8 16.7 9.9  
 Note: ultra-poverty figures for cash beneficiary households are author re-calculations and not tested 
statistically. 
 
Source: Miller, et al., (2008c, pp. 20 & 34, Miller et al. 2010) 
 
 
On the ultra-poverty measure (Table 6.13), more non-cash than cash beneficiaries were found 
to be ultra-poor, and the proportion of beneficiary households defined as ultra-poor (26.6 per 
cent) seems low given that ultra-poverty was the starting principle of social cash transfer 
design. In this case, the evaluation updated the IHS2 ultra-poverty line to MK15,265 per 
person per year in 2008 prices, and the proportions relate to households the per capita 
expenditure of which fall below this level. Of the 26.6 per cent of the beneficiary sample 
found to be ultra-poor, about one third were not labour constrained (using again the 
dependency ratio criterion) and two thirds were labour constrained. The direction of these 
proportions is appropriate relative to non-beneficiaries. A mixed picture emerges, in which, 
yes, a degree of success was achieved in Mchinji in complying with targeting criteria; 
however, this was also by no means perfect with at least (and possibly more than) one third of 
beneficiaries not really complying with fundamental criteria for inclusion in the scheme. 
However, there is also the problem identified earlier that by the time of the evaluation, cash 
transfer beneficiaries had already improved their circumstances as a result of being in receipt 
of transfers for over a year, so the true picture is really rather muddled. 
In an evaluation of the Machinga district SCT, Seaman et al. (2008) found that beneficiaries 
were scattered across the per capita expenditure distribution, and no systematic pattern in their 
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selection could be discerned. When aggregated according to the dependency ratio and ultra-
poverty criteria, only half of the cash beneficiaries met the dependency ratio criterion and less 
than 25 per cent qualified as ultra-poor (Seaman et al. 2008, p.20). While this finding was 
publicly disputed by the Malawi government (RHVP 2008), it has contributed to a sense of 
unease in social protection discussion in Malawi regarding the ability to maintain acceptable 
levels of targeting accuracy in the event of future scaling up of the SCT programme. 
6.5.4 The problem of containing administrative costs 
Reference has already been made to the problem of controlling the administrative costs of 
implementing social cash transfers in Malawi, as the SCT programme expands to cover more 
districts. In particular, it was noted that projected future operational costs of the programme at 
its current level of coverage are set at around 23 per cent; while in its early years the Mchinji 
scheme reported administrative costs of only 7.2 per cent. In fact, the 7.2 per cent figure 
seems to have represented more an effort on the part of the district administration to comply 
with the strictures of the original project document (which set 8 per cent as the maximum 
allowable administrative share of the project budget) than a realistic accounting of scheme 
costs. The Mchinji evaluation examined administrative expenditures on a monthly basis for 
the operation of the Mchinji scheme from September 2006 to January 2008 (Table 6.14) and 
found that the true level of such expenditures represented about 14 per cent of the total grant 
rather than the 8 per cent stipulated in project documents. 
Operational costs are a very real issue for an expanded social cash transfer programme. It is 
widely acknowledged in Malawi that they have tended in the past to be inordinately high in 
public works programmes managed by MASAF (40 per cent and upwards above transfer 
value),71 and as discussed in Chapter 5, they are high also for the ISP. Some countries report 
operational costs as low as 5 per cent for delivering categorical transfers like pensions; so 
projected costs approaching 25 per cent for a social cash transfer begin to seem quite 
excessive. Of course the more that a given budget is absorbed in administrative overheads and 
delivery costs, the less is available for intended beneficiaries, both in terms of coverage (the 
number of beneficiaries) and the amount of the transfer to them. 
 
                                                 
71
 See, for example, Chirwa (2007) 
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Table 6.14: Distribution of Mchinji scheme expenditures, as percentage of total costs 
Month/year Targeting Administrative 
changes 
M & E Overhead Total 
operations 
Transfer 
grant 
Sept 2006 26 0 0 11 39 61 
Oct 2006 34 0 0 4 41 59 
Nov 2006 16 1 0 6 26 74 
Dec 2006 10 0 1 5 17 83 
Jan 2007 7 0 0 5 18 82 
Feb 2007 7 0 0 3 13 87 
Mar 2007 0 0 0 0 1 99 
Apr 2007 0 0 0 0 1 99 
May 2007 0 0 0 0 1 99 
Jun 2007 2 1 0 2 6 94 
Oct 2007 0 1 0 1 8 92 
Nov 2007 0 0 0 2 4 96 
Dec 2007 0 0 0 0 4 96 
Jan 2008 0 1 0 2 9 91 
Overall 8 0 0 3 14 86 
Planned 3 1 1 3 8 92 
 Note:  
(a) Reports were missing for July, August and September 2007 
(b) Costs of delivering the actual cash grants per month are not included in the operational costs. 
They include transport, security charges, fuel etc. 
(c) Planned costs are from the original proposal and log frame. 
 Source: Miller, et al., (2008b, p.13) 
 
6.5.5 Purchasing power of nominal cash transfers 
The final potential weakness of social cash transfers considered here is that of their 
purchasing power in the context of food price instability or longer run food price inflation. In 
general, cash transfers are predicated on a reasonably stable food price environment and low 
inflation. While, the potential to undertake an annual review of their purchasing power is 
evidently there, governments cannot be relied to act on such information, especially if such 
action is discretionary rather than mandated in law. The Mchinji scheme (and its extension to 
six additional districts) has had the same nominal level of transfers since scheme inception in 
September 2006. This works out at roughly MK2,000 per household per month, and this is the 
figure that appears in all planning documents related to SCTs in Malawi (see Table 6.9 
above). 
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A useful starting point for examining the evolving purchasing power of the social transfer in 
the case of the Mchinji scheme is to establish the command over maize that it represented 
soon after it was launched. This is done in Table 6.15 for November 2006. The table has 
columns for the monthly transfer according to household size, and shows the quantity of 
maize that the entire transfer could purchase given the price of maize in Mchinji in that 
month. In addition, the table shows the daily maize requirement per individual in the 
household (based on nutritional data provided in Chapter 4, Table 4.20), the monthly maize 
requirement, and the degree to which the cash transfer in November 2006 could satisfy this 
requirement. The table in fact demonstrates the generosity of the levels of cash transfer 
originally decided. The transfer was very substantially more than sufficient to purchase 
individual and household maize requirements, the degree of this implicit ‘surplus’ varying 
from 55 per cent for a one person household to 40 per cent for a 4 person household. 
Table 6.15: Illustrating effects on cash transfer grants on different households 
Household size 1 person  2 person  3 person  4 person 
Monthly cash grant (MK) 600.00 1,000.00 1,400.00 1,800.00 
Daily maize requirements (kg) 0.43 0.86 1.29 1.72 
Maize Nov 2006 grant could buy (Kg) 29.0 48.0 67.0 86.0 
Nov 2006 maize requirements (kg) 12.9 25.8 38.7 51.6 
Maize surplus (Kgs) 16.1 22.2 28.3 34.4 
Maize surplus as % of maize bought 55.1 46.2 42.3 40.2 
Source: Author calculations based on November 2006 Mchinji maize prices in the text above.  
 
 
Having established this baseline, the maize purchasing power of the transfer is examined on a 
quarterly basis from the final quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2010 in Table 6.16. This 
gives the quarterly average maize price for Mchinji district (MoAFS official price data), the 
average quantity of maize that could be bought at that price, and the variations in maize 
sufficiency that would apply to households of different sizes, obtaining different levels of 
cash transfer under the scheme. This reveals that during 2007, when there was an unusually 
deep seasonal fall in prices post-harvest, households of every size gained, and all cash transfer 
beneficiaries would have found themselves not only able to afford sufficient maize for their 
daily requirements throughout the year, but would also have had money available for other 
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basic needs and discretionary expenditures.72 However, from late 2007, the retail maize price 
in Mchinji began to rise, and in nominal terms rose from MK18.24 kg in the third quarter of 
2007 to MK59.64 in the first quarter 2009 (a nominal rise of 227 per cent). This tipped the 
maize purchasing power balance of cash transfer households steeply into negative territory, at 
worst causing a 4-person beneficiary household to be able to afford only a quarter of their 
monthly maize requirement (deficit of 76.7 per cent shown in the table). In general, 
households would have been in this negative territory (level of transfer unable to meet fully 
maize consumption needs) for the period from mid-2008 to mid-2009, with lingering effects 
thereafter on bigger households until 2010. It is only in the last quarter shown in the table, 
that the maize price drops to a level where, once again, the transfer is more than enough to 
purchase all the households maize consumption needs. This progression is illustrated for the 
‘average’ column given in Table 6.16 in Figure 6.8 below. 
Table 6.16: Food security effectiveness of cash transfer grants 2006-2010 
Year 
 
Quarter 
 
Mz price 
(MK/kg) 
Avge mz 
buy (Kgs)  
Household maize surplus or deficit (%) 
1 Person 2 Person 3 person 4 Person Average 
2006 Oct-Dec 22.38 53.9 51.0 41.3 37.1 34.8 41.0 
2007 Jan-Mar 22.29 54.1 52.1 42.5 38.4 36.1 42.3 
Apr-June 17.52 68.6 61.9 54.3 51.1 49.2 54.1 
Jul-Sep 18.24 66.1 60.0 51.9 48.5 46.6 51.8 
Oct--Dec 23.33 51.7 48.7 38.5 34.1 31.7 38.2 
2008 Jan-Mar 29.03 41.7 36.9 24.3 18.9 15.9 24.0 
Apr-June 34.73 35.9 24.7 9.6 3.1 -0.4 9.2 
Jul-Sep 55.79 21.6 -22.6 -47.2 -57.7 -63.5 -47.7 
Oct--Dec 53.24 22.6 -17.0 -40.4 -50.4 -56.0 -41.0 
2009 Jan-Mar 59.64 20.2 -32.5 -59.0 -70.4 -76.7 -59.6 
Apr-June 47.56 25.3 -3.3 -24.0 -32.9 -37.8 -24.5 
Jul-Sep 36.55 33.0 19.7 3.7 -3.2 -7.0 3.3 
Oct--Dec 41.66 28.9 9.0 -9.3 -17.0 -21.4 -9.7 
2010 Jan-Mar 43.80 27.9 6.5 -12.2 -20.2 -24.7 -12.7 
Apr-June 24.52 49.1 48.3 38.0 33.6 31.1 37.7 
Average 35.77 39.7 21.9 6.3 -0.3 -4.1 6.0 
Source: Compiled as explained in the text and following principles in Table 6.15 
 
 
                                                 
72
 For the purpose of this exercise, beneficiary households’ own maize production is ignored and they are 
treated as pure consumers. To the extent that they satisfy a proportion of their maize requirements 
from own cultivation, their net food security position is better in all time periods than is suggested in 
this table. 
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Figure 6.8: Trends in cash grant-maize availability and household requirements  
  
Source: Compiled using average data underlying Table 6.16 
 
 
Aside from demonstrating the potential flaw of social cash transfers of a given nominal value 
in relation to food price instability or inflation, Table 6.16 reveals some features of the 
Mchinji scheme that were neglected in its evaluation, and have been barely remarked upon in 
the literature. It seems clear that the original transfer levels determined for the Mchinji pilot 
were excessively generous, implying a higher cost and less coverage of the scheme than 
would have been possible with lower payments. After all, the purpose of an SCT is to secure 
the basic minimum calorie requirement of a destitute or near destitute household. Table 6.16 
shows that in the first 18 months of scheme operation, the transfer level allowed consumption 
well in excess of this minimum, and that this pertained again, four years later in mid-2010. 
This explains findings that recur in this thesis (especially in Chapter 7) that the SCT has 
enabled beneficiary households to outstrip the living conditions of poor non-beneficiaries, and 
this also connects to the preceding point about the income distribution effects of cash 
transfers. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined in detail the experience so far in Malawi of implementing poverty 
targeted social cash transfers. These are welfare transfers directed at the weakest members of 
society, and they are unconditional. Their primary aim is to ensure the basic food security of 
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families that for a variety of reasons are thought to be unable to secure a sufficient livelihood 
to fend for themselves even in ‘normal circumstances’ as far as food production and 
availability is concerned. The chapter provides a detailed account of the Mchinji pilot SCT 
scheme, a summary of the key findings of an evaluation of that scheme, the experience of 
expanding the scheme to additional districts, and an examination of strengths and weaknesses 
of SCTs in Malawi. 
Available evidence suggests that social cash transfers have a very considerable positive 
impact on the lives of families who are fortunate enough to be selected to receive them. Not 
only is the food security of beneficiary households achieved, but cash transfer recipients are 
also observed to purchase farm inputs and invest in assets. In this it is not just the level of the 
transfer that is important, but also its security as a continuous monthly payment. It is well 
known that risk pervades the livelihoods of the poor in rural areas of a country like Malawi, 
and the cash transfer significantly reduces livelihood risk. Moreover, the presence of transfers 
quite quickly changes the demographic structure of the household, so that households 
formerly comprising only vulnerable people unable to work (due to old age, chronic illness, 
disability, or youth) are able to take in able-bodied adults who can take up farm work. More 
evidence of these positive effects is provided in Chapter 7. 
These strengths of social cash transfers also, however, point to an important and often 
neglected danger. In rural areas of a country like Malawi, very little separates the material 
standards of living of households in the bottom half of the per capita expenditure distribution, 
and amongst, say, the bottom three deciles welfare differences become minuscule. Therefore 
the advent of a social cash transfer for just some of this population quite easily elevates their 
livelihood circumstances above those of similarly placed families in the same communities, 
with a risk of provoking social divisiveness. This process has been referred to as cash benefits 
‘leapfrogging’ their recipients up the income distribution. The continuity of payments to the 
same recipients also makes this a cumulative process, since the cash transfers enable 
households also to engage in, or expand, agricultural production, use inputs, obtain better 
access to medical facilities, and send their children reliably to school. 
The chapter has also identified other aspects of social cash transfers that require cautious 
assessment about this approach as a way forward for tackling vulnerability in a country like 
Malawi. A serious flaw of Schubert’s ten per cent rule is shown to be significant variations in 
the ‘ultra-poor labour constrained’ across different districts in Malawi, implying that 
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adherence to the rule over selects such households in some districts (inclusion error) and 
under selects them in other districts (exclusion error). The question arises whether these errors 
are acceptable as a trade off for the organisational simplicity of a single cut off point. In 
practice, targeting errors are thought to be quite high, even without this problem, due to the 
almost insuperable difficulty of preventing people in positions of power and authority from 
biasing beneficiary lists in favour of their own friends and relatives. A further problem is the 
difficulty of keeping costs of delivery in check; as expansion of a cash transfer scheme occurs 
the stakes get higher in terms of motivating local officials to carry out the considerable extra 
workload in managing the transfers, and the temptation to use scheme resources for personal 
gain. Finally, as mentioned already in previous chapters, the value of a cash transfer to its 
beneficiaries is only as strong as its purchasing power over food and basic needs, and this can 
be eroded quickly in the event of undue seasonal price spikes or longer term inflation in the 
price of the staple food. 
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Chapter 7: Findings of the Mchinji Fieldwork Research 
7.1 Introduction 
The immediately preceding chapters have discussed as independent policy initiatives the 
transfer to poor and vulnerable rural households in Malawi of agricultural input subsidies and 
social cash transfers. In order to support the secondary data of this thesis, the researcher 
conducted a limited fieldwork exercise in order to gain a more definite feel for critical 
strengths and weaknesses of the two programmes when they operate independently yet side 
by side within the same communities. The restricted character of this exercise is discussed in 
the methodology chapter (Chapter 4). Mchinji was selected as the district within which to 
conduct fieldwork due to the presence there of the cash transfer scheme since 2006, meaning 
that the scheme was well established at the time field visits were conducted in 2007-08. 
Mchinji also of course has experienced the implementation of the ISP since its introduction in 
2005/06, thereby permitting comparison of the working of the two programmes in the 
fieldwork. Specifically, the intention of the fieldwork was to shed additional light on the 
following questions, with special attention to the middle question on food security: 
(1) How does beneficiary selection for the cash transfer scheme and ISP coupon 
distribution work in practice at district, sub-district and community levels?  
(2) How do cash transfers combine with other dimensions of household food security 
across the seasonal cycle (maize harvests, maize stocks, other cash income sources, 
maize prices) to provide a certain level of food security for scheme participants, and 
how does this compare to the food security patterns of non-transfer recipients? 
(3) With respect to coupon recipients, how precisely did they deploy them, and to what 
effect in terms of seeds selected for cultivation, and fertilizer use on different crops? is 
there evidence of farmers selling coupons or fertilizers, and how does this manifest 
itself in a sample of households? What other factors (such as membership of farmer’s 
clubs) have a bearing on coupon use by farmers? 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section examines the district level management of 
the SCT and ISP programmes, and the way beneficiary selection procedures for both schemes 
work out at community level. This is followed, in the third section, by an overview of 
demographic and other social characteristics of the household sample, distinguished between 
  204 
cash recipients and non-recipients in the overall sample of 90 households in three villages. 
The fourth section examines food security in the sample in considerable detail including the 
calorie needs of households according to their demographic structure, the contribution of 
maize to these needs, the ability of cash transfers and other cash income sources to contribute 
to food security, the purchasing power of cash transfers as maize prices change, and the food 
security duration of maize harvests obtained in the 2008 harvest season. The fifth section 
focuses, still in a comparative way, on coupon recipients, and on evidence for the working of 
the secondary market in ISP coupons obtained from key informants, focus group discussions 
and the household survey. 
7.2 Management of SCT and ISP in Mchinji in 2007/08 
The previous chapters have discussed distinctions between SCT which targets ultra-poor 
households with no active labour, and ISP which targets poor households (including ultra-
poor) that possess land and active labour but have little cash to buy inputs. These key 
differences aside, both programmes have tended to emphasize similar human vulnerability 
factors (e.g. chronic illness, orphanhood, elderliness, widowhood or disability) in framing 
criteria for deciding who should be excluded from or included in programme benefits. While 
the institutional arrangements for each of the programmes have been discussed in the 
preceding two chapters, it is useful to see how they interact in the practical implementation 
context of districts, sub-district levels, and individual communities. Figure 7.1 summarises 
institutional arrangements as they prevailed in Mchinji district in 2007/08. 
In relation to Figure 7.1, the District Commissioner as head of district had organisational 
responsibility for both programmes. However, daily management of the SCT was the 
responsibility of District Social Welfare office working through district social cash transfer 
committee and social cash transfer secretariat and Community Social Cash Transfer 
Committees (CSCTCs) at VDC level. On the other hand, the management of the ISP was a 
shared responsibility between the District Commissioner who, working successively through 
VDCs and Village Input Subsidy Committees, managed the beneficiary registration process; 
and the District Agricultural Officer who, working with Agricultural Extension Development 
Coordinators (AEDCs) at extension planning area (EPA) level and by Agricultural Extension 
Development Officers (AEDOs) or agricultural extension workers at section level, managed 
the coupon distribution process. At community level, both programmes used the Village 
Development Committee (VDC) as an institution to facilitate targeting but they differed in the 
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routes taken to identify beneficiary households and distribute coupons (ISP) or beneficiary 
cards (SCT). Input Subsidy Committees formed at village level managed the ISP processes, 
while CSCTCs formed at VDC level managed the SCT processes.  
Figure 7.1: Implementation arrangement for the two programmes in Mchinji 2007/08 
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To select the membership of CSCTCs when the SCT programme was starting in 2006, 
community meetings of villages were held at VDC level and attended by district officials. 
Apparently the ‘most capable’ individuals from the villages were nominated to stand for 
various committee positions, including individuals who were not present at the meeting but 
had others standing in on their behalf. Voting was done by supporters physically standing 
behind a ‘blind-folded’ candidate of their choice; however, variations in the procedure 
occurred in some VDCs where voting was done by raising a hand for the preferred candidate. 
In some cases, candidates were elected unopposed. The process was moderated by local 
volunteers. A typical CSCTC comprised a chairperson and vice-chair, a secretary and vice-
secretary, a treasurer, and 7 elected committee members. However here again variations were 
evident as individual VDCs tried to ensure that all the villages in their jurisdiction were 
represented. For example, Kangwere CSCTC had 11 members while Chiti and Mduwa had 14 
members each. Village heads were not permitted to be CSCTC members but were still able to 
influence the work of the committees if they chose, merely by virtue of their status in the 
community. Based on what was observed during the fieldwork, the CSCTCs could not be said 
to be entirely independent of other governance institutions at community level. Most 
members of CSCTCs were also active members of other community committees, including 
the Input Subsidy Committees.  
To select SCT beneficiaries, members of the CSCTCs went round their respective villages to 
register potential beneficiary households, whose details were then recorded on a form (Form 
1s) that village heads approved. The approved village lists (Form 1s) were then discussed at 
an CSCTC meeting, before holding a community meeting ‘observed’ by extension workers, 
village heads and district officials. The community meetings vetted and ranked the registered 
households according to ‘degree of neediness’. It was not clear during the fieldwork 
consultations whether or not any names were rejected by village heads, CSCTCs or the 
community meetings. It was found that each VDC submitted to the district slightly more 
names than were permitted according to the ten per cent rule (Chapter 6). The District Social 
Cash Transfer Committee (DSCTC) rejected some names apparently for not meeting the 
criteria for selection; however, a more plausible explanation was the need to observe the 
maximum ten per cent targeting rule. The researcher obtained official district records at the 
start of the fieldwork for sampling purposes. The records included households that were 
submitted by VDCs and those that the DSCTC approved and rejected. Table 7.1 provides a 
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summary for the three case study communities. It can be seen that the VDCs registered 11 per 
cent of all households in their jurisdictions, but the DSCTC approved only 10 per cent.  
Table 7.1: Comparing eligible and non-eligible households 
 
VDC 
Total HHs Submitted to District Approved by DSCTC 
No % No % 
Mduwa 1,146 132 11.5 110 9.6 
Chiti 861 89 10.3 82 9.5 
Kangwere 632 73 11.6 64 10.1 
Total 2,639 294 11.1 256 9.7 
 Source: compiled from Mchinji Social Cash Transfer records, December 2007 
 
Unlike in the SCT programme, beneficiary households in the ISP are registered every year. 
Variations in the registration process have been discussed in Chapter 5; this section focuses 
on what was observed to have prevailed in the case study areas in 2007/08. Input Subsidy 
Committees were formed at village level under the ‘authority’ of village heads although the 
latter were not themselves members of the committees. There were variations in the way the 
committees were formed but in general, the village head appointed individuals to the 
committees. There were variations even within the same village in the way households were 
registered as potentially qualified to receive coupons. Some were registered by agricultural 
field assistants, others were registered by village heads, but overall the majority of households 
were registered by the Input Subsidy Committees. The committees apparently registered 
households that were poor households (unable to buy inputs on their own) but nevertheless 
capable of using the inputs for production. The process of registering ISP beneficiaries in 
practice took account of the existence in the same communities of the social cash transfer 
scheme. Based on fieldwork consultations with community members and corroborated by 
extension workers, the set selection criteria were ‘panel-beaten’ by community members in 
order to achieve ‘fairness’ in the distribution of beneficiaries between the two programmes. 
The following are examples of arrangements that came to light during focus group 
discussions with community members in the study sites: 
(a) In Chiti village, social cash beneficiary households were generally excluded from 
registering to receive coupons to minimise unfair advantage over other deserving 
households that were left out because of the ‘one in ten’ limit imposed by the social 
cash transfer scheme. 
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(b) In Kadimba village in Mduwa VDC where the focus group discussions were 
conducted, 30 households were registered to receive ISP coupons. Each of the 30 
households received two coupons per household which were shared among all 53 
households in the village, regardless of whether or not they were also beneficiaries of 
the social cash transfer scheme. 
(c) Kangwere VDC introduced some ‘innovative’ ways of allocating the beneficiaries. 
Households that were considered to lack active labour and hence viewed as a waste of 
resources if given ISP coupons were excluded from ISP registration, but most of them 
were already cash beneficiaries. Cash transfer beneficiary households that were 
considered to have active labour and to possess the capacity to pay the subsidised price 
of MK950 per coupon were registered to receive the coupons in the same way as poor 
non-cash beneficiary households. Households that were perceived to be non-poor were 
entirely excluded from the ISP (and were already excluded from the SCT).  
(d) In Kangwere, ISP beneficiaries without cash, or with cash only sufficient to purchase 
one coupon’s entitlement to fertilizer were encouraged to pool resources with non-
coupon beneficiaries who had the cash (typically, most were social cash beneficiaries) 
and share the fertilizers. The focus group discussions in Kangwere referred to this 
arrangement as ‘katungwe ndi kukankhana’ (literary translated as: ‘in a swing game, 
you need to take turns in pushing each other so that in the end, both players are 
satisfied’). 
(e)  In all three case study sites, some ISP beneficiaries (especially those who were also 
cash beneficiary households) were observed voluntarily to share with non-
beneficiaries. The focus group discussions referred to this arrangement as ‘chaona 
mzako chapita mmawa chiona iwe’ (literally translated as: ‘what has befallen your 
friend today is gone, tomorrow it will befall you’). 
 
The arrangements (a), (b) or (c) above were facilitated by village heads or with their 
‘blessings’; while arrangements (d) or (e) were justified by the villagers in terms of being ‘one 
people’ (affiliated by blood or marriage, or they had co-existed for generations). Chapter 4 
has already discussed the structure of villages and households. The case-study villages were 
essentially small hamlets (mudzi) or ‘clans’. For example, Kangwere VDC seemed to 
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comprise a single Zulu clan such that most members of the CSCTC including the chairperson 
were direct relatives of the group village head. Some villages such as Mdumpha, Jimu and 
Tachoka in Mduwa VDC had as few as ten households. In fact, the population of Mduwa 
VDC comprised 1,146 households living in a total of 33 registered villages, an average of 35 
households per village. 
The sampling procedure for the research was covered in Chapter 4 above, but its salient 
features are worth repeating here: 30 social cash beneficiary households were selected from a 
district level list of approved beneficiaries in the three villages chosen to undertake research; 
26 households were selected from the list of names rejected by the district as not eligible for 
the SCT due to ‘not meeting minimum selection criteria’, and 34 households were drawn 
from households that were not in the first place registered for the SCT because they were 
considered to be less poor. At the time of selecting the sample in October 2007, the 
distribution of coupon beneficiaries was not yet known because registration was still 
underway. It later emerged by chance at the first household survey in January 2008 that 8 
households were beneficiaries of cash transfers only (9 per cent), 22 households (24 per cent) 
were beneficiaries of both cash transfers and ISP coupons, 47 households were beneficiaries 
of coupons (52 per cent), and 13 households were non-beneficiaries of either programme (14 
per cent). This outcome is depicted in Figure 7.2. If the weaknesses of community targeting 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 are put on one side for the moment, the eventual structure of the 
sample suggests that given the ability to distribute between the two programmes, community 
members would allocate social cash transfers to the poorest ten per cent (‘non-viable or 
incapacitated’) and coupons to the next poor 75 per cent (productive but unable to acquire 
input on their own), while the last 15 per cent would not be registered (non-poor and capable 
of supporting themselves). 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 

If we drop the non-beneficiaries (supposedly ‘non-poor’), this gives a distribution of the supposedly 
poor households are follows: 10.4 per cent cash recipients (‘ultra-poor and labour constrained’), 28.6 
per cent joint recipients (‘ultra-poor but with labour’) and 61 per cent coupon recipients (‘poor 
households capable of farming but with little cash to buy inputs’)
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of beneficiary households in the sample for this research 
 
 90 Households 
(Sample) 
30 cash HHs 
 (‘More vulnerable’) 
26 eligible non-cash HHs  
(‘Average vulnerable’) 
34 ineligible cash HHs 
(‘Less vulnerable’) 
8 cash HHs 
(Cash only) 
22 cash + coupons 
(Double beneficiary) 
47 coupons HHs 
(coupons only) 
13 non-beneficiaries 
(No cash or coupons) 
7 HHs 6 HHs 
9 percent of 
sample HHs 
24 percent of 
sample HHs 
 
52 percent of 
sample HHs 
 
14 percent of 
sample HHs 
 
 
 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2007/08 
 
 
Qualitative investigations with focus groups in each case-study village shed additional light 
on the way communities interpret poverty and productive capability, and how this results in 
the beneficiary selection behaviours discussed above. Focus groups were asked to distinguish 
vulnerable groups applicable in their communities. This generated 3-4 groups across the case-
study villages, and the distinctions that were made comprised the: 
(i)  ‘most vulnerable’ (ovutikisitsa – ‘suffering most’); 
(ii) ‘more vulnerable’ (ovutika – ‘suffering’); 
(iii) ‘average vulnerable’ (ovutika pang’ no – ‘suffering a little’); and, 
(iv) ‘less vulnerable’ (osavutika kweni kweni – ‘not suffering very much’). 
Poverty was referred to as kusowa or kusawuka (‘lacking’ or ‘needing’), while vulnerability 
was referred to as kuvutika (‘suffering’). In Kangwere, relatively better off households were 
described as nkhasako (apparently ‘lacking nothing’). Using the participatory wealth ranking 
method (Ellis and Woldehanna 2005, p.73), households in the case study villages were 
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assigned between the different vulnerability groups, and discussions were held about the 
reasons for assignment into specific groups and dynamic factors in the decline or rise in 
household fortunes over time. 
The focus group discussions showed that access to food and agricultural inputs were 
considered the core factors determining people’s relative poverty or vulnerability, and the 
groups also linked this access to demographic, social and economic factors at household level. 
The dynamics of poverty and vulnerability were discussed. Elderly-headed households were 
described as having been ‘less or averagely vulnerable’ in the past becoming ‘more 
vulnerable’ due to the advancing years of the household head. Households headed by persons 
below age 20 were also described as ‘more vulnerable’ because they ‘lacked established 
foundations’ (alibe maziko okwanira). Households headed by women were described as more 
vulnerable than households headed by men; and households headed by widowed women were 
considered ‘most vulnerable’. Consistently, a widowed woman was referred to as mayi 
wamasiye (literary translated as ‘orphaned woman’)74, while divorced or separated women or 
single women in general were described as mayi wayekha (‘a woman on her own’) or mayi wa 
mkono umodzi (a ‘woman of one hand’). 
People’s lifestyles were thought to contribute to their relative poverty or vulnerability. In 
general, polygamy and ownership of livestock were considered indicators of wealth. On the 
other hand, individual female headed households within polygamous marriages were often 
designated as ‘more vulnerable’ due to the husband’s resources, time and effort being spread 
thinly across his wives. Old age, widowhood, and chronic illness (associated with AIDS) were 
seen as causes of people becoming more vulnerable over time. The same applied to excessive 
alcohol consumption. Livestock owners could become poorer and more vulnerable through 
loss of livestock to foot-and-mouth disease or to theft. Indeed livestock rustling of cattle and 
goats was mentioned as a growing factor why better off people could fall into destitution. 
Mchinji district records show that between 1998 and 2000 the goat population fell by 39 per 
cent and the pig population by 32 per cent, the major cause of which was theft (Government 
of Malawi 2002b, pp.39-41). 
                                                 

In the local Chichewa language, wamasiye literary means being ‘left behind by a deceased’. The term 
normally refers to an orphan (mwana wa masiye) and a widow (mayi wamasiye) but rarely a widower 
(bambo wa masiye).
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Focus group discussions also distinguished livelihood improvements that had been 
experienced by some households in the five years preceding the fieldwork. The chief of these 
was success at tobacco farming and receipt of social cash transfers, thus providing an early 
indication of the powerful effect that the SCT could have on the fortunes of individual 
families. In Kangwere, for example, a case was discussed at length concerning a female 
headed household who had been the most destitute and non-viable in every basic aspect of 
life, including clothing. The head of this household could not be registered to receive coupons 
because she was considered unproductive, and lacked active labour. Her situation had 
improved with social cash transfers, and she was now capable of producing enough food. In 
2007-08, this household grew 0.8 ha of maize and applied 100kg of fertilizer; and this despite 
being a non-coupon beneficiary. 
Table 7.2 summarises the vulnerability groups that emerged from this exercise, and the 
proportions of households in the case-study villages assigned to each group. Across all three 
villages, 0.9 per cent of households were assigned as ‘most vulnerable’; 89.7 per cent as 
‘more vulnerable’; 4.6 per cent as ‘average vulnerable’, and 4.8 per cent as ‘less vulnerable’. 
This qualitative assignment matches the distribution of the household sample fairly closely, in 
particular with only 10 per cent (average plus less vulnerable households) in each case 
representing non-poor or better off households. It also mirrors findings from other poverty 
and vulnerability assessments conducted in Malawi. For example, drawing on the wealth 
ranking in rural Malawi conducted by Chewele and others in 1995, Devereux reports that 63 
per cent of households were assessed to be worst off (wosauka/wosowa), 28 per cent were fair 
(wopezako), 6 per cent were categorised as fairly well off (wopeza bwino pang’ono) while 
only 3 per cent of the households were assessed to be well-off (wopeza bwino) (Devereux 
1998, p.38). The fact that nearly 90 per cent of households were placed in a ‘more/most 
vulnerable’ category has implications for targeting of social transfers especially where a 
programme such as the Mchinji Social Cash transfer Scheme puts a cap at only poorest 10 per 
cent of the population. The earlier discussion in this section about how the case study 
communities in Mchinji dealt with the targeting of the two transfer programmes (social cash 
transfers and the input subsidy programme) reflects this subjective categorization of people’s 
vulnerability in the communities. 
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Table 7.2: Vulnerability distribution of households in case study sites in Mchinji 
Vulnerability/ 
poverty group 
Major criteria 
(common to all 3 sites) 
VDC totals (number off HHs) All 3 FGD sites 
Mduwa 
(53) 
Kangwere 
(274) 
Chiti 
(130) 
No 
(457) % 
Most Vuln. Lacks almost everything 1 3 0 4 0.9 
More  
Vulnerable 
 
 
Persistently lack food. 
Farms but with difficulty 
(lack inputs, old age, 
chronic illness etc). 
Limited assets 
Missing meals some days 
41 253 116 410 89.7 
Average 
vulnerable 
 
Own food not last 6 
months. 
Low incomes & assets 
Two meals per day 
0 7 14 21 4.6 
Less 
vulnerable 
 
 
Own food all year. 
Regular and more money 
(remittance, formal jobs) 
Assets and businesses 
2-3 meals per day 
11 11 0 22 4.8 
Source: Mchinji Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), 2007/08 
 
A number of concerns have been raised recently in southern Africa in relation to perceived 
weaknesses of community targeting of social transfers, especially social cash transfers 
(Conning and Kevane 2002). One problem relates to exclusion and inclusion errors that arise 
due to an inability in practice to implement prescribed targeting criteria. Some studies 
(Chinsinga 2005, Miller et al. 2008c) have attributed the failure of community members to 
follow prescribed criteria to limited understanding, however, this research offers an 
alternative view on the basis of the above findings. It was evident in discussions that 
community members understood the selection criteria perfectly well (indeed, they were able 
to narrate them almost word perfect). In effect they ‘bent’ the rules judiciously in order to 
ensure fairness, given the different types of support (coupons and cash transfers) on offer. 
Community members interviewed saw nothing underhand or illegitimate in these decisions.  
Quite different, however, are claims of malpractice (nepotism and corruption) in which power 
or control is used in order to favour some individuals or sections of the community (or 
government officials). An outcome of the fieldwork for this thesis is that an important 
distinction exists (and needs to be made in evaluating the success or otherwise of targeting) 
between modifications to prescribed criteria decided by villagers themselves on grounds of 
fairness or inclusiveness, from modifications that benefit specific individuals in positions of 
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power. It is considered that much previous discussion on this issue has conflated these two 
categories unhelpfully, casting doubt on the value of community participation in beneficiary 
selection, when in fact if communities are given genuine free reign in this type of decision 
making, equitable outcomes seem likely to follow. Of course it is always a possibility that 
powerful individuals can wrest control of a community decision making process, or find ways 
of ignoring the broader wishes of members, but this cannot be assumed always to occur as 
illustrated by the observation of community targeting processes in this fieldwork.  
The foregoing discussion leads us to describe the broader context in which the two 
programmes operate in Mchinji. This is not a deprived district in relative Malawi terms, as 
discussed in previous chapters. While in Malawi as a whole 40-80 per cent of the rural 
population are at risk of missing food entitlements during the months of January-March every 
year, Mchinji is not regarded as one of the ‘hotspot’ districts (see section 6.2.1 and table 6.1 
in Chapter 6). Analysis of the maize production productivity potential of the district has been 
provided in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.2 and Figure 4.3). The low vulnerability of the district 
can be deduced from food balance sheet situation depicted in Table 7.3 below which reveals 
that maize production (MT) has increased steadily and matched population growth. In the 12 
crop seasons from 1996/97 to 2007/08, the district recorded an average maize surplus of 38 
per cent comparing to a national average of 2 per cent, with deficit maize balance sheet in 
most years.  
Table 7.3: Mchinji versus national maize balance sheet 
Crop 
Year 
Mchinji District Maize Balance sheet National Maize Balance sheet 
Prod 
(MT) Pop 
Consum. 
Needs 
Surplus 
/Deficit 
(%) 
Prod 
(MT) Pop 
Consum. 
Needs 
Surplus 
/Deficit 
(%) 
1996-97  72,738  317,270  50,256 31 1,226,478  9,738,983  1,542,655 -26 
1997-98  93,200  324,941  51,471 45 1,534,326  9,933,868  1,573,525 -3 
1998-99  86,633  335,144  53,087 39 2,245,824  10,184,501  1,613,225 28 
1999-00  92,165  345,667  54,754 41 2,290,018  10,441,457  1,653,927 28 
2000-01  66,089  356,520  56,473 15 1,589,437  10,704,896  1,695,656 -7 
2001-02  81,469  367,714  58,246 29 1,485,272  10,974,982  1,738,437 -17 
2002-03  76,688  379,260  60,075 22 1,847,476  11,251,882  1,782,298 4 
2003-04  86,893  391,168  61,961 29 1,608,349  11,535,768  1,827,266 -14 
2004-05  94,633  403,450  63,906 32 1,225,234  11,826,817  1,873,368 -53 
2005-06  150,537  416,118  65,913 56 2,611,486  12,125,209  1,920,633 26 
2006-07  167,963  429,183  67,983 60 3,226,418  12,431,129  1,969,091 39 
2007-08  158,070  456,558  72,319 54 2,634,701  13,066,320  2,069,705 21 
Average 102,257  376,916  59,704 38 1,960,418  11,184,651 1,771,649 2 
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Source: Mchinji data from data underlying Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
 
 
The low vulnerability of Mchinji district from a maize balance perspective is also affirmed by 
relative maize price levels that prevailed in 2007/08 which were below national trends. 
Although the prices had increased from MK150-200 in 2006/07 to MK450-600 in 2007/08 for 
a 20-kg pail of maize, these were low compared to national averages. A kilogram of maize in 
Mchinji sold at MK27-35 compared to over MK50 in other parts of the country (Government 
of Malawi 2008j). Of course, maize prices varied greatly between communities and at 
different points of time. During the fieldwork period, a kilogram of maize sold at an average 
price of MK20 per kilogram in Mduwa compared to MK45 in Kangwere. During the harvest 
period (April-May 2008), maize in the district was selling at a mean price of MK45 per kg but 
this later dropped to MK35 in June and picked up to MK50 in October 2008. Chapter 6 has 
argued that the sudden rise in prices did not signal looming hunger but a response to 
government restrictions on maize trade. District statistics compiled in Table 7.4 show that 
only one per cent of households in the district were deemed at risk of missing food 
entitlements and requiring emergency support in the 2006/07 and 2007/08 seasons. 
Table 7.4: Distribution of households lacking food in Mchinji in 2006/7 and 2007/08 
EPA 
Oct 2007-March 2008 Oct 2006-March 2007 
Total Farm 
Families 
% lacking 
food 
Total Farm 
Families 
% lacking 
food 
Mkanda 27,679 0.4 23,338 1.0 
Kalulu 17,843 1.1 14,301 1.1 
Mikundi 24,011 1.1 21,780 1.2 
Chioshya 24,614 1.2 23,543 1.0 
Mlonyeni 20,693 0.3 17,662 0.6 
Msitu 26,507 0.6 25,631 1.1 
Mchinji  141,347 0.7 126,255 1.0 
Note. Mikundi EPA covers Mduwa and Kangwere while Kalulu EPA 
includes Chiti VDC 
Source: Government of Malawi (2008j, p.2) 
 
It seems that Mchinji counts amongst the least vulnerable in Malawi. The district is one of the 
nine districts in the central region of Malawi where per capita incomes are relatively high in 
comparison to the country as a whole. Central region contain six of the richest ten districts in 
Malawi. By comparison, the southern region is the poorest region containing 8 out of the 13 
poorest districts. Mchinji is ranked within the middle ten districts in Malawi on poverty 
criteria (World Bank 2007a). However, the district does have high prevalence rates of 
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malnutrition (20.9 per cent underweight compared to 20.5 per cent national), stunting (57.5 
per cent compared to 46 per cent national), and wasting (3 per cent compared to 3.5 national) 
(Government of Malawi 2006b, p.46). This is attributable to low nutritional diversity in the 
district; unlike in many Malawi districts where people can draw on rice, cassava, millet and 
sorghum, as well as maize, for their energy foods, there is limited diversity in starchy staples 
in Mchinji (Government of Malawi 2008d). The apparently high incidence of ‘vulnerable’ 
households in the case study sites as interpreted by villagers (and depicted in Table 7.2 and 
Figure 7.2) may not hold up to scrutiny when confronted with quantitative evidence on food 
security, although this is an open question (see next section). 
Certainly, focus group discussions tended to paint a difficult food security picture for most 
households. In Kangwere, it was claimed that by October every year (about 6 months from the 
maize harvest), two thirds of the households had run out of food from own maize production 
and therefore had to rely on ganyu sources. Focus group discussions also revealed the major 
coping mechanisms used by villagers when their food ran out. In Kadimba village in Mduwa 
VDC, coping strategies in the 2007/08 season included buying gaga (maize bran) at maize 
mills, and premature harvesting of the potato crop. In Kangwere and Chiti VDCs, ganyu at a 
nearby orphanage75 or across the border in Zambia was a significant strategy. The most 
common form of ganyu was farm work which involved land clearing at MK1,500 per acre 
and ridging or weeding at MK3,000 per acre. It was claimed that those not involved in ganyu 
relied on non-farm cash sources (petty trading etc.) or cash transfer grants in case of SCT 
beneficiary households. Further evidence regarding participation in ganyu is given in later 
sections of this chapter.  
7.3 Socio-economic characteristics of cash and non-cash beneficiaries in the sample 
An important factor to consider when interpreting data presented in this and subsequent 
sections is that comparisons between cash transfer beneficiaries and others in the sample 
(including coupon recipients) reflect adaptations in the livelihoods of cash transfer 
beneficiaries already set in train by their receipt of cash transfers since late 2006 (Chapter 6). 
Therefore expected differences between sub-samples as a result of implementing different 
criteria in their selection (detailed above) do not necessarily convert into actual differences 
more than a year into SCT operation. The reasons for this are fairly obvious: the regular 
                                                 
75
 The orphanage is called Home For Hope Orphanage and it is where the international musician 
Madonna adopted an orphaned boy (David Banda) in 2008. 
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receipt of cash transfers makes a receiving household a secure place to live; it is not only the 
amount of money that is received that is important, it is also the reduction in livelihood risk 
experienced by beneficiaries; relatives are likely to come home or stay home, changing the 
labour force profile of the household compared to when households were first assessed for 
inclusion in the scheme. 
As discussed in some detail in Chapter 6, the Mchinji social cash transfer pilot programme 
was designed to meet the basic consumption needs of the ‘poorest of the poor’ in rural 
Malawi, designated as ultra-poor households lacking able-bodied labour capable of providing 
the family with a living. The criteria used to identify prospective scheme beneficiaries rested 
heavily in the first instance on lack of able-bodied labour, translated as households with a 
dependency ratio of 3.0 or over. In this context, the dependency ratio is the number of 
dependents in the household divided by the number of economically active adults aged 19-64. 
Dependents include all children aged under 19, older people of 65+, chronically ill and 
disabled people. Children also of course include orphans, looked after by the adults in the 
household. Thus a family comprising a single mother aged 35 looking after 5 children aged 
between 3 and 16 clearly complies with the dependency criterion (dependency ratio 5, in this 
instance). In addition to the dependency ratio other descriptive criteria are looked at to aid 
discussion and decision making: old age, orphans, disability, known individuals who are 
chronically sick and so on). In view of these criteria, as suggested above, the initial 
expectation might be that cash transfer households in the sample survey (30 households) 
should show significantly different levels of vulnerability indicators than non-cash transfer 
households (60 households). Table 7.5 presents findings in this regard from the sample 
survey, comparing beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in terms of household size, 
prevalence of vulnerability conditions such as chronic illness, orphanhood or elderliness, 
dependency and labour availability.  
A mixed picture emerges from Table 7.5, converging on rather a lot of similarity between the 
two sample groups. Cash transfer households contain double the proportion of elderly people 
(16 per cent against 8 per cent), and nearly three times the proportion of disabled people (10 
per cent against 3.3 per cent), and these differences are significantly different. On the other 
hand non-cash households have a higher proportion of chronically ill, and households with a 
dependency ratio greater than 3.0 are higher in the non-cash group than the cash group. No 
significant differences are found for average household size, mean absolute numbers of 
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vulnerable persons, mean dependency ratio, or adjusted (see below) labour availability. These 
results concur in some respects with the findings of other researchers. As shown in Chapter 6 
(Table 6.12) only 16.7 per cent of the cash beneficiary households considered to be also ultra-
poor met the dependency cut-off ratio of 3.0 (Miller et al. 2008c) while in Machinga district, 
the proportion was found to be 25 per cent (Seaman et al. 2008).  
Table 7.5: Characteristics of the sample households 
Demographic characteristics All HHs Cash Non-cash P-value 
Number of Households (n) 90.0 30.0 60.0  
Total persons in the HHs 485.0 145.0 340.0  
Below 18 years (%) 59.8 54.5 62.1 .120 
19-64 years (%) 29.7 29.7 29.7 .991 
65 years and above (%)  10.5 15.9** 8.2** .012 
     
Average household size 5.4 4.8 5.7 .129 
Std. Deviation 2.3 2.5 2.2  
Reported vulnerable persons (% HHs)      
Disabled  5.6 10.0 3.3 .196 
Chronically ill 10.0 6.5 11.7 .459 
Orphans  42.1 40.0 35.0 .764 
     
Mean vulnerable persons  2.0 2.3 1.8 .171 
Household dependency     
Persons 19-64 yrs fit to work (W) 141.0 41.0 100.0  
Dependents or consumers (C) 344.0 104.0 240.0  
% HHs with DR < 3.0 66.7 70.0 65.0 .637 
% HHs with DR > 3.0 14.4 10.0 16.7 .399 
% HHs with incalculable DR (%) 18.9 20.0 18.3 .850 
     
Dependency ratio (calculable) 2.4 2.5 2.4 .884 
HH labour availability (adult units)     
Actual labour (any, above 7 yrs) 3.0 2.8 3.2 .199 
Adult labour (19-64 yrs, fit) 1.4 1.2 1.5 .277 
Adult labour to Actual labour (%) 42.7 42.2 43.0 .899 
Persons > 7 yrs offering labour Oct-Jan 409.0 127.0 282.0  
Farm work (%) 88.0 92.9** 85.8** .041 
Ganyu work (%) 44.7 38.6 47.5 .493 
Business (%) 8.8 10.2* 8.2* .093 
Public works programme (%) 2.2 4.0 1.4 .103 
Total persons 6-18 years (school age) 235.0 68.0 167.0  
Not schooling (%) 9.8 7.4 10.8 .453 
Primary class 1-2 (%) 66.8 69.1 65.9 .632 
Primary class 6-8 (%) 20.0 20.6 19.8 .886 
Secondary Form 1-2 (%) 3.0 2.9 3.0 .983 
Secondary Form 3-4 (%) 0.4 0.0 0.6 .523 
All persons in school (4-26 yrs) 229.0 69.0 160.0  
% persons aged 6-18 years (sch. age) 87.8 87.0 88.1 .805 
Key: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
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The figures for household members available to work in Table 7.5 takes into account the 
reality that children under the age of 18 contribute to the labour force of the household, as is 
prevalent throughout rural Africa. The ages of all persons were converted into adult-labour 
units using factors provided in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.17). In the January survey, households 
were asked about individuals in the house who had provided farm labour (worked in family 
farms or ganyu) and other productive engagements between October 2007 and January 2008. 
Notably the data suggest that in a typical Malawi household, active adult labour contributes 
only just over 40 per cent of the total labour available in the household. There is no difference 
between cash and non-cash sample households in terms of labour availability but the results 
suggest that significantly more individuals in beneficiary than in non-beneficiary households 
participated in family farms and businesses. 
The final part of Table 7.5 contains data on schooling. Again this does not demonstrate any 
significant differences between the cash and non-cash households in the sample. Rates of 
school attendance are high in this sample, with over 90 per cent of all children of schooling 
age (6-18 years). This might be expected for cash transfer recipients due to a bonus that is 
paid for school attendance, but the similarity in proportions of the non-cash beneficiaries 
seems surprising. An interesting implication of these high attendance rates is that the labour 
force participation of children discussed in the previous paragraph is conducted in parallel 
with going to school, implying that a lot of work is conducted out of school hours. 
7.4 Cash transfers and food security 
The central topic investigated in the sample survey was the food security circumstances of 
households, where it was considered that interesting light might be shed on the effect of cash 
transfers in helping very poor and vulnerable households remain food secure during the 
calendar year. In this section, a number of different dimensions of this topic are explored. 
These include the evolution of maize stocks during the year, allowing replenishment through 
cash purchases; the impact of cash transfer receipts on available household cash income; the 
level of cash transfer income and its distribution between alternative expenditures; the 
simulated food security capability of cash transfers if they were wholly spent on food; the role 
of ganyu in generating cash, especially for non-beneficiaries of the cash transfer; and the 
maize provisioning duration of the 2008 maize harvest, not allowing for replenishment using 
cash resources. The purpose of this section is therefore to explore food security relationships 
in the different sub-samples, and examine what happens to families when the maize runs out. 
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The sample survey offered an opportunity to examine various ratios and conversions 
concerning the contribution of maize to food security in Malawi that are encountered 
throughout the thesis, and about which a more precise picture can be achieved by examining 
how these work at household level. For example, a conversion factor of 0.43 kg maize per 
person per day (72.8 per cent of calorie requirement provided by maize) is deployed at 
various points in the thesis, the origins of which have been discussed in Chapter 4, and at 
household level it can be used to construct a picture of how long a particular level of initial 
maize harvest or stocks will last before the household has to turn to the market to obtain 
additional supplies. 
7.4.1 Maize calorie needs and evolving stock position in 2007-08 
The first aspect examined is the evolution of actual maize stocks held in households over a 9-
month period (4 repeat visits) between January and September 2008, reflecting stock 
replenishment as well as run down from an initial harvest position. The sample surveys 
conducted in January, March, May and September 2008 asked households for the sources of 
food stocks that they had in the household at time of survey. The distinctions were between 
own food production, purchased from own cash income, purchased using the cash transfer, 
and obtained through ganyu (often remunerated in the form of food). The findings for each 
round of the survey are summarised in Table 7.6, with some interesting implications.  
Chapter 4 has described conversions that were conducted on the data collected in order to 
permit comparisons between households. Table 7.6 provides data on the outcome of this 
exercise, given that all households in the sample were visited in January and September 2008, 
and a sub-sample was visited in March and May 2008. In each survey, households were asked 
how much maize they had in store at that moment in time. The table shows the mean 
household calorie requirement from maize, calculated according to the procedure described 
above. It also shows average maize stocks per household at each survey, in calorie terms. 
Finally, it shows how many days into the future stocks will last from the given stock position. 
The results in Table 7.6 show that over 90 per cent of the households had food at every survey 
visit. The strikingly low proportion of households with food stocks during the May visits 
which was also crop harvest period does not mean a food crisis (see Figure 7.4). Rather, the 
food was not readily available in the house, but was ripe in the fields. It can also be seen that 
the timing of the surveys reveals critical differences in household maize stocks at different 
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points in the year. January-March is lean season, some 8-9 months after the 2007 harvest, and 
3-5 months before the next harvest. Average stock duration of about 15 days at this time 
reflects households making short term purchases of maize to cover routine consumption (i.e. 
for most households stocks from the last harvest will have already been depleted). In March, 
most households run out of food, and therefore market sources become important and so too 
are the social cash grants. In May, a major proportion of the total harvest occurs, and means 
stocks rise to give 2-3 months forward cover of consumption. By September, the rest of the 
harvest will have occurred (May-June), but mean stocks have already begun to decline, giving 
diminished forward cover. Again, the role of the social cash grants are significant here as 
beneficiary households might have purchased contingency maize stocks (especially with fears 
of looming hunger that saw maize prices soaring from June 2008, as noted in Chapter 5).  
Table 7.6: Availability of food maize in the sample households, Jan-Sep 2008 
Food Security Variables All HHs Cash Noncash P-value 
Sample (Jan and Sept) 90 30 60  
Sample (March and May) 30 11 19  
     
Household size      
January survey  5.4 4.8 5.7 .129 
September survey 5.4 4.5** 5.8** .030 
     
Daily HH maize requirement (Kgs) 2.7 2.4 2.8 .187 
Std. Deviation 1.2 1.2 1.1  
     
HHs with maize stocks (%)      
January survey  97.8 100.0 96.7 .315  
March survey 96.7 100.0 94.5 .832  
May Survey 46.7 54.5 42.1 .582  
September survey 93.3 96.7 91.7 .373  
         
Mean stocks HH maize (Kgs)a          
January survey  31.6 32.6 31.1 0.860 
March survey 21.7 25.6 18.9 0.159 
May Survey 189.1 90.4 250.8 0.211 
September survey 114.2 126.9 107.5 0.348 
         
Days HH maize stocks lasta         
January survey  14.9 18.4 13.0 0.265 
March survey 8.9 13.0** 6.1** 0.026 
May Survey 72.3 42.5 91.0 0.256 
September survey 60.6 67.5** 57.0** 0.037 
Key: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
a Only households with food stocks and after removing outliers 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
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It is notable that significant differences between cash and non-cash beneficiaries emerge from 
this exercise. Cash transfers allow recipient households to buy-in maize stocks during lean 
periods (January and September but not March and May surveys), and this is potentially a 
major benefit of an SCT, verified by the data in Table 7.7.  
Table 7.7: Sources of food at survey visits (%) 
Sources of food by survey visit All HHs Cash  Noncash P-value 
Sample (Jan and Sept) 90 30 60  
Sample (March and May) 30 11 19  
     
January Survey     
Own food production 15.9 16.7 15.5 .889 
Purchase, own income 12.5 20.0 8.6 .128 
Purchase, cash transfer 11.4 33.3 -  
Other (ganyu) 60.0 30.3*** 75.9*** .000 
     
March Survey     
Own food production 3.6 0.0 5.9 .781 
Purchase, own income 3.6 0.0 5.9 .711 
Purchase, cash transfer 3.6 9.1 -  
Other (ganyu) 85.7 81.8 88.2 .817 
     
May Survey     
Own food production 92.9 100.0 87.5 .776 
Purchase, own income 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000 
Purchase, cash transfer 0.0 0.0 -  
Other (ganyu) 7.1 0.0 12.5 .776 
     
September Survey     
Own food production 73.0 72.4 72.7 .976 
Purchase, own income 9.5 0.0** 14.5** .032 
Purchase, cash transfer 8.3 24.1 -  
Other (ganyu) 9.5 3.4 12.7 .171 
 
Key: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
 Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows graphically how these stock and duration positions evolve for the survey 
visit dates. It is clear that the food security of cash transfer recipients is achieved by virtue of 
the receipt of the transfer, with the cash transfer enabling between a quarter and a third of all 
food to be purchased, except in May when households stated they were self-sufficient from 
own production. For non-cash recipients, ganyu is of critical importance at food deficit times 
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of the year as shown in particular by the 76 per cent of their food supplies in January being 
attributable to ganyu. Another way this could be interpreted is whereas cash transfer 
recipients have a secure fallback position in the event of failures in other sources of their food 
security, non-cash recipients must work for the totality of the food security they achieve.  
Figure 7.3: Evolution of food security position, cash and non-cash households 
  
Source: Data in Table 7.6 
 
 
 
7.4.2 Sources of household cash income 
The foregoing evidence begins to demonstrate the significance of cash income for providing 
food security when physical stocks of own produced food are depleted, and here the sources 
of such income are considered in more detail. Household respondents in the January survey 
were asked to provide enumerators with estimates of their household cash income for the 
preceding year, and to break this down between different main sources. Table 7.8 shows the 
findings derived from the cash income questions. It is realised that a one visit survey is 
unlikely to obtain very accurate results for cash income variables. There are problems of 
recall (especially for casual work, or sales of minor crops, that occurred sometime over the 
past year). Individual household members may have cash income sources that the respondent 
is unaware about, or only has a vague idea of its contribution to the household cash position. 
There is a tendency to understate income for obvious reasons when being questioned by 
outsiders. For all these reasons, the literature has a clear preference for estimating household 
material standards of living through expenditure questions rather than income questions 
(Deaton 1997). Nevertheless, the cash income questions were asked, and with a view to 
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strengthening the interpretation of the differing food security circumstances of cash transfer 
and non-cash transfer households in Mchinji district. 
Table 7.8 provides the proportion of households that fall into different annual cash income 
ranges. This shows that 63 per cent of cash transfer recipients fall into an annual cash income 
level of MK20,000 or more, while only 10 per cent of non-cash respondents correspond to 
this top quartile of cash income earners. Furthermore, the average cash income of cash 
transfer recipients was MK24,782 for the preceding year, while that of non-cash recipients 
was MK7,463; or less than a third as much. Finally, cash transfers themselves correspond to 
84 per cent of cash income received by cash transfer households; while of course this is zero 
for non-recipients, who instead obtained cash from a mixture of ganyu, groundnut sales, 
tobacco sales and petty trading. 
Table 7.8: Annual incomes estimated by households in January 2008 
Maize production All HHs Cash  Noncash P-value 
Number of observations (n) 90 30 60  
HHs by income level per year (%) 
    
MK5000 and below 42.2 0.0*** 63.3*** .000 
MK5000-10000 14.4 16.7 13.3 .673 
MK10000 -20000 15.6 20.0 13.3 .413 
MK20000 and above 27.8 63.3*** 10.0*** .000 
 
    
Average income per year (MK) 13,236 24,782*** 7,463*** .000 
Minimum 600 7,200 600  
Maximum 53,600 53,600 50,400  
Standard deviation 12,819 11,579 8,961  
 
    
Share of the incomes (%) 
    
Tobacco 14.9 1.9*** 21.4*** .000 
Groundnuts 19.1 5.9** 25.8** .001 
Maize 5.2 3.3 6.2 .382 
Business (trading/ vending) 6.5 1.5* 9.0* .054 
Ganyu 19.4 1.6*** 28.3*** .000 
Cash Transfers 28.1 84.4 -  
Key: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
Despite a lot of variation and recognisably poor quality data in this exercise, it is nevertheless 
apparent that cash transfers totally transform the livelihood circumstances of recipients 
compared to non-recipients in the same communities. This can be linked to the previous 
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observations made in Chapter 6 about the potential for cash transfer recipients to ‘leapfrog’ 
the living standards of households adjacent to them in the rural income distribution (Ellis 
2011). When, say, 40-50 per cent of rural citizens are truly poor, with little separating them in 
terms of the material conditions of their lives, the advent of a cash transfer that provides a 
secure and continuous flow of cash income into the family throughout the year changes 
completely the fortunes of the households lucky enough to receive the benefit. Moreover, it 
potentially induces a cumulative divergence between recipients and non-recipients if the 
transfer is used to invest and accumulate as well as to meet immediate needs. 
7.4.3 The level of cash transfers and what they were spent on 
It follows from the sizeable impact of cash transfers on comparative levels of household cash 
income that the level of the transfers themselves is highly significant for food security; 
moreover, their level may be such as to permit both food security and other objectives to be 
met by recipient households. 
Table 7.9: Expected versus actual cash transfers in the research sample 
 HH size  
(No of HHs)1 
Actual Cash Transfers2 Expected Cash Transfers3 
Per HH Per Person Per HH Per Person 
 1 (4) 600 600 600 600 
 2 (2) 1,100 550 1,100 550 
 3 (2) 800 267 1,600 533 
 4 (8) 1,850 463 2,150 538 
 5 (2) 1,800 360 2,200 440 
 6 (3) 2,333 389 2,533 422 
 7 (4) 2,450 350 2,800 400 
 8 (3) 2,267 283 2,333 292 
 9 (1) 1,800 200 3,400 378 
 10 (1) 2,400 240 3,000 300 
Average 4.8 (30) 1,747*** 410 *** 2,053*** 472*** 
Std Dev  2.5  754 147 789 108 
*** mean difference significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
Note:  
(1) Figures in brackets refer to number of households reporting 
(2) What the sample were actually receiving per month per household 
(3) What the sample would be ideally receiving per month based on HH size and school bonus. 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2007/08 
 
 
 
With respect to the level of cash transfers, on average, recipient households in the sample 
received MK1,747 per month (Table 7.9), with large variation around this figure caused by 
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differences in household demography (the range was MK600-2800). To digress slightly, the 
average figure was lower than the expected monthly grant of MK2,050 taking into account 
household size and eligibility for school bonuses. The sample households reported missing 
payments in some months. In an 11-month period from October 2007 to August 2008, the 
expected mean payment was MK19,213 (range MK6,600-30,800) but MK18,273 (range 
MK6,000-28,600) was actually received. Thirteen households (43 per cent of the sample) 
missed an average of MK2,169 each (range MK200-4,400). This in effect translates into a 
shortfall of 5 per cent experienced over the 11-month period, equivalent to half a month cash 
grant per household. This seems a good performance when it is considered how many things 
could go amiss in supplying cash to poor households in remote rural areas. District officials 
consulted during the fieldwork stated that reduced or missed payments were deductions of 
school bonus where the children or dependents had dropped out of school. Official district 
statistics show an average monthly grant of MK2,000 per household or MK448 per person 
(Government of Malawi 2008j), while the monthly average for the Malawi programme in 
general is MK2,100 (US$14) per month (Schubert 2009). Table 7.9 compares the actual 
versus expected monthly cash grants. 
There are no restrictions imposed on beneficiaries regarding the acceptable expenditures of 
the transfers they receive in the Mchinji scheme, and in any case, any such restrictions would 
be easily circumvented. The expectation obviously is that the money will be spent on food 
and basic needs, and it is considered unlikely, given the ultra-poverty of recipients, that it 
would be spent on productive inputs or assets (still less, that it would be spent on luxury 
goods) (Miller et al. 2008b, p.42). In the September 2008 survey, the sample cash households 
were asked to provide enumerators with an approximate breakdown of the totality of cash 
grants that they had received during the 11-month period from October 2007 to August 2008. 
The data obtained from this question evidently have to be interpreted cautiously. Recall for 
anyone thinking about cash they have spent over a preceding 11 months is likely to be quite 
broad brushstroke, and in some instances may be quite faulty. However, forgetfulness in 
different directions can even out in a sample, and the broad magnitudes revealed by the 
answers to this question are sufficiently distinctive to consider that it is worthwhile looking at 
them here. Table 7.10 summarises what was discovered. 
The table provides two different types of information. The first is the number and proportion 
of sample households reporting that they spent some share of their cash transfers on the 
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different categories of expenditure. For example, 28 out of the 30 households in the sample 
spent some share of their transfers on food, 23 out of the 30 households spent some share on 
farm inputs, and so on. The second part of the table shows for the sample as a whole, the 
aggregate distribution of grants received between the different uses. Hence, 24 per cent of 
grant income was spent on food, 16 per cent on inputs and so on. The table holds some 
surprises. Use of cash is spread widely, and, interestingly, two households apparently could 
not recall spending any of their transfer on food. The occurrence of farm inputs as the second 
most important use of cash transfers after food is unexpected. Inputs are not a basic need, and 
these are considered to be ultra-poor households. A similar result was reported by Miller et al. 
(2008a, pp.39-42), so this finding is not without support from elsewhere. 
Households in fact spent their grant income in diverse ways, some to do with immediate 
consumption, and others most decidedly to do with capital formation or productive uses. In 
the table, food, clothes, and medicine (and funeral costs) sum to 49 per cent of expenditures; 
while inputs, assets, school fees and business investment sum to 47 per cent. These results are 
consistent with the earlier finding of the powerful position that cash transfers put their 
beneficiaries compared to non-cash beneficiaries in terms of income range and command over 
food. They also strengthen the argument that cash transfers can have important cumulative 
effects on household welfare and wellbeing, which over a sustained period of time may place 
them in a better material position than non-recipients in the same communities. 
Table 7.10: Major uses of eleven months’ cash grants by a household 
Major uses of 11-month cash 
grants 
Sample HHs Average Per 
HH (MK) 
Share of 
Cash (%) No % 
Total cash received 30  18,273 
 Major uses: 
 
 
  Food 28 93 4,465 24 
Agricultural inputs 23 77 2,882 16 
Clothes 26 87 2,533 14 
Assets 26 87 2,450 13 
Medical/funeral costs 23 77 2,026 11 
School expenses 22 73 1,719 9 
Business (small-scale) 9 30 1,689 9 
Other uses (saving, lending) 30 100 509 3 
 
 Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
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7.4.4 The role of ganyu 
It is clear from the evidence presented so far that in the absence of cash transfers, ganyu is the 
means by which food deficit farm households manage their missing food entitlement in the 
lean season. Ganyu represents what might be called informal social protection or ‘traditional 
safety nets’ in Malawian history. It is a lot more than just ‘casual wage labour’. In the past 
there was a social obligation on the part of better-off members of rural communities to ensure 
that weaker members of the community were assisted when misfortune occurred. This is 
ganyu, and in the past comprised work undertaken for a better-off person, typically 
remunerated by being provided with meals, or, occasionally, by a small share of the maize 
harvest. 
The original spirit of ganyu has not entirely disappeared, although it has evolved a long way 
from its origins as customary obligation. The alienation of customary land that took place in 
the 1970s and 1980s (detailed in Chapter 3) contributed to a growing proportion of the rural 
population possessing insufficient land to attain self-sufficiency in food, at prevailing levels 
of productivity. This in turn has meant that ganyu has become routine every lean season for 
perhaps one third to a half of all rural Malawians, rather than an occasional need caused by an 
unexpected shock or bad luck. In effect, ganyu has become the rural labour market, and is 
paid either in kind, or in cash, depending on the preferences of the employer. The need to turn 
to ganyu as early as the final land preparation prior to sowing of maize represents a labour 
allocation problem noted by several researchers. In effect, engagement in early ganyu 
(carrying out maize cultivation and sowing activities for another farmer) detracts from the 
proper preparation and sowing of the labourer’s own maize, resulting in poorer crop 
performance later in the growing season (Alwang 1999, Whiteside 2000). 
The sample was asked to indicate what typically applied to their households on average, the 
hiring-in or hiring-out of household labour. This question was repeated in successive surveys 
and it was apparent that the same households both hired in or hired out labour at different 
times of the year depending on the availability of cash (for hiring in), or the lack of cash or 
food (resulting in hiring out). In accordance with the emerging picture of the role of cash 
transfers, cash recipients are found to be more likely to hire in labour than non-cash 
recipients, and non-cash recipients are more likely overall to hire out labour. Figure 7.5 shows 
that 72 per cent of non-cash beneficiaries compared to 53 per cent of cash recipient 
households reported engaging in ganyu between October 2007 and January 2008. In the same 
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period, 57 per cent of cash beneficiary households but only 27 per cent of non-beneficiary 
households reported hiring in labour.  
For both groups, however, as own food production got depleted, ganyu became an important 
food source and vice versa. In the May survey when crops were being harvested, non-cash 
beneficiary households reporting ganyu dropped by 30 per cent from 90 per cent during peak 
lean period in January. The high numbers of cash beneficiaries that reported ganyu sources of 
income, especially in January (Figure 7.6) can be attributed to delays in payment of the cash 
grants. On a wider scale in the Mchinji scheme, Miller et al. (Miller et al. 2008a, p.viii) have 
recorded a 10.7 percentage point difference between cash and non-cash beneficiary 
households in children that worked in neighbouring home in order to supplement incomes and 
food in their households and most of the participants were from non- beneficiary households. 
Figure 7.5: Comparing ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ of household labour in the sample, Jan 2008 
 
 
  
Source: Mchinji household survey data, 2008 
 
Figure 7.6: Comparing seasonal participation in ganyu Jan-Sept 2008 
 
 
Source: Mchinji household survey data, 2008 
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7.4.5 The food purchasing power of cash transfers 
A further aspect of the cash transfers that is worth examining in the food security context is 
the impact on changes in their purchasing power of seasonal changes in the price of maize. 
This is done here by examining the quantity of maize ultra-poor households with differing 
demographic structures would be able to purchase with the cash transfer to which they were 
entitled, given changing seasonal maize prices. Using the maize calorie conversions discussed 
earlier in this section, the maximum contribution of the cash transfer to satisfying household 
maize needs can also be calculated. Table 7.11 summarises the findings of this simulation 
exercise. 
Table 7.11: Comparing maize the cash grants could buy in different periods of the year 
Impact indicator Household size Sample avge 
Household size 1 2 3 4+ 4.8 
Number of Households (n) 4 2 2 22 30 
Expected Monthly transfer (MK)* 600 1,100 1,600 2,445 2,053 
Actual Monthly transfer (MK)** 600 1,100 800 2,100 1,747 
 
          
Daily maize needs (Kgs) 0.55 1.06 1.60 3.00 2.45 
 
          
Maize bought (Kgs) 
( all grant spent on maize)           
Jan survey (MK25.88/kg) 23.2 42.5 30.9 81.1 67.5 
Mar survey (MK31.95/kg) 18.8 34.5 25.1 65.7 54.7 
May survey (MK28.13/kg) 21.3 39.1 28.4 74.6 62.1 
Sep survey (MK59.74/kg) 10.0 18.4 13.4 35.1 29.2 
 
          
Duration maize take (days) 
          
January survey  42.1 40.2 19.2 28.8 30.7 
March survey 34.1 32.6 15.6 23.3 24.8 
May Survey 38.7 37.0 17.7 26.5 28.2 
September survey 18.2 17.4 8.3 12.5 13.3 
 
          
Share monthly needs (%) 
          
January survey  135.8 129.7 61.9 92.7 98.9 
March survey 110.0 105.1 50.1 75.1 80.1 
May Survey 124.9 119.4 56.9 85.3 91.0 
September survey 60.8 58.1 27.7 41.5 44.3 
 
Note: * What household should be receiving given size and school bonus 
** What sample households were actually receiving per month  
 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
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Table 7.11 is illuminating in two further areas of this discussion about cash transfers and food 
security. First, it is notable that the maximum contribution that the cash transfers can make to 
household maize needs diminishes as household size increases. For example, at the January 
survey, the cash transfer could have supplied a one-person household with 125 per cent of its 
monthly calorie needs from maize (39 days supply); while for a 4-person household only 76 
per cent of needs would be met by spending the entire transfer on maize. Second, seasonal 
changes in the market price of maize can make large differences to the food security 
purchasing power of a cash transfer. In this respect, it is recalled (Chapter 5) that 2008 was an 
unusual year, in which the post-harvest drop in maize prices was unusually small and of short 
duration before prices began to rise steeply in August and September. This is picked up in the 
sample survey, by the rise in the maize from MK28.13 in May to MK59.74 in September. A 
consequence of this rising price is that the maize needs purchasing power of the cash transfer 
drops from 86 to 39 per cent of total household maize needs for the average sample 
household, between the first survey (in January 2008) and the last survey (in September 
2008).  
7.5 Comparative evidence on ISP coupon recipient households 
7.5.1 Land ownership and use 
It is recalled that the ISP in principle targets poor households possessing land and labour, but 
with limited cash to buy inputs. The objective of the programme is to increase agricultural 
output and incomes. This section examines what was observed to have occurred in the case 
study sites in 2007/08 in terms of household responses to the ISP. As discussed earlier, the 
household selection process resulted in a sample of 69 coupon recipients, of which 22 were 
also beneficiaries of cash transfers. In addition 21 households did not receive ISP coupons (8 
cash beneficiaries, and 13 non-beneficiaries of either scheme). In the tables which follow 
‘coupon only’ recipients (47 households) are distinguished from joint recipients and non-
recipients. 
Although not necessarily a targeting requirement of the ISP, land size in Malawi is often used 
as an indicator of relative poverty or vulnerability. For example, MVAC livelihood profiles 
for the Kasungu-Lilongwe zone, within which Mchinji district falls, reveals that the most 
vulnerable households have holdings of 1.0-2.5 acres (0.4-1.0 ha), averagely vulnerable 
households own 2-3 acres (0.8-1.2 ha), and less vulnerable households own 3-5 acres (1.2-2.0 
ha (Government of Malawi 2008d). Table 7.12 summarises land distribution in the sample, 
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and shows no statistical differences between coupon recipients and non-recipients in terms of 
land size but a larger proportion of coupon recipients (43 per cent) had 0.5-1.0 ha compared to 
only 20 non-beneficiaries or 18 per cent joint beneficiaries. However, non-beneficiaries in the 
2007/08 cultivated slightly less proportion of the land, compared to households that were 
coupon or joint beneficiaries. 
Table 7.12: Comparing land ownership and use 
Land ownership and sizes All HHs Coupon Both None1 P-value 
Observations (HHs) 89 47 22 20 
 
HHs by land size (%) 
Less than 0.5 ha 11.2 12.8 9.1 10.0 .887 
0.5 to 1.0 ha 31.5 42.6* 18.2* 20.0* .060 
1.0 to 2.0 ha 34.8 27.7 36.4 50.0 .214 
2.0 ha and more 22.5 17.0 36.4 20.0 .195 
  
    Average land size (ha) 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.3 .208 
Standard deviation 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 
Minimum  0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 
Maximum  6.1 6.1 5.3 4.3 
  Land cultivated in 2007/08 (%)2 60.0 67.1 53.6 50.4 .040** 
Std Deviation 28.3 27.0 29.3 26.9 
Minimum  7.6 7.6 12.9 8.2 
Maximum  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
 Note:  1one household did not have land and is excluded in all analysis to do with ISP 
 
2
 Total areas cultivated to maize, groundnuts and tobacco as stand- alone crops. 
  
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Crop and crop varieties 
As the staple food crop, maize was grown by almost all households in the case study area, 
only differing in cultivation practices. The tobacco crop is often regarded in Mchinji as the 
main source cash income but, as group discussions made clear during the fieldwork, people 
only grew tobacco in 2007/08 if they had access to tobacco fertilizer coupons because tobacco 
had declined in profitability due to low auction prices. Instead, groundnuts were cited as an 
important source of cash income in that crop season.  
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Table 7.13 summarises data obtained on crops, areas and varieties grown by the different 
sample groups in 2007/08. Coupon recipients had more maize area on average than non-
recipients. Overall, the majority of the sample planted local maize, followed in importance by 
hybrid maize. The preference of all farmers for hybrid seed as compared to OPV seed is clear 
from this sample. This has been documented on a wider scale in the evaluation of 2006/07 
ISP by Dorward et al (2008). Surprisingly, a significant proportion of joint recipients planted 
mixed seed. 
Table 7.13: Comparing crops and varieties in 2007/08 
Crops and varieties All HHs Coupon Both None P-value 
Observations (HHs) 89 47 22 20 
 
 HHs that grew crop (%) 
Maize 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.000 
Tobacco 24.7 18.2 29.8 20.0 .502 
Groundnuts 47.2 54.5 48.9 35.0 .483 
 
    Average cropped area (ha) 
    Maize 0.46 0.44ab 0.56a 0.39b .032** 
Tobacco 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 .692 
Groundnuts 
 0.22   0.20   0.25  0.23 .192 
 Maize varieties grown (% HHs) 
    Local 58.4 59.6 50.0 65.0 .603 
OPV (Composite) 3.4 2.1 9.1 0.0 .213 
Hybrid 36.0 38.3 31.8 35.0 .869 
Mixed 2.2 0.0 a 9.1a 0.0 b .046** 
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Figures denoted by different letters significantly different (p=0.032 
  
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
 
 
7.5.3 Fertilizer sources, coupon uses and membership of farmer clubs 
In 2007/08, ISP procured from abroad and distributed in Malawi 170,000 metric tonnes of 
fertilizer, but the government also allowed the private sector to redeem coupons and claim the 
difference (between coupon value and commercial value) from the government. In effect, all 
the 216,553 metric tonnes of fertilizer that was purchased or consumed by the smallholder 
sector in 2007/08 was ISP fertilizer. Trading in ISP coupons was ubiquitous in the case study 
areas. In consultations with agricultural staff, VDC members and households the author was 
informed that fertilizer coupons with a face value of MK900 sold on average at MK2000, 
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mostly to ‘business men’. The redeemed fertilizer at MK900 per bag was then reportedly sold 
to wealthier (estate) farmers or across the borders in Mozambique and Zambia for around 
MK10,000 per bag, but other Malawian farmers could also buy their requirements at 
negotiated prices. 
It was apparent in Mchinji in 2007/08 that the rules surrounding coupon redemption were 
easily evaded. The principle ‘rules’ in this respect were that the coupon could only be 
redeemed in their district of issue, and that a single individual could only turn up at the 
fertilizer distribution point to claim two bags (or a maximum of four bags, if they had also 
been allocated tobacco fertilizer). These rules were circumvented by individuals wishing to 
aggregate fertilizer into larger volumes by hiring young men, sometimes from outside the 
district, to act as the purchasers and redeemers of the coupons, for a small fee. The same 
young men would move around the district turning up at different outlets to claim their two 
bags of maize. It was common during the fertilizer purchase period to see long queues 
containing a disproportionate number of young men in their late teens or early twenties (much 
more than in the farming population at large) waiting to redeem their fertilizer coupons. 
Table 7.14: Sources of inputs and uses of coupons in 2007/08 (%) 
Observations (HHs) All HHs (n-89) 
Coupon 
(n=47) 
Both 
(n=22) 
None 
(n=20) P-value 
Maize and tobacco fertilizer sources 
Coupons 58.4 63.6 57.4 55.0 .926 
Cash purchases 3.4 0.0 6.4 0.0 .388 
Coupons and cash purchase 12.4 13.6 8.5 20.0 .441 
Other (e.g. sharing) 9.0 4.5 8.5 15.0 .478 
Did not apply 16.9 18.2 19.1 10.0 .636 
      Uses of the 2007/08 coupons 
    
Bought inputs 58.4 81.8 72.3 - .503 
Sold (traders/other farmers) 13.5 13.6 19.1 - .576 
Did not use/still available 5.6 4.5 8.5 - .763 
Did not receive coupons 22.5 - - 100.0 
      Member of farmer club 2007/08 9.0 10.6 4.5 10.0 .703 
 For uses of coupons, tests compare ‘coupon’ and ‘both’ groups of households only 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
The results of information collected in the sample survey summarised in Table 7.14 lends 
support to these qualitative observations. For example, 55 per cent of the non-coupon 
  235 
recipients in the sample acquired their fertilizer through coupons. About 14 per cent of the 
recipients openly stated that they sold their coupons, which must be regarded as a minimum 
proportion, since respondents would have been wary about stating this to an outsider. It is 
surprising that coupon recipients who were also cash beneficiaries were also found to sell 
coupons (19 per cent of them admitted to this). The table also shows the membership in 
farmer clubs of sample households, striking by its low proportion of the sample in all groups. 
An implication of this is low access to extension advice, since extension officers generally 
carry out their tasks within the framework of farmers clubs in Malawi. 
7.5.4 Maize seed and fertilizer rates and outputs 
For the purpose of this section, the main input use here is fertilizer on the maize crop because 
it is obvious that the practice in Malawi does not promote fertilizer application on groundnuts, 
while a tobacco crop that has not applied fertilizer automatically gets disqualified at the 
(auction floors) market. It is nevertheless recognized that the ISP in the area distributed both 
maize and tobacco fertilizer and, in some communities, beneficiaries had to choose between 
the two. Table 7.15 presents results on seeding, fertilizer application and maize output in 
2007/08. 
Table 7.15: Sources of inputs and uses of coupons in 2007/08 
Maize-fertilizer productivity All HHs Coupon Both None P-value 
Observations (HHs) 89 47 22 20 
Average maize area (ha) 0.46 0.44ab 0.56b 0.39a .032** 
Seed planted (Kgs) 10.1 9.8 11.1 9.5 .580 
Fertilizer applied (Kgs) 41.3 41.4 46.6 35.4 .587 
Maize harvested (Kgs) 387.0 391.3 425.0 335.0 .682 
‘Standardized’ figures 
    Seed rate (Kg/ha) 23.6 23.5 22.4 25.2 .690 
Fertilizer rate (Kg/ha) 139.8 148.4 130.2 131.6 .702 
Yield (Kg/ha) 951.5  927.5  1,034.9  927.3  .806 
Average product (kg mz/kg fert) 10.0 8.1a 8.7a 15.6b .070* 
HHs by fertilizer application (%) 
   Did not apply 16.9 19.1 18.2 10.1 .632 
Applied once 69.7 70.2 68.2 70.0 .991 
Applied twice 13.5 10.6 13.6 20.0 .614 
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 & Figures denoted by different letters are significant 
 
 Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
Significant differences in maize areas between coupons recipients and non-recipients have 
been observed above (Table 7.15). In terms of seed rate, the recommendations in Malawi are 
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20-25 kilograms per hectare and the results depicted in Table 7.15 suggest this. It has to be 
recalled from Chapter 5 that farmers in Malawi apply far much below 100 kilograms of 
fertilizer per hectare of maize crop against the recommended rates of 150-250 kilograms per 
hectare but the sample for this research suggest closer to the recommendations. However, 
there is no evidence to suggest differences between recipients and non-recipients of coupons. 
Instead, evidence suggests lower fertilizer efficiency among recipients than non-coupon 
recipients as far as average fertilizer product (kilograms of maize per kilogram of fertilizer 
applied) is concerned, providing an additional insight into the discussion in chapter 5 about 
efficiency of the ISP (see Table 5.8 in Chapter 5).  
The official maize yield in Mchinji in 2007/08 averaged 2,208 kilograms per hectare (1,113 
for local maize, 2,324 for OPV and 3,188 for hybrid maize). It has been noted earlier (Table 
7.13) that about 60 per cent of sample households grew local maize and about 70 per cent 
applied fertilizer once instead of the recommended two times (basal dressing for growth and 
top dressing for cob development), and about 17 per cent did not even apply fertilizer. The 
yields in Table 7.15 may therefore be within and acceptable range although they are lower 
than the official yields in that year (of courses estimation methods differed but farmers are 
also known to provide fairly accurate estimates of their own production). 
7.5.5 Cash incomes from crop sales 
One objective of the ISP is to promote farmer incomes through sale of crops. Table 7.16 
presents results of households that reported (during the September survey) selling crops – it 
has to be noted here that most crop sales take place between April and August. Although the 
results do not suggest any statistically significant differences in crop sales incomes, it is 
important to observe the low crop sales in the sample, especially among tobacco growers. 
Most farmers especially non-coupon recipients that cultivated the crop did not manage to the 
standards required (fertilizer application, weeding, etc) by the market and hence failed to sell 
it. But for growers who sold the crop, it accounted for 50 per cent of the crop sales income in 
non-coupon recipient households while groundnuts accounted for about 60 per cent of share 
of the crop sales income in coupon recipient households. It is also important to observe the 
shares of maize, groundnuts and tobacco in households that were recipients of both schemes 
(social cash grants and coupons). 
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Table 7.16: Crop sales and shares 2007/08 
Variable All HHs Coupon Both None P-value 
Observations (HHs) 89 47 22 20 
HHs reported crop sale (%)a 48.3 55.3 45.5 35.0 .241 
 Households reported selling (%)a 
     
Maize  13.5 17.0 9.1 10.0 .563 
Tobacco 43.8 47.4 50.0 28.6 .633 
Groundnuts 45.2 43.5 58.3 28.6 .560 
 
    Total crop sales income (MK)b 14,588 17,365 12,912 6,671 .627 
Maize share (%) 22.5 24.4 13.1 28.6 .693 
Tobacco share (%) 35.0 33.5 28.2 50.6 .606 
Groundnuts share (%) 40.2 38.2 58.7 20.8 .243 
 
   Share of 2007/08 prod sold (%)b 
   Maize 2.0 2.2 0.9 2.4 .691 
Groundnuts 14.3 16.1 11.7 13.0 .812 
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
a
 Farmers that grew the crop in 2007/08; b Farmers that reported selling the crop 
  
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
 
7.5.6 The food security implications of the 2008 harvest 
A final way the food security of sample households is examined here is by reference to the 
actual size of their 2008 maize harvests, occurring from late April to early June 2008. This is 
worth doing because the final survey conducted in September 2008 was able to collect data on 
the size of the preceding maize harvest, at a time when the recall period was fairly short and 
most households had a clear recollection of the quantity of maize they had achieved in the 
2008 harvest. Table 7.17 shows how long, on average for the different sample groups, the 
maize harvested in 2008 would have lasted the household, using the same assumption as 
before that maize contributes 72.8 per cent to dietary energy in Malawi. For the sample as a 
whole, the maize harvest would have lasted 193 days or 6.4 months; leaving them exposed to 
acquiring maize in the market for another 6 months. Differences between categories are not 
statistically significant as far as production is concerned; however, differences are observed in 
terms of days the maize would take to deplete (if used for household consumption only). The 
slight differences between coupon recipients and joint coupon and cash recipients arises from 
differences to mouths to feed; as expected, the cash beneficiary households might have 
attracted additional members into the households. It is important also to note the variation in 
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mean values between the groups was from 95 per cent food requirements met for joint coupon 
and cash recipients to 40 per cent for coupon holders.  
Table 7.17: Maize balance sheet for sample households in 2008 harvest 
Category All HHs Coupon Both None p-value 
Observations (HHs) 85 46 20 19  
     
 
Household size 5.5 5.9 5.3 4.8 .237 
Annual maize requirements (Kgs) 989.8 1061.9 935.9 871.8 .200 
 
 
2007/08 Production (kg) 396.9 373.7 492.5 352.6 .303 
How long would last (days) 193.3 149.0* 282.9* 206.2 .065 
HHs requirements met (%) 57.5 40.4* 95.4* 58.8 .053 
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Source: Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
 
Another way harvest and sales data from the 2008 harvest can be utilised is to examine 
various scenarios by which sample households can (a) consume their own production, (b) 
supplement own production by purchases from the proceeds of crop sales (tobacco, groundnut 
and soya sales) or (c) use cash transfers to purchase maize later in the season (cash transfer 
recipients only). This simulation is important because the previous findings (Table 7.6) 
showed that in May survey, cash beneficiary households had food stocks to last 1.5 months 
while non-beneficiary households reported stocks that would last three month. Three months 
later in September 2008, cash beneficiary households reported stocks that would last 2.2 
months, representing an increase of 0.81 months of stocks. In contrast, stocks in non-
beneficiary households dropped by one month of stocks (assuming this is not a reflection of 
sales) months to reported. The results of a simulation exercise taking these alternatives 
successively into account are provided in Table 7.18.  
Some much more interesting findings on the potential role of cash transfers emerge from this 
exercise: 
(a) as in the previous table, overall 51 per cent of nutritional needs can be provided by maize, 
on average, if most maize output is used for home consumption and not sold; 
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(b) sales of other crops are only at best able to provide a small proportion of annual maize 
requirements, amounting to 7-29 per cent; 
(c) cash transfers on their own would provide cash transfer beneficiaries on average with 51 
per cent of their annual needs; 
(d) a combination of own production, plus maize that could be purchased from other crop 
sales, plus maize that could be purchased with the cash transfer shows how the cash 
transfer transforms the food security of recipient households compared to other groups in 
the sample; the potential command over maize calories of cash recipient households is 
over 100 per cent compared to 49-57 per cent for other groups in the sample. 
Table 7.18: Food security simulation based on maize production and purchase 2008 
Category All HHs Cash Coupon Both None P-value 
Observations (HHs) 90 8 47 22 13  
Household size  
January survey 5.4 3.3 a 5.7 b 5.4 b 5.4 b .046** 
September survey 5.4 3.3 a 5.7 b 5.0 a 6.0 b .037** 
      
 
Simulation 
     
 
(a) 2008 maize output less sales (Kg) 378.7 235.7 357.2 481.6 383.3 .183 
Annual maize needs (Kgs) 989.8 668.0 1043.2 975.5 990.7 .175 
Maize requirements met (%) 50.5 53.3 44.2 64.7 50.8 .595 
Observations (n) 85 7 47 19 12  
      
 
(b) 2008 use of other crop sales (Kg) 367.4 213.7 451.1 303.9 74.7 .926 
Annual maize needs (Kgs) 1,117.7 901.6 1,236.3 925.5 1,008.6 .245 
Maize requirements met (%) 26.9 23.0 29.2 29.0 7.0 .929 
Observations (n) 35 2 21 9 3  
      
 
(c) Cash transfer purchase maize (Kg) 412.2 342.2 
 
437.7 
 
.248 
Annual maize needs (Kgs) 893.9 610.5 a 
 
996.9 b 
 
.032** 
Maize requirements met (%) 51.3 60.2 a 
 
48.0 b 
 
.053* 
Observations (n) 30 8 
 
22 
 
 
      
 
Potential maize (Kg) (a)+(b)+(c)  638.0 601.9 558.8 977.9 371.1  
Annual maize needs (Kgs) 981.4 610.5a 1,043.2b 996.9 b 959.7 b .063* 
Overall maize needs met (%) 75.2 112.7a 57.3 a b 115.8 a 48.5 b .003** 
Observations (n) 90 8 47 22 13  
Sig: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Note: Figures denoted by different letters are significant  
Source: Compiled from Mchinji Household Surveys, 2008 
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The above exercise affirms how access to cash transfers entirely changes the prospective food 
security situation of beneficiaries relative to non-beneficiaries, a finding now approached 
from several different angles and being consistent across a range of indicators and food 
security relationships.  
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has utilised a sample survey of 90 households in three villages to explore 
empirically certain important dimensions of the way cash transfers and input coupons work in 
practice for poor rural families. The district chosen to do this was Mchinji district in Malawi’s 
central region, the district selected to pilot poverty targeted social cash transfers in Malawi. It 
is pointed out in the course of the chapter that Mchinji is not a severely deprived district in 
comparative terms for Malawi as a whole. It is generally quite a food secure district, and it 
can only be supposed that its choice to trial an SCT was more to do with the logistics of 
access to Lilongwe than strictly to do with the severity of food vulnerability faced routinely 
by its inhabitants. 
The chapter sought to clarify three aspects of the two programmes being compared in this 
thesis in particular. The first aspect was how programme organisation and beneficiary 
selection worked in practice, especially at the level of the individual community. The second 
aspect was how participation and non-participation in the SCT altered the food security 
prospects of different households across the seasons, taking into account the interactions 
between cash and food (via the price of maize) and the alternative sources of cash income 
available to households in different categories. The third aspect was whether coupon 
beneficiaries could be distinguished in any particular ways in practice from other groups 
represented in the sample, and in particular whether evidence could be found of the existence 
and working of a secondary ‘coupon market’ created by the working of the ISP. 
In relation to the first of these aspects certain interesting points emerged. One is that both 
programmes are fairly well ‘managed’ in the sense that district administrators in general 
follow prescribed procedures, and there is some effort (not always successful) to involve 
communities properly in deciding who should participate in individual schemes. Second, 
selection behaviour at community level depends a lot on the strength of ethnic and kinship 
solidarity within any individual village. Where this is very strong (as in one of the case study 
villages where the entire population seemed to be related to each other), then beneficiary 
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selection is likely to be fair, and pooling of resources within the community can be observed 
to occur from different benefits. Third, so-called ‘malfeasance’ in which selection criteria are 
neglected, or coupons or payments go astray, is rarely a village or community-level 
phenomenon; it occurs ‘higher up’ the system at the level of authority figures and officials 
rather than ordinary villagers. This is important because in the literature targeting failures are 
often laid at the door of community targeting, while the observation from this fieldwork is 
that communities are often made the scapegoats for failures that occur amongst leaders. 
The second aspect of food security also yields some important insights. The chapter takes an 
innovative approach to food security, by first establishing the maize consumption needs in 
calorie terms of households with differing demographic structures. This enables a more 
rigorous approach to maize harvests and stocks and how long they will last, than relying only 
on the subjective impressions of interviewees. The findings show that households rely on a 
combination of own maize stocks and cash purchases across the seasons. On average, 
household maize harvests provide food security for about 6 months, but with tremendous 
variation between households in this regard. Covering food security for the rest of the year 
depends on generating cash, and in normal circumstances this occurs either through working 
for other farmers (ganyu) or by selling crops like tobacco, groundnuts and soybeans. Cash 
transfers totally transform this picture, as recipient households then have a secure monthly 
cash flow that can be used for a variety of different purposes (depending on season), and this 
makes them ‘cash rich’ compared to non-beneficiaries, notwithstanding the ultra-poverty and 
extreme vulnerability that led to them being included in the SCT scheme in the first place. 
The third aspect concerned coupon beneficiaries and differences between them and other 
groups in the sample in relation to agricultural practices. A first finding here was that coupon 
beneficiaries did not appear to differ much from other farm households with respect to any of 
the main indicators which might have displayed such differences. This is almost certainly to 
do with the sheer size of the programme (aimed to reach 60 per cent of all farmers), and the 
many ways that coupons can get redistributed between households. The second finding is 
precisely on the ‘market in coupons’ that microeconomic theory would expect to arise when 
there is a significant gap between the ‘commercial’ price of a commodity and its subsidised 
price. As shown in Chapter 5, in Malawi in 2008, this gap was about 80 per cent of the full 
price (i.e. the coupon price was only 20 per cent of the market price). Key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions and observation showed a vibrant coupon market in 
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existence, utilizing innovative means to circumvent regulatory prohibitions concerning the 
redemption of coupons. The existence of this market was also supported by quantitative data 
in the form of coupons sold by their recipients, and purchased by non-coupon beneficiaries. 
What was observed in Mchinji in 2008 was already the outcome of a process of adaptation to 
getting cash transfers by SCT beneficiaries. They were no longer in the ‘ultra-poor labour 
constrained’ circumstances in which they might have started, and their basic socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics differed little from non-recipients in the overall sample. In 
effect, the presence of a secure and continuous level of cash income meant that these were 
households worth residing in by relatives, and other adaptations such as being able to farm 
would follow from this circumstance. In other words, beneficiary households attracted in new 
household members, therefore had labour with which to cultivate, and also invested part of 
the transfer on agricultural inputs. In the fieldwork, individual examples were encountered in 
which near destitute households were transformed to become amongst the most productive 
and viable households in their communities. It is shown in the simulations (see Table 7.18) 
that an average social cash recipient household had the potential to generate 10-15 per cent 
‘maize surplus to household requirements’ while non-cash beneficiary households were at 
potential risk of failing to meet minimum household calorie requirements, barely achieving 49 
per cent of the requirements. 
The evidence suggests that genuine concerns about cumulative divergence could arise from 
continuously providing the same set of households with cash transfers over several years. It is 
not just the level of the cash transfer that is important in this (although it seems quite possible 
that the Mchinji level has been too generous); it is also the risk free character of a cash 
transfer (as compared to the uncertainties that prevail for all other means of earning cash in 
rural communities, except salaried jobs). In general, a cash transfer may enable a real pathway 
out of poverty to be achieved for its recipients, but then the literature contains little guide to 
what happens if you cease such a transfer after an interval of time, a decision referred to as 
‘graduation’. Conceptually, a family might be considered ready to graduate if they can with 
confidence satisfy their future minimum food security needs in the absence of the transfer. 
However, this idea proves difficult to convert into practical guidance due the circularity of 
cause and effect involved in the stimulus the transfer gives to command over resources 
(Devereux 2010). 
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Chapter 8: Comparing Policies in Terms of Attributes, Coverage and Fiscal Costs 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the process of drawing the strands of this thesis together. The preceding 
three chapters have examined the agricultural input subsidy and the Mchinji social cash 
transfer programmes separately (Chapters 5 and 6), and the household level effects of receipt 
of one or both types of transfer (Chapter 7). An outcome of those chapters is that the two main 
approaches to vulnerability being compared each have flaws as well as strengths, so that they 
do not individually provide a sufficient means for preventing a significant proportion of 
Malawian rural households from experiencing extreme livelihood distress, either every year 
(in the lean season) or in years of poor harvests. The flaws of the fertilizer subsidy are that 
outcome gains may be substantially lower than claimed; leakages and secondary markets for 
both fertilizer and coupons mean that better off rural dwellers gain more from the subsidy 
than the poorer and most vulnerable segments of rural society; and the subsidy represents a 
substantial cost to the government budget (to be explored further in this chapter). The flaws of 
social cash transfers are that they are costly to target satisfactorily; targeting may fail at point 
of beneficiary selection; an artificial cap is imposed on outreach by restricting beneficiaries to 
10 per cent of households; and continuous receipt of transfers may create the peculiar 
outcome that cash transfer recipients cumulatively end up better off than non-recipients who 
at the start are almost identical in income and asset levels (and vulnerability to hunger). 
At various points earlier in this thesis, it has been pointed out that although fertilizer subsidies 
and social cash transfers may turn out to exhibit a high degree of complementarity in their 
coverage and effects on reducing vulnerability, they compete with each other (and with other 
discretionary expenditures) in terms of their claims on scarce public financial resources. At 
the core of this competition are two questions: what proportion of its total budget can the 
Malawi government allocate routinely and sustainably to a combination of farm subsidies and 
social transfers? And what portfolio of policy approaches within this allocation should be 
adopted in order to achieve a reliable reduction in the incidence and prevalence of hunger and 
deprivation in Malawi? These questions are explored in this section. 
This chapter also provides an opportunity to consider other types of routine cash transfer in 
addition to poverty targeted social cash transfers. In particular, given that around 65 per cent 
households obtaining social cash transfers turn out to contain at least one person over 65 years 
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of age, it seems useful to include a social pension when examining the affordability of 
different policy options, or combinations of policies.76 The chapter proceeds as follows. The 
next section draws together some key comparisons between fertilizer subsidies and social 
cash transfers that arise, in part, from the evidence and discussion of preceding chapters. This 
is followed in section 8.3 by an examination of the budgetary implications of different 
policies or combinations of policies. This exercise itself has three components: an 
examination of recent government income and expenditure in Malawi and the scope it reveals 
for ‘fiscal space’ (discretionary expenditure above unavoidable long term commitments); the 
evolving toll of the ISP on the government budget; and the comparison of individual policies 
and policy combinations, each of which could conceivably be implemented within the 
available fiscal space. 
8.2 Conceptual comparisons between fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers 
Table 8.1 makes a series of comparisons between fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers as 
different instruments for reducing vulnerability to hunger. The comparisons involve multiple 
attributes: mechanism for reducing vulnerability, prior asset needs, risk reduction, time 
horizon, coverage limitations, inclusion and exclusion, unplanned effects, budget differences, 
political dimensions, and rights considerations.  
Fertilizer subsidies reduce vulnerability indirectly. Following the microeconomic logic set out 
in Chapter 2, fertilizer subsidies result in higher fertilizer use, higher yields (if agronomic 
conditions permit), more output, and lower prices. It is also hoped that seasonal price 
instability will be kept within a range that reflects competitive storage and trading costs, 
therefore ameliorating the high proportion of insufficient food entitlement that is caused by 
high seasonal price volatility. By contrast, cash transfers enable food to be purchased 
immediately. Local food prices are supported (by contrast to the market effects of food 
transfers), and the poverty gap between household per capita expenditure and the poverty line 
is also reduced. 
 
                                                 
76
 This is not because a social pension is particularly on the current policy agenda in Malawi (it is 
mentioned in some quarters and is promoted by the international NGO HelpAge), but in order to 
demonstrate orders of comparative magnitude of different policy options, and to place the cost of ISP 
into a relative perspective. 
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Table 8.1: Comparative Attributes of Fertilizer Subsidies and Social Cash Transfers 
Attributes Fertilizer subsidies Social cash transfers 
Mechanism for 
Reducing 
Vulnerability 
Indirect: 
• low price increases use 
• increased use raises yields 
• high yields raise food security 
• increased market sales keep seasonal 
food prices down 
Direct: 
• transfer buys food 
• food prices supported 
• poverty gap reduced 
Asset and 
Resource 
Requirements 
Many: 
• land to cultivate 
• labour for cultivation 
• fertilizer responsive varieties 
• reliable moisture in growing season 
Some: 
• land, labour, not required 
• markets deliver food & basic needs at stable 
prices 
Risk Reduction 
Effects 
Farm Livelihoods: 
• does not remove climate risks 
• personal hunger risks reduced 
All Livelihoods: 
• personal hunger risks reduced 
• provided food price swings not excessive 
Time Horizon 
Dimensions 
Cumulative Effects (hoped for): 
• uptake of fertilizer sustained 
• complementary technical 
improvements (seeds, water) 
• farm output growth secured 
• later phase out possible 
Immediate and Linkage Effects: 
• food insecurity immediately addressed 
• cash boosts local economy 
• some investment may occur 
• protected or increased assets improves future 
resilience to shocks 
Coverage 
Limitations 
Sectoral Limits: 
• rural, not urban 
• farmers, not non-farmers 
• not landless rural dwellers 
• other limits may be set by targeting 
criteria 
More Open: 
• rural or urban equally 
• farmer or non-farmer equally 
• coverage determined by targeting criteria 
o narrow: poverty targeting 
o broad: categorical targeting 
Inclusion and 
Exclusion 
Targeting Weak: 
• inclusion well-off farmers  
• exclusion poorest farmers 
Targeting Accuracy Varies: 
• poverty transfers prone to inaccurate targeting 
o ‘elite capture’ 
• pensions typically accurate 
Unplanned 
Effects 
Unplanned Market Effects: 
• displacement full price supplies 
• secondary coupon market 
• external leakages at borders 
Unplanned Household Effects: 
• ‘moral hazard’ 
• demography changes to suit targeting criteria 
Budget 
Planning 
Differences 
Budgetary Commitment: 
• unstable, due to varying world 
fertilizer prices 
• rises, due to rise in demand for low 
price fertilizer 
Budgetary Commitment: 
• stable & predictable – pensions 
• stable – poverty transfers if capped (e.g. 10% 
targeting) 
• unstable with regular indexing to food prices 
Political 
Dimensions 
Farm Lobby: 
• supported by rich as well as poor 
farmers 
• reliable constituency in support  
• strong political resistance to scaling 
down or removal 
Diverse Picture: 
• pensioners can be strong electoral force 
• the destitute politically weak 
• civil society lobbies in favour 
Rights 
Considerations 
Economic Instrument: 
• no rights attached 
• can be reduced or removed 
• long run goal to phase out 
Social Settlement: 
• social transfers derive from human rights (UN 
declarations etc.) 
• legislated pension a right 
• so far poverty transfers seldom a commitment 
or a right 
 
Source: adapted from Ellis (2009, p.3) 
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Fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers have different asset and resource profiles. Subsidies 
require land and labour and appropriate crop varieties to be cultivated. They also require 
reliable moisture in the growing season in order to achieve the potential increase in yield that 
additional fertilizer use makes possible. In some of the literature of the past five years, 
vulnerable people owning land and labour are referred to as the ‘vulnerable but viable’, 
meaning that they do not lack the capabilities required to pull themselves into a stronger 
livelihood position (Schubert 2003). This is contrasted to the ‘vulnerable non-viable’ meaning 
lack of land or capacity to work that prevents engagement in productive activity. Cash 
transfers have no prior asset requirements to achieve their objectives; indeed, it is precisely 
the lack of assets (and especially the labour asset) that results in cash transfers being 
advocated as an alternative to forms of support that require labour such as public works 
programmes. However, in the absence of indexation to food prices cash transfers do require 
stable food markets to be effective in achieving their food security objective for beneficiary 
households. This is an important point to which this thesis returns in due course. 
The risk attributes of fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers can also be contrasted. As is clear 
from much preceding discussion, fertilizer subsidies do not eliminate weather-related 
agricultural risks. Indeed in certain circumstances, they can make the losses incurred by such 
risks more severe, since the outlay on fertilizer, even at the subsidised price, is not recouped if 
crop failure occurs due to drought. In the past in Malawi, and throughout tropical Africa, one 
of the problems of fertilizer subsidies has been precisely the degree of climate variability that 
means that output failures can still occur irrespective of the improved application of fertilizers 
(Mellor and Ahmed 1988). Moreover, this risk applies not just at household level, but at 
budget level in central government, where harvest failure in the presence of the input subsidy 
means that significant public resources have been spent with little to show in terms of 
securing citizens welfare in a bad season. On the cash transfers side, receipt of the transfer 
immediately reduces the risk of hunger, depending on the level of the transfer and the stability 
of food prices. Since food price risks often stem from production events there turns out to be 
an interesting inter-relationship between fertilizer use, food output, market management 
(including use of imports) and the risk reduction potential of cash transfers for poor families.77 
                                                 
77
 The maize market management aspects of maize price instability in Malawi are further drawn out in 
the final chapter of this thesis. 
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The time horizon dimensions of fertilizer subsidies compared to social cash transfers also 
differ. A fertilizer subsidy has intended cumulative long run benefits. Indeed, there are few 
agronomists or economists who would expect the full benefits from such subsidies to be 
realised within one crop season. This is because cultivation practices do not change 
instantaneously across all farmers, and the scope for complementarity between increased 
fertilizer use, improved seeds, and improved management of soil moisture may take a 
sequence of seasons to realise. It becomes a matter of careful evaluation of progress made to 
determine at what point fertilizer use may have stabilised to the extent that the subsidy can be 
gradually phased out without impairing yield and output levels (provided there is also the 
political will to contemplate doing this). Cash transfers address food insecurity directly, 
subject only to the earlier caveat about food prices and the food purchasing power of the 
transfer. However, as shown in Chapter 7 expenditures from such transfers show that food, on 
average, corresponds to about 25 per cent of their use, and other goods and services are 
purchased, as well investments in small assets (e.g. chicks) made. Therefore multiplier and 
cumulative effects can also occur with cash transfers even though these are not the chief 
reason for having such transfers. One economic study estimated that the multiplier effect of 
the DECT social cash transfer in 2006-07 was 2.0 i.e. for every MK transfer MK2.0 net 
additional economic activity occurred in the local economy (Davies 2007). 
The potential coverage of fertilizer subsidies and social cash transfers differ, with respect to 
very poor people. Fertilizer subsidies provide a potential route to food security for farming 
families with access to land. Cash transfers on other hand can potentially be made to any poor 
or vulnerable person: farmer or non-farmer, rural or urban, elderly or young or ill and so on. 
Both types of transfer can limit their outreach by adopting selection criteria, but leakages from 
target groups are likely to be greater with fertilizer subsidies due to the emergence of 
secondary markets for the fertilizer itself or the coupons that provide subsidised access (or, 
indeed, through the sale of the fertilizer abroad to an adjacent country which does not have an 
equivalent subsidy policy). 
In general, fertilizer subsidies are thought to be weak at reaching, or being utilized by, precise 
target groups. In social protection terminology, they embody high risk of inclusion errors (the 
people who benefit from the subsidy are different from the intended beneficiaries) and 
exclusion errors (the desired beneficiaries fail to be reached by the subsidy). The same can 
also occur with cash transfers, although this varies a lot between different forms of cash 
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transfer. Thus poverty targeted transfers have been found difficult to target accurately, even 
with strenuous efforts to do so, including the creation of new community institutions to make 
the selection process as transparent and democratic as possible. On the other hand, once age 
registration has been completed successfully (itself quite a difficult task in a country like 
Malawi), pensions are typically found to reach elderly people with a high degree of accuracy). 
Both fertilizer subsidies and cash transfers have unplanned effects, as identified in various 
places in Chapters 5-7 above. In the case of fertilizer subsidies, subsidised supplies displace 
full price supplies that were already being used by better off farmers; therefore the net gain in 
fertilizer use (as shown in Chapter 5 for the ISP) is significantly below the use represented by 
the programme itself. As already noted here and previously, subsidised fertilizers tend to 
create parallel markets, they can encourage illegal (and impossible to police) cross-border 
fertilizer trade, and they can be used on different crops than those intended. Cash transfers 
invite a similar array of unplanned effects, although in their case this tends to occur at the site 
of the household rather than in markets. In particular, household demography is fairly easily 
manipulated so if the criteria determining selection for a programme demands a particular 
formation of the household (for example, women headship, presence of elderly, presence of 
orphans) then these attributes can be readily constructed for the sole purpose of achieving 
eligibility. 
The budgetary implications of different transfers in the Malawi case are treated later in this 
chapter; however, a few preliminary comments can be made here in terms of how ‘open-
ended’ budgetary commitments are likely to turn out, for the comparison between fertilizer 
subsidies and cash transfers. As shown by the Malawi case (see further below), the budgetary 
commitment of a fertilizer subsidy is unstable. As shown in Chapter 2, if subsidised supplies 
are not rationed, then costs tend to rise steeply in successive years reflecting rising fertilizer 
usage at subsidised prices. However, even in the absence of this mechanism, the international 
prices of inorganic fertilizers are unstable,78 and a subsidised price that seems affordable 
when introduced in a low international price period can double or triple in budgetary cost 
when prices in world markets rise. By contrast social cash transfer budgetary outlays permit 
greater expenditure stability. This is so most obviously for categorical transfers like pensions, 
                                                 
78
 They tend to parallel the world price of petroleum, since many of their ingredients are side-products of 
the petroleum industry. 
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where the number of individuals in the population who are above a given age threshold can be 
predicted with a high degree of accuracy from census data. However, the same applies to 
poverty targeted transfers if they are restricted to a specific population proportion (such as the 
10 per cent of the Mchinji cash transfer). Where cash transfers can potentially cause 
budgetary difficulties is if high food price inflation occurs resulting in pressure for indexation 
of the transfer to the food price. In sub-Saharan Africa indexation has as yet not been 
considered as a feasible policy option; except in the occasional small-scale pilot exemplified 
by the DECT scheme in Malawi (Devereux et al. 2007). 
This thesis has several times drawn attention to the political dimensions of Malawi 
government stances on different policy options. Input subsidies have loomed large in Malawi 
politics for decades. They are a popular policy in rural areas, and claims between political 
parties concerning their future are scrutinised heavily in the press, radio and television, and 
the plausibility of electoral promises about them can make the difference between success or 
failure in re-election. Before the 2009 election, for example, the UDF party attempted (as it 
turned out, unsuccessfully) to gain an advantage over the incumbent president by promising 
free fertilizers to all farmers ((ADMIN 2009b, Murwira 2009)). This was such an extreme and 
unrealistic promise that the electorate were not swayed by it, and went with what they had 
already experienced. The DDP government had already demonstrated that it was prepared to 
provide low cost fertilizers on a widespread national scale. 
Interestingly, governments that have implemented social pensions similarly find that there is 
considerable political traction in them once they are in place. As Lesotho demonstrates, since 
pensions are a legislated entitlement, and since pensioners can be vociferous in their defence, 
a government that introduces them and then maintains their real purchasing power can turn 
this to advantage for re-election. Pensions also have the advantage well known to social 
welfare advocates in industrial countries that a benefit that is also received by better off 
people in society gets a lot more support than one that is targeted just to the poor (Pelham 
2007, Hagen 2008, Likoti 2008). Unfortunately, poverty targeted social transfers do not offer 
this political impetus.  
In Chapter 2 the rights based advocacy of social transfers was mentioned, as an entry point 
that differs from the needs based approach that tends to underlie most policy discussion of 
food insecurity in countries like Malawi. Input subsidies and different social transfers have 
differing rights implications. An input subsidy scheme is a discretionary economic policy 
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instrument, and as such has no rights attached. While recipient farmers may be able to 
exercise their power of democratic veto in order to ensure that the subsidy remains in place, 
they cannot claim an entitlement to a productive subsidy of this kind. Any government would 
need to reserve the ability to withdraw an input subsidy if circumstances changed. Cash 
transfers can, by contrast, be instituted as rights. The provision of a pension, for example, 
typically requires legislation rather than executive discretion to be put in place, and once 
legislated it becomes an entitlement on the part of everyone in society who is eligible to 
receive it. On the other hand, poverty targeted cash transfers such as the Mchinji social cash 
transfer is not a right or an entitlement. Hitherto it has been paid for by external funds, and no 
legislative policy commitment to its future funding from government resources has been 
entered into. The same is also true of safety net expenditure on PWPs. These differences are 
important for the policy discussion, since some policies (the prime example being pensions) 
lock governments into indefinite future obligations, while other do not. 
Summarising this discussion, the comparisons made in Table 8.1 reveals quite quickly that 
fertilizer subsidies are, or could be, to a considerable degree complementary to social cash 
transfers. They potentially address different vulnerabilities, experienced by different social 
groups, with different direct and indirect effects, and different politics and rights 
characteristics. For example, while fertilizer subsidies really only help active farmers with 
land and labour, and are intended to contribute to growth as well as poverty reduction in the 
long term, social pensions provide for those no longer in the active labour force, and they are 
not intended to contribute to growth as their primary goal, even though they may do so 
indirectly (via the economic stimulus created by expenditure of the pension). 
It is apparent from the table and discussion that social cash transfers possess important 
strengths of their own for tackling chronic vulnerability to hunger that are quite distinct from 
the indirect impacts of a fertilizer subsidy. Social cash transfers reach those who are unable to 
generate a livelihood due to lack of land or labour, they do this directly through the 
purchasing power over food of the transfer, they are equally effective in urban as rural areas, 
their delivery using electronic methods can be secure at low cost, and their budget cost for a 
given transfer to a defined set of beneficiaries is stable and predictable.79 The relationship of 
complementarity between fertilizer subsidies and social cash transfer can be depicted, as 
                                                 
79
 This assumes reasonably stable food prices and annual rather than more frequent adjustments in the 
level of the transfers. 
  251 
shown in Figure 8.1, by two intersecting spheres. The overlap shared by these spheres 
represents the degree to which the fertilizer subsidy can provide a reliable defence against 
hunger for the poorest members of the farming sector. Clearly, the larger the overlap, the 
more the fertilizer subsidy can be considered as providing a social protection function, and 
vice versa, the smaller this overlap, the more social cash transfers are needed to protect 
vulnerable citizens from hunger. 
The discussion so far has mainly emphasized the scope for complementarity between fertilizer 
subsidies and social cash transfers in the task of protecting vulnerable citizens from avoidable 
hunger. These two alternative policies also, however, compete with each other. The most 
obvious way they compete is in terms of claims over scarce budgetary resources. They also 
compete in the efficiency with which they provide a given level of protection from hunger; in 
other words, how much does each cost to ensure that 100,000 at risk families will securely 
meet their minimum food needs in the coming year? And they may compete in effectiveness: 
the reliability with which they ensure that such protection occurs. 
Figure 8.1: Illustrating the Intersection of Fertilizer Subsidies and Vulnerable People 
 
 
 Source: Ellis (2009, p.4) 
 
It is in this dimension of competition that the true trade-offs between the two policies come 
out into the open. Fertilizer subsidies are notorious for the heavy demands they eventually 
make on budgetary sources, even if they start from a modest initial position (see the Malawi 
data below). In terms of Figure 8.1, the more that fertilizer subsidies accrue to better off 
farmers, and the less they provide direct or indirect support to vulnerable people, the higher 
the opportunity cost they represent for protecting vulnerable people from hunger. In addition 
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the gains from fertilizer subsidies can prove elusive in the long term; initial success aided by 
favourable climate conditions can turn to disappointment when an adverse shock results in 
crop failure despite the huge outlays that have been made. If the subsidies fail to moderate 
seasonal price instability, then they also fail to protect vulnerable rural populations from one 
of the greatest sources of their food insecurity. Finally, despite the widely accepted logic that 
input subsidies should be phased out once their job of stimulating routine use of fertilizers is 
done, they are politically exceptionally difficult to reduce or remove, and this difficulty 
intensifies the longer that the subsidies are in place. 
8.3 Budgetary explorations of different policies 
Table 8.2 summarises government revenue and expenditure in Malawi over the five-year 
period from 2004/05 to 2008/09. Provisional figures for 2009/10 are also provided. The table 
also contains some GDP trend information, comprising the size of nominal GDP, the share of 
current expenditure in nominal GDP, and estimated real GDP growth on an annual basis. 
There are several interesting points to make regarding these figures. First, external grants 
typically make up 40 per cent of total government revenue. Grants comprise general budget 
support, project finance and assigned (dedicated) grants. In recent years, general budget 
support has comprised 25 per cent of all grants and this proportion is growing (in 2009/10 it is 
predicted to reach 32 per cent). Dedicated grants are aid flows that are assigned for specific 
purposes by donors, for example the health sector wide approach (SWap) which was 19 per 
cent of all grants in 2008/09 and support to the National Aids Commission which was 16 per 
cent of government grant income. Pertinent to this thesis, in 2008/09 MK2.8 million was 
assigned in this category to maize, fertilizer and seed support (a DFID/EU grant), showing 
that some donors have been prepared to help directly with the logistics of delivering ISP. 
Second, expenditure has on average been about 8 per cent higher than revenue, showing that 
Malawi has kept reasonably tight control of its spending in relation to income in the current 
era. Exceptions occurred in 2004/05, a food crisis year requiring commercial as well as 
concessional imports of maize when expenditure was 15 per cent above revenue, and 2008/09 
when expenditure was 18 per cent above revenue. The primary reason for this, as will be 
discussed shortly, was a very substantial overshoot in the cost of the agricultural subsidy 
programme in 2008/09. For the same reason, in that fiscal year current expenditure leapt from 
22-24 per cent of GDP to 32 per cent GDP. The table also shows real GDP growth in this 
period averaging nearly 7 per cent per year, with a predicted outcome of 6.7 per cent for 
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2009/10. The Malawi economy appears to be in robust overall health, and much of this 
success is being attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the fertilizer subsidy. According to the IMF 
(2010, p.5) agriculture contributed about 4.3 per cent of the average GDP growth rate of 6.7 
per cent recorded in the period 2005-09. 
Table 8.2: Summary of Malawi Revenue, Expenditure and GDP Share 
Budget aspect 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 Average 2009-10(P) 
Revenue (MK mn)   
Total 84,925 116,986 147,632 176,853 210,270 147,333 257,661 
Domestic 56,809 67,316 84,295 105,700 134,291 89,682 168,773 
Grants 28,117 49,670 63,337 71,153 75,979 57,651 88,888 
Expenditure (MK mn)   
Total 97,215 120,010 153,580 179,397 247,519 159,544 270,153 
Current 71,657 93,746 99,464 119,186 200,780 116,967 187,581 
Development 25,558 26,264 54,116 60,211 46,739 42,578 82,572 
Nominal GDP (MK mn) 311,954 384,174 464,464 540,053 631,120 466,353 760,842 
Current/GDP (%) 23 24.4 21.4 22.1 31.8 25.1 24.7 
GDP Growth (%) 3.6 5 7.7 8.7 8.6 6.7 6.7 
 
Sources: Government of Malawi (2007a, 2010b, 2010g); IMF (2008, 2009, 2010) 
 
 
 
Fiscal space is a difficult concept to pin down for a country like Malawi that is so heavily 
dependent on donor funding for its government revenue and expenditure. In one sense, 
Malawi has no fiscal space at all since the state would not even be able to meet its routine 
expenditure commitments if it were reliant on domestic revenue to do this. For example, in 
2008/09 external grants amounted to MK75 billion out of total revenue of MK210 billion (36 
per cent). Domestic revenue was MK134 billion. Current expenditures excluding the fertilizer 
subsidy were MK163 billion, so without external support there would have been shortfall of 
MK30 billion just in relation to routine expenditures. However, the external grants are in 
place, and have been growing in relative importance in recent years. Because of this, the 
government does indeed have some room for manoeuvre, even in the short term. In 2008/09 
expenditure overshot revenue by MK37 billion. This coincidentally is almost exactly what the 
fertilizer subsidy cost in total that year, but expenditure overruns in other areas also 
contributed to the recurrent deficit in that financial year (Government of Malawi 2007a, 
2010b, 2010g). 
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A ‘best guess’ arrived at by inspecting the government accounts for the fiscal years 2004/05 
to 2008/09 is that in an average year in the late 2000s, Malawi has had scope for discretionary 
expenditures of around MK20 billion out of a mean total expenditure of MK160 billion (12.5 
per cent). It has chosen to exercise this discretion almost wholly on the fertilizer subsidy. The 
aid underpinning of this discretion needs to be kept in mind, especially with general budget 
support reaching MK20 billion in 2008/09 and predicted to amount to MK28 billion in 
2009/10 (IMF 2010, p.23). It could be inferred that the Malawi government is allocating its 
general budget support to the fertilizer subsidy, which explains the somewhat ambivalent 
reactions of donors to the subsidy when it was introduced and in subsequent years (Chinsinga 
2007c, 2007a). On the one hand, general budget support is designed precisely to give 
governments more autonomy in their decision making over aid expenditures; on the other 
hand, this can enable governments to spend money on programmes which would not 
necessarily have been the priority preferences of the aid donors. 
The fertilizer subsidy is certainly proving costly in terms of government resources, whether of 
domestic or external origin. Table 8.3 provides data on the trend of its costs, as well as its 
share of total revenue, recurrent expenditure and GDP. In nominal terms, the subsidy rose 
steeply in value, from MK4.3 billion in 2004/05 to MK37.8 billion in 2008/09. The original 
amount budgeted for 2008/09 was MK19 billion, but fertilizer purchases in that fiscal year 
occurred at the height of the 2008 ‘price crisis’ when fertilizer prices encountered an unusual 
price spike due to parallel unprecedented levels of the world oil price. To some degree, 
therefore, the cost of the subsidy in 2008/09 can be regarded as caused by unusual events. On 
the other hand, the trend shown in Table 8.3 is precisely what the literature cited in Chapter 2 
predicts about fertilizer subsidies: that their costs spiral due to political pressure to keep 
raising the subsidy proportion, high uptake at low fertilizer prices, and an inability to adjust to 
just such unforeseen events as the international price rise that occurred in 2008. 
As shown in Table 8.3 the inputs subsidy has acquired a large imprint in the Malawi economy 
over the past five years. Its share of total government revenue grew from 5 to 18 per cent, of 
current expenditure from 6 to 19 per cent, and of GDP from 1.4 to 6.0 per cent. These are big 
figures in a small economy. Even with the predicted lower cost in 2009/10 (MK22 billion) 
due to a fall back in fertilizer prices in international markets, the fertilizer subsidy continued 
to represent 12 per cent of current government expenditure and 3 per cent of GDP in that 
fiscal year. 
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Table 8.3: Inputs Subsidy Compared to Government Finances and GDP 
Fiscal 
Year 
Fertilizer 
Subsidy 
Share 
Total 
Revenue 
Share 
Current 
Expenditure 
Share 
Total 
GDP 
 
MK m. % % % 
2004-05 4,328 5.1 6.0 1.4 
2005-06 6,937 5.9 7.4 1.8 
2006-07 9,067 6.1 9.1 2.0 
2007-08 15,018 8.5 12.6 2.8 
2008-09 37,823 18.0 18.8 6.0 
Average 14,635 9.9 12.5 3.1 
2009-10 21,861 8.5 11.7 2.9 
 Source: elaborated on the basis of data contained in IMF (2008, 2009, 2010) 
 
It is apparent from this data that the ISP is a costly programme, and to the extent that it does 
not meet the needs of a substantial proportion of Malawian citizens who routinely experience 
episodes of hunger, the policy has an opportunity cost in terms of other programmes that 
could meet those needs more directly. For this reason the subsidy needs to be viewed as one 
amongst a portfolio of policies that tackle vulnerability, allowing for debate to take place 
about the relative priority and budgetary allocation that should be accorded to each of them. 
The exercise conducted here tries to do this just for two of the largest categories of potential 
cash transfer recipients; the 10 per cent most vulnerable households and older people. The 
Mchinji cash transfer represents an incomplete commitment on the part of the Malawi 
government to provide the latter category with cash transfers, while the cost of a social 
pension is interesting to put into the mix in terms of its relative magnitude compares to other 
expenditures. 
Table 8.4 provides some basic coverage, cost and budget share data for a number of different 
alternatives, including the fertilizer subsidy. This table requires a few notes of explanation, so 
that known facts are distinguished from plausible assumptions, and the basis of the figures 
provided can be transparently seen: 
(a) the population figures underlying beneficiary data are the 2008 census figures of 
13,066,320 persons and 2,957,683 households (Government of Malawi 2008b); 
(b) population share refers to individuals for the two pension columns, and to households 
or farmers for the other three columns, the same applies to beneficiary numbers; 
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(c) the shares of the population aged 60+ and 65+ are as published for the 2008 census; 
(d) for pensions and poverty targeted households, the transfer per month is set at 
MK1,500 (just over US$10), irrespective of whether this is to an individual 
(pensioner) or a poverty targeted household; 
(e) the transfer per year is MK18,900 which is MK1,500 transfer per month plus a 5% 
administration allowance; 
(f) total cost is transfer per year multiplied by the number of beneficiaries (individuals or 
households); 
(g) for the fertilizer subsidy, it is assumed that total cost will in the future fall back to 
around MK22 billion, which is about 60 per cent of the 2008-09 level of MK38 
billion; 
(h) GDP and budget shares are calculated on the 2008-09 figures given in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.4: Comparative Attributes of Social Protection Alternatives 2008-09 
Variable Unit Input Subsidy 
SCT 
(10%) 
HHs 
Pensions Comb. 
A 
Comb 
B 65+ 60+ 
Pop. Share % 57.0 10 3.83 5.24 11.4 n.a. 
Recipients No. 1,700,000 295,768 500,657 685,316 1,488,626 1,353,427 
Monthly Amount MK n.a. 1,500 1,500 1,500 n.a. n.a. 
Annual Amount MK 12,941 18,900 18,900 18,900 14,125 15,536 
Total Cost MKm 22,000 5,590 9,462 12,952 21,027 21,027 
Share GDP % 3.5 0.9 1.5 2.1 3.3 3.3 
Share Budget % 10.5 2.7 4.5 6.2 10.0 10.0 
Sources: Government of Malawi (2008b); other sources as for Tables 8.2 and 8.3; 
calculations as described in the text. 
 
In addition to the comparison between input subsidies (at existing coverage), social cash 
transfers at exactly 10 per cent coverage of all households, and pensions at existing numbers 
of people aged 65+ or 60+, Table 8.4 contains two ‘combined’ policy alternatives. These are, 
of course, just two illustrative examples out of an almost infinitely graded array of policy 
combinations that could be put together. They have both been set so that their total cost equals 
exactly 10 per cent of the 2008/09 Malawi total government budget. The two combined 
policies set out in the last two columns of Table 8.4 are: 
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Combination A 
In this combination, 10 per cent of all households in the country are covered by a poverty 
targeted social cash transfer. This does not need to be a uniform proportion geographically in 
the mode of the original Mchinji cash transfer formulation (Chapter 6). From column 4 of the 
table we know that this would cost MK5.6 billion, and this then leaves an amount of MK15.4 
billion out of the total budgetary allocation of MK21 billion that can be spent on the fertilizer 
subsidy. In this scheme 1.2 million (rather than the current 1.7 million) farmers would be 
provided with an input subsidy package, and 296 thousand families would be covered by 
regular monthly social cash transfer. Altogether 1.5 million households/farmers would be 
covered. In this combination 26.6 per cent of the budget allocation would be spent on poverty 
targeted transfers, and 73.4 per cent on the inputs subsidy programme. 
Combination B 
This combination brings in social pensions for the over-65s in addition to poverty targeted 
transfers and the input subsidy. Keeping the same 10 per cent budgetary allocation, first social 
pensions costing MK9.5 billion are deducted from the MK21 billion, allowing MK11.5 
billion to be spent on the other components. It is estimated that 65 per cent of poverty targeted 
beneficiary households are headed by persons of pensionable age, and therefore only 30 per 
cent of this group would receive the poverty targeted transfer (at a cost of MK1.7 billion). 
This leaves MK9.9 billion that could be spent on an input subsidy programme. In this 
combination, 501 thousand persons would receive a non means-tested social pension, 89 
thousand households would receive a poverty targeted transfer, and 764 thousand farmers 
would receive input subsidy coupons. The budgetary share of each of these schemes would be 
45 per cent, 8 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. 
Table 8.4 offers some illuminating insights. The input subsidy at the predicted future total 
cost of around MK22 billion (IMF 2010, p.23) represents over 10 per cent of the total 2008/09 
level government budget and 3.5 per cent of GDP. If this is treated as a preparedness to spend 
roughly 10 per cent of government resources on some combination of input subsidies and 
social transfers it provides an established capability to entertain a variety of social 
programmes. The poverty-targeted transfer if implemented fully at the simplified benefit rate 
assumed in Table 8.4 would cost only 2.7 per cent of the government budget, and represent 
0.9 per cent of GDP. A universal pension for over 65s would cost 4.5 per cent of the budget 
and 1.5 per cent of GDP. For illustrative purposes, the comparative figures for providing all 
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over 60s with a pension is also provided (this would cost 6.2 per cent of the budget and 
represent 2.1 per cent of GDP). Finally the two combinations constructed for illustrative 
purposes show that Malawi could, for example, provide a countrywide poverty targeted 
transfer scheme or a national social pension for the over 65s, and still conduct an input 
subsidy policy covering 0.8 to 1.2 million farmers.80 
This exercise is admittedly broad brushstroke, however it serves the useful purpose of lifting 
the debate about alternative methods for achieving social protection in a country like Malawi 
above the ‘affordability’ blocking tactic (‘we cannot possibly do that; it would cost too 
much’) into the more productive realm of the appropriate balance between different 
instruments that can satisfy both productive and protective goals between them. In this realm, 
a good case can be made for scaling back the fertilizer subsidy to some degree, thus creating 
the fiscal space to permit at least one form of scaled-up social protection to be properly 
instituted with countrywide outreach. As discussed throughout this thesis, the fertilizer 
subsidy fundamentally favours non-poor farmers and only incidentally (and unreliably) 
benefits land- and labour-constrained poor rural households. Moreover, its entrenchment at 
rates of subsidy and coverage that stretch affordability to its limits is both economically and 
politically unwise; it becomes politically impossible to phase out, and its costs leave no room 
to deal with unforeseen eventualities (such as, for example, the not unlikely occurrence of two 
successive years of poor rainfall). If the fertilizer subsidy were to cost 5-6 per cent rather than 
10 or 15 per cent of the budget, then social cash transfers could comfortably occupy 4-5 per 
cent, providing reliable protection against hunger for perhaps 15 per cent of the population at 
that level.81 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter brings input subsidies and social cash transfers into juxtaposition with each 
other, and also broadens the discussion to include other forms of social transfers, principally 
social pensions. One purpose of the chapter is to affirm the complementarity of different 
policies, which is recognised rhetorically by the Malawi government, but not in the funding 
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 It is reiterated that the pension discussion here is purely being used to demonstrate relative orders of 
magnitude of different social transfer options; it is not because pensions are currently viewed as a 
priority by the Malawi government, nor to detract from the main comparison of this thesis between 
input subsidies and targeted cash transfers. 
81
 If 500,000 individuals were covered and shared their benefit on average with 4 people, then this would 
protect 15 per cent of the population. Similar calculations can be made for a variety of different 
scenarios. 
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priorities accorded to different policies. Another purpose is to bring into the open the 
‘affordability’ dimension of social transfer policy discussion, because all too often feasible 
policy alternatives are rejected out of hand on the basis that they are not affordable for a poor 
country like Malawi. Yet an input subsidy programme which in 2008/09 cost 18 per cent of 
the entire budget has been considered affordable by the Malawi government. The 
interpretation of this is not, however, entirely straightforward since general budget support 
from the donor consortium to Malawi underpins this level of expenditure, and in its absence 
the input subsidy programme would cause substantial budget deficits. 
The chapter shows that input subsidies and cash transfers are complementary to each other 
across a range of attributes. In some ways, they compensate for each other’s weaknesses, 
revealed in the detailed analysis of them in Chapter 5 and 6. In particular input subsidies are 
at their most effective for better off farmers, able to combine land, labour and moisture 
retention to the best effect to realise high maize yields. Input subsidies are less effective for 
poorer farmers, especially those lacking labour to apply to the production process, and of 
course they are not helpful at all (except in a rather indirect way) for landless rural dwellers. 
By contrast, cash transfers can reach these especially resource poor rural social groups, and 
can provide an underpinning to their food security obviating the necessity for emergency 
operations except in exceptional circumstances.  
The chapter examines the budgetary costs of different policies, and combinations of policies. 
The input subsidy programme is expensive. Even without the unusual cost spike of 2008, the 
current level of farmer coverage is predicted in the future to cost more than 10 per cent of the 
Malawi government budget (at 2008/09 budget levels). This makes ‘lack of affordability’ 
arguments about social transfers rather untenable, especially given the doubts expressed 
elsewhere in this thesis (and backed up by empirical evidence) that the input subsidy may not 
be anywhere near as effective as its proponents claim. Malawi could indeed afford fairly 
generous social transfer coverage. For example, it could easily afford to provide the entire 10 
per cent ‘most vulnerable’ in the country with cash transfers. A good case can be made for 
Malawi to reconsider the policy options that could be afforded within roughly 10 per cent of 
the national budget, and to construct a more balanced portfolio of policies for reducing 
vulnerability to hunger in the country. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
9.1 Revisiting the research objective 
This thesis has explored the difficulty in Malawi of constructing a policy environment that 
can enduringly reduce the proneness of the rural population to hunger and deprivation. In 
Malawi history, this goal has primarily been seen as a production-side challenge, depending 
for its achievement on the realisation of yield and output gains in smallholder agriculture. 
Efforts in this direction have had mixed results in different time periods. While initial success 
in estate agriculture occurred in the first two decades after independence, the smallholder 
sector has had variable fortunes, and for a lengthy period from the 1980s to the mid-2000s 
production outcomes were unreliable and rising vulnerability to hunger seemed to be centrally 
located in the poor performance of food crop agriculture. Since the introduction of a national 
agricultural input subsidy programme in 2005/06, maize production appears according to 
official figures to have experienced a substantial step upwards. However, trends in maize 
price data in the period 2007-09 indicate the need for caution in accepting these figures at 
their face value. 
The thesis objective has been to gain a much fuller understanding than hitherto available of 
the complementarities and trade-offs between policy options that are advanced for reducing 
chronic vulnerability to hunger. The various options such as input subsidies, public works 
programmes and targeted social cash transfers have tended to be viewed in a rather 
fragmentary way. In particular, the government has tended to prioritise input subsidies as the 
chief policy to which it accords ownership; whereas social transfer policies have tended to be 
motivated and funded by donors, and they enter strategic policy documents either on the back 
of food security crises, or as part of donors or NGOs pursuing particular agendas. While, 
senior officials interviewed about policy options during the research were keen to emphasise 
the government’s commitment to social protection, it was always clear that for them the 
inputs subsidies programme was the chief form of such a commitment, and other policies 
were at the perimeter of their priorities for what social protection in Malawi might comprise. 
In Malawi, official rhetoric is to regard input subsidies as one of four main components of 
social protection policy in the country. The other three components are the social cash transfer 
scheme, public works programmes, and a nutrition programme related to HIV/AIDS. These 
components are, however, disconnected and funded in entirely different ways. Input subsidies 
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are funded by government and implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security. Social cash transfers have been funded by the Global Fund and are implemented by 
the Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Gender and Community Development in 
partnership with the National AIDS Commission and UNICEF. Public works programmes are 
funded by MASAF (mainly World Bank funding), Government/European Union and the 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works, and are implemented by District Assemblies. The 
nutritional programme is resourced by WFP and implemented by the Department of 
HIV/AIDS and Nutrition in the Office of the President and Cabinet. 
As described in Chapter 3 of the thesis, these different national policies have different 
historical origins, and in practice are not effectively coordinated at central government level. 
An attempt by donors to assist the government to development a coherent social protection 
policy has made slow progress and has become weakened in successive iterations. The current 
status of this process is a policy document entitled the Social Support Policy, which has yet to 
be approved by cabinet as an official statement of government intentions in this area. It was 
decided early in the work of this thesis not to elide agricultural input subsidies and social 
transfers in the way both donors and government have tended to do in Malawi over the past 
half decade. It is considered that this melding of productive and welfare policy lacks clarity 
and contributes to the confusion about what different policies can achieve for poverty and 
vulnerability reduction that permeates the discourse on them in Malawi. The thesis has 
preferred to keep these policy groups separate, and has done this by comparing input subsidies 
and social cash transfers at arms’ length from each other. This also enables the trade-offs 
between calls on scarce budgetary resources and eventual vulnerability reduction impacts to 
be identified more clearly. 
The original contribution of this thesis lies partly in the sustained way that input subsidies and 
social cash transfers have been juxtaposed and compared throughout the thesis. It also lies in 
analysis conducted using existing data to clarify the key character of vulnerability in Malawi 
(Chapters 3 and 6), interpret production trends in the light of price behaviour (Chapter 5), 
interpret social cash transfers in the light of spatial patterns of poverty and ultra poverty, and 
the income distribution effects of transfers themselves (Chapter 6), and consider the budgetary 
implications of different individual instruments or portfolios of instruments (Chapter 8). In 
addition, Chapter 7 contains the description and analysis of original data collected by the 
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author in Mchinji district, in which the livelihood effects of these policies in a sample of 
households are examined. 
9.2 Research questions and associated findings 
Before turning to the final conclusions of the thesis, it is appropriate to revisit the research 
questions set out in Chapter 1, and show how the thesis has attempted to answer these 
questions, and the main findings that were achieved in relation to each research question. It is 
recalled that the research questions were as follows, and in ensuing paragraphs each of these 
is discussed in turn: 
(1) What are the chief sources of vulnerability to hunger in Malawi, and how have debates 
about reducing poverty and vulnerability tended to be framed in the past? 
(2) What are the criteria that distinguish different vulnerable groups, and how are the 
needs of these groups in the short and long term met by different policy levers? 
(3) What is the history of input subsidies in Malawi, and how successful have they been in 
tackling vulnerability, especially in the most recent era? 
(4) What is the history of social cash transfers in Malawi, and what is the evidence to date 
on their effectiveness at improving the food security of the extreme poor? 
(5) What does empirical investigation at community and household levels show us about 
the effectiveness of input subsidies and cash transfers for achieving family food 
security in rural Malawi? 
(6) What are the budgetary trade-offs in Malawi regarding the costs, coverage and 
effectiveness of different potential components of a vulnerability reduction strategy? 
9.2.1 Vulnerability in Malawi and policy responses 
Vulnerability in Malawi is closely associated with agriculture, the connections being the 
relative size of the rural population and the prevalence of food deficit small farmers in the 
smallholder sector. The thesis reprises the known characteristics of vulnerability as 
documented in numerous reports and analyses (Devereux 1998, Devereux et al. 2006a, 
Government of Malawi/World Bank 2006). In particular, Malawi is prone to periodic crisis 
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events in the maize market, when the price rise between the harvest and lean season can vary 
from 100-200 per cent and more. Such very high lean season prices have a devastating effect 
on the ability of food deficit farmers to provision themselves when their own stocks run out. 
The severity of these price effects on food insecurity depends, of course, on the size of the 
‘food gap’ for individual farm families. Certainly in the 1990s and early 2000s, the food gap 
seemed to be widening amongst poorer small farmers; however, this may have stabilised with 
better growing conditions and the fertilizer subsidy in recent years.  
Steep seasonal rises in maize prices inescapably mean a shortage of maize in the country 
relative to consumption requirements. Interestingly, however, the maize price is not 
particularly prioritized as a food security indicator in Malawi; and successive governments of 
all political parties tend to act reluctantly and slowly on price evidence, delaying as long as 
possible the acceptance that imports may be required. With logistical delays in putting in 
motion and obtaining delivery of maize import orders, eventual imports often arrive too late to 
prevent adverse coping behaviours (skipping meals, reducing the size of meals etc.) in the 
most vulnerable population groups. The food security apparatus in Malawi places greatest 
credence on crop forecasts (the collection method of which is described in Chapter 4), on food 
balance sheet calculations produced by MoAFS (which depend on the crop forecasts for their 
accuracy), and on household economy approach (HEA estimates) of localised food shortages 
(collated and made available to decision makers by the MVAC, also described in Chapter 4). 
An important dimensions of vulnerability explored in the thesis is the spatial distribution of 
ultra poverty (generally regarded as a good correlate for vulnerability). This reveals that ultra 
poverty varies considerably across the regions and districts of Malawi, with the highest rates 
of extreme deprivation found in several districts of the southern region (Chapters 6). This 
finding also accords with patterns of ‘missing food entitlement’ identified in the regular 
vulnerability analyses produced by the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
(MVAC). Spatial variations in vulnerability mean that the imposition of a uniform cap on 
beneficiary numbers in poverty targeted transfers, as is done at 10 per cent in the Mchinji 
social cash transfer scheme, causes either under-provision or over-provision in different 
places. This is one of several weaknesses identified with poverty targeting, the implications of 
which are discussed later in this chapter.  
The consistent thread of past policy responses to vulnerability in Malawi has been the 
emphasis on improvements in agriculture. This has varied in emphasis in different eras, but 
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always with an eye to ensuring national maize self-sufficiency. The relaxation of the previous 
smallholder prohibition on burley tobacco in 1990 expanded the options open to smallholder 
farmers to generate cash income; however, the tobacco market is itself unreliable from one 
year to the next. Efforts to diversify food crops away from maize have been partially 
successful, with an increase in the area under cassava and sweet potatoes in the 1990s; 
however, maize has remained preeminent as Malawi’s food crop cultivation of choice 
throughout. The agricultural input subsidy of the past five years represents continuity in this 
line of policy thinking, in which reduction of vulnerability equates with rising own food 
security which, in turn, equates with rising maize yields and output. The Malawi government 
response to vulnerability is thus production rather than consumption oriented. It is this 
approach that is truly ‘owned’ by successive Malawian governments. 
Other responses to vulnerability have been ‘owned’ more by donors than the government, and 
have tended, until the advent of the Mchinji social cash transfers scheme, to have comprised 
seasonal safety net operations, mainly in the form of food-for-work. Seasonal safety nets 
remain a key component of the government response to anticipated food insecurity, but their 
funding is almost entirely by external agencies and is tailored to the scale of the immediate 
problem being addressed. The World Bank (through MASAF), the European Union and DFID 
have all been major contributors to seasonal safety nets since the mid-1990s. A major role has 
been played by WFP as the organiser of the food supplies required for food-for-work 
programmes. Also since the mid-2000s, international NGOs have played significant roles in 
emergency responses, safety nets and (more recently) cash transfers; as manifested, for 
example, by Concern Universal’s scheme in Dedza district (Levy et al. 2002); an Oxfam 
scheme in Thyolo district (Harvey and Savage 2006); and the Concern Worldwide FACT in 
2005-06 and DECT in 2006-07 (Devereux et al. 2006b) A fuller discussion of social cash 
transfers is deferred to question (4) below. 
9.2.2 Criteria distinguishing vulnerable groups and policies that address their needs 
At various points in the thesis, the question of identifying vulnerable groups for targeting 
purposes is discussed (Chapters 3, 5 and 6). The identification problem is interpreted 
differently across groups of policies, yet underlying criteria should converge if policies are to 
succeed in averting hunger episodes at both household and collective levels. Input subsidies 
have tended to view vulnerability through the lens of the smallest and poorest farmers, with 
an implication (not always tied down precisely) that small farm size and ability to cultivate 
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are the two critical criteria for the allocation of coupons or subsidised supplies. In the case of 
the ISP, the programme has been so large and the targeting procedures adopted at local levels 
so variable (Chapter 5) that all small farmers seem to be eligible in an uneven way to 
participate in the scheme. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, social transfers approach the selection problem in different 
ways depending on the type of scheme. Seasonal public works programmes embody the 
principle of self-targeting (people will only turn up out of dire necessity), yet in the early 
2000s this approach proved inadequate with schemes routinely having substantially more 
applicants than could be provided with work. This caused rationing, and an evolution towards 
leadership or community targeting. Poverty targeted transfers have tended to use proxy 
criteria for extreme deprivation to select beneficiaries, including the headship of the 
household (women, elderly, children), number of orphans, dependency ratio, chronic illness 
and (in urgent circumstances) direct observation of adverse coping (e.g. households only 
taking one meal per day). The Mchinji social cash transfer scheme (Chapter 6) adopts the 
poverty targeted approach with a special emphasis on the absence of able-bodied adult labour 
in the household. All proxy criteria approaches tend to be combined with community-based 
processes of beneficiary selection. 
These different approaches to distinguishing the most vulnerable indicate in the direction of 
complementarity rather than conflict between different vulnerability reduction policies. An 
inputs subsidy scheme potentially improves the livelihood situation of poor farm families 
possessing both land and labour for cultivation. A seasonal safety net picks up those farm 
families who do not succeed in covering their annual food requirements from own production, 
and are unable to afford high priced food in the lean season. A poverty targeted transfer 
addresses the more permanent problem of population categories that are unable to meet their 
basic needs even in the best of circumstances. This group includes destitute families, elderly 
people not being supported adequately by their families, chronically ill people, children with 
no social means of support (orphans), households entirely lacking productive labour, and 
disabled people. 
Nevertheless, successful targeting of these groups is costly and difficult and prone to error or 
capture by other parties. Overall, in a very poor country like Malawi, there is a high risk of 
overlap between some beneficiaries while the needs of others fail to be met, caused by what 
are called inclusion and exclusion errors (Coady et al. 2004, Miller et al. 2010). Specifically 
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(as shown in Chapter 7) when input subsidies and cash transfers coexist, many households 
may end up with both types of transfer, and may also benefit from seasonal safety nets. This 
is sometimes referred to as ‘double dipping’, and can occur as much from agencies making 
available different transfers to the same families, as from households consciously strategising 
to receive different transfers. As discussed later in this chapter, complementarity in input 
subsidy and social cash transfer delivery offers scope for considerable improvement in 
Malawi, to the benefit of both the government budget and vulnerable people with differing 
specific needs. 
9.2.3 Input subsidies in Malawi and their success at reducing vulnerability to hunger 
This thesis has explored the input subsidy approach in Malawi in considerable detail, 
providing a conceptual background in Chapter 2, a historical account of the starter pack 
scheme and targeted input programme in Chapter 3, and a fairly full description of the ISP in 
Chapter 5. The latter chapter also carries out an analysis to demonstrate that the output gains 
of the ISP have been nowhere near as large as has been claimed for them in government 
official statistics.  
The large scale ISP has both positive and negative features. It demonstrates that when there is 
the political will, even a country as poor and supposedly ‘lacking capacity’ as Malawi is 
capable of mobilising on a massive scale. The organisation of the ISP, even though prey to 
some weaknesses, has largely been successful at conducting a complex nationwide 
undertaking with a high degree of competence. It is a tribute to MoAFS and cooperating 
organisations (SSFFRM and ADMARC) as well as the private sector (when permitted to 
participate) that this has in general worked so well. There is evidence that coupons have 
reached the intended target of 60 per cent of small farmers, and the fertilizer purchased has 
almost certainly gone beyond this coverage due to secondary redistributions that occur 
subsequent to primary allocations. 
On the other hand, the ISP raises some legitimate doubts about the strength of its contribution 
to yield growth and poverty reduction. Chapter 5 describes some of the misallocation that 
occurs with regard to coupon distribution (see, for example, Ellis 2007, Kadzandira 2007), 
and this was also found in the researcher’s own fieldwork in Mchinji district (Chapter 7). 
However, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of these occurrences in the broader picture 
of coupon allocation and fertilizer distribution. More important problems are, first, the true 
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level of output gains that can be attributed to the subsidy (Chapter 5); and, second, the cost of 
the programme to the government budget, effectively squeezing out the ability of the 
government to contemplate complementary provision that could be more successful at 
reaching the most vulnerable groups in society directly (Chapter 8). 
With regard to maize output over the period since the ISP was introduced in 2005/06, the only 
year for which an unambiguous level of harvest was achieved in line with official estimates 
occurred in the 2005/06 season itself. There are reasons to be confident that this season 
delivered an output of around the 2.6 million ton mark officially claimed, a new maize harvest 
record for Malawi, and 1.4 million tons higher than the preceding disastrous season of 
2004/05. Much of the subsequent positive interpretation of the benefits of the subsidy stem 
from this single season, and the impact it had on maize prices over the following lean season 
and into the 2007 harvest period. However, the 2007 harvest cannot have set yet another new 
record as claimed (prices rose steeply in late 2007), nor can the 2008 harvest have been as 
high as that experienced in 2006 (prices rose even more steeply again). The analysis in 
Chapter 5 suggests harvests in the period 2006/07 to 2009/10 may be overestimated.82 
The overestimation of harvest levels achieved by the ISP casts doubts on the growth benefits 
of the subsidy, and affects the assessment of its influence in reducing vulnerability to hunger. 
In the lean seasons of 2007 and 2008, poorer rural families in Malawi were once again thrust 
into negative coping strategies as revealed in routine MVAC assessments described in 
Chapter 4 and 5, and once again an array of fragmentary social transfer provision had to come 
into play in order to avert hunger in different parts of the country. In addition, as examined in 
Chapter 8 of the thesis, the cost of the subsidy spiralled up to the 2008/09 fiscal year, 
attaining 19 per cent of the government budget and 6 per cent of GDP in that year. The 
affordability ramifications of this trend are examined further under item (6) below. 
9.2.4 Social cash transfers and their impacts on vulnerability reduction 
Until 2006, by far the predominant social transfer response of the Malawi government to 
anticipated or reported hunger was public works programmes. Most public works 
programmes until the mid-2000s took the form of food-for-work, with WFP being responsible 
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 The 2007/08 harvest cannot have been greater than the 2005/06 harvest (taking into account a 
subtraction of 400,000 tons for exports) for otherwise prices would not have risen so steeply in late 
2007. Likewise the 2008 harvest must have been at least 400-600,000 tons lower than the 2007 harvest 
in order to explain the 2008 run up in prices. 
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for delivering the required food supplies when domestic stocks were unable to fulfil this 
requirement. In addition direct delivery of food rations to hungry people would occur in the 
event of a crisis emerging faster than the ability to put in place a suitable PWP. In the period 
between the 2001-02 and 2005-06 food crises, a highly unstable policy environment 
prevailed, comprising late and excessive maize imports in some years, high volumes of food 
aid, large oscillations in strategic food security stock levels, and multiple food security 
interventions across rural areas conducted by MASAF, international NGOs, donor projects 
and WFP. 
The advocacy of cash transfers needs to be interpreted in the context of this somewhat 
anarchic situation, found not just in Malawi but also in other countries experiencing recurrent 
food security crises (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia). The proponents of cash 
transfers point to the predictability of a ‘core’ caseload of families seeming to require 
assistance almost every year, allied to the benefits for all stakeholders of replacing 
heterogeneous short term transfers by routine transfers made on a continuing basis. The 
specific genesis of the Mchinji scheme has already been described in Chapters 3 and 6, and is 
not rehearsed again here. The Mchinji scheme has generally been considered fairly successful 
in terms of its internal logic and objectives (Miller et al. 2008a, 2008c, 2008b). It has reached 
extremely poor rural families characterised by their lack of ability to generate their own needs 
for survival. In Mchinji district itself, but apparently less so in other districts to which it has 
expanded, it created a viable organisational structure for implementation including beneficiary 
selection and cash delivery. 
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that social cash transfers at the level provided by the Mchinji 
SCT scheme have dramatic positive effects on the livelihoods and food security of their 
beneficiaries. In effect, their basic food needs are not just secured, but exceeded, and cash 
availability allows discretionary expenditures on inputs, assets, health, education and savings. 
A key factor is the predictability of the cash flow to households, which is in striking contrast 
to the risks that attach to all other income streams in a rural Malawian context, whether non-
monetised or monetised. This predictability attracts able-bodied family members into 
households that formerly lacked labour, and permits cultivation of maize and other crops 
where formerly this was not possible. The ability of households to overcome maize price 
seasonality is also considerably enhanced, although not avoided altogether. The purchasing 
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power of nominal cash transfers held at the same level remains a critical issue for social cash 
transfers in an environment of unstable or rising food prices. 
Despite these positive benefits, some weaknesses of social cash transfers are identified. First, 
the scale of rural poverty in Malawi means that little differentiates the living conditions of 
scheme recipients from other, only fractionally better off, poor people in the same 
communities (Ellis 2011). In addition, the stability of cash transfers confers cumulative 
benefits which mean that the livelihood circumstances of recipients is likely to diverge from 
non-recipients over time. In this context, it is possible that the monetary level of transfer in 
the Mchinji SCT was set too high at the beginning, going beyond the amount required strictly 
to lift destitute families to a minimally acceptable food security level. Second, the fixed 
proportional cap on beneficiary numbers, from national to district, sub-district and community 
levels (the ‘ten per cent’ rule) neglects spatial differences in the incidence of ultra-poverty and 
destitution. Third, rising operational costs have occurred as the scheme has scaled up, with an 
initial voluntary ethos of local level management giving way to rewards and remuneration, 
and administrative costs rising from a planned level of 8 per cent at inception in 2006 to 14 
per cent in practice and 23 per cent in future projections. Fourth, the future funding of the 
scheme is doubtful: the government has allocated a minuscule budget to social cash transfers 
in 2010/11, and commitments of external agencies remain piecemeal and uncertain at the time 
of writing. 
9.2.5 Findings of fieldwork in Mchinji district for both inputs subsidies and cash transfers 
The fieldwork utilised a sample survey of 90 households in three villages to explore 
empirically certain important dimensions of the way cash transfers and input coupons work in 
practice for poor rural families. The first aspect was how programme organisation and 
beneficiary selection worked in practice, especially at community level. The second aspect 
was how participation and non-participation in the SCT altered the food security prospects of 
different households across the seasons, taking into account the interactions between cash and 
food (via the price of maize) and the alternative sources of cash income available to 
households in different categories. The third aspect was whether coupon beneficiaries could 
be distinguished in any particular ways in practice from other groups represented in the 
sample, and in particular whether evidence could be found of the existence and working of a 
secondary ‘coupon market’ created by the working of the ISP. 
  270 
Regarding the first aspect, the fieldwork yielded interesting insights into how social transfers 
may be managed within communities, although it is difficult to judge whether the experiences 
observed in a few village in Mchinji district can be generalised. In the case study research 
sites, community members ‘defied’ official criteria by allocating ISP and SCT to different 
households depending on what they felt would ‘effectively’ make a positive contribution to 
the livelihood of a particular household. Households that were considered to be ‘non-viable’ 
were allocated cash transfers; households that were considered to be poor but productive and 
capable of raising some cash on their own were allocated coupons; households that were 
considered to be poor and unable to raise cash ,but nevertheless productive, were allocated 
both transfers; while households that were considered to be less poor and therefore capable of 
supporting themselves in terms of productive inputs and food were not registered for either 
schemes. Interfaced between these allocations were arrangements to share (especially 
fertilizer) as part of social networking. 
From this community allocation, the unplanned distribution of the sample for this research 
emerged as follows: 9 per cent of households allocated cash, 52 per cent allocated coupons, 
24 per cent joint beneficiaries, and 14 per cent non-beneficiaries. Excluding the non-
beneficiaries, the distribution emerges as 10.1 per cent cash households, 61.0 per cent coupon 
households and 28.6 per cent joint beneficiaries. In the programming of social cash transfers 
in Malawi (and Zambia), the first group corresponds to the labour constrained ultra-poor; the 
second corresponds to poor but productive households; while the third group corresponds to 
ultra-poor but productive households. These distributions bear similarities to the distribution 
of poor rural households from the IHS2 dataset (Table 3.4): 15.8 per cent ultra-poor labour 
constrained households; 23.1 per cent ultra poor but with labour; and 61.1 per cent poor 
households. It is also worth noting that the evaluation of the Mchinji scheme found that only 
16.7 per cent of the cash beneficiaries were both ultra-poor and labour constrained. These 
similarities may or may not be mere coincidence but are emerging from three separate studies. 
Regarding the second aspect and third aspect, what was observed in Mchinji in 2008 was 
already the outcome of a process of adaptation to getting cash transfers by SCT beneficiaries. 
In effect, by the time of the fieldwork, they were no longer in the ‘ultra-poor labour 
constrained’ position in which they started, and their basic socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics differed little from non-recipients in the overall sample. The presence of a 
secure and continuous level of cash income meant that these were households worth residing 
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in by relatives, and other adaptations such as being able to farm would follow from this 
circumstance. The evidence suggests that real concerns about cumulative divergence could 
result from continuously providing the same set of households over several years with cash 
transfers at the level decided for Mchinji. It is not just the level of the cash transfer that is 
important in this (although it seems quite possible that the Mchinji level has been too 
generous); it is also the risk free character of a cash transfer (as compared to the uncertainties 
that prevail for all other means of earning cash in rural communities, except salaried jobs). In 
general, a cash transfer may enable a real pathway out of poverty to be achieved for its 
recipients, but the literature contains little guide to the ‘fairness’ of this with respect to the 
fortunes of non-recipients, nor to what would happen if the transfer to that set of beneficiaries 
were abruptly ceased after an interval of time. 
9.2.6 Affordability and the costs and coverage of alternative policies 
Governments of poor countries like Malawi often express the view that national social welfare 
programmes are not affordable in view of extremely constrained public finances. However, 
this is a matter of politics and decision making. The real constraints are likely to be how 
fiercely established spending bodies (mainly government ministries) defend their past and 
current levels of expenditure, and whether the government in power sees any political 
advantage in introducing social transfers. In Malawi, as has been made clear throughout this 
thesis, successive governments have seen substantial political advantage in input subsidies 
which are popular with the mainly rural and farming electorate, and poverty targeted transfers 
do not seem to offer anything like the same political traction. 
Chapter 8 of the thesis examines the affordability question in some detail. It shows that 
Malawi has had a strong government budget for the past five years, and has experienced only 
small annual deficits except in 2008/09. About 40 per cent of the budget is contributed by 
donors, and a quarter of this proportion (i.e. 10 per cent of the total budget) takes the form of 
general budget support. Since the input subsidy has cost, on average, around 10 per cent of 
total revenue in its first five years of implementation, it could be inferred (but does not 
necessarily follow) that the donors are funding the input subsidy through general budget 
support. Needless to say this is not a popular inference to make with either the government or 
the donors, who are able to point to a lot of other socially valuable expenditures that general 
budget support makes possible. The Malawi government has in fact been prepared to spend up 
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to 18 per cent of total revenue (6 per cent of GDP) on the input subsidy, as occurred in the 
2008/09 fiscal year. 
The bottom line on affordability is the answer, yes, the Malawi government is able to afford a 
portfolio of social transfers and agricultural subsidies, and that the size of such a portfolio is 
around 10 per cent of total government income (or MK25 million by reference to the 2009/10 
planned revenue). How this discretionary expenditure is allocated between different claims is 
within the government’s power to choose. 
9.3 Conclusions 
It is apparent that neither input subsidies nor poverty targeted cash transfers represent 
definitive solutions to the continued prevalence of vulnerability to hunger in Malawi. They 
both manifest particular strengths accompanied by identified weaknesses. The strength of 
input subsidies is their contribution to growth as well as to poverty reduction, and to the 
extent that they can secure stable and sustainable increases in yields in food crop agriculture, 
they have an undeniable role to play in overall vulnerability reduction efforts. However, their 
major weakness is that they almost certainly help better off farmers more than the poor and 
their beneficial effect on land- and labour-scarce rural households is indirect and very 
dependent on the true scale of their agricultural achievement.  
The strength of social cash transfers is that they directly protect the consumption level of their 
beneficiaries. This protection is instantaneous and not dependent on the roundabout or 
cumulative process of gains from growth in the rural economy. Nevertheless social cash 
transfers are shown to have important weaknesses: their targeting is administratively 
cumbersome and prone to exclusion and inclusion errors; the 10 per cent cap on their level is 
arbitrary and fails to capture variations in extreme poverty within and across districts; 
moreover, this cap can cause social invidiousness in communities where selection of the 
worst-off 10 per cent involves trying to discern microscopic differences in their circumstances 
compared to other extremely poor families. Finally, all types of cash transfer are prone to 
failing to achieve their intentions in circumstances of volatile food prices. As stated earlier in 
this chapter and elsewhere, a cash transfer is only as valuable as the quantity of food and other 
basic needs it can buy. 
The thesis concludes that the agricultural input subsidy on its own is likely only to make a 
modest contribution to vulnerability reduction; and it argues that a portfolio of instruments in 
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which different types of transfer are tailored to differing needs is more appropriate in the 
Malawi case. The precise combination of the two and other instruments is a matter for future 
policy debate. A portfolio of instruments is affordable within the parameters of national 
budgetary allocations that have hitherto been allocated to the input subsidy on its own. Finally, 
the thesis accepts that all these considerations are dependent on political factors that may or 
may not permit advances in the directions suggested here to occur in the future, and will 
certainly determine the pace of policy change if it occurs. 
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Annex: Field Survey Guides  
Annex 1. Baseline Survey Questionnaire (January 2008) 
HH NAME: VILLAGE:  ZONE: VDC:  TA: 
 
FORM 1. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
MEMBER 
NO  Name 
Age 
(years) 
Sex 
 
Relationship 
to H/H head 
Marital 
Status 
Highest 
Education 
Main 
Occupation 
Residency 
status 
1                 
2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
         
CODES  
 Q3 Sex: 1 = Male; 2 = Female  
Q4 Relationship to H/H head: 1 = Head; 2 = Spouse; 3 = Child; 4 = Other relation;  
5 = Other permanent  
Q5 Marital Status 1 = Married; 2 = Married, polygamy; 3= widowed; 4= separated/divorced;  
5 = Never Married; 6= No (e.g. child) 
Q6 Highest Education: 1 = None; 2 = Adult Literacy; 3 = Std 1-5; 4= Std 6-8; 5 = Form 1-2;  
6 = Form 3-4; 7 = Other (specify)  
Q7 Main Occupation, at present 1 = Child, not schooling; 2 = Schooling; 3 = Own farming;  
4 = Labourer, nearby farms/HH; 5 = employee of an organization; 6 = Self-employed (business);  
7 = No Occupation (old, ill etc )  
Q8 Residency status: 1 = Permanent resident; 2 = Permanently or always away ( State place)  
 
 
FORM 2. ASSET OWNERSHIP 
 
2.1. TYPE OF MAIN HOUSE 
 
QNO Question Options/codes Code 
Q1 Type of wall 1= Burnt brick wall; 2= mud/un-burnt brick wall ; 3= Other  
Q2 Type of floor 1= cement floor; 2= mud floor; 3= Other   
Q3 Type of roof 1= corrugated roof; 2= Grass thatched roof ; 3= Other  
 
2.2. AMOUNT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND OWNED 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
Plot ID 
 
Amount of land  
Owned by  Normally used by Quantity Unit 
A     
B     
C     
    
 
CODES  
Q2 Owned by: 1 = jointly; 2 = Wife; 3 = Husband; 4 = Other household member (ID from Form 1) 
Q3 Normally used by: 1 = jointly; 2 = Wife; 3 = Husband;  
4 = Other household member (ID from Form 1); 5= Idle; 6= Rented out; 7= Other 
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2.3. LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP  
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Livestock Type Code Numbers now Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
     
 
 
2.4. OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED FARM ASSETS/TOOLS (e.g. ploughs, oxcarts, hoes) 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Farm asset/tool Code Numbers Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
     
 
 
2.5. OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLD ASSETS (e.g. radio, bicycle, sofa sets) 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Household asset Code Numbers Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
D     
E     
     
 
 
 
FORM 3. INCOME, SAVINGS AND CREDIT FOR THE HOUSEHOLD 
 
3.1. MAJOR SOURCES OF REGULAR INCOME (if household member staying away sends money, 
give ID from Form 1)  
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Income source  Code Estimated amt (MK) Frequency of income flow 
A     
B     
C     
D     
     
Codes 
 Q3 Frequency of income flow 1= Per day; 2= Per week; 3= Per month;  
4= Per year; 5= Other) 
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3.2. SAVINGS BY HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS- SINCE OCTOBER 2007 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
 ID 
HH member Where save Frequency of savings savings now (MK) 
 Place/Institution Code 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Codes 
 Q3 Frequency of savings 1= Daily; 2= Weekly; 3= Monthly; 4= Annually 
 
 
 
3.3. ACCESS TO CREDIT/LOANS – SINCE OCTOBER 2007 
 
 
QNO 
 
Q1 
Q2 Q3 
Q4 
Q5 Q6 
Q7 Q8 
ID 
 
HH 
member Source 
of loan 
 
Code 
 
 
Form 
of loan 
Amt 
(MK) 
 
 
Date 
taken 
(Mth & 
Yr) 
Duration 
(Months) Purpose 
 
 
Balance 
now 
 (MK) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Codes 
 Q3 Form of loan 1= Cash, 2= Inputs, 3= Materials 
Q7 Purpose 1= Agricultural, 2= Business, 3= Consumption (food) 
 4= Other (e.g. school fees, funeral/medical etc) 
 
 
 
FORM 4. LABOUR AVAILABILITY AND USE FROM OCTOBER 2007 
  
QNO Question Code 
Q1 Does your household hire in labour?  
Q2 Does your household hire out labour?  
Q3 Have members of the household participated in the following activities? 
ID 
Member 
of HH 
31 32 33 34 
Farming Business Casual labour (ganyu) Cash For Work (PWP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Codes 
 Q1, Q2 1 = No; 2= Yes, casual; 3= Yes regular; 4= Both casual and regular 5= Other 
Q3 Participation in activities 1= Yes, 2 No 
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FORM 5. AGRICULTURAL/FARMING ACTIVITIES (CROPS) 
 
5.1. AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES 
 
QNO Question Code 
Q1 Which crops do you normally grow?  
Q2 Which major maize varieties do normally you grow?  
Q3 What is your major source of seed?  
Q4 Do you normally apply fertilizer?  
Q5 What is major source of your fertilizer in the last three agricultural years?  
Q6 How many times do you weed your field?  
Q7 What is your major source of agricultural extension messages/information  
Q8 Does any member of your household belong to a farm club?  
Q9 Complete the table below as applicable since October 2007  
 91 92 93 94 95 
ID 
 
HH 
member 
Name 
of 
Club 
Code 
 
organization 
 
Years as 
member 
Code If attended 
meetings, how 
often? 
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
Codes 
 Q1 Crops 1= maize; 2= tobacco; 3= groundnuts; 4= other 
 Q2 Maize varieties 1= local; 2=OPV; 3= hybrid; 4= mixed (state) 
 Q3 Seed sources 1= own; 2= cash purchase; 3= coupons, 4 = coupons and cash purchases;  
5 Other(state) 
 Q4 Normally apply fertilizer? 1= Yes; 2= No 
 Q5 Source of fertilizer 1= cash purchase; 2 = coupons, 3 = coupons and cash purchases;  
4 = Other(state) 
 Q6 Weeding 1= None 2= Once, 3= Twice; 4= More than twice 
 Q7 Sources of extension 1= extension worker; 2= media (state); 3= other farmers;  
4= input/output dealers; 4= Other 
 Q8 Farmer club membership 1= Yes; 2= No 
Q94 Organization 1= Government, 2= NGO 3= Other 
Q95 Meetings 1= None, 2= weekly, 3= Fortnightly, 4= Monthly, 5= Other 
 
5.3. CROP PRODUCTION 2007/08 SEASON 
 
Plot 
ID 
 
Q1 Q1 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
Area 
cultivated 
Main 
crop  
Variety 
grown How much 
seed 
Source 
of 
seed 
Weeding 
to date  
 
Applied 
fert? How much fertilizer? 
Source 
of fert 
Qty Units Qty Unit    Qty Unit  
    
 
  
 
     
    
 
  
 
     
    
 
  
 
     
CODES  
Q2 Main crop planted 1= maize; 2= tobacco; 3= groundnuts; 4= other  
Q3 Variety grown 1= local; 2=OPV; 3= hybrid; 4= mixed (state) 
Q5 Source of seed 1= own; 2= cash purchase; 3= input for work, 4= free ; 5 subsidised; 6= Other 
Q6 Weeding to date 1 = None; 2= completed twice; 3= completed once; 4= other 
Q8 applied fertilizer? 1= Yes; 2= No 
Q9 source of fertilizer 1= cash purchase; 2 = coupons, 3 = coupons and cash purchases; 4 = Other(state) 
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FORM 6. FOOD AVAILABILITY – January 2008  
 
Q1 How many meals per day are you having now?  
Q2 Maize (ufa) stocks available now 
 
 
21 22 23 
Food type Major sources  
 
How much is available now 
Name Code Quantity Units 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
CODES  
Q1 Meals 1= once; 2= twice; 3= three times; 4= none, some days; 5=other 
Q2 Sources Major sources 1= own production; 2= purchase, own income,  
3= purchase, cash transfer; 4=Other 
 
 
 
FORM 7. SOCIAL TRANSFERS 
 
 Question Responses  Code 
Q1 How many times in the last three years up to September 2007 
have you received any social transfers?  
1= Once, 2= twice, 3= 
three times, 4=none 
 
Q2 Have you received coupons this year (2007/08 season)?  1= Yes 2= No  
Q3 For Cash Transfer beneficiaries, how much are you currently 
receiving per month (MK) 
MK  
 
 
FORM 8. SOCIAL CASH GRANTS RECEIVED AND USE - FROM OCTOBER 2007  
 
Month SCT Amt (MK) Major uses/expenditures Amt spent (MK) 
    
    
    
    
Detail for each month 
 
 
FORM 9. HOUSEHOLD’S SELF ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY 
 
QNO Question Code 
Q1.1 
How do you compare your HH vulnerability relative to other HHs in this village? 
(1= less vulnerable, 2= average vulnerable 3= More vulnerable) 
 
Q1.2 What reason do you give for your classification?  
Q2.1 
How would you have classified this household five years ago?  
(1= Same, 2= less vulnerable today 3= More vulnerable today) 
 
Q2.2 What reason do you give?  
Q3 Do you have a disabled person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q4 Do you have a chronically ill person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q5 Do you have an orphan person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q6 Do you have an elderly person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q7 Number of HH members you consider vulnerable in this household   
 
 
Interviewer:  Date: 
Completed form checked by: Date: 
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Annex 2. Household Tracking Survey Questionnaire (March and May 2008) 
 
HH NAME: VILLAGE:  ZONE: VDC:  TA: 
 
A. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION (ONLY THOSE JOINED OR LEFT) 
 
HH SIZE NOW __________ 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
MEMBER 
NO  Name 
Age 
(years) 
Sex 
 
Relationship 
to H/H head 
Marital 
Status 
Highest 
Education 
Main 
Occupation 
Residency 
status 
1                 
2                 
         
CODES  
 Q3 Sex: 1 = Male; 2 = Female  
Q4 Relationship to H/H head: 1 = Head; 2 = Spouse; 3 = Child; 4 = Other relation;  
5 = Other permanent  
Q5 Marital Status 1 = Married; 2 = Married, polygamy; 3= widowed; 4= separated/divorced;  
5 = Never Married; 6= No (e.g. child) 
Q6 Highest Education: 1 = None; 2 = Adult Literacy; 3 = Std 1-5; 4= Std 6-8; 5 = Form 1-2;  
6 = Form 3-4; 7 = Other (specify)  
Q7 Main Occupation, at present 1 = Child, not schooling; 2 = Schooling; 3 = Own farming;  
4 = Labourer, nearby farms/HH; 5 = employee of an organization; 6 = Self-employed (business);  
7 = No Occupation (old, ill etc )  
Q8 Residency status: 1 = Left 2= Joined; 3= Other (death)  
 
 
B. ASSET CHANGES SINCE LAST SURVEY 
 
B1. LIVESTOCK CHANGES SINCE LAST SURVEY  
 
ID 
Livestock 
Type  Code Numbers 
Value 
(MK/unit) 
Status 
(1= sales 2= purchases; 3= deaths; 4= other) 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
B2. HH ASSET CHANGES SINCE LAST SURVEY  
 
ID Asset Type  Code Numbers 
Value 
(MK/unit) 
Status 
(1= sales 2= purchases; 3= other) 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
C. INCOME, SAVINGS AND CREDIT FOR THE HOUSEHOLD 
 
C1. INCOME SOURCES  
 Code 
MAJOR INCOME 
SOURCES  
SINCE LAST SURVEY  
How often Total amount to date (MK) 
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C2. SAVINGS SINCE LAST SURVEY 
 ID RESIDENT HH MEMBER WHERE SAVE  HOW MUCH NOW (MK) 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
C23. CREDIT/LOANS SINCE LAST SURVEY 
 
ID 
HH 
MEMBER SOURCE  CODE 
AMOUNT 
( MK) 
DURATION 
(MTHS) PURPOSE CODE 
BALANCE 
NOW (MK) 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
D. MAJOR FOOD SOURCES AND CURRENT SITUATION 
Q1 How many meals per day are you having now?  
Q2 Maize (ufa) stocks available now 
 
 
21 22 23 
Food type Major sources  
 
How much is available now 
Name Code Quantity Units 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
CODES  
Q1 Meals 1= once; 2= twice; 3= three times; 4= none, some days; 5=other 
Q2 Sources Major sources 1= own production; 2= purchase, own income,  
3= purchase, cash transfer; 4=Other 
 
E. SOCIAL TRANSFERS 
 
Question Responses  Code 
Q1 Since the last survey, have you received any social transfers? 1= yes, 2= No  
Q2 If yes, specify  1= coupon, 2= SCT  
Q3 For Cash Transfer beneficiaries, how much? MK  
 
 
F. SOCIAL CASH GRANTS RECEIVED AND USE – SINCE LAST SURVEY  
Month SCT Amt (MK) Major uses/expenditures Amt spent (MK) 
    
    
    
    
Detail for each month 
 
G. HOUSEHOLD’S VULNERABILITY (SINCE LAST SURVEY) 
QNO Question Code 
Q3 Accident/incapacitation i the household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q4 Chronically ill in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q5 Death in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q6 Theft in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
 
 
Interviewer:  Date: 
Completed form checked by: Date: 
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Annex 3. Follow up Survey Questionnaire (September 2008) 
HH NAME: VILLAGE:  ZONE: VDC:  TA: 
 
 
FORM 1. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION (ONLY THOSE JOINED OR LEFT) 
 
HH SIZE NOW __________ 
 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
MEMBER 
NO  Name 
Age 
(years) 
Sex 
 
Relationship 
to H/H head 
Marital 
Status 
Highest 
Education 
Main 
Occupation 
Residency 
status 
1                 
2                 
         
CODES  
 Q3 Sex: 1 = Male; 2 = Female  
Q4 Relationship to H/H head: 1 = Head; 2 = Spouse; 3 = Child; 4 = Other relation;  
5 = Other permanent  
Q5 Marital Status 1 = Married; 2 = Married, polygamy; 3= widowed; 4= separated/divorced;  
5 = Never Married; 6= No (e.g. child) 
Q6 Highest Education: 1 = None; 2 = Adult Literacy; 3 = Std 1-5; 4= Std 6-8; 5 = Form 1-2;  
6 = Form 3-4; 7 = Other (specify)  
Q7 Main Occupation, at present 1 = Child, not schooling; 2 = Schooling; 3 = Own farming;  
4 = Labourer, nearby farms/HH; 5 = employee of an organization; 6 = Self-employed (business);  
7 = No Occupation (old, ill etc )  
Q8 Residency status: 1 = Left 2= Joined; 3= Other (death)  
 
 
FORM 2. ASSET OWNERSHIP 
 
2.1. TYPE OF MAIN HOUSE 
 
QNO Question Options/codes Code 
Q1 Type of wall 1= Burnt brick wall; 2= mud/un-burnt brick wall ; 3= Other  
Q2 Type of floor 1= cement floor; 2= mud floor; 3= Other   
Q3 Type of roof 1= corrugated roof; 2= Grass thatched roof ; 3= Other  
 
 
2.2. AMOUNT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND OWNED 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
Plot ID 
 
Amount of land  
Owned by  Normally used by Quantity Unit 
A     
B     
C     
    
 
CODES  
Q2 Owned by: 1 = jointly; 2 = Wife; 3 = Husband; 4 = Other household member (ID from Form 1) 
Q3 Normally used by: 1 = jointly; 2 = Wife; 3 = Husband;  
4 = Other household member (ID from Form 1); 5= Idle; 6= Rented out; 7= Other 
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2.3. LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP  
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Livestock Type Code Numbers now Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
     
 
 
2.4. OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED FARM ASSETS/TOOLS (e.g. ploughs, oxcarts, hoes) 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Farm asset/tool Code Numbers Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
     
 
 
2.5. OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED HOUSEHOLD ASSETS (e.g. radio, bicycle, sofa sets) 
 
QNO Q1 Q2 Q3 
ID Household asset Code Numbers Current Price (MK/unit) 
A     
B     
C     
     
 
 
 
FORM 3. INCOME, SAVINGS AND CREDIT FOR THE HOUSEHOLD 
 
3.1. CROP SALES 2008  
 
CROP   Code UNITS QTY TOTAL VALUE (MK) 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
3.2. SAVINGS BY HOUSEHOLD- SEPT 2008 
 
Q1 Q2 
How much household savings now 
(MK) 
Where household save 
Place/Institution (e.g. NBS, Mchinji) Code 
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3.3. OUTSTANDING CREDIT/LOANS BY SEPT 2008 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 
Loan value 
( MK) Source  
Code 
 
Form 
of loan  
Purpose 
of loan 
Date taken 
(Mth, Year ) 
duration 
(Months) 
Balance now 
 (MK) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FORM 4. CROP PRODUCTION 2007/08 SEASON 
 
Main crop planted Area planted PRODUCTION 
Crop Code Units Qty  Units Qty  
        
        
        
 
 
 
FORM 5. FOOD AVAILABILITY – SEPT 2008  
 
Q1 How many meals per day are you having now?  
Q2 Maize (ufa) stocks available now 
 
 
21 22 23 
Food type Major sources  
 
How much is available now 
Name Code Quantity Units 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
CODES  
Q1 Meals 1= once; 2= twice; 3= three times; 4= none, some days; 5=other 
Q2 Sources Major sources 1= own production; 2= purchase, own income,  
3= purchase, cash transfer; 4=Other 
 
 
 
FORM 6. SOCIAL TRANSFERS 
 
 
8.2 COUPONS RECEIVED – 2007/08 
 
 Question Answers Code 
Q1 Did you receive coupons in the 
2007/08 season 
1=Yes. 2= No  
 What did you with the coupon? 1= Bought subsidized inputs 2= Sold other 
farmers/traders; 3= Did not use it/is still available; 
4= Other 
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8.2 CASH TRANSFERS - FROM OCTOBER 2007 TO AUG 2008 
 
 
CASH TRANSFER GRANTS AND USE AMT (MK) 
Total Cash transfer from October 2007 to August 2008  
Major uses   
Agricultural Inputs (fertilizer, seed)  
Food  
Asset purchases  
Business investment  
School fees and associated costs  
Clothing  
Health (bills, funeral costs etc)  
Other  
  
 
 
 
FORM 7. HOUSEHOLD’S SELF ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY 
 
QNO Question Code 
Q1.1 
How do you compare your HH vulnerability relative to other HHs in this village? 
(1= less vulnerable, 2= average vulnerable 3= More vulnerable) 
 
Q1.2 What reason do you give for your classification?  
Q2.1 
How would you have classified this household five years ago?  
(1= Same, 2= less vulnerable today 3= More vulnerable today) 
 
Q2.2 What reason do you give?  
Q3 Do you have a disabled person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q4 Do you have a chronically ill person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q5 Do you have an orphan person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q6 Do you have an elderly person in this household? (1= Yes, 2= No)  
Q7 Number of HH members you consider vulnerable in this household   
 
 
Interviewer:  Date: 
Completed form checked by: Date: 
 
 
 
Annex 4. Qualitative assessment checklist of issues explored 
 
A. Community assessment issues 
 
(1) Social protection  
• types and reasons  
• For how long  
• Coverage 
• Criteria and process for beneficiary selection 
• preference ranking 
• uses – cash transfer and coupons 
• impacts - food sources 
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(2) Well-being assessment 
• Criteria for vulnerability and the groupings 
•  List all households 
• Categorise households vulnerability groups- current 
• Changes in household vulnerability past five years and factors 
 
(3) Agriculture 
• Major crops and livestock  
• input and output markets  
• input use 
• agricultural extension and other agricultural services 
• Future potentials and challenges.  
 
(4) Food situation 
• food sources,  
• food availability  
• number of meals,  
• type of food, quality and amount of food;  
• Coping when own food production run out,  
 
 
B. Issues for consultations (government, NGOs, donors, researchers) 
 
(a) Who is vulnerable in the rural and smallholder agricultural sector of Malawi and 
why? 
 
(b) In what ways and to what extent do different types of social protection seek to 
secure a reduction in vulnerability among different ‘vulnerable groups’? 
 
(c) In what ways and to what extent do different types of social protection seek to 
contribute to growth in agricultural output and incomes? 
 
(d) Since cash transfers, or cash equivalent transfers (vouchers), are increasingly 
popular as devices for delivering social protection, what effects do they have on 
agriculture? 
 
(e) To what extent do traditional agricultural services institutions such as extension, 
technology transfer, marketing support effective utilization of social protection to 
promote sustainable growth in agricultural output and incomes? 
 
(f) To what degree do social protection policies encroach on traditional agricultural 
policies? What are areas of complementarities, overlaps and conflicts between 
social protection and agricultural policies? In the event of overlaps and conflicts, 
what are the implications for the role of agricultural service institutions such as 
extension, marketing and input delivery institutions? 
 
(g) Where are men and women in all these and why? 
 
